Malê Rising

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Any chance that, if not for this summary, then sometime in the third year cycle, we'll hear some of the debate of the American pro-imperialist/pro-war types versus anti-imperialist/anti-war types?

We'll certainly hear from them during the third year, especially once the run-up to the 1896 presidential election begins.

Right now, as you correctly guessed, there are two factors that will be key to determining whether the United States enters the war: the Amazon and Spain. In the Amazon, both the BOGs and the FARs have thus far been very careful to avoid interfering with American rubber interests. The trouble, at least from the American point of view, is that the BOGs have now made an alliance of desperation with the quilombos which involves land reform and progressive labor legislation. The British and German rubber companies - and to some extent the Dutch ones as well - will swallow that for now in order not to appear unpatriotic, but the American companies have no reason to do so. Also, the Army of Angelim has never had any qualms about attacking rubber plantations, and although their new Anglo-German allies are currently restraining them, it would be very easy to provoke an incident. There's a lot of dry tinder in the Amazon right now, and if it falls on the right ears in the American newspaper-political complex, it could ignite.

Spain has, as you say, been pushing the envelope about as far as possible. So has Ethiopia, with its volunteers in the Russian army. Right now the BOGs have bigger problems, so they're willing to let both countries be, but if the Spaniards ore Ethiopians try their patience even a little more, that might change. In that event, Cuba and Puerto Rico would be very tempting prizes for American imperialists (not to mention that the BOGs would also have something to offer Japan in exchange for cutting off Russian access to Korea). Of course, American entry into the war against Spain would also leave the American-owned Amazon rubber plantations as fair game for the Franco-Brazilians, so there would be a down-side risk as well.

You're correct that the South Carolinians would mostly want to stay out of the war, both because they see no good purpose in it and because they can make more money as neutral merchants. The wild card is Sierra Leone. As I've mentioned, many of the Gullah families have made business connections there, and some have even married into Krio families and become naturalized British subjects. Sierra Leone is now under siege, and the South Carolinians will want to do something to help, although that would probably stop short of outright support for war - there will be a few volunteers fighting for the British (maybe even with Usman's irregulars) but most will favor lend-lease aid.

We'll hear from a couple of the South Carolinians personally during year three, as well as some other American political figures, both pro-war and anti.

In regards to rebellions, I fear my phrasing wasn't clear. I meant that an 1848-style repression of the rebellions would be less likely, rather than the occurrence of rebellions themselves. I do believe that, should large portions of the loyalist army avoid internment, unlike OTL, then Habsburg deposition shall be a more difficult affair, especially as Franz Joseph is still upon the throne. So, depending upon the circumstances which end the war, the Habsburg Monarchy mightn't pass out of history quite as peacefully as she did IOTL.

OK, now I understand. This war will, if anything, be more destructive to the Austrian officer corps than OTL, given that the empire is fighting on three fronts (North Germany, the Ottoman Empire and Italy), so the will to suppress an 1848-style uprising might not be there. On the other hand, you're certainly correct that an autocrat like Franz Joseph won't go gently into the good night. If the war turns against Austria-Hungary, things could get ugly.

Hmm....how about something untouched so far.....Canada. The Conscription Crisis was quite important, and I do wonder if anything similar will pop up here.

I assume the Quebecois won't be any more eager to die for the British Empire in TTL than in OTL - if anything, they'd be less so, since one of the opponents is France. And conscription would at least be under discussion by now, given the empire's manpower shortage. I may include something about this in the "empire at war" section.

Also, do you know where the primary African-Canadian communities were located at this time, and what relationship (if any) they'd be likely to have with other Africans in TTL?

I am grateful, Johnatan, for this update, especially because it made me aware of the incredibly awesome Magyarab. I would be happy to know more about these guys, both IOTL and ITTL.

Interestingly, i found a report pointing to a spin-off group emerged out of them, in... Congo. Sadly, according to a blogger (could not find the link now, sorry) it seems to be a hoax.

In TTL, reports of spinoff groups, or groups influenced by them, may prove to be more accurate. They'll visit a few places before all's said and done.

Also, do you have any opinion on Samoht's suggestion about Venetian nationalism - i.e., that a wartime Austrian occupation government, or Austrian agents who are attempting to destablilize Italy, might encourage separatism there? Would a fringe separatist movement be likely after the war, assuming that Italy survives as a united state?

 

[azander12]

Also, do you know where the primary African-Canadian communities were located at this time, and what relationship (if any) they'd be likely to have with other Africans in TTL?

Africville on the outskirts of Halifax is one of the more famous Afro-Canadian communities. With Halifax as the main port connecting Canada to the Atlantic and thus the Empire, there would probably be at least some exchange between South Carolinian freedmen, the Malê and the local Africans. That might be interesting to look at.

 

[Badshah]

Africville on the outskirts of Halifax is one of the more famous Afro-Canadian communities. With Halifax as the main port connecting Canada to the Atlantic and thus the Empire, there would probably be at least some exchange between South Carolinian freedmen, the Malê and the local Africans. That might be interesting to look at.

Also, Windsor had an historically large Afro-Canadian community, with it's origins in the Underground Railroad IIRC.

 

[flyguy117]

Also, Windsor had an historically large Afro-Canadian community, with it's origins in the Underground Railroad IIRC.

Saint Catherines as well.

 

[Falecius]

Also, do you have any opinion on Samoht's suggestion about Venetian nationalism - i.e., that a wartime Austrian occupation government, or Austrian agents who are attempting to destablilize Italy, might encourage separatism there? Would a fringe separatist movement be likely after the war, assuming that Italy survives as a united state?

Well, I recently wrote about Italian nationalism in Veneto in Risorgimento era, and I did some study, though by no means exhaustive, about similar topic.
In my understanding, in our timeline Venetian republicanism and memory of past glories as the Serenissima was largely framed within some form or another of Italian nationalism. Cultivated elites, while clearly proud of a specifically Venetian past, conceived it largely as a bridge towards an Italian future.
These trends did not necessarily merge well with OTL's Savoyard monarchy (there was a very strong Republican streak) but were markedly in favor of some form of Italian unification. Many would have preferred a more federal outlook, but support for Italy was overwhelming, and distrust for Austria even more so.
I never found any instance of Venetian separatist or nationalist groups or ideals after 1848 until after the Second World War. Any such thing, if it ever existed IOTL, would have been marginal. And I'd bet that if Venetian nationalists ever existed IOTL, they likely would have chosen Italy over Austria as a lesser evil.
Make no mistake, Venice and Veneto at large had a strong sense of regional distinct identity even at this time, but this was markedly cultural, and linguistic to some extent (Venetian language never ceased to be used for literary purposes). Not political, not in noticeable quantity as far as know. Political Venetian separatism/regionalism/nationalism as a significant force emerges much later, mostly after the sixties as far as I can tell. Nostalgia (sometimes mixed with irony) for the Austrian rule is even more recent and less widespread. Very few people from Veneto remember Austrian rule with real fondness, at least among the ones I met, though many compare it favorably with subsequent Italian administration. It's more criticism of Italy than endorsement for Austria in my experience.
By the way, at the time and even today, there was a strong rivalry between Venice the city and the mainland, and a lot of municipal bickering between the main mainland cities: Vicenza, Padua and Verona hardly ever got along, unless it was against Venice. Not to mention Udine and Friuli.
The countryside was mainly poverty-stricken, industry was scarce, sometimes people literally starved. Padua and Venice had their history, their municipal glory, universities and palaces and all the nice stuff, but the area was declining steadily under the last century of the Serenissima, continued to decline under Austrian rule, despite some well-meaning efforts, and showed no clear sign of general improvement afterwards. Industrial boom, money, jobs, pride and self-sufficiency came in the seventies, much later. Serious separatism emerged strongly in the eighties and is currently losing support (though it is still a serious force).
So, in IOTL, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a lot of cultural awareness, no political separatism to speak of, and especially nothing that could be of use for the Austrians.

ITTL, however, Risorgimento is subtly but noticeably different from the beginning. Garibaldi's different career might affect how the Republic of Venice ended in 1849, and from this, a Venetian nationalist minority might remain visible. Problem is, this is likely to begin as a moderately left-wing republicanism, feeding from Giuseppe Mazzini and Carlo Cattaneo. Forty-five years of political change and butterflies might to interesting things to minor ideologies though, and I can definitely see a small group of Conservative, Catholic Venetian nationalists willing to cooperate with the Austrians. I still doubt they can or will win the hearts and minds of most people in Veneto, but they can be a not negligeable force.
As a working suggestion, I'd see them mostly based in Verona, as a mainland splinter group of the Venice-based leftist original group. Verona is arguably the most consistently right-wing city in Italy, though this wasn't already established at the time. Verona has a very long history as the gateway of German (read Austrian/Imperial) influence in Italy,and it has a staunchly Conservative/Catholic countryside to this day. More, Verona has a quite a history of rivalry with Venice, and its lords (marquesses IIRC) had almost unified all Veneto on the Emperor's behalf before the Venetian Republic in her heyday defeated and conquered all the place. So, I guess that if a Conservative, Catholic-leaning, somewhat pro-Austrian, Monarchist Venetian nationalism is to emerge, Verona is likely to be its center, as it can be said to be for much later kinda-similar ideologies IOTL.

 

[eliphas8]

Oh god, just read through everything up to now and have come to the disturbing realization there isn't more to read.

 

[Falecius]

Also, do you have any opinion on Samoht's suggestion about Venetian nationalism - i.e., that a wartime Austrian occupation government, or Austrian agents who are attempting to destablilize Italy, might encourage separatism there? Would a fringe separatist movement be likely after the war, assuming that Italy survives as a united state?

To answer you further, a fringe movement is possible. A strong and popular movement is very unlikely, esp. if seen to be on Austria's side.
But.
If Italy screws things up badly enough, it might work.
Martyrs. Venetian separatists shot by firesquads or hanged as traitors. Let's say, Catholic peasants who resist draft and are turned into "true Venetians" by separatist propaganda. Maybe not taken seriously by the your average townspeople at first, but Italy isn't exactly acting as a benevolent national government in the welfare of the citizens.
Dialect is discouraged - heck, hey, what? We'd use to print books in that languages during the Renaissance, what dialect are you talking about? And those Jacobin jackasses in Turin just threw us all in an unwinnable war against... who? The Pope?

Yeah, if Italian authorities are stupid enough, and the Austrians smart enough to support it, I can see the emergence of a Venetian nationalism here. Mind you, it would still a minority thing, unless the Italian central government proves really unbelievably stupid, and allegiance with Austria might prove a R disaster, but it could be there with the right changes. I suppose that at first they'd want re-negotiate Veneto's position within Italy (assuming the place ends up in Italy after the war) rather than going for all-out independence right from the start. And I'm very unsure of how to factor Friuli into this. The area was historically part of Venetia, but linguistically clearly distinct, with a quite respectable literary tradition of its own and a marked local/regional identity. I guess that two nationalisms for such a small area are too much, but...

 

[Falecius]

... you asked me about a fringe movement, I'll give you three:

1) Venetian Republicans: mainly inspired by the Federalist tradition of Risorgimento embodied by Carlo Cattaneo. They also claim to have drawn a lot from wirtiers like Ippolito Nievo and Caterina Percoto, who, for their part, never openly endorsed the movement. Largely based in Venice the city and Padua the university, with some attempts to reach out the industrial proletariat in Schio, they would want Italy to become a Federal Republic, were "Republic" was originally meant to be the more important part. They perceive Italy to be essentially a collection of different regions, each with its own identity that should be preserved within the harmonious whole. However, they have usually little concern for identity and traditions of other regions. They see Republicanism as an especially Venetian contribution to the whole and show a considerable pride about it.
Their base is among the cultivated bourgeosie, but their egalitarian views and their attempts to root themslelves in "popular culture" have gained them some limited sympathy among the commoners, especially fishermen of the coastal areas. They call for land reform and have proven sensible to the plight of the peasantry, but, except for a few radicals who "went narodnik" (direct influence from Russia is possible) they are too much focused on the city as the place of choice for their notion of cantonal democracy to get following in the countryside. They are secular in outlook but not especially anti-clerical or necessarily atheists. Actually, young Jews and Protestants often feel comfortable with this message.
The stress on regional identity increases with time as they try to negotiate with the central government about language rights, land reform and extensions of franchise. While despising the more moderate monarchist liberal left in power, they were generally willing to cooperate with existing institutions and they initially supported Crispi. However, his centralizing tendencies and militant Italian nationalism estranged and isolated the venetian Republicans and strengthened their regional focus, with the teaching of Venetian language and history in state school acquiring increasing importance among their demands.
This request sounds odder to many, and the movement was losing some of its never very numerous adherents before the war as long as it became more and more regionalist. However, they adopt an open view of national identity; Venice was a city for all, and the true vocation of the Venetian people is contribute to mankind's progress in their unique way.
While quite radical in principle, they were consistently for change through legal change. Unhappy with the monarchy and very vocal about it, but ready to acknowledge that it was at least a constitutional monarchy.
In some cases, Venetian Republicans tried to revive their city's supposed role as the "door to the East". That meant relationships with Greece and the Ottoman Empire in particular. Some of the more endeavouring came across the Ottoman versions of Abacarism and Belloism, and some writings on the topic were translated. In 1891 (some years before OTL) as Italy moved closer to the BOG alliance, chairs of Modern Greek, Turkish and Arabic were created at the recently founded University of Venice. The University itself is probably the only real result the Republicans can claim.

2) Venetian Populists: they are the Catholic, conservative splinter group of the former, mainly based in Verona and its countryside.
Their focus on regional identity, language and customs is based on a much more closed notion of what means being "Venetian", with a stress in rootedness to the lands. While socially conservative, they are sensible to the peasant's suffering and often denounce the oppression the bourgeosie, for all its liberal talk, exerts on the Venetian good people. They tend to oppose industrialization and are mildly anti-urban. Small land-owners and cultivated rich tenants are often recruited in their small, but incrasing ranks. They favor land reform to some extent, as the largest estates are not theirs anyway (they belong to the liberals in the cities, yeah, right). They are often less cultured than their republian counterparts, having often a Catholic school background and not having attended university in Padua. Staunchly Catholic, they oppose the Italian state on this ground and find themselves much more marginalized politically as a consequence. However, their "instinctive" conservatism makes them uneasy with Republicanism. Some of them actually advocate an aristocratic Republic, but as their sub-regional base in Verona took preminence, previous history of the region was taken into account, leading to a markedly Monarchist and Austrophile leaning. They are rather prone to municipalism however, and in their polemic with Venice, they sometimes suggest a separate identity for Western Veneto.
They are generally much more adamant about the use of vernacular as the "national" language, but, in their principled refusal of standard literary Venetian as "artificial", they are at loss in the attempt to standardise peasant local dialects. Usually they settled for a nuanced average of dialects used in the area of Verona, with some concession to the mountain dialects. Their attention to local difference, however, has won them some support among the German-speaking minority communities. Austria might try to exploit them.
Their ideology is not so different from the French populist overall.

3) Friulan Patriots. The later group to emerge, partly inspired by the Republicans, but never part of them. They start all out with the assumption that Friuli is its own nation, as its language clearly shows. Unlike the two above, they start as separatists and remain consistently such, which does nothing to make them popular. They are actually little more than a fringe group of intellectuals based in Udine and among the Friulians studying in Padua. They are usually radical Republicans and support direct democracy in small autonomous communities. Most suggest some form of Socialized property as the best structure of such communities. Estranged from society and disgruntled with Italy, they wouldn't be significant in the political spectrum before the war. After, they openly invoked renitence to draft. The more radical invoke armed resistance against Italy, though most think reactionary Austria has to be confronted first.

What do you think?
Of course you can use what of this you deem useful, or nothing at all.

 

[Julius Vogel]

I must say Nazir Ali Hydari came out of left field - well done!

You mention that his actions are not going down too well in London but nothing is likely to happen - I wonder if the Australian colonies feel quite the same way? I suspect elements in those colonies will be slightly aghast to have anyone, even a British Indian loyalist (of sorts) in control of Tahiti. Especially if religion comes into it.

I don't have any figures here, but I've been led to believe that at some point Australians started providing a lot of the Christian missionaries that went to the Pacific; as opposed to say European (British or French) sources. I'm not sure when this started or how it relates to your TL, but I imagine that if there is an active movement at the point we are at in your TL they will be wanting to go in boots and all to Tahiti now that the French are out.

Certainly a quick look on the Internet shows that Australian sourced British missionaries were active in China by the point the war is going on ITTL.

I've come across the topic here and there in passing and it certainly seems that the White Colonies/Dominions quickly became active in the missionary game, independent and alongside of the European efforts by this point IOTL.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Africville on the outskirts of Halifax is one of the more famous Afro-Canadian communities. With Halifax as the main port connecting Canada to the Atlantic and thus the Empire, there would probably be at least some exchange between South Carolinian freedmen, the Malê and the local Africans. That might be interesting to look at.

Also, Windsor had an historically large Afro-Canadian community, with it's origins in the Underground Railroad IIRC.

Saint Catherines as well.

Halifax seems particularly interesting - the original black community there started with refugees from the American Revolution, and many of them went on to become founding fathers of the Sierra Leone freedman community. Now, most of the historic Afro-Canadian community in Halifax came in later waves - from what I can tell, pretty much all the 1792 tranche of immigrants ended up in Africa and the subsequent arrivals weren't connected with them - but I wonder if, in TTL, the greater prominence of Sierra Leone as a center of trade and political thought might create a lasting connection between Nova Scotia and Freetown. Maybe the Africans who passed through Halifax on the way to Sierra Leone might continue to think of Halifax as "their" city, the place where they got their first taste of freedom, and consider themselves patrons of the Africans who came to Nova Scotia later. That could lead to an interesting dynamic between the Krio, the Afro-Canadians and the Gullah of South Carolina, with Freetown as the fulcrum.

I'd also expect, with the lower Niger being a rich and important part of the British Empire in TTL, that there would be trade between Halifax and Lagos, which would bring the Afro-Canadians into contact with the Malê. This would be especially true if many of the Afro-Canadians work as sailors or dock workers, which was apparently the case in OTL.

Well, I recently wrote about Italian nationalism in Veneto in Risorgimento era, and I did some study, though by no means exhaustive, about similar topic.

You raise some really fascinating possibilities here, both in terms of what might happen during the war and what the effects would be later on.

I assume that the Austrians wouldn't want to encourage any kind of liberal nationalism, even in opposition to an enemy country, so I doubt they'd work with or stir up the Venetian Republicans. The Venetian Populists would be more the type of group that Austria could work with - in fact, Franz Joseph might find them very like-minded. In TTL, they'd be very disillusioned with the anti-clerical nature of the Italian state, and they might be willing to work with an Austrian empire that promises a return to Catholic values and respect for regional particularism. This could lead to a town-versus-country schism, for instance if Venice city becomes a center of resistance while Venetia heeds the Austrian call for Catholic unity.

Austria might work with the Friulians too, or might even stir them up if they don't get the idea themselves. From the Austrian perspective, the more regionalist movements in northern Italy, the better - by now, they might be planning a postwar order in which Italy is divided into a number of client republics and princely states.

Of course, if the BOGs win and Italy survives the war intact, these groups' collaboration with Austria would probably not make them popular. But the Venetian Republicans, on the other hand - if they're seen as resisting while the central government was unable to defend the country, they might gain cachet in the same way as Sarajevo and the other Bosnian pockets. The war's end, again assuming a BOG victory, could see the liberals in Venice city with a strong sense of independence and a memory of all the slights they suffered at the hands of the Italian monarchy. If the Italian government compounds that by doing stupid things during the battle for Venetia - which is quite possible, because governments often do stupid things in wartime - then there could be a substantial Venetian autonomist movement which continues to be strong during the twentieth century. This would be a minority movement, but even that could have all kinds of consequences.

You've given me many ideas for year three, when the Italian front will heat up again - thanks for your time and thoughts.

I must say Nazir Ali Hydari came out of left field - well done!

You mention that his actions are not going down too well in London but nothing is likely to happen - I wonder if the Australian colonies feel quite the same way? I suspect elements in those colonies will be slightly aghast to have anyone, even a British Indian loyalist (of sorts) in control of Tahiti. Especially if religion comes into it.

I don't have any figures here, but I've been led to believe that at some point Australians started providing a lot of the Christian missionaries that went to the Pacific; as opposed to say European (British or French) sources. I'm not sure when this started or how it relates to your TL, but I imagine that if there is an active movement at the point we are at in your TL they will be wanting to go in boots and all to Tahiti now that the French are out.

Tahiti's on the other side of the Pacific, so the Australians aren't as unhappy as they'd be if Hydari were in Noumea, but they're certainly not thrilled. They'll be even less thrilled when Hydari takes on legendary status among the Indo-Fijians, given that Fiji is part of their plan for an Australasian federation.

I anticipate that there will be competition between Muslim, Catholic and Protestant missionaries on many Pacific islands, and that Australian missionaries will lead the charge on the Protestant side. Remember how Islam and Christianity became surrogates for political factions among TTL's Yoruba? That will also happen among the Polynesians and Melanesians, with the political-religious correspondence varying from place to place - on some islands, Islam will represent modernity, while on others, Catholicism or evangelical Protestantism might. The Pacific is in for interesting times.

BTW, New Caledonia is in Australian hands - they took it fairly early in the war, before their military strength was needed elsewhere. And we need to figure out what's happening in Hawaii - any ideas?

Oh god, just read through everything up to now and have come to the disturbing realization there isn't more to read.

There'll be more soon.

Out of curiosity, I'm always interested in the perspectives of new readers who've caught up all at once rather than following the story as it develops: is anything about the story particularly good or intriguing? Any weak points, or ideas that haven't been developed enough? Any comments on the format or where the story is likely to go? In any event thanks for reading.

 

[Badshah]

Oh, I totally forgot to ask....what's the border between Afghanistan and India? Has the *Durand Line been created, or is it something else, entirely?

 

[Falecius]

You raise some really fascinating possibilities here, both in terms of what might happen during the war and what the effects would be later on.

I assume that the Austrians wouldn't want to encourage any kind of liberal nationalism, even in opposition to an enemy country, so I doubt they'd work with or stir up the Venetian Republicans. The Venetian Populists would be more the type of group that Austria could work with - in fact, Franz Joseph might find them very like-minded. In TTL, they'd be very disillusioned with the anti-clerical nature of the Italian state, and they might be willing to work with an Austrian empire that promises a return to Catholic values and respect for regional particularism. This could lead to a town-versus-country schism, for instance if Venice city becomes a center of resistance while Venetia heeds the Austrian call for Catholic unity.

Austria might work with the Friulians too, or might even stir them up if they don't get the idea themselves. From the Austrian perspective, the more regionalist movements in northern Italy, the better - by now, they might be planning a postwar order in which Italy is divided into a number of client republics and princely states.

Of course, if the BOGs win and Italy survives the war intact, these groups' collaboration with Austria would probably not make them popular. But the Venetian Republicans, on the other hand - if they're seen as resisting while the central government was unable to defend the country, they might gain cachet in the same way as Sarajevo and the other Bosnian pockets. The war's end, again assuming a BOG victory, could see the liberals in Venice city with a strong sense of independence and a memory of all the slights they suffered at the hands of the Italian monarchy. If the Italian government compounds that by doing stupid things during the battle for Venetia - which is quite possible, because governments often do stupid things in wartime - then there could be a substantial Venetian autonomist movement which continues to be strong during the twentieth century. This would be a minority movement, but even that could have all kinds of consequences.

You've given me many ideas for year three, when the Italian front will heat up again - thanks for your time and thoughts.

You are welcome.
I would like to repeat, just in case it wasn't clear enough before, that all the three groups are completely extrapolated from this TL context. None of them existed IOTL.

 

[eliphas8]

There'll be more soon.

Out of curiosity, I'm always interested in the perspectives of new readers who've caught up all at once rather than following the story as it develops: is anything about the story particularly good or intriguing? Any weak points, or ideas that haven't been developed enough? Any comments on the format or where the story is likely to go? In any event thanks for reading.

To start, the weakest point in the story is the fact its part of a thread, this is a timeline that generates enough discussion that there can be a signifigant amount of posts unrelated to the written parts. Otherwise the timeline is very fun and original, I love Abacar (Usmans cool but his dad was just awesome).

The thing I liked though is the thing I like about most of your timelines though, they are about an idea more than a nation or a people and that is a very interesting way to write a timeline.

 

[othyrsyde]

Still not caught up, but I'm more and more impressed as it moves along.

 

[Inquisitor Tolkien]

I'm surprised the expulsion of the Pope hasn't had deeper social ramifications for a number of countries.

How has Catholicism and the clerical movement in France evolved then? I've finally gotten through this timeline (it's great, keep it going ), so I might've missed it. The other would be Catholics in Italy, but I am not too familiar of the interplay between nationalism and religion in Italy during the 19th century.

It would also have likely been more prudent for Italy to take the war as an opportunity to negotiate with France over the status of Rome and the Vatican. As it stands, Italy is not in the most pleasant of strategic situations (well, the NDB is worse; they've got helluva frontage to cover, and I'm mildly surprised they managed to hold out, given correspondingly weaker development ITTL [Franco-Prussian War indemnity]). Then again, Wilhelm was the one to push it past the point of no return.

I'm going to do some number crunching at least for NDB population figures, but my guess is that they aren't promising. If Germany doesn't have an obscene shortage of manpower I'd be surprised.

 

[Inquisitor Tolkien]

I'm surprised the expulsion of the Pope hasn't had deeper social ramifications for a number of countries.

How has Catholicism and the clerical movement in France evolved then? I've finally gotten through this timeline (it's great, keep it going ), so I might've missed it. The other would be Catholics in Italy, but I am not too familiar of the interplay between nationalism and religion in Italy during the 19th century.

It would also have likely been more prudent for Italy to take the war as an opportunity to negotiate with France over the status of Rome and the Vatican. As it stands, Italy is not in the most pleasant of strategic situations (well, the NDB is worse; they've got helluva frontage to cover, and I'm mildly surprised they managed to hold out, given correspondingly weaker development ITTL [Franco-Prussian War indemnity]). Then again, Wilhelm was the one to push it past the point of no return.

I'm going to do some number crunching at least for German population figures, but my guess is that they aren't promising. If Germany doesn't have an obscene shortage of manpower I'd be surprised.


EDIT: Alright, using 1890 figures, Germany sans the South German states (Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, plus roughly over half of Hessen-Darmstadt), as well as the loss of A-L has a population of somewhere less then 38 million (not including the demographic effects of ATL Franco-Prussian War results). Metropolitan France has a population of 41 million including A-L, again not factoring in population loss via conflict (or population gain vis-a-vis immigration and the butterflying of the Paris Commune and war indemnities, etc.), or of DOMs such as Senegal.

Moreover, up until the offensive towards Prague, much of the fighting has taken place on NDB soil, which has cut away at Germany's population (and, more importantly, its industrial heartland). The Rhineland has a population of ~4.8 million, with everything from Trier to Bonn and Cologne presumably under occupation. The Russians are somewhere in West Prussia (1.4 million) and have presumably made gains in Posen (1.8 million) and Silesia (4.7 million), and taken East Prussia (2 million). My other assumption is that there have been gains in Hessen (2+ million, has Frankfurt fallen?) and Thuringia and other small states (2ish million).

All in all, the NDB is probably down to less then ~28-31 million in population, not including casualties from war, and there is no extensive colonial empire for the NDB to draw much manpower from at all. If it loses all of the above-mentioned areas minus Silesia, it's down to 24 million (if it loses Silesia AND Saxony [over 6 million]), ~13 million. Westfalen is ~2.4 million, so if France has made any inroad there, add that to the above mentioned population figures.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Oh, I totally forgot to ask....what's the border between Afghanistan and India? Has the *Durand Line been created, or is it something else, entirely?

I doubt the border would follow the Durand Line. The Second Anglo-Afghan War, which resulted in the cession of the frontier provinces to the Raj, resulted from a Russian attempt to become Afghanistan's patron in the wake of its victory over the Ottomans. In TTL, the Ottomans beat Russia, and it's unlikely that a defeated Russia would push the envelope in Afghanistan so soon. The border probably resembles the pre-1878 frontier more than it does the Durand Line, and I doubt it's been demarcated.

In the meantime, of course, Russia has been making up for lost time, and the Afghans are about to become a problem for the British.

I would like to repeat, just in case it wasn't clear enough before, that all the three groups are completely extrapolated from this TL context. None of them existed IOTL.

Here's the part where I look embarrassed and admit that I didn't realize that - I thought you were extrapolating autonomist movements from the 1960s-70s back to TTL's nineteenth century. With that said, though, it seems very plausible that such groups would exist in TTL, possibly coalescing during and just after the war.

To start, the weakest point in the story is the fact its part of a thread, this is a timeline that generates enough discussion that there can be a signifigant amount of posts unrelated to the written parts. Otherwise the timeline is very fun and original, I love Abacar (Usmans cool but his dad was just awesome).

The thing I liked though is the thing I like about most of your timelines though, they are about an idea more than a nation or a people and that is a very interesting way to write a timeline.

The thread thing is part of the reason I've illustrated all updates other than the first few - that way, anyone who wants to page through the thread and read only updates will be able to tell at a glance which posts they are.

And thanks - I enjoy playing with ideas here, and I'm sometimes surprised at how far beyond the Niger Valley they have traveled.

Still not caught up, but I'm more and more impressed as it moves along.

Thanks - I'd love to hear your impressions when you get all the way through.

I'm surprised the expulsion of the Pope hasn't had deeper social ramifications for a number of countries.

How has Catholicism and the clerical movement in France evolved then? I've finally gotten through this timeline (it's great, keep it going ), so I might've missed it. The other would be Catholics in Italy, but I am not too familiar of the interplay between nationalism and religion in Italy during the 19th century.

It would also have likely been more prudent for Italy to take the war as an opportunity to negotiate with France over the status of Rome and the Vatican. As it stands, Italy is not in the most pleasant of strategic situations (well, the NDB is worse; they've got helluva frontage to cover, and I'm mildly surprised they managed to hold out, given correspondingly weaker development ITTL [Franco-Prussian War indemnity]). Then again, Wilhelm was the one to push it past the point of no return.

The clerical parties in France want revenge - the expulsion of the Pope has made them full rather than lukewarm supporters of the war, and has made them reluctant supporters of the Leclair government, whose views on social issues they despise. Many of them have also been radicalized, though; I've mentioned that some of them enlisted in the volunteer Papal Legion rather than the French army in order to fight a "purer" war, and those who survive the war may have little time for the secular French state.

Italy in TTL is more anti-clerical than OTL because the Rome crisis festered for a whole generation, which means that the conservative Catholics are more alienated from the state. That may feed into some of the regionalist movements that Falecius has posited above.

I'm going to do some number crunching at least for NDB population figures, but my guess is that they aren't promising. If Germany doesn't have an obscene shortage of manpower I'd be surprised.

I crunched the numbers myself in post 1430, and yes, the North Germans need all the men they can get. What's saving them now is a huge influx of troops from Britain, India and the dominions (also some from British Africa, although most of the African soldiers are fighting in the West African, Bornu or Congolese theaters). At this point close to half the defenders in the NDB are from the British Empire.

(Also, just saw your edit: the North German population losses wouldn't be as high as you suggest, because many people fled the occupied areas ahead of the advancing FAR armies, and because not all of Silesia and West Prussia have fallen. But they certainly aren't in good shape.)

 

[Inquisitor Tolkien]

The clerical parties in France want revenge - the expulsion of the Pope has made them full rather than lukewarm supporters of the war, and has made them reluctant supporters of the Leclair government, whose views on social issues they despise. Many of them have also been radicalized, though; I've mentioned that some of them enlisted in the volunteer Papal Legion rather than the French army in order to fight a "purer" war, and those who survive the war may have little time for the secular French state.

Italy in TTL is more anti-clerical than OTL because the Rome crisis festered for a whole generation, which means that the conservative Catholics are more alienated from the state. That may feed into some of the regionalist movements that Falecius has posited above.

Thank you for clearing that up, and makes plenty of sense.

I crunched the numbers myself in post 1430, and yes, the North Germans need all the men they can get. What's saving them now is a huge influx of troops from Britain, India and the dominions (also some from British Africa, although most of the African soldiers are fighting in the West African, Bornu or Congolese theaters). At this point close to half the defenders in the NDB are from the British Empire.

The only problem I found in your numbers was Alsace-Lorraine (which was ~1.6-7 million) was not subtracted from the NDB figure, or added to the Metropolitan France figure, so you had their numbers reversed (Metropolitan France has slightly higher population then the NDB, 40 vs 38 million). But that doesn't really effect the general situation greatly.

And as time goes on, that disparity becomes more and more lopsided no doubt, as German manpower begins to runs dry and British conscription becomes more effective.

Also, based on your West Prussia update, I have a feeling that the Oder will soon look like an attractive natural defense. You've committed a large reserve of men to reach the outskirts of Prague, but when you are numerically outnumbered pretty handily as is...

(Also, just saw your edit: the North German population losses wouldn't be as high as you suggest, because many people fled the occupied areas ahead of the advancing FAR armies, and because not all of Silesia and West Prussia have fallen. But they certainly aren't in good shape.)

Of course. They're just estimates, given there aren't too many clues as to where the frontlines are. Still, the NDB should, compared to OTL France, be in a fair bit worse situation in terms of population loss/occupation, though they've managed to preserve the majority of their industry, at least in the Ruhr, not quite sure about Silesia or Saxony.

Besides, there's no real need for concrete figures: I'm not reading your TL for that.

Last comments for tonight, given that the French are besieging Koln, Belgian entry seems rather insignificant at this point. The Belgian railroad network would greatly improve French logistics, no doubt about it, but beyond that, there isn't any great flanking maneuver that can be attempted. I assume the French are either outside or have taken Aachen already. Belgian finances and industry would be a boon, however (in general though, I assume France's finances are in a far better state then they were OTL, given France didn't have to fork over capital equal to 22% of GDP to Prussia).

Was there any negotiations on the status of Rome and the Papal state attempted by Italy prior to the war/before they joined? It would seem to me that Italy could've had their cake and eaten it too, so to speak, by getting Rome as a bribe for neutrality, without having to go to war with the two large neighbors next door, when Italy is in no condition to fight an industrial war. Certainly, if the clerical parties in France were up in arms against the Leclair government (though it would be unpopular amongst the rest of the Catholic Frenchmen, but still). It would've been mutually agreeable for all; Italy gets Rome, France gets rid of Rome and its commitment to it (and the antagonism it produces), and the Pope...doesn't live in fear of constant annexation thanks to arranged annexation? I'm sure some mutually acceptable arrangement could've been arrived upon.

Unless Italy really wants that irredenta, I suppose.

 

[Falecius]

Here's the part where I look embarrassed and admit that I didn't realize that - I thought you were extrapolating autonomist movements from the 1960s-70s back to TTL's nineteenth century. With that said, though, it seems very plausible that such groups would exist in TTL, possibly coalescing during and just after the war.

Except for the Friulan patriots, who have no OTL equivalent I know of, the other ideas are actually present in regionalist discourse of OTL's eighties and nineties to this day, but you'll never find the polarization between Republicans and Monarchists with markedly different subregional bases.
IOTL, you have both Venetian right-wing nationalists/regionalists (the majority, with Catholic and secular views alike) and left-wing ones, far less important. However, I couldn't use the recent situation to extrapolate because it develops within the framework of a wider regionalist/separatist trend encompassing all Northern Italy in opposition to Rome, and in Veneto especially, this happens in the aftermath of a major economic and industrial boom. Memory of La Serenissima is used by both right and left wing regionalist in present day OTL, while almost nobody, even in Verona, gives the Scaliger lordship any important political value.
It could be interesting however to note that in the seventies, before regionalism really took off, Venice and Verona were quite important centers of activity of extreme left-wing and right-wing terrorism respectively.

 

[Falecius]

Was there any negotiations on the status of Rome and the Papal state attempted by Italy prior to the war/before they joined? It would seem to me that Italy could've had their cake and eaten it too, so to speak, by getting Rome as a bribe for neutrality, without having to go to war with the two large neighbors next door, when Italy is in no condition to fight an industrial war. Certainly, if the clerical parties in France were up in arms against the Leclair government (though it would be unpopular amongst the rest of the Catholic Frenchmen, but still). It would've been mutually agreeable for all; Italy gets Rome, France gets rid of Rome and its commitment to it (and the antagonism it produces), and the Pope...doesn't live in fear of constant annexation thanks to arranged annexation? I'm sure some mutually acceptable arrangement could've been arrived upon.

Unless Italy really wants that irredenta, I suppose.

I assume that the sore point of Rome had tangled Italy into a somewhat stable alliance with North Germany and maybe Britain long before the war, so that their full commitment is, if not automatic, to be expected right from the start. Also, domestic situation in France, as Jonathan described it, does not seem very conducive to an agreement.
I suggested a hypotetical more detailed scenario for Italy somewhere upthread and discussed it with Jonathan and Wolf Brother, and were more or less agreed that war is the most likely option for Italy.
I concur, however, that Italy is in a fairly nasty spot with this choice.
Two factors: 1) Crispi is in charge. He was really a dick IOTL, though maybe somewhat less so here. But he believed in action and force (he admired Bismarck IOT IIRC) and was not a very good diplomat. He'll be way more anti-clerical here, too.
2) In this TL, butterflies affect Italian unification right from the start, even before 1848. Italy and Britain are arguably the first European countries significantly changed by the POD I think. In my view, Italy will be better off overall because of the change. The moderate/liberal rift within the unification movement is going to be less severe and the liberals will be stronger. So the country is politically more cohesive overall. On the flip side, though, Catholics will be more alienated to the new state, and I think they could be far more prone to lean to some form of regionalism.
Regionalism existed in Italy at this OTL, but was largely non-political and generally marginalized, the main partial exception being Sicily. Here, I see a more varied landascape on this front, mostly in Veneto, Genoa and the South, but not limited to that.