Certainly that they didn't like it. But do note that it wasn't terribly uncommon among santris to indulge in wayang culture, at least in Javanese Java, and it remains that Salafism was and still is an imported culture instead of the establishment.
Got it. Salafism is, and will remain, much more of a regional phenomenon in TTL, although there will be other anti-modernist reactions in various places.
The association of LGBT rights with colonially-imposed is an especially odd one, because in quite a number of places, it was Western imposed laws that either started or increased discrimination toward homosexuals.
True enough. I suspect that a good deal of the equation of LGBT rights with colonialism has to do with the fact that the church has been a big enough part of many African cultures for long enough to be considered indigenous. Also, some leaders in developing countries reflexively view the demands of Western human rights organizations as neo-colonialist, which isn't helped by the fact that a purported concern for human rights has sometimes actually been a stalking horse for colonialism (e.g., suppression of the slave trade as the moral excuse for the Scramble for Africa).
How are Austrian domestic politics at the moment? I'd presume that parliament hasn't been prorogued, unlike in the First World War, which may serve as an outlet for some discontent. Like in OTL, the army has most probably agitated for being granted sweeping powers, however, an effective Austrian parliament may be able to stave of the worst of this, as the Hungarian one was able to IOTL. The harsh army regime in Bohemia did much to alienate the Czechs from the Dynasty, as the Habsburg Army Laws were very draconian (the most draconain in Europe in 1914). Even ITTL, howver, it seems difficult to avoid the decleration of Bohemia as a war zone, as, unlike IOTL, it actually is one.
Bohemia is definitely considered a war zone - even before the North German offensive across the Erzgebirge, Bohemia was a vital route to the Silesian front, and was also a border province of uncertain loyalty. The Austrians also instituted conscription during the second year of the war, which isn't popular among the minorities, and there's a nasty cycle developing in which draft resistance leads to repression which in turn leads to more draft resistance.
The parliament is still in session, and has done something to control the army's excesses, but the deputies are also very wary of saying or doing anything that could be construed as disloyalty in wartime, especially since a few of the Galician members have been arrested for sedition.
How far has the extension of the suffrage progressed thus far? Von Taaffe's extension I would presume has already occurred, but has something analogous to Badeni's?
Not as yet, but the property qualifications for the various voting classes have been reduced; at this point, most adult males can vote, but the working classes are still underrepresented because nearly all of them are fourth-class electors.
Also, without the French defeat in 1870, I'd imagine that Austria-Hungary is still meddling in Southern German affairs, as she did under von Beust until the French defeat. Without complete German Unification, the Pan-Germans mightn't be quite as quick to abandon the Dynasty, instead agitating for Germany's Unification under the Habsburg Aegis, although, as Austria had lost her most recent war with Prussia, they might conclude that she is a lost cause.Were the Habsburgs to seem close to subjugating Germany, it would presumably horrify all of the other nationalities.
Since the Austrian defeat in 1866, the pan-Germanists have looked to the Hohenzollerns rather than the Habsburgs, and pan-Germanism in the southern German states has become increasingly populist. Austria has indeed tried to meddle in southern German affairs, but the southern German rulers have been more inclined to follow France, which is both a more powerful military patron and a wealthier trading partner. One of Austria's war aims is actually to prove itself France's equal or better, and to regain its lost influence in southern (and possibly even northern) Germany.
A restoration of the German Confederation would be Austria's ideal outcome, although the politicians in Vienna realize that they'd have to make concessions to the local rulers in order for such an arrangement to work, and that it would be unwieldy to restore
all the principalities that were mediatized by Prussia in 1866. They probably wouldn't take too much from Prussia and would leave it a large and rich state, although they'd make sure it was subordinate.
Silesia, Venetia and Lombardy are definitely on its list.
Should Austria be victorious (I believe you said that she was going to be destroyed in this war, but in case I'm mistaken), it might be interesting to see her try to foster Venetian nationalism, as she did in Bosnia, admittedly rather unsuccessfully.
It wouldn't necessarily take an Austrian invasion to cause trouble in this regard - they might do this even during a temporary occupation, or try to stir things up toward the end of the war when everyone is inciting each other's minorities. I doubt it would be very successful given the popularity of the Risorgimento and of Italian nationalism, even with the Venetian language as a sweetener, but once the seed is planted, even a small separatist movement could cause trouble.
As you say, the army and the politicians might fight over how to treat the Venetians if Austria ever ends up in charge of them. Once it becomes policy to stir up minorities, though, all bets are off.
And finally, how are the Habsburg officer corps faring in the industrial war? IOTL, an incredible quantity were slaughtered in the opening year, due to the Empire's split priorities. ITTL, I'd imagine that Germany would clearly be the primary enemy, ensuring less losses. Upon the other hand, the Empire seems to be involved in trench warfare in Bohemia, ensuring astronomical casualty rates amongst the officer corps.
They were involved in trench warfare from the beginning of the war - they held part of Silesia before being pushed out during the German offensive, and are also involved in the fighting north of Bavaria and on the alpine front against Italy. The Italian front has mostly been quiet, but there have been periodic offensives by either side, and alpine warfare is costly both in terms of battle casualties and deaths from exposure and disease. The officer corps has not fared well.
Out of curiosity, though, why do you say that an 1848-type rebellion would be
less likely if the dynastically-loyal officer corps is decimated? I'd think that the opposite would be true, and that soldiers less loyal to the dynasty would be more likely to launch a liberal rebellion against the monarchy.