Malê Rising

I like it since I'm myself a person of muslim upbringing with experience of exposure to Hindu epics. In fact, they often go hand-in-hand in where I live.

Yes, Indonesia (or at least Java, Sumatra and the Lesser Sundas) is very similar in that regard to Cambodia, Thailand or Malaya - all have major Indian influence in their classical civilizations.

Do you know offhand what the stricter members of the santri class thought of the Hindu epics during the colonial period? I assume the priyayi would have been fine with them, just like the Thai and Cambodian Muslims were.

Southeast Asia is definitely culturally linked with India, after all Ayuthaya is a corruption of Ayodhya. It would be interesting to see what the ramifications of the region being part of the British sphere. I would think that if India was made powerful, it would naturally flow into that stage of a "big brother", but you'll definitely see people resent that. I'd imagine that India in this TL will end up quite colonialist in mindset, like a British cadet in Asia.

India with an Australian attitude, then? That could potentially get tricky, especially since an India which includes Pakistan and Bangladesh - even one with a few holes in the map where some of the larger princely states managed to stay out - would be a larger and more powerful India than the one we know. It will also, at least in some regions, be more developed, which will add to the power imbalance vis-a-vis Southeast Asia (and also Central Asia, although the Central Asians may have the Ottoman Empire, Russia and/or China to lean on). Of course, this scenario depends on southeast Asia becoming British over the medium term, which may not happen or which may happen only in part.

One more update for year two, hopefully this weekend: Tahiti and Sudan, and yes, there's a connecting theme. After that, I'll do the second year wrap-up and move on.
 
So, when will we see LGBT Rights emerge?

That is a very good question; IOTL their was a beginning of acceptance in the 1920's which collapsed with the depression, and even in the 19th century it was more like the OTL 1950's attitude wise*.


*Their's a famous campaign poster created by the then Democrats warning that should their opponent be elected Blacks would have equal rights, women would have the vote, nudity would be abundant and gays (using the then term) would be allowed to exist openly.
 
So, when will we see LGBT Rights emerge?

That is a very good question; IOTL their was a beginning of acceptance in the 1920's which collapsed with the depression, and even in the 19th century it was more like the OTL 1950's attitude wise*.

In OTL, attitudes varied pretty widely depending on particular countries' legal and cultural traditions, and I don't see that being different in TTL.

There are several questions tied up in the issue of LGBT rights, starting with when - and indeed whether - the modern concept of sexual orientation comes into being. I expect that the idea of a gay and lesbian community would exist in the West, given that the precursors were already there in the 19th century. But outside the West, I'm not so sure - same-sex relations might continue to be thought of less as an identity than as something certain people just did, as with tolerated male prostitution in Persia or men in the Egyptian oases marrying other men when there weren't enough women around.

Another, related question is the extent to which sexual morality will become a fault line between tradition and modernity. In OTL, the Ottoman Empire was one of the first countries to decriminalize homosexual conduct, doing so in 1858 as part of the Tanzimat reforms. It was only later on that sexual morality became tied in with nationalism and religious authority. Similar things happened in a number of European countries, with some decriminalizing homosexuality during the 19th century, some making it a crime for the first time, and others going back and forth.

Unfortunately, I don't think that sexual behavior can stay entirely out of the traditional-modern conflict, because urbanization, universal education and other social changes will make rural conservatives afraid of losing control over their women and children. In some areas, there will probably be a traditionalist crackdown on non-conforming behaviors that were previously tolerated, including homosexuality.

On the other hand, the developing world is modernizing somewhat more on its own terms, meaning that another complicating factor - the equation of Western sexual morality with colonialism - might not be as severe. In OTL, one of the reasons why Africa and the Middle East are so hostile to LGBT rights is because many people there consider the concept a Western imposition. With more influence over the political and economic factors that are affecting their lives, the colonized peoples might not turn (or at least might not turn as much) to regulation of sexual behavior as a surrogate for matters outside their control.

In any event, I'd guess that at this point in TTL, there are notional LGBT communities in Western Europe and the United States and widespread tolerance of homosexual conduct on the down-low in areas where it's traditional, but as yet, little or no legal sanction. The idea of LGBT rights at this time involves not going to jail (or, in areas where decriminalization has already occurred, gaining social acceptance) rather than getting married. How this will be affected by the social changes of the twentieth century - and, possibly, by wartime loosening of norms - remains to be seen.
 
Yes, Indonesia (or at least Java, Sumatra and the Lesser Sundas) is very similar in that regard to Cambodia, Thailand or Malaya - all have major Indian influence in their classical civilizations.

Do you know offhand what the stricter members of the santri class thought of the Hindu epics during the colonial period? I assume the priyayi would have been fine with them, just like the Thai and Cambodian Muslims were.

Certainly that they didn't like it. But do note that it wasn't terribly uncommon among santris to indulge in wayang culture, at least in Javanese Java, and it remains that Salafism was and still is an imported culture instead of the establishment.
 
On the other hand, the developing world is modernizing somewhat more on its own terms, meaning that another complicating factor - the equation of Western sexual morality with colonialism - might not be as severe. In OTL, one of the reasons why Africa and the Middle East are so hostile to LGBT rights is because many people there consider the concept a Western imposition. With more influence over the political and economic factors that are affecting their lives, the colonized peoples might not turn (or at least might not turn as much) to regulation of sexual behavior as a surrogate for matters outside their control.
The association of LGBT rights with colonially-imposed is an especially odd one, because in quite a number of places, it was Western imposed laws that either started or increased discrimination toward homosexuals.

Also, having just about caught up with the TL now, I have to say that it is perhaps one of the best I've ever read. The way that you breath life into so many diverse people and settings makes for some very engaging reading. Bravo!
 
A truly excellent timeline Jonathan!

How are Austrian domestic politics at the moment? I'd presume that parliament hasn't been prorogued, unlike in the First World War, which may serve as an outlet for some discontent. Like in OTL, the army has most probably agitated for being granted sweeping powers, however, an effective Austrian parliament may be able to stave of the worst of this, as the Hungarian one was able to IOTL. The harsh army regime in Bohemia did much to alienate the Czechs from the Dynasty, as the Habsburg Army Laws were very draconian (the most draconain in Europe in 1914). Even ITTL, howver, it seems difficult to avoid the decleration of Bohemia as a war zone, as, unlike IOTL, it actually is one.

How far has the extension of the suffrage progressed thus far? Von Taaffe's extension I would presume has already occurred, but has something analogous to Badeni's? Also, without the French defeat in 1870, I'd imagine that Austria-Hungary is still meddling in Southern German affairs, as she did under von Beust until the French defeat. Without complete German Unification, the Pan-Germans mightn't be quite as quick to abandon the Dynasty, instead agitating for Germany's Unification under the Habsburg Aegis, although, as Austria had lost her most recent war with Prussia, they might conclude that she is a lost cause.Were the Habsburgs to seem close to subjugating Germany, it would presumably horrify all of the other nationalities.

What are Austria's war aims? Presumably she wants Silesia, Venetia, and perhaps Lombardy, but is there anything else? Does she want to form a South German Federation to mirror the North's, or even restore the German Confederation of old? Either of these options would most probably lead to difficulties with the Southern German states, so I would imagine such plans would be subject to the utmost secrecy.

Should Austria be victorious (I believe you said that she was going to be destroyed in this war, but in case I'm mistaken), it might be interesting to see her try to foster Venetian nationalism, as she did in Bosnia, admittedly rather unsuccessfully. Were a Venetian crownland to be created, I'd imagine that it would be represented as a continuation of the old Republic, under Austro-Hungarian protection from unitary Italy. The education system would most likely stress such events as Lepanto, and the Peace of Passarowitz, during which Venice made a perpetual alliance with the Habsburg Monarchy. Atleast one factor which would presumably make the fostering of Venetian nationalism easier than ''Bosnianism'' is that Venice has her own language, at the time rather widely spoken (indeed, there are 2.2 million native speakers today). Relations with Dalmatia would presumably be fraught, as any form of Venetian nationalism would push for its integration, and colonisation. Alternatively, were the army to run the occupation, rather than the civil service, they would attempt to eliminate all forms of nationalism, much as they did in Serbia.

And finally, how are the Habsburg officer corps faring in the industrial war? IOTL, an incredible quantity were slaughtered in the opening year, due to the Empire's split priorities. ITTL, I'd imagine that Germany would clearly be the primary enemy, ensuring less losses. Upon the other hand, the Empire seems to be involved in trench warfare in Bohemia, ensuring astronomical casualty rates amongst the officer corps. The degree of the slaughter would be crucial, as without the rabidly anti-national, dynastically loyal officer corps, a repeat of 1848, should rebellions arise, would be difficult. Even IOTL however, one of the returning armies from the Italian Front did attempt to repeat 1848, and this was despite the fact that most of the loyalist troops were captured by the Italians when they refused to abandon their posts, and were consequently interned en masse.
 
Certainly that they didn't like it. But do note that it wasn't terribly uncommon among santris to indulge in wayang culture, at least in Javanese Java, and it remains that Salafism was and still is an imported culture instead of the establishment.

Got it. Salafism is, and will remain, much more of a regional phenomenon in TTL, although there will be other anti-modernist reactions in various places.

The association of LGBT rights with colonially-imposed is an especially odd one, because in quite a number of places, it was Western imposed laws that either started or increased discrimination toward homosexuals.

True enough. I suspect that a good deal of the equation of LGBT rights with colonialism has to do with the fact that the church has been a big enough part of many African cultures for long enough to be considered indigenous. Also, some leaders in developing countries reflexively view the demands of Western human rights organizations as neo-colonialist, which isn't helped by the fact that a purported concern for human rights has sometimes actually been a stalking horse for colonialism (e.g., suppression of the slave trade as the moral excuse for the Scramble for Africa).

How are Austrian domestic politics at the moment? I'd presume that parliament hasn't been prorogued, unlike in the First World War, which may serve as an outlet for some discontent. Like in OTL, the army has most probably agitated for being granted sweeping powers, however, an effective Austrian parliament may be able to stave of the worst of this, as the Hungarian one was able to IOTL. The harsh army regime in Bohemia did much to alienate the Czechs from the Dynasty, as the Habsburg Army Laws were very draconian (the most draconain in Europe in 1914). Even ITTL, howver, it seems difficult to avoid the decleration of Bohemia as a war zone, as, unlike IOTL, it actually is one.

Bohemia is definitely considered a war zone - even before the North German offensive across the Erzgebirge, Bohemia was a vital route to the Silesian front, and was also a border province of uncertain loyalty. The Austrians also instituted conscription during the second year of the war, which isn't popular among the minorities, and there's a nasty cycle developing in which draft resistance leads to repression which in turn leads to more draft resistance.

The parliament is still in session, and has done something to control the army's excesses, but the deputies are also very wary of saying or doing anything that could be construed as disloyalty in wartime, especially since a few of the Galician members have been arrested for sedition.

How far has the extension of the suffrage progressed thus far? Von Taaffe's extension I would presume has already occurred, but has something analogous to Badeni's?

Not as yet, but the property qualifications for the various voting classes have been reduced; at this point, most adult males can vote, but the working classes are still underrepresented because nearly all of them are fourth-class electors.

Also, without the French defeat in 1870, I'd imagine that Austria-Hungary is still meddling in Southern German affairs, as she did under von Beust until the French defeat. Without complete German Unification, the Pan-Germans mightn't be quite as quick to abandon the Dynasty, instead agitating for Germany's Unification under the Habsburg Aegis, although, as Austria had lost her most recent war with Prussia, they might conclude that she is a lost cause.Were the Habsburgs to seem close to subjugating Germany, it would presumably horrify all of the other nationalities.

Since the Austrian defeat in 1866, the pan-Germanists have looked to the Hohenzollerns rather than the Habsburgs, and pan-Germanism in the southern German states has become increasingly populist. Austria has indeed tried to meddle in southern German affairs, but the southern German rulers have been more inclined to follow France, which is both a more powerful military patron and a wealthier trading partner. One of Austria's war aims is actually to prove itself France's equal or better, and to regain its lost influence in southern (and possibly even northern) Germany.

A restoration of the German Confederation would be Austria's ideal outcome, although the politicians in Vienna realize that they'd have to make concessions to the local rulers in order for such an arrangement to work, and that it would be unwieldy to restore all the principalities that were mediatized by Prussia in 1866. They probably wouldn't take too much from Prussia and would leave it a large and rich state, although they'd make sure it was subordinate.

Silesia, Venetia and Lombardy are definitely on its list.

Should Austria be victorious (I believe you said that she was going to be destroyed in this war, but in case I'm mistaken), it might be interesting to see her try to foster Venetian nationalism, as she did in Bosnia, admittedly rather unsuccessfully.

It wouldn't necessarily take an Austrian invasion to cause trouble in this regard - they might do this even during a temporary occupation, or try to stir things up toward the end of the war when everyone is inciting each other's minorities. I doubt it would be very successful given the popularity of the Risorgimento and of Italian nationalism, even with the Venetian language as a sweetener, but once the seed is planted, even a small separatist movement could cause trouble.

As you say, the army and the politicians might fight over how to treat the Venetians if Austria ever ends up in charge of them. Once it becomes policy to stir up minorities, though, all bets are off.

And finally, how are the Habsburg officer corps faring in the industrial war? IOTL, an incredible quantity were slaughtered in the opening year, due to the Empire's split priorities. ITTL, I'd imagine that Germany would clearly be the primary enemy, ensuring less losses. Upon the other hand, the Empire seems to be involved in trench warfare in Bohemia, ensuring astronomical casualty rates amongst the officer corps.

They were involved in trench warfare from the beginning of the war - they held part of Silesia before being pushed out during the German offensive, and are also involved in the fighting north of Bavaria and on the alpine front against Italy. The Italian front has mostly been quiet, but there have been periodic offensives by either side, and alpine warfare is costly both in terms of battle casualties and deaths from exposure and disease. The officer corps has not fared well.

Out of curiosity, though, why do you say that an 1848-type rebellion would be less likely if the dynastically-loyal officer corps is decimated? I'd think that the opposite would be true, and that soldiers less loyal to the dynasty would be more likely to launch a liberal rebellion against the monarchy.
 
Strangers in strange lands, March 1895

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By now, Nazir Ali Hydari’s walk from the barracks to his throne on the waterfront had become a ritual. He would leave at sunrise with an honor guard of two soldiers, and as they marched through the streets of Papeete, those he passed would fall into line. At the harbor, the day’s petitioners would be waiting, as would his Tahitian clerks, who would chorus “Ia orana” as he took his seat under the tree.

Then it would be time for the day’s business – the business of Tahiti’s conqueror, the governor of British Polynesia by appointment of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.

Nazir Ali wasn’t sure the Queen herself knew he was here, or that she would approve if she did; there were certainly enough others who didn’t. It was something even he would never have conceived of two years ago. But Tahiti had been a problem, and he’d solved it.

The Society Islands were a backwater, but they were one where French commerce raiders could hide, and one the British army couldn’t spare the men to take. Nazir Ali had been in Singapore, arranging a contract for his industrialist family, when he’d heard of it, and he’d offered to do the job himself. From almost anyone else, that would have been a joke, but he was among the richest men in India: rich enough to buy three obsolete warships and a transport from the Portuguese at Goa, rich enough to raise two regiments from his own pocket, and rich enough to bribe the Governor of Singapore to give him both a commodore’s commission and the governorship.

As it turned out, he’d hardly needed the warships; there had only been a couple of cutters present when his mini-fleet descended on Tahiti, and his regiments had overwhelmed the French garrison at the cost of only two men. By the time the French raiders returned, he was in control of all the nearer islands, and with the shore batteries held against them, they’d turned tail and fled.

He’d commanded the batteries from the throne on the harbor, and from then on, it had been his judgment-seat.

“You’re not a humble man,” his father had told him years ago, when he’d first gone out to do business for his family. “But you need to appear as one.” He’d taken the lesson to heart, and he’d found it as useful to a warlord as to a businessman. Not for Nazir Ali the French governor’s mansion; instead, the chair from which he’d defended the city would do. He would rule with Abacarist austerity, although unlike the Malê teacher, he had no great love of popular government and no objection whatever to being a king.

It had impressed his men – Malays and Indian Ahmadis, most of them, with a leavening of Javanese and Hadhramis exiled from the Dutch East Indies. And it had impressed the Tahitians as well. When he’d come, Tahiti had been a country very uncertain of itself: its last king had drunk himself to death after the French deposed him, the missionaries had banned many of the old ways, and there hadn’t yet been time to rebuild their culture around Catholicism. With no king to come to for judgment, they’d got used to going to the Frenchmen and the missionaries, and with the French governor sent packing – and with the missionaries who wouldn’t swear allegiance to the Queen gone with him – they came to him, in his seat under the tree.

Some of them had been waiting since well before dawn, and they approached one at a time: to offer gifts, to ask favors, to seek reconciliation with their neighbors. The morning would be spent resolving disputes over livestock or fishing boats, or mediating the gifts that families would have to give to the fathers of the women their sons had slept with or the victims from whom they had stolen. The gifts would be exchanged later, at a kava ceremony, but the amount would be agreed beforehand, in front of Nazir Ali’s throne.

“Ia orana, Nazir Ali,” the next petitioner said as she approached; he refused to be called anything else. She was a woman in her seventies, one who still remembered the days before Queen Pomare and the French, and she was a ta'ata rapa'au, an herbalist. “I bring you a gift, a fine mat of my making, and I ask a gift in return.”

The fine mat was very fine indeed, one that could adorn his living-chamber at the barracks. “Name your request, and I will give judgment.”

“The French doctors and the missionaries taught medicine to our healers. They are gone now, most of them. Are there any doctors among you, who can continue the lessons?”

“There are,” said Nazir Ali. “I brought doctors to care for my regiments, and they will go to your healers and continue their teaching.”

“Maururu,” the petitioner said, and backed away. As she did, Nazir Ali wondered if he should tell her the rest of the story about his doctors, and about one of them in particular. She was a woman, and the women among the patients and healers would welcome her; she was also a jaji, trained in Java to teach children their letters and numbers and to instruct village women in Islam. He would force nothing on the Tahitians, but she would be as much a missionary in her way as the Frenchmen had been in theirs.

But the petitioner had gone by then, and she would find out soon enough.

*******

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Nine months ago, the air that András Weisz breathed was heady with victory. The Ottomans had been beaten on the Vardar, and he was an officer at the forefront of an advancing army. The men in the officers’ mess were trading boasts about what they would do to the Turkish forces, and some were laying bets on when Stamboul would be taken.

But the generals had gone too far too fast – or maybe it had been a trick of Sarkis Pasha’s all along. The Turks had come down from the north to cut them off, and they’d been pinned against the Struma, faced by three times their number. They’d fought – oh, yes, no one could ever say that the Honvéd went down easily – but in the end, they’d surrendered. In the space of a day, the taste of victory turned to galling defeat, and András and his men were not soldiers but prisoners.

He remembered the day when one of the men – Szabó, it must have been – asked the Ottoman guards where they would be sent. “To the ends of the earth” was the answer: someplace far from the front and far from any help, where they could make no more trouble for the Sultan.

They’d been separated shortly after that, the regiments broken up and sent to different camps, and András never found out where most of the men had gone. For him, the ends of the earth proved to be someplace deep in Upper Egypt. It took two months to march there, and a third of the men had died on the way. The Turks hadn’t been cruel – they’d given the prisoners food and water, and they’d taken the march in easy stages – but for wounded and exhausted men, even that had been too much.

And so he’d reached his place of exile: he and two thousand other Hungarians, joining the Austrians and Russians who were already there. For a while, the prisoners had been hopeful. The French would be there soon: Libya had fallen, there was fighting in Egypt itself, and soon General Picquart would be marching up the Nile. But months passed and the Frenchmen never came, and the new prisoners said that the battle was in Libya again.

Many of them had lost hope after that. András had despaired too, for a while. Then he’d noticed that the Egyptian guards were working three shifts instead of four, and one day there were only two. They might have pushed the French back into Libya, but they’d stripped their garrisons clean to do it.

So he’d gathered with his men in secret, and when the time was right, they’d ambushed one of the patrols. With the weapons they seized, they’d broken into the armory. Fifty men had died getting in, and another hundred in the assault on the tower, but when the sun set on the Nile, the prison was theirs.

Which left the not inconsiderable question of where to go.

They couldn’t stay, of course. The garrison commander reported to someone, and when that someone didn’t get the next report, he would investigate. The prisoners had barely a hundred guns between them, and even a single Turkish company with a machine gun could lay them low. The force sent to retake the prison would certainly be more than that.

No, they would have to go: they’d have to be far gone by the time their absence was discovered.

North was the obvious direction. Home was to the north; so was the French army. Like Xenophon’s ten thousand, the prisoners could march to the sea. But the north would also be teeming with Egyptian and Turkish troops, more than they could ever face. They’d never live to look on the sea or to shake hands with a Frenchman.

West was a trackless desert, one that would be suicide to cross. To the east lay another sea, but it was on the other side of a desert, and there were no friends on its shores.

South, then. South, to where the river branched and the mountains rose, to a place where they could lose themselves among peasants who cared little for their overlords. If they could make it to Ethiopia, they would be among friends, and after that… surely they’d think of something.

That was decided – it had taken a day and a night of shouting and more than one fistfight, but it was decided. And the problem of where to go was replaced by the problem of how to get there.

Marching was easy enough – just put one foot in front of another. But they needed to avoid patrols, and they needed food and water. They could steal the food, but that would raise the countryside against them, and ill-armed as they were, they wouldn’t last long against enraged peasants. They had to work for their keep or pay for it – but with what?

Answering that question was, inevitably, András’ job; he was an alezredes, a lieutenant-colonel, the highest-ranking of the prisoners. He’d sent scouts out to make sure the road was safe. He’d negotiated passage with village headmen in his broken Arabic. He’d traded away everything they’d been able to take from the prison camp, right down to their uniforms, and when those ran out, he’d bluffed or sent out working parties. Most of all, he’d made the prisoners act like an army which followed orders rather than a mob that robbed as it pleased. And those who didn’t want to take orders from a Jew… well, he’d only had to shoot three.

“There’s another village up ahead.” It was Százados László Tóth, returning from a scouting patrol. The man had been a sergeant before the Turks captured him, but András had made him a captain; he’d been in a jäger battalion, and his Arabic was the best of any of the prisoners.

“I’d figured that out, László,” András answered, waving an arm at the fields that surrounded them. There were peasants in the fields, looking at the prisoners apprehensively; András idly noticed that they were wearing hats rather than the turbans that were common fare in this region. “Is it safe to go through?”

“They’ve gone to get the headman. He’s coming to meet us.”

“We’ll stay where we are for now, then.” András raised a hand to signal a halt, and the weary prisoners sank down onto the track. A few minutes later, the headman and two others came into view from the south.

András stepped forward to greet him, and offered one of the buttons he’d saved from his uniform: it was one of the few gifts he had left to give. “Tell him we mean no harm, but that we’d like food.” As László began translating, he added, “And ask him what this place is called.”

László finished the question and the headman responded in rapid-fire Arabic. “He says this village is…”

But for once András didn’t need a translation, because he’d heard the name the same time the captain did.

“Magyariyya.”
 
András stepped forward to greet him, and offered one of the buttons he’d saved from his uniform: it was one of the few gifts he had left to give. “Tell him we mean no harm, but that we’d like food.” As László began translating, he added, “And ask him what this place is called.”

László finished the question and the headman responded in rapid-fire Arabic. “He says this village is…”

But for once András didn’t need a translation, because he’d heard the name the same time the captain did.

“Magyariyya.”

Haha, ever since I was informed of their existence via LTTW, I was wondering when and if the Magyarab would show.
 
Wow... Muslim Tahitians and the most interesting coincidence in the history of displaced minorities. Fascinating update, Jonathan!
 
Actual Hungarians meeting the Magyarab? Awesome!

Haha, ever since I was informed of their existence via LTTW, I was wondering when and if the Magyarab would show.

They're too perfect to leave out, aren't they? BTW, thanks to Thande for making me aware that they existed, and to Admiral Matt for suggesting the scenario that led to the encounter.

We'll see András Weisz and his men again during the third and fourth years of the war, so you'll find out the result of this meeting. All I'll say now is that they'll never get to Ethiopia but they won't stay long in the Magyarab country either, and that András is as much a schemer at heart as Nazir Ali - he just doesn't know it yet.

And in case anyone's wondering about a Jewish lieutenant-colonel in the Honvéd, the Austro-Hungarian military in both OTL and TTL was more hospitable to Jews than any other army in Europe, and had many Jewish officers. By the 1890s, Jewish representation in the officer corps was on the decline due to rising anti-semitism, but there were still a large number, particularly on the Hungarian side. And during wartime there would be field promotions - András started the war as a captain.

Wow... Muslim Tahitians and the most interesting coincidence in the history of displaced minorities. Fascinating update, Jonathan!

Thanks! The Tahitians will get TTL's Javanese mix of Islamic modernism, overlaid with Polynesian folk tradition and a bit of Ahmadi messianism - the result will resemble, from a distance, the Maori interpretations of Christianity. There will also be political overtones to the competition between Islam and Christianity, both in Tahiti and elsewhere in Polynesia and Melanesia, and there will be no shortage of syncretic folk-religions and cargo cults that are based on either or both.

EDIT: I should add that Nazir Ali's conquest of Tahiti has met with very mixed reviews in the UK. The swashbuckling nature of his exploit has played well in the papers, byt many politicians are asking "who the hell god the idea of putting an Indian in charge of a British territory, not to mention letting him take it over with an army of Javanese troublemakers?" The blowback will cost the Governor of Singapore his career, although given the size of the bribe Nazir Ali paid and the job he has waiting at the family's Bombay headquarters, he won't particularly care. And wartime pragmatism will prevent anyone from trying to actually do something about Nazir Ali - he's loyal enough and he got rid of the French, so the easiest thing to do is leave him where he is.
 
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We'll see András Weisz and his men again during the third and fourth years of the war, so you'll find out the result of this meeting. All I'll say now is that they'll never get to Ethiopia but they won't stay long in the Magyarab country either, and that András is as much a schemer at heart as Nazir Ali - he just doesn't know it yet.

Ahh no, I was hoping they would run into Beta Yisrael...
 
Ahh no, I was hoping they would run into Beta Yisrael...

Oh, they'll run into people, don't worry about that, and the Beta Israel might hear of them before all's said and done, just not directly.

Anyway, the next post will be the second-year wrapup, which will probably take a few days to put together given the current deadline convergence at work. I'm planning to touch on the following topics in varying levels of detail:
  • The overall progress of the war;
  • The war in Africa;
  • The war at sea;
  • Technological innovations, particularly trucks, and their uses;
  • The British Empire at war: Ireland, India and Australia/NZ;
  • The Russian, Ottoman and possibly French home fronts; and
  • The neutrals (or some of them) and their empires.
Does anyone have anything else they want to see or that they're curious about? As you may remember with the Bosnia story, I do sometimes take requests.
 
  • The war at sea;
  • Technological innovations, particularly trucks, and their uses;...
  • The neutrals (or some of them) and their empires.
Does anyone have anything else they want to see or that they're curious about? As you may remember with the Bosnia story, I do sometimes take requests.

Looking forward especially to those three items on your list.

I presume the USA is one of the neutrals discussed.

Any chance that, if not for this summary, then sometime in the third year cycle, we'll hear some of the debate of the American pro-imperialist/pro-war types versus anti-imperialist/anti-war types?

I shouldn't bracket being pro-one thing with pro-the other; some imperialists might be thinking of taking advantage of neutrality to pull a fast one--hard to imagine where though--while other people might be staunchly anti-imperialist yet favor taking one side or the other in the war. I'd think that pro-FAR would be a minority voice among the hawks, but the US is in quite an interesting position, isn't it?

After all, ITTL so far, the American imperialists have had no opportunity to grab easy pickings overseas yet; they are all either supporters of privateering filibusters or it's all on paper as of now.

Spain is on mighty thin ice with the BOGs, what with its volunteer Papal Legions, and more importantly the way it serves, as long as they remain neutral, as a pipeline for France (and via France, Austria) to get trade goods and war materiel. The BOGs, strained as they are at the moment, hardly want even one more straw on their camel's back and so Spanish forces, token as they might prove to be, are something worth keeping out of the FAR ranks--for the moment. (Which is why the Papal Legions are so provoking; they can't amount to any vast numbers or weight of arms, but even a little bit more is bad for Germany. They tend to erode the disincentives the British have to seeing Spain declare war and be done with it). If Spain is foolish enough to enter the war, her colonies are forfeit; given the way the BOGs are overstrained at the moment it might take them a while to get around to investing them though. Which might be where the Yanks come in--except I don't think the British will be keen to have the Yankees helping themselves to new colonies unless they can also get an American commitment to helping out on the German front, which Americans would be quite reluctant to do.

But if the Spanish have the wit to stay out of the war, and meekly submit to the British tightening the restrictions on what cargos can sail to Spanish ports (so as to put the squeeze on France) then Yankee adventurism at Spanish expense might actually look more like an act of war against the BOG alliance; I trust Americans would be suitably deterred by that consideration.

Also I've never wrapped my head around how the South American front looks from a US point of view. South America, I think, was OTL and so even more ITTL rather distant from US interest. In theory the Monroe Doctrine was supposed to cover the whole Western Hemisphere but in practice we only tended to invoke it regarding North American (including of course Central America) matters.

Here of course there are American entrepreneurs involved in the Amazon brouhaha, who will be writing their Congressmen--more likely, their agents in New York and Washington will be wining and dining the Senators they more or less own, or their bigger financial associates do. I don't have a clear enough picture of the way things have shaped up there to get a notion whether American rubber interests will tend to favor BOG or FAR there, or if on the whole what they really want is for both the big alliances to go away and leave the place in what looks to newspapers in the northern hemisphere like peace.

Also you mentioned the possibility of American shipping interests, even Carolinan ones, going for the profits of blockade running, or anyway trade with both sides and African neutrals like Liberia.

Mainly I'm angling to hear the voice of alt-TR, and most of all the acerbic Mark Twain, who I suppose would be against all war and all conquests. I quite realize that trying to replicate the tones of the Sage of Hannibal might be quite a literary challenge and so if you do feel up to it I wouldn't expect to see it for quite some time.

And of course some Carolinan reactions, in their own voice. I'd think the living memory of the Civil War would be strong enough to make pacifists out of most of them; going through war's terrors and even inflicting some is one thing in the cause of God and justice, but I don't think the inter-imperial squabbling of the Great War will look like that to many African-Americans; the status of Africans under French and British rule might have been more of an issue, except both sides look like a wash, with pros and cons for each. Heck even the Russians are looking good at the moment from a generically pro-African, even pro-Muslim, point of view. Different individuals might have ties and interests that draw them to one side or the other but on the whole I'd think keeping North America out of it would be the prevailing sentiment in Carolina. Even among the partisans; they can agree to disagree and the Old World peoples fight it out.

Again I haven't thought through what the Amazonian mess looks like to the Carolinans more than any other Americans. Perhaps a bit different for African-Americans than others but again I don't see either side looking like it's the pro-African side particularly there any more than anywhere else, so it's a wash.
 
An excellent update, and thank you for the replies. In regards to rebellions, I fear my phrasing wasn't clear. I meant that an 1848-style repression of the rebellions would be less likely, rather than the occurrence of rebellions themselves. I do believe that, should large portions of the loyalist army avoid internment, unlike OTL, then Habsburg deposition shall be a more difficult affair, especially as Franz Joseph is still upon the throne. So, depending upon the circumstances which end the war, the Habsburg Monarchy mightn't pass out of history quite as peacefully as she did IOTL.
 
Does anyone have anything else they want to see or that they're curious about? As you may remember with the Bosnia story, I do sometimes take requests.

Hmm....how about something untouched so far.....Canada. :) The Conscription Crisis was quite important, and I do wonder if anything similar will pop up here.
 
I am grateful, Johnatan, for this update, especially because it made me aware of the incredibly awesome Magyarab. I would be happy to know more about these guys, both IOTL and ITTL.
Interestingly, i found a report pointing to a spin-off group emerged out of them, in... Congo. Sadly, according to a blogger (could not find the link now, sorry) it seems to be a hoax.
 
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