Malê Rising

This is why I love TTL - not only do readers point out lexical problems I never considered, but they solve them in a way that improves on the original. Al-Umum al-Osmaniyya al-Muttahida it is - a union, and also a community of nations.

this is one of the reasons I LOVE this site. Discussions on alternate language use based on changed cultural history, and the like. The INFORMED, and rational discussion (OK, ja, there's lots of the other, too).

Mind, Jonathan, you are one of the absolute top people on this site for creating believable new worlds that radically change - but make incredible internal sense.

And the level of erudition, scholarship and knowledge you show is also a real treat. Thank you.
 
This is why I love TTL - not only do readers point out lexical problems I never considered, but they solve them in a way that improves on the original. Al-Umum al-Osmaniyya al-Muttahida it is - a union, and also a community of nations.

Before it goes entirely canonized, the form as I wrote it upthread contains a typo and transcription inconsistency.
In Arabic it would be الأمم العثمانية المتّحدة . It wouldn't look like exactly same in Ottoman Turkish, where I guess it would be more like this: امم عثمانيه متّحده

The classical Arabic pronounciation is rendered in scientific transcription as follows:
al-umam al-‘uṯmāniyya al-muttaḥida (not "umum" which was a typo) while I believe the Turkish rendering should be approximately umam-[FONT=Times New Roman, serif]ı (or [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]ümmetler-i[/FONT]) osmani-ye müttahide (using what I gather to be OTL's modern Turkish script rendition).
 
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Before it goes entirely canonized, the form as I wrote it upthread contains a typo and transcription inconsistency.
In Arabic it would be الأمم العثمانية المتّحدة . It wouldn't look like exactly same in Ottoman Turkish, where I guess it would be more like this: امم عثمانيه متّحده

The classical Arabic pronounciation is rendered in scientific transcription as follows:
al-umam al-‘uṯmāniyya al-muttaḥida (not "umum" which was a typo) while I believe the Turkish rendering should be approximately umam-[FONT=Times New Roman, serif]ı[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif] osmani-ye müttahide (using what I gather to be OTL's modern Turkish script rendition). [/FONT]

Ummah/Umam or Millet/Milletlar ?
 
Ummah/Umam or Millet/Milletlar ?

I think that Millet has a more stringently religious connotation, as in "religious community", while umam/ümmetler might be seen as more neutral in this case, but my understanding of Turkish political lexicon is not very good.
 
I wanted there to be a NACA equivalent ITTL--in fact, what I wanted was a NACA on steroids, at least partially under Peace Department supervision. This would give the PD something real to do. My notion was that a political deadlock between people who wanted to build up the US military along OTL lines (for reasons both of imperial ambition and corporate pork) and the stronger pacifists of the timeline--make developing new airplane models adequate to defend the USA in case of need the responsibility of an agency under the Peace department, so there are checks and balances between prudent defense preparedness and "merchant of death" boosterism, and also charge it with assisting American aeronautics firms competitive through aggressive development of advanced technology; this in lieu of these firms expecting a chance to bid on juicy Army and Navy orders--the services get a very thin gruel of token numbers of fairly modern planes, and funds to keep a flying circus of obsolete models going, so their aviators have some flight experience and have to share brief tours with the latest stuff--in case of serious war threats the services would of course be expanded with orders of the latest stuff. This way the US has some preparedness for serious war should matters come to that, but avoids the high costs of maintaining a strong force and the implicit threat that conveys.

Such was my suggestion, but it didn't spark any interest. The Department of Peace, we are told, remained a moribund and irrelevant political sinecure after Jane Addams left it; it did not acquire an air R&D arm, whereas I can't imagine the US Army Air Corps could have ever amounted to much, while even the Navy is probably consistently smaller than it was in any given year of OTL (before the WWII buildup I mean--after 1937 or so the USN of TTL would be increasingly dwarfed by the one of OTL).

All of this means--very few tax dollars supporting the various aeronautical firms; they all have to make it or break on private, commercial business (or war materiel sales to overseas customers--but the Great Powers will have their own and their client's markets sewn up, so that leaves slim pickings).

Therefore the infrastructure that is close enough to the needs of a rocketry program would be mighty scarce in the USA.

This is my hidden agenda for the Peace Dept super-NACA; I wanted a more robust, cutting-edge US aero industry without the OTL war-mongering, and I wanted a government agency besides the Navy capable of taking up the mission of space exploration.

I suppose there is probably a NACA of some kind ITTL--maybe. OTL it was a Wilson Administration thing, tied to the scare and eventual involvement in the Great War. God knows it operated on a shoestring budget OTL, so it won't take much tax dollars to have something like it by the way here, but again the government's involvement and concerns with aeronautics are less here; if the alt-NACA is defunded in proportion to the military, it will probably drop dead of anemia. With the OTL one a war-boom sort of thing I'd expect its ATL cousin to have been something cooked up by the Lodge administration--and axed when he finally left office by the anti-war coalition that took over. (This was the juncture where I hoped the Rube Goldberg Peace Department NACA would come into being). So there might well be nothing of the sort.

If there is, I guess it would have an HQ somewhere in range of Washington, but not necessarily in DC. I've personally resided at Langley AFB and I know that it is a good half-day's drive from DC, not exactly next door--but it is possible to get from one to the other within the same business day. (In the early 20th century I don't know that one could shuttle back to one's starting point again also in that same day, and still have time to get any business done).

So I don't see the hand of inexorable fate at work in locating the main offices of NACA in southern Virginia rather than say in northern Virginia or in Maryland or even in say the Pine Barrens!:rolleyes:

I'm not quite sure how to describe your viewpoint here, which seems a peculiar mix of pessimism and optimism; I suppose I shall simply call it strange. But it does seem odd from the evidence of the timeline that you appear to have concluded that the United States won't have a military of any appreciable strength from the end of the Great War on, which simply doesn't seem supported by the text (from what I recall of it; with all respect to Johnathan, it is a bit of a big bear to go back through!) The key difference, and the reason the United States of this timeline is considered by virtually everyone to be more pacifist, is that the pre-1898 isolationist status quo has continued; efforts to create an empire of liberty, outside of the continent at least* were shot down, and aside from the Bahamas and perhaps a few other minor islands purchased from other colonial nations, the United States has decided to stick to its borders and its knitting.

But this does not mean that the United States has no military, or no significant military industry! Although the United States is not engaging in foreign adventuring, it still needs to defend itself, meaning that it needs a Navy and, since the Great War and the introduction of aircraft, an Air Force (whether that's a separate branch or a division of the Army hardly matters). A strong navy has almost always been considered important for the United States, given our enormous coastline and extensive international trade, something which will not have changed because of this timeline (both predate the POD, after all), while the Russo-Chinese and Anglo-Indian wars have served as entirely serviceable demonstrations of the power of aerial vehicles. The growth of powers such as China and India, and the continuing significance of countries like France, Germany, and the Ottoman Union means that there are many countries which could theoretically threaten the United States navally or aerially if they wished, and against which defenses must be maintained. If the enormous post-World War II complex of aeronautical and military firms doesn't exist, that actually increases the incentive to invest in technology and create an R&D shop like NACA, in order to get the most out of a small budget, and to help as large an aeronautical industry as possible stay alive should it be needed in the future. Whatever the political inclinations of the country, this sort of investment in the future and in defense--an investment with, moreover, substantial pacific applications--is hardly likely to be rejected. Events have shown that nations must be ready to defend themselves, however much people might like the World Court and Consistory to eliminate war altogether, and that means keeping up with technological developments elsewhere.

Hence it is very probable in my view that there would have been for the past several decades some type of NACA-like organization for researching aeronautical technology with an eye for keeping up with other nations and ensuring that the United States remains technologically competitive, and that in the present of the timeline with the recent demonstration of ballistic missiles by the Russians and Chinese and the detonation of a nuclear weapon by the Germans that there would be very considerable interest in researching ballistic missiles, if for no other reason than to defend against nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Moreover, given the probably low oil prices of this time period and the development of jet engines, there is almost certainly a lot of interest in continuing to push the envelope to go higher and faster, now that the barriers propellers and piston engines impose have been broken. Supersonic airliners are certainly being looked at, and might even succeed to some extent without an oil shock, and a few dreamers are probably looking at hypersonic aircraft. To build those or to defend against them will take research...research that will substantially overlap with that needed for space travel.

In reality, there's actually quite a good demonstration of how a substantial military-industrial complex is not needed for a capable space program in the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency. It's certainly among the top space programs in the world, capable of engaging in essentially every area of spaceflight save independent launch of astronauts, yet no one would claim that there is any significant Japanese military-industrial complex, given the paucity of their military budgets compared to just about everyone on the planet. Moreover, and this gets at your management expertise pessimism as well, the Japanese space program (more precisely the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science) actually started as a special unit within the University of Tokyo--that is, not as some grand governmental program, nor one with enormous resources or experienced managers, but one started by a bunch of academics. Yet Japan was the fourth country in the world to launch a satellite independently, beating out everyone except the Soviets, NASA, and France. And obviously if Japan does not presently have a military-industrial complex worthy of the name, what could it have possibly had in the 1950s and 1960s when the work leading up to their first orbital launch was being done?

Given that the United States has vastly more resources than Japan, financially and population-wise, and has a significantly better physical situation for rocket experimentation and development, it hardly seems reasonable to me that they would be anything less than a major space power, if not necessarily as dominant as OTL.

*One thing I can't remember off the top of my head...is Alaska still in Russian hands or not, and if not in whose hands is it?
 

Sulemain

Banned
I suspect the US Armed Forces are dominated by the Navy ITTL, for the reasons stated above.

I mentioned a while back that the US, on a bang for buck basis, will probably go for nukes in a big way.
 
I'm not quite sure how to describe your viewpoint here, which seems a peculiar mix of pessimism and optimism; I suppose I shall simply call it strange.
That's me!:)
But it does seem odd from the evidence of the timeline that you appear to have concluded that the United States won't have a military of any appreciable strength from the end of the Great War on, which simply doesn't seem supported by the text (from what I recall of it; with all respect to Johnathan, it is a bit of a big bear to go back through!)
You may note I keep going back to the Mexican/Central America invasion fiasco of the 1910s, the Lodge Administration's dirty little war. I figure the backlash from it was rather bitter. It was polarizing, the President behaved high-handedly, the results were inglorious and shameful. So I figure it had an impact on the US of the time like Vietnam and Watergate did OTL, and the post-Lodge years (for at least a presidential term, maybe several) were kind of like the 1970s of OTL. Except that OTL, during that backlash time, the Soviet Union remained a huge and credible threat. ITTL, despite Lodge's tantrum of a war presumably alienating Mexico and the northern tier of Latin America in general, no one posed more than a theoretical, potential threat--so the recourse of slashing back the military was wide open and presumably resorted to to some extent.

And take a good look at just how desultory the US military was OTL between wars before WWII. The Army and its Air Corps were on life support in the 1920s and well into the 30s. The Navy had more friends and more consistent support--but now consider the difference between the timelines--OTL we had imperial commitments to maintain in the Philippines and Panama, as well as more integral territories (I've lost track of Alaska too:eek:; I think it is US having been purchased under Lincoln ("Seward's Folly":p) paralleling OTL--Russia would have been in similar circumstances and the USA an even more credible buyer considering the Union government settled the Civil War a year earlier) such as Hawaii; ITTL only Alaska perhaps and as a replacement of all others, the Bahamas, come under that rubric.

Even so, OTL our Army was something of a joke between the World Wars. I don't mean to mock the great (and lesser) soldiers who served in it nonetheless; they made do with very little, and they knew it. The Navy too was under stringent economies during the '20s and these got even tighter in the Depression. As we approached WWII, our Army was smaller than that of Bulgaria. (Presumably significantly better equipped, but I fear not by much--the troops were trained in the hope that they'd get good equipment but carried out exercises with comic-opera substitutes. As for experience--well, we needed to relearn how to fight in the early battles we were part of in WWII--that was all right since it was a new kind of war, and observers including the Germans noted that we'd make big mistakes--once. But not the same one twice.)

During the interwar period, despite penny-pinching economies, the notion that the US Navy should be "second to none" did not die and the taxpayer ponied up to approximate parity with the mighty Royal Navy. But also the government sought to put a cap on the cost of realizing such ambitions by seeking global arms limitations with the financially straitened British were keen to cooperate with--leaving powers like Japan to cavil at being assigned an officially second-tier place.

Now look at TTL--some Americans may dream of the glory of matching the RN, but they are clearly going to be outvoted by others who for various reasons will regard that as extravagant. Some will condemn the idea of appearing to challenge the sleeping Lion when it poses no threat (I daresay some of these fell silent during the Imperialist Era, but knowing the Canadians were not happy with that and seeing the hornet's nest the "Enemy of Mankind" stirred up against themselves, panic would not have been called for--and the Impies blew over, leaving Britain battered and disgraced--quite an exemplary lesson for would-be American supremacists). Others would simply not want to double or triple the taxes they already pay for a pretty good, pretty big Navy. The territories the Navy needs to protect are either the contiguous shores of the states, or the Bahamas just offshore from Florida and perhaps Alaska. Japan is far less of a potential threat--China is the scariest and nearest new Great Power to arise after the Great War, but they have the Japanese and the Russians to check them. Americans might have private interests anywhere in the world, but no colonial territories to protect or expand.

It seems only logical to me that the USN, while it will figure in the lists of the top ten or even top five navies in the world, will not be nearly as large as OTL--maybe half or even a third the size it was at any given time OTL--and smaller than that after 1940! I'd guess we'd keep parity with say the French Navy, maybe say 2/3 the total French strength in the Atlantic Fleet and match that with the Pacific Fleet to have a net edge. I don't see any power in the world seeking to have a navy much bigger than France's except of course for the Commonwealth. China might aspire but would be too backward to plausibly pose a threat until just a decade or so before the war with Russia flares up. Americans aren't going to worry seriously about the Ottomans or Indians; maybe the Russians or Germans if they went on a naval spree but it doesn't seem either power did. If Mexico and other Latin Americans who had serious grievances with El Norte were to grow economically by leaps and bounds and also maintain a strong anti-Yanqui policy that might be alarming--hey, a Spanish-Mexican alliance would suddenly make Cuba a threat!:eek: But I suspect as the USA put the Lodge years behind it, repudiating them with an Army even more emaciated than OTL 1920s and early 30s, and kept the Navy to a reasonable level, and adopted more conciliatory policies toward Central America, that indeed Mexican and other Latin prosperity would be due in large part to peaceful trade (without being strongarmed by rich Yankees, thanks to stronger, more democratic and vigilant governments in the region) with the USA, and the bad feeling from the 1910s war would fade within a generation--by 1950 or so be almost forgotten. So the Mexicans are not going to be so foolish as to attempt to muster a vengeful army they can ill afford, nor challenge the USN as long as Yankees don't try to lord it over their waters.

The USA is safe, and will not be lacking voices claiming the safety is due in part to forging a minimum of swords and a maximum of plowshares.

ICBMs do change the picture. I've put the case before why I disbelieved there would be a wave of developing jet intercontinental bombers--that jet tech would be developed in a more desultory fashion, devoted mainly to "defensive" fighter-interceptors rather than "offensive" bombers--this generally across the world, but it would retard the USA along these lines--support for developing jet airliners might actually be frowned upon because it might look like an under-the-table bomber project

....it is very probable in my view that there would have been for the past several decades some type of NACA-like organization for researching aeronautical technology with an eye for keeping up with other nations and ensuring that the United States remains technologically competitive, and that in the present of the timeline with the recent demonstration of ballistic missiles by the Russians and Chinese and the detonation of a nuclear weapon by the Germans that there would be very considerable interest in researching ballistic missiles, if for no other reason than to defend against nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.

I tried to provide for a distinctly alternate one, one that in the spirit of the eagle on the Great Seal of the USA that has its eyes on the olive branch in one talon but arrows at the ready in the other, signals to the world that all the tech the US government patronizes is meant for peaceful applications--but if someone is foolish enough to think the Americans are too soft to defend themselves, the same Peace Dept mandate that prevents the first application of new tech to be to war machines also stands ready to step aside and let the generals and admirals roll up their sleeves and order the latest weapons by the trainload. Because they exist on paper, and have been tested, and plans drawn up to convert the factories to make them are continually being made as well by the same firms currently turning out what is probably the single greatest civil aeronautical output in the world (US geography favoring that industry) and automotive and such output matched only by Germany, if by them.

I felt that if there were no strong mandate to ostensibly peaceful purposes then ITTL anything like NACA would be opposed by a coalition of penny-pinchers and pacifists, and both would be stronger than OTL.

Now that the missile age is suddenly upon the world, and the memory of Lodge's War faded to historical footnotes, I suppose that all of a sudden a whole lot of people might wonder why the US has no government support for high technology--but the nation will surely suffer for coming from behind.


Moreover, given the probably low oil prices of this time period and the development of jet engines, there is almost certainly a lot of interest in continuing to push the envelope to go higher and faster, now that the barriers propellers and piston engines impose have been broken. Supersonic airliners are certainly being looked at, and might even succeed to some extent without an oil shock, and a few dreamers are probably looking at hypersonic aircraft. To build those or to defend against them will take research...research that will substantially overlap with that needed for space travel.

Jonathan has mentioned how, between many of the iconic technologies of the 20th century being gas-burners and being invented ten years earlier, and more publics prosperous enough to buy them earlier too, the rate of fuel consumption has been higher in this world, and the crash will come sooner.

Of course not everyone believes that the OTL oil crisis of the early 1970s had much to do with actual shortages already happening by then. But insofar as they may actually have been, at least to depletion of major reserves of some nations--expect them earlier, before 1960 I'd say.

Having said that, I sure hope some of that wonky stuff is finding applications somewhere.

I just am not too sanguine the Americans are at the head of the parade. or even very near it. I think the civil market might have alone been enough for Americans to be near the leading edge of R&D during the piston era. But relative to such powers as Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and possibly even the Ottomans, the Americans will lack the centralized guidance of the military establishments of these old world powers and have fallen distinctly behind in employing the newest wave of technologies.

In reality, there's actually quite a good demonstration of how a substantial military-industrial complex is not needed for a capable space program in the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency. ...Japan was the fourth country in the world to launch a satellite independently, beating out everyone except the Soviets, NASA, and France. And obviously if Japan does not presently have a military-industrial complex worthy of the name, what could it have possibly had in the 1950s and 1960s when the work leading up to their first orbital launch was being done?
But you can't consider Japan of OTL after 1945 as a normally independent country. Under terms of their surrender to the Allies and embedded in their postwar constitution, Japan cannot have armed forces (just a "Self-Defense Force"). But that was because they were under Allied supervision, and the single Ally effectively occupying them was the USA. With the coming of the Cold War the Americans suddenly found the Japanese a very useful and necessary counterweight to China in the region; found her industrial potential needed in building up the general strength of the Western alliance Japan was perforce a member of, and this reinforced the Allied--that is to say, practically speaking, the US--commitment to defend them. A commitment that continues to this day.

Obviously, Japan is not comparable to the USA of the TTL, which simply never did develop the vast military-industrial complex it did in OTL. Japan had all the integration of private enterprise with military vision that the US ever developed and more before being conquered; the people, the memory, and some of the mentality simply carried over to the post-war situation, where the US did not need or want them to design weapons--but by all means to reemerge as a major industrial power, and to provide their share of the infrastructure of the Western Alliance's weapons systems.

Relieved of the cost of supporting a major military of their own, the Japanese can bring more tax revenue (and shared, coordinated commitment of private resources along government-indicated paths, something carried over also from pre-war Japanese post-Meiji culture) to bear on non-military projects.

Japan's position is then anomalous, due to the nation's status as a conquered and thus protected fiefdom of the USA. When that relationship finally ends, I fully expect Japan to immediately produce a military of its own and equip it with a lot of Japanese designs; for a full-blown Japanese military-industrial complex to appear out of apparently nowhere. Because actually Japan is currently part of the US MIC; they can do it on their own behalf if the US has neither the hegemonic position nor the will or ability to defend Japan that applied during the era you cite.

The USA of this timeline is in no such position; it isn't maintaining a virtual MIC in disguised form on behalf of a hegemonic power that restricts but also supports it; they are just plain hicks when it comes to playing this game.

Given that the United States has vastly more resources than Japan, financially and population-wise, and has a significantly better physical situation for rocket experimentation and development, it hardly seems reasonable to me that they would be anything less than a major space power, if not necessarily as dominant as OTL.

Well, I expect it to be farther behind on the list than gross national product would suggest--that is, not second or third, more like sixth or seventh.

And it makes me sad.

Aside from admittedly "strange" ideological reasons for wanting the USA to establish a distinct alternative to the military services as kingpin and master coordinator of aerospace tech (I mean, in my head I was imagining a corps of female test pilots in Peace Dept service squaring off in war games with their male counterparts in regular Air Corps and Navy flyer uniforms...you know, Jackie Cochran and Amelia Earhart versus Jimmy Doolittle and Charlie Spaatz:p); I also hoped the Peace Dept connection might lead to the Americans forming non-military alliances with other nations that would make their efforts toward space travel internationally cooperative from the get-go--I never wanted to see so much an American program be first or even in the top four so much as the first big space achievements being part of an international team effort, with Americans in leading places there alongside Germans, Britons, French, Africans, Indians... I thought if such a strange thing as a technology-promoting Peace bureaucracy funded by US tax dollars could exist, it might catalyze the effort to reach and exploit space being truly international, of by and for, in principle, all humanity.

The way, say, science is. Or art.
 
Yet another 'Bravo!!' for Post #5352. The imagination and craftsmanship of Al-Umum al-Osmaniyya al-Muttahida exceeds even the hopes I had, and for this timeline my hopes are very high indeed. And, as others have said, even the discussion is great reading.
 

Sulemain

Banned
Al-Umum al-Osmaniyya al-Muttahida .

How does one go about pronouncing that?

I suspect that by ITTL 2014 various parts of the Ottoman Union will be in various international organisations. Some in the ALT EU, some in an ALT Arab Union, etc.
 
How does one go about pronouncing that?

I suspect that by ITTL 2014 various parts of the Ottoman Union will be in various international organisations. Some in the ALT EU, some in an ALT Arab Union, etc.

Actual pronounciation varies regionally quite a bit, not to mention the marked difference between Turkish and Arabic in that department, but I can give you an IPA transcription if you really care about it.
 
Actual pronounciation varies regionally quite a bit, not to mention the marked difference between Turkish and Arabic in that department, but I can give you an IPA transcription if you really care about it.

Should be like this (Classical Arabic) more or less: [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]əl'ʔʊmæm ʊlʕʊθmaː'nijːæt ʊlmʊ'tːɑħidæ[/FONT]
 
After leaving this thread for the past week and seeing everything that happened, all I can say is that this TL is awesome. :eek:

Still concerned about what's going on for Iran though. It looks like the liberals and conservatives might be willing to cooperate to overthrow the Shah, so that's a good outcome, relative to OTL.
 
The finer points of diplomacy

Ilorin, 1950:

UCqodqI.jpg

The house on Oyo Square had stood empty since Muhammadu Abacar’s fall from power. For more than a quarter-century, the floors had gathered dust, barricades of broken furniture had stood in front of the windows, and blood still stained the floor where Muhammadu had shot himself at the last. The air that had greeted Tiberio when he opened the door two months before had been stale and ghostly, and only now was the house starting to feel like home.

People still stopped Tiberio as he walked out the door and told him how good it was to have an Abacar in that house again. It wasn’t quite the same as in his grandfather’s day: once, the Malê had been the Abacar family’s people, and now they thought of the family as theirs. But people still wanted to shake his hand and touch him, tell him what a great man his grandfather had been, and ask him when he would run for parliament.

Never, if I have anything to say about it. Tiberio had no more interest in electoral politics in Ilorin than he had in Lagos, and he remembered his father’s words about Ilorin needing to free itself from their family. He was as much a politician as any businessman, but he hadn’t moved here to run for office as some believed; instead, at forty-four, he’d simply had enough of being a foreigner.

The square was full at this time of day: office workers from the government buildings were making their way to the trams, schoolchildren released from class were playing in the fountains, tourists in from the countryside were taking in the places where the nation’s fate had been decided and battles had been fought. There were the usual crowds of people around the Statue of the Founders – Usman dan Fodio, Paulo the Elder, the Nana Asma’u and Usman Abacar, all four of whom would have disapproved fiercely of their images being carved in stone – and the smell of suya and moin-moin came from a hundred stalls.

Tiberio escaped unnoticed into the crowd and bought a skewer of suya on his way to a side street. His route took him out of the center city, past the Portuguese Garden and along the banks of the Asa, through a district of Brazilian-style houses from the last century. They were colorful and well-kept, but most of them needed painting; he’d noticed that in Ilorin, everything needed repainting every three or four years. It was a city of boulevards and gardens, but it was also a city of factory smoke, and the upper stories of the office buildings sometimes disappeared into the haze.

Once upon a time, he’d been told, it was worse. The stone wall along the Asa was full of pipes and culverts where waste had once been dumped into the river. That had been illegal for twenty years, and the water no longer had the oily sheen it once had. Another law, a more recent one, required smoke and ash filters. But he wasn’t sure it was really better: chemicals still got into the ground and air, and found their way to the water by more subtle means. There were the beginnings of a response to this, too, but thus far it amounted to setting up waste dumps and piping water to villages where well water was unsafe; no one was quite sure how to stop the pollution without shutting down the factories.

At least they’re thinking about it. Tiberio had been in cities where no one did; after all, the people in industrial neighborhoods were usually poor. He’d been to others where environmental conservation was the province of those who had never been comfortable with industrial modernity in the first place. Thinking about how to manage growth, how to enrich the country without poisoning it, was something they’d been doing here longer than most other places, and most political parties paid at least lip service to Imam Umaru’s declaration.

Which has its inconvenient aspects, Tiberio admitted as he turned onto a side street and saw the lot where he hoped to build an electronics plant. There were two hundred people gathered there, even more than he’d expected: people who lived in that neighborhood, and who would vote on his permit. The vote would be tomorrow, which meant that the assembly-field was today, and the citizens of this district, who’d lived cheek by jowl with industry for three generations, were even more Imam Umaru’s disciples than most.

He reached the lot along with a dozen other latecomers, and stepped onto the makeshift platform that had been laid at one end. People called friendly greetings – few here would treat an Abacar as an enemy, and Tiberio didn’t have his grandfather’s reluctance to trade on his family name. That was what having a home was, wasn’t it? Being known by one’s neighbors and being part of a deep-rooted family?

But friendly as it might be, the assembly was serious about its business. In other places, Tiberio might have begun the proceedings with a speech, but these were Malê, and here, the people spoke first. A woman in the crowd questioned him about whether he would use gas power rather than coal; a young man asked if he would plant trees; an older one asked what kind of waste containment systems he was planning. Much of this wasn’t required by law, but the neighborhood assemblies were well ahead of the parliament, and if they rejected his permit, he’d be tied up in appeals for years.

“I’m happy to answer your questions,” he said at last, the Sudanic sounding strange in his ears after so many years of German and Swahili and English, “and those of you who met with me while I was preparing my permit application know that I take them very seriously. I’ve asked my construction engineer to come – here he is now – and he’ll explain our environmental plan…”

*******​
Benares, 1951:

Is8y8yY.jpg

The sound of fiacre horns and fireworks was everywhere, and even from his sixth-floor office, Ujjal Singh could hear the chanting of jubilant Janata Dal supporters. People were calling out party slogans, and others were shouting “Svatantratā divasa” or “Bharat Mata ki jai” – this was not only election day but the thirtieth anniversary of the recognition of India’s independence, and the Janata Dal voters were none-too-subtly equating Sikandar Bakht Bahadur’s fall with that of the Raj. Ujjal could only imagine how the Mughal partisans were taking that – there were surely fights going on in the city, and he hoped there wasn’t anything worse.

“Did you vote for the Mughal?” asked the man in front of the desk. “I’d say no. You don’t look sad enough. A Janata Dal man?”

“I voted Congress, actually – I’m not sad, but not very happy.” Ujjal walked over to the window and looked out at the celebrating voters. “All I wanted from this election was for it not to be Hindu against Muslim, and I got that.”

“I remember. A couple of the Mahasabha people tried to make it that, with the Mughal being who he was, but there were too many Hindus in the Mughal list…”

“And too many Muslims in the other parties. I can hope we’ve buried all that, though I still get scared every time someone tries to dig it up.” Ujjal paced across the room one more time and sat down. “All right, Sangat, tell me why you’re here.”

“You do a lot of business in East Africa…”

“Yes.”

“Do you know anyone in Kismayo? I’m looking for land there.”

“Land? In Kismayo? I can get you all you want, if you don’t mind it being outside the city. But what for?”

“Kismayo’s ours now…”

“It’s a free city.”

Our free city. I’d like to get in at the beginning.”

“Fine. But why land? I can get you a warehouse and offices, and I can set you up trading with the Somalis or Kenia, but you don’t need land of your own for that, and it’ll take twenty years of infrastructure-building before you’re ready to build a factory.”

Sangat Ram listened, but he was smiling. “Remember those rockets Russia used during the war? The ones that could go halfway across China?”

“Yes, but…”

“They’re working on one that can carry a fission bomb now. So are the French and Germans, and probably half a dozen others. Including India.”

“And we’ll build them in Kismayo?”

“Not build them, launch them. And not right away. We don’t need Kismayo for missiles. But the first thing the French futurists thought of when they saw the Russian rockets was putting men into space. That’s practically holy writ to them, given how Verne figures in their founding myth. And for that, you want a site close to the equator. Kismayo’s as close as it gets, and when we start sending men to space twenty or thirty years from now, wouldn’t it be good if there’s a site ready to hand?”

“And of course they’ll build it on your land, rather than the thousands of other hectares of scrubland they can get for free.”

“Well, you said it would take twenty years to build infrastructure. If I built it ahead of time, then where do you think the government would put its launch site – and which contractor do you think they’ll hire to build the facilities?”

“Maybe,” Ujjal conceded. “In the meantime, it’ll be a money sink for twenty years, maybe even thirty.”

“But in twenty years, imagine the profits!”

“In twenty years I might be dead.”

“Nonsense. They say with all the medical miracles we’re seeing these days, everyone will live to ninety or a hundred.”

“They also say we’ll all go to work on flying buses.”

“Maybe, maybe. But even so, you’ve got the company, and you have children. You’re making a public stock offering in a couple of months – you can afford to burn a little money now for a fortune later. Especially if I can get the Germans to throw in on the infrastructure – Kismayo’s a lot closer than New Britain, and it’s more stable than Madagascar.”

“Yes, Sangat, I do have money. One of the reasons I have money is that I try not to throw it away.” But Ujjal had risen from his chair and was looking out the window again. “I’ll tell you what. I’ll buy you the land – you won’t have to pay an anna for it – and I’ll handle the diplomacy with the Somalis and Germans. But for that, and nothing more, I get eight percent. And another five percent for the Somali partners I line up for you – trust me, you don’t want them saying they were cut out of the deal.”

At least some of that five percent, Sangat knew, would find its way back to Akhtar & Singh, and Ujjal’s own commission was a high one, even with his local connections. But dusk was falling, and he had his eyes fixed on the stars, and given time, so would Ujjal.

“I have to take it back to my partners. But I think they’ll agree.”

*******​
Saint-Lunaire, 1953:

AjJHUF5.jpg

Funmilayo walked for seven miles along the shore, past the lighthouses and fishing villages. She’d taken to doing that every morning in good weather; it filled the extra hours in the day after her retirement from the corps législatif, and it concentrated her mind now that she was writing again. That, and she’d lost fifteen kilos.

She turned onto the lane that led back to her house, and saw that Gilles Cariou was standing there. He and his wife lived across the way, and took care of the house when she wasn’t there, but she didn’t usually see them on her land unless she’d invited them for a meal.

“Demat deoc'h, Madame Touré,” he said. Such formality wasn’t common any more, even here in Brittany, but there were families the Red Twenty hadn’t touched.

“Trugarez,” she answered, with equal formality. “Demat deoc'h.”

Gilles smiled; he still did, even after all this time, when he heard her speak Breton. She’d become fluent these past few years. She divided her retirement between Paris, Dorset and Brittany, but she’d come to spend most of her time here; there was something about the Bretons’ independent streak that pleased her Malê soul.

Regional cultures are a right-wing cause these days, she reflected, not for the first time. Maybe I’m becoming reactionary in my old age. Or maybe – again, not for the first time – I wasn’t always right about what I called progressive.

“There’s someone in your yard,” Gilles said. “She came by about half an hour ago. I told her you weren’t there, but she said she’d wait.”

“Do you know who?”

“She said you’d know her.” It seemed Gilles knew more than he was telling, but Funmi was tired, and she let it pass. She’d find out in a minute, so she said “trugarez” again and walked the rest of the way up the lane.

She did know the woman sitting in a chair behind the house. She hadn’t been expecting visitors, but to be fair, the other woman’s summer house wasn’t far away. Even if it wasn’t yet summer.

“Sit down. Don’t blame Monsieur Cariou; I swore him to secrecy. I brought a bottle of calvados from my Norman estate – I hope you don’t mind.”

Funmi didn’t; the days when she would have refused a drink were long in the past. The apple brandy was seven years old, and its warmth spread through her as she settled.

“You’ve lost weight,” the other woman said. “Could stand to drop another twenty, though.” It wasn’t an insult; it was the honest statement of an old friend, and she was right. Funmi was still over a hundred kilos, and would probably always be.

“I’ve been a mother eight times, Marianne, and I enjoy living well. Did you come here to scold me, or is there another reason?”

“We could talk about your novel.”

“The Igbo Women’s War one? Certainly. But after. I don’t care for small talk with business hanging overhead, even when I’m writing about the past and not the future.”

“Who says there’s… oh, never mind. I’d like you to go to Washington.”

“As part of the French delegation?” Funmi asked cautiously.

“No, not as an official member…”

“Who would I represent, after all?”

“… but I need a liaison between the official mission and the other French delegations.”

If Marianne had expected Funmi to be surprised, she was disappointed. “The West Africans…”

“The Algerians too. The Corsicans, and the Bretons.”

“But not the Alsatians. And not the Occitans, at least not yet.” Funmi waited for the other woman’s nod; evidently, what she’d been hearing wasn’t wrong. “Do you expect them to seek autonomy there?”

“No. I expect them to seek it here, but they’ll lay the groundwork there and make their alliances. I’d like to know what they have in mind, and how they’re planning to get it. It’ll be the parliament’s decision, of course, but I expect I won’t be without influence. You know the politics there…”

“So do plenty of other people.”

“They’re partisan. You’re not, anymore.”

“Mostly.” Funmi held the cup in her hand and considered. “If you have influence, which way will you use it?”

“I’m… not certain,” Marianne admitted. “For Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, the only thing I’m concerned with is that the people make a fair choice. But Corsica, even Algeria – there are so many conflicting claims. They want to be their own nation and part of ours too…”

She filled her cup again. “I’ve heard that the Jews are also sending their own delegates. A nation spread throughout the world. Tell me, Funmi, how does one serve that many masters?”

“I’ve managed.” But Funmi knew there was more to the question than that. She’d been able to keep her multiple nationalities through a fluke of French law – foreign titles were permissible, and her right to retain her rank in the nobility of Ife, and the Oyo and British Empire citizenship that accompanied it, had never been challenged – but most Frenchmen weren’t comfortable with such things, and Marianne shared that discomfort. “We’re going back to the Middle Ages in that way, Marianne, and there were rules for sorting out the obligations of vassals who served more than one lord. I expect we’ll work out something similar, where we haven’t already.”

“But if the Jews are a nation, and also citizens of where they live, what happens if France and Germany go to war? What side will the Jews be on?”

“Maybe they’ll be the ones who reach across and stop the war. You’re sending me to Washington because I stand between worlds, aren’t you? I think we all will, a hundred years from now, not just the Jews.”

“Touché. Maybe it’s like women wearing trousers – something I’ll have to get used to, even if it doesn’t seem natural. These things have a way of becoming natural for the next generation.”

Funmilayo, who was wearing trousers, let that pass. “The Corsicans and the Bretons don’t want to serve two masters.”

“No, they don’t. But they want to change what France is, and that will affect all of us, not only them. Change can be for the better… but it has to be done carefully, and with a thought to the whole.”

“They know that.”

You know that. I’m not as sure about them. Which is why I want you there. You’re part of many worlds: make sure they plan their changes in a way that won’t shatter any of them…”
 
That's me!:)

You may note I keep going back to the Mexican/Central America invasion fiasco of the 1910s, the Lodge Administration's dirty little war. I figure the backlash from it was rather bitter. It was polarizing, the President behaved high-handedly, the results were inglorious and shameful. So I figure it had an impact on the US of the time like Vietnam and Watergate did OTL, and the post-Lodge years (for at least a presidential term, maybe several) were kind of like the 1970s of OTL. Except that OTL, during that backlash time, the Soviet Union remained a huge and credible threat. ITTL, despite Lodge's tantrum of a war presumably alienating Mexico and the northern tier of Latin America in general, no one posed more than a theoretical, potential threat--so the recourse of slashing back the military was wide open and presumably resorted to to some extent.

And take a good look at just how desultory the US military was OTL between wars before WWII. The Army and its Air Corps were on life support in the 1920s and well into the 30s. The Navy had more friends and more consistent support--but now consider the difference between the timelines--OTL we had imperial commitments to maintain in the Philippines and Panama, as well as more integral territories (I've lost track of Alaska too:eek:; I think it is US having been purchased under Lincoln ("Seward's Folly":p) paralleling OTL--Russia would have been in similar circumstances and the USA an even more credible buyer considering the Union government settled the Civil War a year earlier) such as Hawaii; ITTL only Alaska perhaps and as a replacement of all others, the Bahamas, come under that rubric.

It's true that the 1920s and 1930s were very dark years for the military, but there was a huge confluence of factors at that time that made it so. Besides the enormous backlash from World War I (and Lodge's war is not going to provoke anything like the same response), there were, as you note, international treaties that effectively restricted military spending, and during the 1930s there was of course the Great Depression.

And despite all this the government did not give up on innovation and developing new technology! NACA was not defunded despite the antiwar feeling of the late 1910s, and considerable amounts were spent on research and development by both the government and private industry. The United States had, by 1939, a large navy, including modern carriers and submarines, with innovative technology being developed for the fleet (such as the infamous Mark VI torpedo detonator; although seriously flawed, it should be recognized for what it was, a significant investment in advanced technology); it was developing or had technically advanced aircraft, quite on par with the rest of the world, including several very capable bombers (the B-17 of course had been in service for some time, and the B-24 and B-29 were already beginning to see the light of day); and it was procuring a semi-automatic rifle for infantrymen, one of the first countries to abandon the bolt-action. Precisely because they did not have many resources, and precisely because they knew that if they were involved in a major war they would have to hold with what they had while men were recruited and trained and manufacturing plants spun up, they were keenly interested in advanced technology, hoping to use it to even the odds and to make sure that if they did have to fight a war of materiel, it would be good materiel.

If anything, this would be even more true in Johnathan's timeline, because there are more possible enemies (the Navy, in particular, had a rather monomaniacal focus on Japan for several decades, which is less likely to be the case here), because the United States has never been involved in a world war and hence does not really have a good understanding of what's required, and because the United States has no buffers past the oceans, particularly in the Pacific. To maximize the use of their limited budget, advanced and capable technology is a must, as is focusing on the Navy and the Air Force to protect the homeland while the military is built (just as OTL).

During the interwar period, despite penny-pinching economies, the notion that the US Navy should be "second to none" did not die and the taxpayer ponied up to approximate parity with the mighty Royal Navy. But also the government sought to put a cap on the cost of realizing such ambitions by seeking global arms limitations with the financially straitened British were keen to cooperate with--leaving powers like Japan to cavil at being assigned an officially second-tier place.

Now look at TTL--some Americans may dream of the glory of matching the RN, but they are clearly going to be outvoted by others who for various reasons will regard that as extravagant.

I don't see why this would "clearly" be true. World War I IOTL played a significant part in reducing public dislike for the British, who had been traditional American enemies. Without that, and with the Imperial period showing that the British could at the drop of a hat become dangerously unstable, it's unlikely that "second to none" would have no draw as a slogan. Would there be a substantial constituency against it? Of course, but you seem to be assuming that the American population has become much more pacifistic than is in evidence; after all, they did get sucked into Lodge's war, and they do intervene in the world (as evidenced by the number of international conferences taking place in the United States!). There would equally be quite a substantial number of people who would think that having a strong military--one "second to none"--is the best way to protect the United States and American interests abroad, even if they don't want to conquer colonial territories. As we have seen in the modern world, one does not have to be a territorial colonizer to have colonies, if you get my drift, and the Caribbean and Central America are still proximate and rich with American interests...

It seems only logical to me that the USN, while it will figure in the lists of the top ten or even top five navies in the world, will not be nearly as large as OTL--maybe half or even a third the size it was at any given time OTL--and smaller than that after 1940! I'd guess we'd keep parity with say the French Navy, maybe say 2/3 the total French strength in the Atlantic Fleet and match that with the Pacific Fleet to have a net edge.

Obviously the United States Navy is going to be smaller than that after 1940, that was during an active war! But I strongly doubt that it will be significantly smaller than OTL's strength, relative to the other powers; in reality, there was a tacit understanding of sorts between the United States and Britain (and hence France) prior to the war, and of course the Washington Naval Treaties, leaving it to square off against only the relatively puny Italian, German, and Soviet navies, and the powerful Japanese one. Here, there is no such understanding; the United States is not aligned with any power. And even if it were, there are far more powers in far more alignments to have to deal with. Russia might have shrunk its navy under Tolstoy, almost assuredly would in fact, but historically they were a major naval power from Peter the Great on (the 1920s and '30s being, again, an exception) and his successors would assuredly seek to resume their third-place position; China would be growing its navy to protect its coastline and intervene abroad; the Japanese Navy wasn't tainted during their invasion of Korea and will remain large; India is a power to watch for; the British, as always, have a large fleet and, with the Imperialists, have shown that they cannot be trusted to remain necessarily pacific; the French could never make up their minds about being a naval power or not; Germany surely has quite a navy given its colonial interests and the fact that Wilhelm II was in power for so long. And that's discounting the Mediterranean powers, who the United States Navy might indirectly have to fight, depending on what happens.

No, there is a strong argument for a large Navy, and unlike the Army the Navy is not much of an instrument for colonialism of the vulgar territorial sort. America will be a naval power, that's assured.

I don't see any power in the world seeking to have a navy much bigger than France's except of course for the Commonwealth. China might aspire but would be too backward to plausibly pose a threat until just a decade or so before the war with Russia flares up. Americans aren't going to worry seriously about the Ottomans or Indians; maybe the Russians or Germans if they went on a naval spree but it doesn't seem either power did.

As I said, the Russians were, under the Tsars considered the number three naval power IOTL. It had been a priority since Peter the Great. Tolstoy would not have made the navy a priority, of course, but I can hardly expect the sort of people who would pick a war with China to ignore it. Similarly, as I said, Germany has a widespread colonial empire and was ruled by Wilhelm II for many decades; it will surely have quite a navy itself, even if it doesn't aspire to the heights it did IOTL.

The USA is safe, and will not be lacking voices claiming the safety is due in part to forging a minimum of swords and a maximum of plowshares.

And there will be plenty of others claiming it's not safe, or that its safety depends on the maintenance of a powerful military. Pacifists have won some of the battles, the most important ones, but they haven't won all of them, and they're not going to. The events of the timeline have shown that war still exists, and that some means of dealing with it is still necessary.

ICBMs do change the picture. I've put the case before why I disbelieved there would be a wave of developing jet intercontinental bombers--that jet tech would be developed in a more desultory fashion, devoted mainly to "defensive" fighter-interceptors rather than "offensive" bombers--this generally across the world, but it would retard the USA along these lines--support for developing jet airliners might actually be frowned upon because it might look like an under-the-table bomber project

That's unlikely, because jets are clearly going to be the wave of the future in air transport--they are, after all, quieter, faster, cheaper to maintain, and more efficient (after a bit of development) than piston-engined aircraft--because other countries are also going to be developing jets, and because the firms developing jets are going to be private companies, not national champions. If anything, the development of jet bombers is likely to be sped up a bit, because the big drawbacks of early jet bombers--their limited range--is irrelevant to their usage in Europe, where most of the early powers that could develop them are located.

I tried to provide for a distinctly alternate one, one that in the spirit of the eagle on the Great Seal of the USA that has its eyes on the olive branch in one talon but arrows at the ready in the other, signals to the world that all the tech the US government patronizes is meant for peaceful applications--but if someone is foolish enough to think the Americans are too soft to defend themselves, the same Peace Dept mandate that prevents the first application of new tech to be to war machines also stands ready to step aside and let the generals and admirals roll up their sleeves and order the latest weapons by the trainload. Because they exist on paper, and have been tested, and plans drawn up to convert the factories to make them are continually being made as well by the same firms currently turning out what is probably the single greatest civil aeronautical output in the world (US geography favoring that industry) and automotive and such output matched only by Germany, if by them.

In other words, you would have the same OTL situation as the 1920s or 1930s, when the United States Navy and United States Army Air Forces were at the global cutting edge for precisely those reasons, so that what forces they had (and, again, they were not insubstantial; the argument of "Si vis pacem, para bellum" will be as powerful here as anywhere else) could fight while factories churned out designs on par with the

I felt that if there were no strong mandate to ostensibly peaceful purposes then ITTL anything like NACA would be opposed by a coalition of penny-pinchers and pacifists, and both would be stronger than OTL.[/quote]

But there is a strong mandate for peaceful purposes, ensuring competitiveness in aviation. If the Lodge administration did create such a thing, it would surely have been sold at least as much for ensuring that American aviation technology caught up with that of France, Germany, or Britain, and stayed level with it in the future, in order to promote the aeronautical industry of the United States. Certainly, this has benefits in war; it means that the United States will be well-prepared. But it has obvious pacific utility as well, in promoting the competitiveness of the American aviation industry. You might want to read Roger Launius' new book on space commerce, which discusses NACA in some detail (and has a lot of footnotes for further sources).

Now that the missile age is suddenly upon the world, and the memory of Lodge's War faded to historical footnotes, I suppose that all of a sudden a whole lot of people might wonder why the US has no government support for high technology--but the nation will surely suffer for coming from behind.

But that simply isn't true. The government has always supported high technology in one fashion or another. In one era it was granting land to rail entrepreneurs to help them develop their networks; in another, it was setting up research institutes to carry out the basic science needed to enable the development of aviation. More subtly, the land-grant system (surely created here as well) created a fine network of universities, ensuring that the United States would have a plentiful supply of trained scientists and engineers to carry out scientific research. It's not for nothing that luminaries like Robert Goddard, Richard Feynman, or Jonas Salk were American.

Jonathan has mentioned how, between many of the iconic technologies of the 20th century being gas-burners and being invented ten years earlier, and more publics prosperous enough to buy them earlier too, the rate of fuel consumption has been higher in this world, and the crash will come sooner.

Of course not everyone believes that the OTL oil crisis of the early 1970s had much to do with actual shortages already happening by then. But insofar as they may actually have been, at least to depletion of major reserves of some nations--expect them earlier, before 1960 I'd say.

They had nothing to do with depletion of reserves, as proved by the collapse in prices after 1980 and the fact that the countries whose restriction of output caused the crisis (ie., OPEC) are continuing to pump oil today, in great quantities too. They were an entirely geopolitical event, and given the vastly different geopolitics of the Male world cannot be expected to recur. Increases in oil prices may be expected, of course, but the secular trend will be for a relatively gradual slope like the one that took place from the late 1990s to today, with prices rising two to four-fold depending on when you start the clock. Not a sudden shock, but a gradual squeeze...

But you can't consider Japan of OTL after 1945 as a normally independent country. Under terms of their surrender to the Allies and embedded in their postwar constitution, Japan cannot have armed forces (just a "Self-Defense Force"). But that was because they were under Allied supervision, and the single Ally effectively occupying them was the USA. With the coming of the Cold War the Americans suddenly found the Japanese a very useful and necessary counterweight to China in the region; found her industrial potential needed in building up the general strength of the Western alliance Japan was perforce a member of, and this reinforced the Allied--that is to say, practically speaking, the US--commitment to defend them. A commitment that continues to this day.

Which simply tends to reinforce my point. Clearly the United States in Male is not going to lack for domestic industry; they have no need to "build up" (and it's worth noting, again, that Japan was by no means an economic or industrial powerhouse in the 1950s and 1960s, when this work was being done), and they have a tremendous scientific and technological infrastructure. A Japanese university, without an enormous governmental program, without extensive utilization of a military-industrial complex, was able to by itself become a reasonably competitive space program (if you look at what just ISAS did before it was folded into JAXA in 2003, it constituted a reasonably capable space program on its own, with multiple cutting-edge astronomical and planetary missions, and an independent launch vehicle design. If the United States can't match that, I'll eat my hat (well, I don't have a hat).

Relieved of the cost of supporting a major military of their own, the Japanese can bring more tax revenue (and shared, coordinated commitment of private resources along government-indicated paths, something carried over also from pre-war Japanese post-Meiji culture) to bear on non-military projects.

And...the United States is not burdened with a large military here, allowing it to bring more tax revenue to bear on matching competitors in space. Pacifists, at least, will probably applaud fighting the Great Powers in visceral single space challenges rather than actual bloody conflict.

The USA of this timeline is in no such position; it isn't maintaining a virtual MIC in disguised form on behalf of a hegemonic power that restricts but also supports it; they are just plain hicks when it comes to playing this game.

And that isn't necessary. The United States didn't do a thing to help the Japanese get into space. It did, indirectly and directly, help to get them farther faster, it's true; after all, for a time the Japanese licensed the Delta rocket, before developing their own, and Kibo would never have flown without the United States. But Japan could have developed their own launch vehicles without the United States, and not flying their own space stations and astronauts has more to do with a lack of funding than a lack of technical capability--and at that that has more to do with politics and the general lack of interest in expansive space spending than anything else.

I never wanted to see so much an American program be first or even in the top four so much as the first big space achievements being part of an international team effort, with Americans in leading places there alongside Germans, Britons, French, Africans, Indians... I thought if such a strange thing as a technology-promoting Peace bureaucracy funded by US tax dollars could exist, it might catalyze the effort to reach and exploit space being truly international, of by and for, in principle, all humanity.

The way, say, science is. Or art.
International efforts will assuredly arise, just as IOTL, but they will be preceded by national ones, and the catalyzation will arise mostly from the fact that no one can afford to explore space on their own to any great extent, barring unexpected events like the Space Race.
 
Great update as usual.
I am afraid that an updated Abacar family tree would be helpful to track the newer generations.
 
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