LEVIATHAN Rising: An Alternative Space Age

Specifically "submarine-launched ballistic missile". Up until August 1955, the Navy was institutionally highly skeptical of the feasibility of using ballistic missiles afloat (be it on surface vessels or submersibles), when Arleigh Burke became Chief of Naval Operations. Burke was very keen to get into ballistic missiles, specifically on submarines, and signed the Navy up to co-develop the PGM-19 Jupiter by the end of 1955. The Nobska Exercises/Study, which really did change the Navy's institutional culture on ballistic missiles and really got them on-board with wanting ballistic missile submarines, didn't come until the following year. Within a year of Nobska the Navy was dropping out of Jupiter co-development and initiating the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, that would produce Polaris.

Understood that but there was a point prior to that that Bob was getting some interest in the sea-launch idea :) The "institutional" skepticism actually had a good basis given their experience trying to launch a V2 from a carrier. (And then building a carrier deck in the middle of Nevada and essentially blowing one up a hundred feet above said deck and the horror that caused :) )

I've looked high and low for a pre-NASA Navy study that includes a moon-base and have never been able to find one. You wouldn't happen to have a link to where I could find it? Because sharing is caring.

I would if I could and that's why I phrased it that way because while I've seen it referenced but not a clue on anything more solid. I envy TTL because those records ARE going to exits and have several really prominent people more than willing to share :)

To have nice allohistorical things, sometimes our nice OTL things need to be sacrificed. It could be worse, you know. At least von Braun hasn't been thrown under a bus.

...yet.

::::Sigh::: I know, I've got notes on several possible "Von Braun dies early and/or has no influence on the US rocket development" myself. The fun thing with the Saturn 1 was it was a kludge that worked quite well and had a massive amount of potential that was never really given a chance. Having a recoverable and reusable booster stage by about 1965 has some pretty big butterflies after all :)

I have a finite quantity of authorium, good sir, which is acquired only by garnering the audience's buy-in. And I am saving mine for a time when it is only slightly less weird to spin in my chair and shout "ENCELADUS BY 1970 WOOOOOOO!"

As long as it's for a good cause :)

Randy
 
Now that would have been a most melodious gnashing of teeth.

Heh-he :D

Good gracious.
As to the MX-1593...better, but still fairly limited, no? You really want something other than balloon tanks (both in terms of it being a maintenance nightmare, but also because otherwise you can't take advantage of Uncle Sam's Special Skill in Solids). LDC kerolox Titan or bust.

There apparently were always plans for later models to have more internal structure as materials science and engine hardware improved. Oddly the way the booster thrust structure worked you could pretty easily get away with using SRB's that 'lifted' from the bottom with minimal connections at the top for boosting. I've got notes on them going a bit wild and working a RENE (Rocket Engine Nozzle Ejector) system onto the Big Atlas as an early booster concept.

I am by no means a Heinlein expert, but I would be very surprised if Campbell pushed him (or, honestly, anyone) left. And wasn't his involvement in EPIC (and in Social Credit) well before he got involved in writing? Staying in the Navy as an officer it's likely though by no means certain (see also: whether his marriage survives) he'll trend more conservative than he was in the thirties IOTL, but it's unclear to me that he'll end up more conservative than he did in the end. Weird in a different way, though? Certainly.

Campbell's rather "hard-right-but-libertarian" formula tended to grate on Heinlein's nerves as the characters were shallow and quite often the story was forgettable and formulaic to the extreme. Like how he burned out on the Teen-Juveniles he found himself "writing-down" which he felt insulted his audience as well as himself. But a paycheck is a paycheck after all. Not to get into to modern of detail but it's a lot like Baen today with a lot of early writers distancing themselves due to the hard-right turn of the publisher.

Once outside the Navy Heinlein opened up to his more liberal side and this because even more pronounced once the Great Depression hit. But again a paycheck is a paycheck and for everything he put out for Campbell he seemed to take a bit of pleasure in turning
even more center-left :)
Yes please! Lockheed can have SUNTAN.

Problem is the Navy really wasn't interested due to the single engine and rather short range... And yet the turned around and bough the Skyhawk...

Of all the craft that could have used a Spaceship One style shuttlecock tail...the reentry plan for that thing scares me. 100% eyeballs-out, too.

If you don't point the nose at the ground and MEAN it how is the airplane supposed to really understand you want to go down now? Simple aerodynamics after all :)

I also have been unable to find a firmer cite for that study, though I recall reading about it as well. It's quite frustrating.

Horribly actually, I mean this was supposed to be the 'catalyst' that stirred up the whole early US missile and rocket program even more than reports of the V2 and yet there's nada I can find on it....

As for HATV...yes. Don't think anyone's done a proper TL on it. Way more plausible than all the A-9/A-10/A-11/A-12 napkinwaffe, IMO, though still an uphill climb.

And finding out that Curtiss "the Mad Bomber" LeMay was not only the early advocate but personally initiated the study and pushed the results!

Arguably the only way forward is if Truman is not FDR's VP as his budget cuts were the big problem. You can make a case that development can be 'restarted' if Dewey wins in '48, (he was upfront about his plans to increase military spending across the board and raise top-tier taxes again if need be and had broad Republican support) but even though it's only been two years since most of the rocket programs have been shut down it was a hard shutdown so it will be a few more years to ramp back up in any case. OTL they had to wait until 1950 and Korea to re-start anything but that still gives you a little over two extra years of work.
(And then again Korea is a lot less likely in this case)

Something to keep in mind is that WVB and company were NOT brought to the US for their expertise but to pretty much ensure the Russian's didn't grab them. The continual failures of the V2's under their guidance did not inspire confidence, (and the fact they had had little actual contact with the construction process so missed the various sabotage methods included in the captured V2s) only increased the pressure to simply keep them locked away till their knowledge was stale and then let them go. The US had already surpassed their work by 1945 and by 1946 we had already been testing more advanced rockets and engines before the financial bottom fell out and everything shut down. When Korea came around the Air Force had already corralled most of the big contractors for their projects so the Army, as always, looked to create an in-house' development group and it made sense to use WVB and provide them with updated knowledge and equipment and see what they could do.

The Redstone was essentially an Americanized V2 but WVB had always hoped for more from it and even got some in making the Jupiter A and C models. He finally got to shine with the Jupiter but fate was stacked against it. Saturn specifically came about from needing to find a way to keep his team together and general interest in a possible big booster...

Speaking of:
It's unclear to me that the Navy would have dropped out of Jupiter without Teller's comment at Nobska regarding shrinking thermonuclear warhead weight to ~600lb. What we probably would have gotten would have been something a bit larger than the R-13, and hypergolic because it for sure would have been (and wouldn't that have been a nightmare, as the Soviets repeatedly learned), and with a lower range than the original Jupiter, but a 20-30t liquid IRBM would have juuuust fit in the Navy's dimensional budget for an alt-GW-class boomer. Whether they could convince ABMA to accept the lower range from that reduced size is less clear. It would have had to be liquid, because a solid motor of that diameter would not have been a reasonable prospect at that point; Polaris and Minuteman were bleeding-edge.

One of the things the Navy regretted about leaving the Jupiter program was that while they didn't actually BELIEVE the Army/WVB the baseline accuracy of the Jupiter was supposed to be vastly better than any other missile. And they didn't fully bow out till it was clear that the proposed Jupiter-S (solid) wasn't going to be much smaller than the liquid Jupiter. On the other hand it turned out that the Army and WVB were actually right in that the Jupiter was actually a lot more accurate, so much so that when push came to shove the Air Force was required to field BOTH the Thor and Jupiter, much to their annoyance.
(And anything that annoys the Air Force of course :) )

Interestingly when the decision to take IRBM's away from the Army and give them to the Air Force was made the Army actually offered to finish Jupiter development and then make them for the Air Force to use. The Air Force (Schriever specifically) declined and said it was "naive" to think the Army would in good faith build missiles for the Air Force but in fact it was specifically to keep WVB and company engaged and active so the Army was dead serious. (And mind you the Air Force's "Thor" missile which was essentially built using Jupiter parts, was having so much development trouble and cost overruns there was a danger that higher powers would cancel the program. As noted the official decision was for them to field both)

Because Polaris was a totally separate program from Jupiter it got none of the benefits of but if you can find a way to combine the two programs then early Polaris becomes a lot more useful.

EDIT: I make that case because I don't think the Navy would have accepted the A3D (and P6M, maybe) as enough access to the nuclear club.

They didn't because in a straight up 'argument' with the Air Force both those do nothing really other than duplicate Air Force operations. They embraced SLBM because it was an obvious 'alternative' means of nuclear delivery and had obvious advantages over manned bombers or land based ICBMs. The down side was the early Polaris was so inaccurate that the Air Force suggested their only use was to blow holes in the Soviet air defense net to let manned bombers through. So the Navy claimed the Polaris was more accurate than it was and spent a lot of time and money making that a reality.

Now part of the problem is the inertial guidance platform and part is the issue of figuring out exactly where the sub is in relation to the target at launch. Now if you toss in satellite navigation systems and guidance updates in flight through satellite communications...

I mean, given what happened to Malina and Hsue-Shen Tsien happened after the POD (which was in 1931), it's possible they're still around. Even if it's massively unlikely.

If someone outside the Army (who McCarthy claimed was riddled with Communists) stood up for them they might still be around.

I've been trying to keep the butterflies from a surviving Heinleinian naval career few and off-screen for the most part, because this kind of TL is at its best when it's playing things mostly straight and chronicling generally small changes that fulfill our dreams of space cadetery. (Atomic midshipping?) One of the things I've really, really wanted to play with is Heinlein's remaining in the Navy ends up in a series of personnel changes in which the Hyde Park Agreement ends up being filed where it's supposed to and there's a durable, persistent Anglo-American nuclear cooperative. (The Trilateral Atomic Energy Commission, for the added bonus of a Trilateral Commission really being behind the world's ills!) Given that it fundamentally rewrites the history of British post-war military and foreign policy, though, that's not really in keeping with the spirit of things.

Britannia still rules the waves while America rules the skies! What's not to like? :)

(As awesome as it would be to have the Churchill International Spaceport at the Anglo-American Sea Dragon staging lagoon in Guiana.)

Ah yes, the one Greenpeace blocks every flight because each launch kills everything in the South Atlantic? (I mean really did anyone here NOT laugh a bit when "FAM" announced a Seadragon launch "30 miles south-west of Guam"?)

Never give up on a good idea, though. I still want that delicious, delicious free delta-v from being closer to the Equator than Canaveral.

Ya Johnston island and Midway are still on my list :)

Randy
 
Chapter 8: Project Vanguard of the Proletariat [August 1955]
Chapter 8: Project Vanguard of the Proletariat
The Ad Hoc Committee on Special Capabilities was, in theory, like the dozens of other inter-service boards, bureaus, and task forces in the Pentagon. It was supposed to be a clearing house for the exchange of information and the coordination of policy relating to the various Pentagon programs which did not neatly fit any existing institutional checkbox. (In this instance, selecting a program to launch the country’s first artificial satellite.) In practice – also like the dozens of other inter-service boards, bureaus, and task forces in the Pentagon – it was just another arena for territorial jockeying, occasionally decorated with the trappings of a kangaroo court and leavened with just a hint of palace intrigue.

In May 1955, President Eisenhower had tapped Homer Stewart with chairing a committee to be composed of two representatives from each of the three services as well as two civilian designees appointed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles. The Committee’s task was to select a program with which to launch the first artificial satellite to commemorate the International Geophysical Year, which was to commence on July 1, 1957. It should have been a fairly straight-forward task, as there were only two proposals from the services: Project Orbiter, a joint Army-Navy proposal to place a payload from the Naval Research Laboratory’s Department of Rocketry into orbit using a Jupiter-C rocket versus Project World Series, an Air Force program to place an as yet undetermined payload into orbit using an Atlas rocket. Given the comparative maturity of the Jupiter-C relative to Atlas and the Department of Rocketry’s years of experience with Project BOWDITCH, it should have been an easy choice for the Committee.

The presence of Project Vanguard, however, threw whatever simplicity might have been hoped for into a cocked hat.

The brainchild of Richard Porter and Joseph Kaplan – both of whom were, appropriately enough, ASECDEF Quarles’ designees – Project Vanguard would see the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics place a satellite into orbit using a new rocket, the Vanguard, with the payload coming from either the National Science Foundation or Naval Research Laboratory. Vanguard was the result of an in-house project at NACA Langley to continue development of Milton Rosen’s Viper 3 concept following the Department of Rocketry’s proceeding with development of the rival Tethys program. Vanguard’s advantages were the same as the Viper 3’s, being as it was an evolution of already several fairly mature systems and it could therefore be brought to a flyable state cheaply and quickly. This made, Kaplan and Porter argued, Vanguard superior economically to both Projects Orbiter and World Series while not being any slower to launch-readiness than Orbiter. Vanguard also had the benefit of being entirely civilian with no involvement from any ex-Nazis.

It was at this time that inter-service politics derailed the work of the Committee. As, on the first ballot, the Army voted for Orbiter; the Air Force for World Series; the civilians for Vanguard; and the Navy, with a foot in each of the Orbiter and Vanguard camps, split and leaving the Committee divided 3-2-3. On the second-ballot, the Air Force – sensing World Series would not be chosen and relishing playing kingmaker – swung its support behind Vanguard, which should have given Vanguard a majority of the eight-man Committee. However, upon the Air Force’s doing that, the Navy’s representatives fell in entirely with Orbiter, which was the Navy’s true preference, leaving the Committee deadlocked at 4-4. Stewart, exercising his tie-breaking vote as the Committee’s chairman, voted for Orbiter and a referral of that selection was made to the President. Which was when, on a bright early August morning, DEPSECDEF Anderson got the pleasure of hearing the entire sordid story from a profoundly unhappy President Eisenhower.

As what the President found himself grappling with was the profound stench of Pentagon politics associated with the whole affair. As by rights, NACA should not have been involved in any of this, as it had never formally submitted any manner of proposal for consideration by the Committee. NACA had, rather, gotten their seat at the table by virtue of the prominence of Kaplan and Porter in the space and rocketry communities, who just so happened to know about this idea NACA had and were gracious enough to pass it along for the Committee’s consideration. Having been around Pentagon procurement politics for his entire professional life, the President recognized this as a classic setup. It worked by a party innocuously leading a competent governmental agency to that party’s preferred solution, which that interested party purposefully laid out to be found and adopted. As it was obvious someone brought Viper 3 to NACA and there was no reason not to think Kaplan and Porter were not up to their eyeballs in that. And it was a hell of a coincidence that the man whom the President had just tapped to be the next Secretary of the Air Force just so happened to select the two men best in a position to lobby for Vanguard’s inclusion into consideration and advocate for its selection.

DEPSECDEF Anderson found himself a bit perplexed by the President’s unhappiness. Certainly, the Air Force’s fingerprints seemed to be all over getting Vanguard considered, but at the end of the day Stewart’s commission had recommended the selection of Orbiter. The President’s first concern, Anderson learned, was that if the Air Force was engaged in the kind of intrigue it seemed to be, over such a small thing, just what was going to happen when big things started coming up? The Air Force’s possessiveness of space was going to be problem that likely needed dealing with sooner rather than later. As it seemed that what was motivating the Air Force’s involvement was equal parts general desire to cut-out the other services and its continued unhappiness with the resolution of the funding of Tethys. And if the Air Force was willing to meddle as appeared the Air Force had, it could be reasonably assumed that NACA would go overboard just as quickly if and when the Air Force felt its interests infringed upon.

The second problem was that, even though Orbiter was recommended, the President felt that Vanguard was the superior option. Because, as underhanded as Kaplan and Porter’s insertion of Vanguard into consideration was, doing this as cheaply – and with as few ex-Nazi bastards involved – as possible was highly desirable. It would also, if brought to fruition, successfully establish a clear-skies policy for orbiting structures and would establish an important precedent to limit the military’s prerogatives in orbit. Overriding the Committee and greenlighting Vanguard, however, would reward the Air Force’s behavior and guarantee more behavior of that sort in the future. Which would only add fuel to the fire that was the President’s first concern.

And that was why the President summoned his good, close, personal friend DEPSECDEF Anderson to provide counsel and advice in this time of national need. And in the hope that maybe – just maybe – DEPSECDEF Anderson might also be able to pull a rabbit out of his hat again, as he had a few months earlier with getting the Navy and Air Force to make peace over Tethys. DEPSECDEF Anderson was a great many things, but he was unfortunately not a miracle-worker, and asking the Air Force to change its nature was a feat worthy of the Second Coming. As it would take an act of God -- or Congress -- to make the Air Force cease playing these kinds of games when it came to what the Air Force considered its rightful dominion. And they’d probably keep fighting God and Congress on following that commandment until their funding was tied to their adherence to it.

So, DEPSECDEF Anderson noted, it was not worth sweating the petty institutional consequences of the choice, because those consequences would not change the Air Force’s behavior one way or the other. And if the President thinks Vanguard is the more appropriate satellite program, than NACA’s going to be getting in the launching business. As while the Army and Navy might be unhappy, they both know how the game is played and, more importantly, that what the President wants the President gets, at least from the services. Money and personnel will need to be found – both for NACA and the Department of Rocketry, as the former would certainly need some of the latter’s staff, which in turn would also need replacing – but those problems were manageable in the grand scheme of defense policy.

While not precisely the advice which the President had expected, that would indeed resolve the present problem of what program to fund for the International Geophysical Year. And perhaps even planted a seed or two for the future, as the President had not seriously considered the potential of a legislative solution. As all of the services, not just the Air Force, could not resist the imposition of Congress’s will through the power of the purse. Legislation establishing the primacy of civilian control of space and delineating the proper scope of military involvement there would have several salutary effects beyond merely quieting the squabbling among the services. But pursuing such without a clear vision of all that would entail was fraught with danger, not only legislatively and the usual sausage-making process it entails, but within the services themselves, as that would unleash a frenzy of intrigue and jockeying for position both in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill the likes of which had not been seen in a long while.

As fate would have it, Halfway to Everywhere: A Space Manifesto would be published less than six months later.
*=*=*=*=*
Author's Notes
Oh boy, it feels like things are happening again. Our long, slow trudge through the labyrinths of service politics, petty rivalries, and generally unsexy foundation-laying is winding down. Chapter 9 will almost certainly be a long one, detailing just what the heck Halfway to Everywhere is and what it contains. (Though from title and context alone it should titillate with its possibilities.) It might take a while longer than previous entries: I originally started this TL to practice Heinlein's First Rule of Spec-Fic Writing -- "write it" -- and had aimed for a thousand words a day, which has routinely been run over. Given that I'm expecting this to be long, it'll invariably end up much longer, so just a heads-up. We'll probably get VoFP entries for the Gar Incident, the Enterprise-centric Donald Duck, Atomic Midshipman serial, and maybe a specs write-up for Tethys when I need breaks. Plus whatever else comes up, because the comments always give me the best bad ideas. (Donald Duck, Atomic Midshipman owes its existence to that "make Donald Duck and Daffy Duck the faces of Disney/WB" thread from a few weeks ago, after all.)

As far as what's happening in universe, I promised Vanguard would be back, and here we are. The first great decision in the Space Race and...everything's as OTL. Oh, sure, it's not exactly OTL, because the context is entirely different. But Vanguard's still chosen for primarily political reasons, to be developed by a team that's not the one which was originally envisioned as bringing it to maturity. We'll see if Vanguard has better luck TTL. Milton Rosen -- an obvious choice to head over to Langley with Vanguard being selected -- deserves better than being remembered in the popular imagination as the man behind Kaputnik.
 
::::Sigh::: I know, I've got notes on several possible "Von Braun dies early and/or has no influence on the US rocket development" myself. The fun thing with the Saturn 1 was it was a kludge that worked quite well and had a massive amount of potential that was never really given a chance. Having a recoverable and reusable booster stage by about 1965 has some pretty big butterflies after all :)
I'm not saying that by mid-1955 Robert Truax is requesting money to study building Tethys out of marine steels and to do controlled crash studies, but it's kind of inevitable that the same thoughts he had OTL won't cross his mind eventually TTL. (IIRC, one of the big contributors to his thoughts on Sea Dragon and big dumb boosters in general was working on Thor and the problems with trying to make everything small and light. TTL, Tethys is very clearly intended to replicate that experience, and he's seen the practical and economic gains obtained just from Tethys's evolution from OTL Titan I to a TTL-specific LV.) And the importance of launch economics of scale is on the minds of the movers-and-shakers of the Department of Rocketry, starting with Heinlein. So we might well get that recoverable and reusable decently-powered booster stage by the mid-Sixties. And hoo-boy are those butterflies big indeed.

Now part of the problem is the inertial guidance platform and part is the issue of figuring out exactly where the sub is in relation to the target at launch. Now if you toss in satellite navigation systems and guidance updates in flight through satellite communications...
It's gonna be a long time before you can get in-missile guidance updates. OTL Transit, which BOWDITCH is on steroids, had a quarter-ton computer that had to be specially designed to fit through sub-hatches. BOWDITCH's big conceptual innovation over Transit is "what if we throw up a constellation big enough that you can always get three sats to triangulate off of?" and its solution is just use three receiving computers to plot your triangulating fix off of, with the triangulating itself probably requiring another computer and perhaps even a slide-rule-equipped navigator. Whole bunch of work, but the benefits are absolutely worth it, but that's really only feasible on ocean-going vessels.

The solid-state electronics revolution will change a great many things, but the technical problems of trying to measure reversed Doppler shift from three separate points at super- or hypersonic speeds is just going to take many years for electronics to catch-up to.

If someone outside the Army (who McCarthy claimed was riddled with Communists) stood up for them they might still be around.
I mean, Bob Heinlein did Something™ that got him sent into the wilderness to spend the remainder of his career shepherding a passion project that was never expected to go anywhere but was worth funding a bit of just in case it ever did. Putting his weight into a defense of them -- and implicitly of the circles he had run in in his career -- would both be sufficient to avert the worst for both of them. And being perceived as soft on the Reds would certainly explain a banishment to the Naval Research Laboratory.

Ah yes, the one Greenpeace blocks every flight because each launch kills everything in the South Atlantic? (I mean really did anyone here NOT laugh a bit when "FAM" announced a Seadragon launch "30 miles south-west of Guam"?)
Hey, the research is divided as to whether Sea Dragon would deafen every aquatic creature within a couple hundred miles of the launch site. High-frequency sound waves, such as those from a rocket's firing, apparently have significantly different propagation patterns than the low-frequency sound waves marine evolution has preferenced. Only logical thing to do is build a Sea Dragon and test it!

I did laugh at For All Mankind and Guam, but for the reasons below.

Ya Johnston island and Midway are still on my list :)
The problem with Johnson Island -- and Guam in For All Mankind -- is that it's such a PITA to do basic things to support launching there due to how far removed it is from everything. The only reason why I've previously considered a Guiana-based launching/staging complex is that it's close enough to the continental United States that you can squint and convince yourself the extra work of hauling stuff across the Gulf of Mexico is worth the delta-v gain, especially if you're using water-launched systems that can just be fabricated in the shipyards of the Gulf Coast.
 

Garrison

Donor
The problem with Johnson Island -- and Guam in For All Mankind -- is that it's such a PITA to do basic things to support launching there due to how far removed it is from everything. The only reason why I've previously considered a Guiana-based launching/staging complex is that it's close enough to the continental United States that you can squint and convince yourself the extra work of hauling stuff across the Gulf of Mexico is worth the delta-v gain, especially if you're using water-launched systems that can just be fabricated in the shipyards of the Gulf Coast.
Well in FAM the thing was launching a cargo of Plutonium so they were basically picking somewhere it wouldn't matter, to the USA at least, if there was an accident. Remember that's a series where nuclear powered armed shuttles are a thing.
 
Well in FAM the thing was launching a cargo of Plutonium so they were basically picking somewhere it wouldn't matter, to the USA at least, if there was an accident. Remember that's a series where nuclear powered armed shuttles are a thing.
See, that's what pissed me off about Sea Dragon in For All Mankind. Guam is an inhabited part of the United States: If there's an accident during ascent and you're launching only 30mi away from it, it is all likelihood going to be contaminated. If you want to do a Sea Dragon launch with a radioactive payload and don't care about fallout, why not just launch from somewhere just off of the coast of Canaveral where all of your infrastructure is? Or you do care about potential accidents, why not just tow your Sea Dragon to the Equator in the Central Pacific where there's nothing but water for hundreds of miles in any direction? (And the less we talk about the Pathfinder-Buran dogfight in lunar orbit, the better. ...that somehow looks even stupid written than it sounded in my head.)

But I'm one of the wrong people to talk to about this sort of thing, because I want to ground-launch Orions from the Antarctic, because Orion's still the most efficient heavy-lifter we've yet devised that's actually buildable.
 
Chapter 8: Project Vanguard of the Proletariat
"DEPSECDEF Anderson was a great many things, but he was unfortunately not a miracle-worker, and asking the Air Force to change its nature was a feat worthy of the Second Coming. As it would take an act of God -- or Congress -- to make the Air Force cease playing these kinds of games when it came to what the Air Force considered its rightful dominion. And they’d probably keep fighting God and Congress on following that commandment until their funding was tied to their adherence to it."

I can in no way nor would I argue with that final assessment in any way :)

The saying is after all "when Jesus was a corporal" so why should a good airman listen to HIM?

So, DEPSECDEF Anderson noted, it was not worth sweating the petty institutional consequences of the choice, because those consequences would not change the Air Force’s behavior one way or the other. And if the President thinks Vanguard is the more appropriate satellite program, than NACA’s going to be getting in the launching business. As while the Army and Navy might be unhappy, they both know how the game is played and, more importantly, that what the President wants the President gets, at least from the services. Money and personnel will need to be found – both for NACA and the Department of Rocketry, as the former would certainly need some of the latter’s staff, which in turn would also need replacing – but those problems were manageable in the grand scheme of defense policy.

So the President chooses.... Disney and Hughes!
(What can we say, he's a Daffy fan :) )

Randy
 
Tethys-EC is basically an example of that wonderful kind of Pentagon logic where there's a sudden new need and the bureaucracy's first impulse is to throw an existing development project at it to justify those already requested appropriations dollars. When the new Chief of Naval Operations wants a ballistic missile fit for use on a submarine, you don't quibble by pointing that there's nothing on the drawing board that's really fit for repurposing. No, you take the quite expensive LV you're already footing the bill for and throw some more money at Martin on a study contract to essentially spin-off a new, functional redesign of what was being worked on for this new task. The sort of thing that usually results in the contractor laughing all the way to the bank as they prepare a few reports and maybe, once in a blue moon, start doing preliminary engineering before the money runs out and the procurement boffins have finally caught up to the fact they really should at least be making using stuff from the parts-bin a contractor-driven bidding decision to meet criteria.

Tethys-EC's performance was never firmly pinned down, as the engineering never got that far, though the back-of-the-envelope "Power Point for the Congresscritters" performance numbers would've indeed been between Jupiter and R-13. It's conceived of as a Day 1 initiative by Burke's staff, but almost immediately runs afoul of everybody, including Martin, questioning whether it makes sense and the problems of inter-service optics. (You're quite right that an 8' Tethys/Titan-derived single-engined hypergolic-fueled system would be a better back-up to Atlas than Tethys's 12-14'-diameter and bloated pad-weight. But that also gives away too much of the "Tethys is a back-up for Atlas" game all the right people are playing and averting their eyes to the truth of, so you can't do that.) It ends up lingering in developmental purgatory, eventually being settled on as a hypergolic fuels storage demonstration program after Jupiter is signed onto, as the Navy's still not convinced solid-fuels as embodied in Jupiter-S can do what needs done. A couple of cylinders are cut to the anticipated dimensions of Tethys-EC's first-stage, fitted with UMDH/N2O4 tankage, and then lodged in dummy silos refitted aboard one of the Navy's many surplus diesel-electric boats for basic sea-handling experiments. Things go about as you expect and the poor U.S.S. Gar burns down and probably sets the Cuyahoga River on fire in the process. (There may or may not be a Visions of Futures Past segment on it at some point.)

By the time of the Gar Incident, it's post-Nobska and the Navy really just wants to forget the whole affair, so Tethys-EC gets memory-holed and becomes a stub article on Encyclopedia Astronautica and Astronautix.

Tethys began as being envisioned as being more or less OTL Titan I by Martin, before fattening to 12-14' in diameter through initial consultations through Q4 1954 with the Department of Rocketry in pursuit of greater payload and improved program economy by making it less ICBM-like. The original Marin Tethys-Titan I concept would also be bad as an SLBM, but you can kind of squint and see how someone could think it a good idea to at least explore its feasibility, versus the submitted-for-appropriations Tethys that's a pure LV.

But no, you didn't read anything wrong. What I just typed above is just backfilling to plug holes caused by readers more knowledgeable than I pointing out my errors. It started at "Tethys is a thing that's gonna basically be Titan II, with allowances for overly optimistic 1960 intended flying dates" and was written as such in that post.
That all sounds entirely too plausible, yes! And at least the storables will deflagrate rather than detonate, giving most of Gar's crew time to escape, albeit with elevated cancer risk. Plus, please don't take my nitpicking as implying I am anything but loving this yarn, and feel free to tell me to stuff it as appropriate. :D

Quite right, but this poses a critical problem. While it's awesome if Tethys is the gateway to a sustainable boosting capability that's right in the sweet spot of capabilities and which will support scaling launch cadences as time goes on, this is a TL with a muscular Naval rocket program and Robert Truax has already appeared. Sea Dragon is going to rear its ugly head eventually and we can't very well not address that. Breaking out my dog-eared PDF of the original Sea Dragon proposal, I was kind of amazed that even the cost per-pound estimate for the purely expendable Sea Dragon was 60% that of the Saturn V. It makes me wonder, without getting into Sea Dragon's economic assumptions -- 550-metric-tons to orbit every two weeks for a decade! -- if you could justify something like Sea Dragon solely on the basis of its flying once a year or every other year because of the missions it opens up.
I mean, the economics of basically any LV come down to flight rate, no? Because the RnD needs to be amortized and the launch infrastructure is (broadly) a fixed cost, with a low marginal cost for extra flights. That's not going to be any different for Sea Dragon, and going from a STS-as-planned flight rate to a worse-than-STS flight rate is going to do about what you'd think it would to the cost-per-ton. Now, as for how to justify 3-500t in LEO per year...while you might well have that aggregate requirement (550t over 2 years is only about 2 Apollo lunar landings a year after all), those payloads are almost certainly not going to the same orbit at the same time. A propellant depot can go some distance to solving this problem--using Sea Dragon as a tanker to send up LH2 (or LCH4 if they realize that's better for NTRs, due to cooling and tank mass ratios) and using nuclear tugs to change plane and altitude of various other payloads lofted by the Big Dumb Booster--but it's still not going to make too much sense. A good OTL example is Ariane V, where SYLDA was used far less than hoped. AFAIK most actual ridesharing has been with tiny satellites that just need to be in orbit and aren't particular about their parameters.
What might be a stepping stone here is Tethys to something like Saturn C-3 (40t to LEO) but done Sea Dragon style as a big dumb booster--probably all-kerolox, too, so something like 2000-2500t all-up for that payload on pressure-fed kerolox. And then with that proved out (and launching the first set of real orbital infrastructure) scaling it up. But that's going to require either orbital forts, or a huge lunar complex, or manufacturing and colonization in the high frontier as justification for monthly-ish (and therefore affordable) Dragon launches. (Which you want, of course, but it's the selling that's the problem.)

I mean, given what happened to Malina and Hsue-Shen Tsien happened after the POD (which was in 1931), it's possible they're still around. Even if it's massively unlikely. I've been trying to keep the butterflies from a surviving Heinleinian naval career few and off-screen for the most part, because this kind of TL is at its best when it's playing things mostly straight and chronicling generally small changes that fulfill our dreams of space cadetery. (Atomic midshipping?) One of the things I've really, really wanted to play with is Heinlein's remaining in the Navy ends up in a series of personnel changes in which the Hyde Park Agreement ends up being filed where it's supposed to and there's a durable, persistent Anglo-American nuclear cooperative. (The Trilateral Atomic Energy Commission, for the added bonus of a Trilateral Commission really being behind the world's ills!) Given that it fundamentally rewrites the history of British post-war military and foreign policy, though, that's not really in keeping with the spirit of things. (As awesome as it would be to have the Churchill International Spaceport at the Anglo-American Sea Dragon staging lagoon in Guiana.)

Never give up on a good idea, though. I still want that delicious, delicious free delta-v from being closer to the Equator than Canaveral.
(punting on talking about the JPL/Aerojet folks until the later instance). But yes, I tend to agree all the above is (a) interesting, but (b) whoo boy scope creep. There's also the extent to which it's a hard row to hoe because it's so counter to American interests pragmatically construed.


IIRC, in the earliest drafts of "The Cage", the ship was the U.S.S. Yorktown. I am unsure what, precisely, motivated Roddenbury to change it, though CVN-65 could've easily been a factor. I'd assumed the network execs would be the drivers of a change, as they'd probably be disquieted given that the "Save the Enterprise!" campaign was galvanized by another sci-fi property and fears about copyright issues with Disney.
I'm doubtful that the memory will last in pop culture (vs fandom) almost a decade on? Since the galvanizing would be in the mid-50s unless she lies in pre-scrap, pre-museum limbo for a while? Given her OTL scrapping in '58 (and CNV-65 being laid down in 58).
If not Big E, though, Intrepid seems like the best name to go with? Although Yorktown has the better pedigree.

Campbell's rather "hard-right-but-libertarian" formula tended to grate on Heinlein's nerves as the characters were shallow and quite often the story was forgettable and formulaic to the extreme. Like how he burned out on the Teen-Juveniles he found himself "writing-down" which he felt insulted his audience as well as himself. But a paycheck is a paycheck after all. Not to get into to modern of detail but it's a lot like Baen today with a lot of early writers distancing themselves due to the hard-right turn of the publisher.

Once outside the Navy Heinlein opened up to his more liberal side and this because even more pronounced once the Great Depression hit. But again a paycheck is a paycheck and for everything he put out for Campbell he seemed to take a bit of pleasure in turning
even more center-left :)
As a longtime fan of Eric Flint and Lois McMaster Bujold, I laughed entirely too hard at the Baen reference. Haven't paid much attention to the publisher since...hmm, probably not too long after Jim died? But "today" is a relative term as far as that bent is concerned, unless it's really gone up a notch recently.
As to Heinlein, I think it's plausible that he didn't "get political" until after his discharge, but the timing is such (and Ginny's later influence a solid argument as well) that as likely a basis was his marriage to Leslyn which predated his discharge by two years. But I'll return to this point in re: the JPL folks.

Problem is the Navy really wasn't interested due to the single engine and rather short range... And yet the turned around and bough the Skyhawk...
I wasn't suggesting the Navy. I was suggesting the Air Force, i.e. it beating out the Starfighter. Hence SUNTAN as a fallback for Lockheed.

And finding out that Curtiss "the Mad Bomber" LeMay was not only the early advocate but personally initiated the study and pushed the results!
Sorry? I was unaware LeMay was at all involved in HATV, it being a Navy project. Involved in the response to it, sure, but not HATV itself.

Something to keep in mind is that WVB and company were NOT brought to the US for their expertise but to pretty much ensure the Russian's didn't grab them. The continual failures of the V2's under their guidance did not inspire confidence, (and the fact they had had little actual contact with the construction process so missed the various sabotage methods included in the captured V2s) only increased the pressure to simply keep them locked away till their knowledge was stale and then let them go. The US had already surpassed their work by 1945 and by 1946 we had already been testing more advanced rockets and engines before the financial bottom fell out and everything shut down. When Korea came around the Air Force had already corralled most of the big contractors for their projects so the Army, as always, looked to create an in-house' development group and it made sense to use WVB and provide them with updated knowledge and equipment and see what they could do.

The Redstone was essentially an Americanized V2 but WVB had always hoped for more from it and even got some in making the Jupiter A and C models. He finally got to shine with the Jupiter but fate was stacked against it. Saturn specifically came about from needing to find a way to keep his team together and general interest in a possible big booster...
Yes to all this; the popular conception of "our Germans beat their Germans" is so very, very wrong.

One of the things the Navy regretted about leaving the Jupiter program was that while they didn't actually BELIEVE the Army/WVB the baseline accuracy of the Jupiter was supposed to be vastly better than any other missile. And they didn't fully bow out till it was clear that the proposed Jupiter-S (solid) wasn't going to be much smaller than the liquid Jupiter. On the other hand it turned out that the Army and WVB were actually right in that the Jupiter was actually a lot more accurate, so much so that when push came to shove the Air Force was required to field BOTH the Thor and Jupiter, much to their annoyance.
(And anything that annoys the Air Force of course :) )
And bringing us full circle, that guidance package flew on Titan!!

Interestingly when the decision to take IRBM's away from the Army and give them to the Air Force was made the Army actually offered to finish Jupiter development and then make them for the Air Force to use. The Air Force (Schriever specifically) declined and said it was "naive" to think the Army would in good faith build missiles for the Air Force but in fact it was specifically to keep WVB and company engaged and active so the Army was dead serious. (And mind you the Air Force's "Thor" missile which was essentially built using Jupiter parts, was having so much development trouble and cost overruns there was a danger that higher powers would cancel the program. As noted the official decision was for them to field both)

Because Polaris was a totally separate program from Jupiter it got none of the benefits of but if you can find a way to combine the two programs then early Polaris becomes a lot more useful.
Given guidance was its achilles heel OTL, definitely yes.
(And Schriever has a lot to answer for, not least punting on fixing the LR79 turbopump issues until after Pioneer-Able...)

I'm not saying that by mid-1955 Robert Truax is requesting money to study building Tethys out of marine steels and to do controlled crash studies, but it's kind of inevitable that the same thoughts he had OTL won't cross his mind eventually TTL. (IIRC, one of the big contributors to his thoughts on Sea Dragon and big dumb boosters in general was working on Thor and the problems with trying to make everything small and light. TTL, Tethys is very clearly intended to replicate that experience, and he's seen the practical and economic gains obtained just from Tethys's evolution from OTL Titan I to a TTL-specific LV.) And the importance of launch economics of scale is on the minds of the movers-and-shakers of the Department of Rocketry, starting with Heinlein. So we might well get that recoverable and reusable decently-powered booster stage by the mid-Sixties. And hoo-boy are those butterflies big indeed.
Yep, if a notional 40t-range booster (per above) gets Truaxed, that's a very plausible candidate for first stage recovery--Tethys is going to be gossamer-light (OTL Titan mass ratios gave Atlas a run for its money!) but a pressure-fed booster...not so much.

It's gonna be a long time before you can get in-missile guidance updates. OTL Transit, which BOWDITCH is on steroids, had a quarter-ton computer that had to be specially designed to fit through sub-hatches. BOWDITCH's big conceptual innovation over Transit is "what if we throw up a constellation big enough that you can always get three sats to triangulate off of?" and its solution is just use three receiving computers to plot your triangulating fix off of, with the triangulating itself probably requiring another computer and perhaps even a slide-rule-equipped navigator. Whole bunch of work, but the benefits are absolutely worth it, but that's really only feasible on ocean-going vessels.

The solid-state electronics revolution will change a great many things, but the technical problems of trying to measure reversed Doppler shift from three separate points at super- or hypersonic speeds is just going to take many years for electronics to catch-up to.
If you combine that kind of launch-platform fix with Jupiter's guidance package, you get an incredibly potent alt-Polaris. And Jupiter's package was rated for Jupiter's burnout TWR (a concern during development!) so it should do fine with the higher initial TWR but lower burnout TWR of Polaris.

I mean, Bob Heinlein did Something™ that got him sent into the wilderness to spend the remainder of his career shepherding a passion project that was never expected to go anywhere but was worth funding a bit of just in case it ever did. Putting his weight into a defense of them -- and implicitly of the circles he had run in in his career -- would both be sufficient to avert the worst for both of them. And being perceived as soft on the Reds would certainly explain a banishment to the Naval Research Laboratory.

This actually synergizes very, very well with the discussion above re: his second marriage surviving (or, if not, his third marriage being to someone of similar politics, since he won't meet Ginny if he's on sea duty).
Frank Malina remaining engaged in rocketry has, I think, fairly minor effects; he had already resigned from Aerojet in the late 1940s on the basis of not wanting to be involved in military rocketry. It's possible his Good Friend Captain Heinlein could talk him into staying, however, but the Korean War is going to make that even harder.
Qian/Tsien, however, is both a harder ask and of far greater import--both in terms of potential contributions to the US, but even more importantly in terms of the effects on China--he was an absolute genius, a leader in China's nuclear, ballistic missile, and space programs after his return to China. He's a harder ask because, well, at the time everything came to a head the US was in a (limited) war with China, and Qian made very clear he would not "make weapons to kill [his] countrymen".
Now, maybe there's a way to solve that impasse, or maybe it doesn't come up (perhaps he gets sniped to NRL instead of staying sort-of-in-the-army and a professor at Caltech). But it's definitely hard.
And if you do, however...then you probably have to consider what that does to China, in terms of delaying its nuclear weapons program, its missile program, and its eventual space program.

Either way however--even if their careers both continue as OTL uninterrupted--Heinlein attempting to stick his neck out on their behalf can serve you well, as you say, and certainly jibes with his at-the-time politics. (It probably also further entrenches said politics.)[/QUOTE]
 
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Yay Vanguard!

The second problem was that, even though Orbiter was recommended, the President felt that Vanguard was the superior option. Because, as underhanded as Kaplan and Porter’s insertion of Vanguard into consideration was, doing this as cheaply – and with as few ex-Nazi bastards involved – as possible was highly desirable. It would also, if brought to fruition, successfully establish a clear-skies policy for orbiting structures and would establish an important precedent to limit the military’s prerogatives in orbit.
And above all, a precedent vital to the forthcoming WS-117L.
Fun conspiracy theory I've seen (IIRC there was a book on this?): Eisenhower intentionally sabotaged the US's IGY approach so the Soviets would be first, cementing the safety of WS-117L/CORONA.

Money and personnel will need to be found – both for NACA and the Department of Rocketry, as the former would certainly need some of the latter’s staff, which in turn would also need replacing – but those problems were manageable in the grand scheme of defense policy.
Milton Rosen -- an obvious choice to head over to Langley with Vanguard being selected -- deserves better than being remembered in the popular imagination as the man behind Kaputnik.
Hopefully at least some of the Viking engineers stay on for Vanguard, with Tethys not quite as pressing as Titan, and both being Navy. I'm sad for NRL/DoR/BuAstro/whatever without Milt Rosen, however, unless he gets poached back? Further, maybe I'm naïve, but I feel like anyone who's in the loop enough to know him for Vanguard also knows him for Delta (and his other spot-on LV choices for NASA)? Anyway I am so here for this.

maybe a specs write-up for Tethys when I need breaks.
You have my attention. :D
 
I'm not saying that by mid-1955 Robert Truax is requesting money to study building Tethys out of marine steels and to do controlled crash studies, but it's kind of inevitable that the same thoughts he had OTL won't cross his mind eventually TTL. (IIRC, one of the big contributors to his thoughts on Sea Dragon and big dumb boosters in general was working on Thor and the problems with trying to make everything small and light. TTL, Tethys is very clearly intended to replicate that experience, and he's seen the practical and economic gains obtained just from Tethys's evolution from OTL Titan I to a TTL-specific LV.) And the importance of launch economics of scale is on the minds of the movers-and-shakers of the Department of Rocketry, starting with Heinlein. So we might well get that recoverable and reusable decently-powered booster stage by the mid-Sixties. And hoo-boy are those butterflies big indeed.

BDB actually made sense to a LOT of people who built 'normal' rockets, it was the idea that rockets and sea-water could not only mix but play well together than was the tricky part. I think I noted before that WVB's idea of recovering the Saturn 1 first stage was laughed at because most people thought soaking a rocket engine in salt water was a "BAD IDEA"... Till he proved otherwise and which everyone promptly forgot :(
(Seriously... 24 hour soaking, rinse off with a hose, stick it in 'storage' for a month, pull it out and refurbish-not-rebuild-it and then stick it on a test stand and fire away. And of the engines tested NONE failed static testing on either end. And for the longest time the ONLY information was a couple of grainy copies of photos with a "salt-water-recovery of engine test" blub on them... Yeesh)

It's gonna be a long time before you can get in-missile guidance updates. OTL Transit, which BOWDITCH is on steroids, had a quarter-ton computer that had to be specially designed to fit through sub-hatches. BOWDITCH's big conceptual innovation over Transit is "what if we throw up a constellation big enough that you can always get three sats to triangulate off of?" and its solution is just use three receiving computers to plot your triangulating fix off of, with the triangulating itself probably requiring another computer and perhaps even a slide-rule-equipped navigator. Whole bunch of work, but the benefits are absolutely worth it, but that's really only feasible on ocean-going vessels.

But even Transit helped with the positioning problem immensely :) Likely not going to be all that helpful initially but it's a direction that even OTL really only the Navy was thinking about at the time.

I mean, Bob Heinlein did Something™ that got him sent into the wilderness to spend the remainder of his career shepherding a passion project that was never expected to go anywhere but was worth funding a bit of just in case it ever did. Putting his weight into a defense of them -- and implicitly of the circles he had run in in his career -- would both be sufficient to avert the worst for both of them. And being perceived as soft on the Reds would certainly explain a banishment to the Naval Research Laboratory.

Sounds plausible :)

Hey, the research is divided as to whether Sea Dragon would deafen every aquatic creature within a couple hundred miles of the launch site. High-frequency sound waves, such as those from a rocket's firing, apparently have significantly different propagation patterns than the low-frequency sound waves marine evolution has preferenced. Only logical thing to do is build a Sea Dragon and test it!

I did laugh at For All Mankind and Guam, but for the reasons below.

Actually they did kind of, they found during testing of the concept that the rockets 'roar' was heard for great distances. The higher frequencies did damp out, (till the exhaust breached the surface then they carried further over the water) but the lower frequencies tended to be amplified and carried further.

And who didn't laugh at FAM? Oh it had some good stuff and some rather silly stuff but from the premise I had issues with it.

The problem with Johnson Island -- and Guam in For All Mankind -- is that it's such a PITA to do basic things to support launching there due to how far removed it is from everything. The only reason why I've previously considered a Guiana-based launching/staging complex is that it's close enough to the continental United States that you can squint and convince yourself the extra work of hauling stuff across the Gulf of Mexico is worth the delta-v gain, especially if you're using water-launched systems that can just be fabricated in the shipyards of the Gulf Coast.

In context a lot of folks were aware of how risky rocket launch was AND had a notion that people were going to start complaining loudly and often if they went and put a launch site to near them. (Not to mention Johnston was initially considered BECAUSE of the toxic mess the proposed propellants would make of things)
Unfortunately you're choices are going to be limited "near civilization" but going outside that imposes greater logistical burdens that make such options also unwieldy.

Sealaunch had a relatively good idea but by the 90s it wasn't as practical (nor were their operations methods but that's more a nit) really and SpaceX's "offshore" concept is insane. (Actually worse than Boca Chica) But it's all about the context and timing I suppose.

Well in FAM the thing was launching a cargo of Plutonium so they were basically picking somewhere it wouldn't matter, to the USA at least, if there was an accident. Remember that's a series where nuclear powered armed shuttles are a thing.
See, that's what pissed me off about Sea Dragon in For All Mankind. Guam is an inhabited part of the United States: If there's an accident during ascent and you're launching only 30mi away from it, it is all likelihood going to be contaminated. If you want to do a Sea Dragon launch with a radioactive payload and don't care about fallout, why not just launch from somewhere just off of the coast of Canaveral where all of your infrastructure is? Or you do care about potential accidents, why not just tow your Sea Dragon to the Equator in the Central Pacific where there's nothing but water for hundreds of miles in any direction? (And the less we talk about the Pathfinder-Buran dogfight in lunar orbit, the better. ...that somehow looks even stupid written than it sounded in my head.)

What he said and with "AIR LAUNCHED" nuclear powered space shuttle on top :)

But I'm one of the wrong people to talk to about this sort of thing, because I want to ground-launch Orions from the Antarctic, because Orion's still the most efficient heavy-lifter we've yet devised that's actually buildable.

The problem is like most of the 'good' concepts Orion had a shelf life that was arguably shorter than most people know. Never mind the test-ban treaty by the time it had 'matured' enough to get serious it was already past its prime unless there was an ELI headed out way.
You can tell it's still a favorite because it's still studied and referenced in current and ongoing actual work.

Ever heard of the "GABRIELE" (yes it's in all caps in the reports for some reason never clarified) concept? No? Understandable as it only gets mentioned in places like reports on "Externally Pulsed Plasma Propulsion" (EPPP, Orion's "technical" name btw) ideas and concepts.
It's a 'we just found an ELI and we've only got months to do something.
GABRIELE uses an Orion drive as both propulsion and mitigation method. Power your way out to the object and then use pulse units to steer it or break it up.

Couple that with launching it by 'Nuclear Verne Gun' and the term "Planetary Defense System" takes on a whole new meaning :)

Randy
 
I'm doubtful that the memory will last in pop culture (vs fandom) almost a decade on? Since the galvanizing would be in the mid-50s unless she lies in pre-scrap, pre-museum limbo for a while? Given her OTL scrapping in '58 (and CNV-65 being laid down in 58).
If not Big E, though, Intrepid seems like the best name to go with? Although Yorktown has the better pedigree.

Depending it might even be "Vanguard" :)

As a longtime fan of Eric Flint and Lois McMaster Bujold, I laughed entirely too hard at the Baen reference. Haven't paid much attention to the publisher since...hmm, probably not too long after Jim died? But "today" is a relative term as far as that bent is concerned, unless it's really gone up a notch recently.

Yep fans myself along with Webber and others but after Jim died there was a turn and then they embraced "We need to save SciFi from the Liberals!" And I have a hard time getting through the dross that created :(

As to Heinlein, I think it's plausible that he didn't "get political" until after his discharge, but the timing is such (and Ginny's later influence a solid argument as well) that as likely a basis was his marriage to Leslyn which predated his discharge by two years.

As a Navy Lieutenant (and "younger") your expressed 'politics' are whatever your Commander tells you they are but he does seem to have been more liberal than not at least among friends.

I wasn't suggesting the Navy. I was suggesting the Air Force, i.e. it beating out the Starfighter. Hence SUNTAN as a fallback for Lockheed.

Misunderstood, but to be honest the Air Force was likely worse than the Navy in regards to fighter weight.

Sorry? I was unaware LeMay was at all involved in HATV, it being a Navy project. Involved in the response to it, sure, but not HATV itself.

Sorry I wasn't clear but LeMay drove and promoted the "World-Circling Spaceship" report and got in a lot of hot water with the Fighter/Bomber higher ups due to his being outspoken on rockets and missiles. Then he got put in command of SAC and ...
That he dove that deep figures as he was put into R&D command which he took on like any other job he was given but the what-could-have-been if there had actually been a budget available...

Yes to all this; the popular conception of "our Germans beat their Germans" is so very, very wrong.

And like many popular conceptions it refuses to die already :)

And bringing us full circle, that guidance package flew on Titan!!

Cool didn't know that.

Given guidance was its achilles heel OTL, definitely yes.
(And Schriever has a lot to answer for, not least punting on fixing the LR79 turbopump issues until after Pioneer-Able...)

The unfortunate thing is if I were ever to have met him in person I was essentially 'trained' to pretty much worship at his feet. It's only been in the last 20+ years I've learned all the screwups he was involved in.

Yep, if a notional 40t-range booster (per above) gets Truaxed, that's a very plausible candidate for first stage recovery--Tethys is going to be gossamer-light (OTL Titan mass ratios gave Atlas a run for its money!) but a pressure-fed booster...not so much.

If you combine that kind of launch-platform fix with Jupiter's guidance package, you get an incredibly potent alt-Polaris. And Jupiter's package was rated for Jupiter's burnout TWR (a concern during development!) so it should do fine with the higher initial TWR but lower burnout TWR of Polaris.

@NotaHint but "hint" there Juumanistra :)

Randy
 
Yep fans myself along with Webber and others but after Jim died there was a turn and then they embraced "We need to save SciFi from the Liberals!" And I have a hard time getting through the dross that created :(
Taken to PM because this is a heck of a derail by this point. :D

As a Navy Lieutenant (and "younger") your expressed 'politics' are whatever your Commander tells you they are but he does seem to have been more liberal than not at least among friends.
Which sets him up to be the anti-LeMay on that axis, too.

Misunderstood, but to be honest the Air Force was likely worse than the Navy in regards to fighter weight.
No worries, I certainly could have been clearer! Worse, yes, but the Fang was Northrop's entry to the contest the Zipper won, and the latter seems mostly to have won it because it was already nearly complete, rather than a better design per se.

Sorry I wasn't clear but LeMay drove and promoted the "World-Circling Spaceship" report and got in a lot of hot water with the Fighter/Bomber higher ups due to his being outspoken on rockets and missiles. Then he got put in command of SAC and ...
That he dove that deep figures as he was put into R&D command which he took on like any other job he was given but the what-could-have-been if there had actually been a budget available...
Ah yep! That I knew. And a 1940s space program is probably the only way to reasonably get massive space infrastructure. Electronics (well, KH-1 and its successors, more to the point) remove the need for military manned spaceflight. Barring whatever @Juumanistra has cooking, of course!
 
Ah yep! That I knew. And a 1940s space program is probably the only way to reasonably get massive space infrastructure. Electronics (well, KH-1 and its successors, more to the point) remove the need for military manned spaceflight. Barring whatever @Juumanistra has cooking, of course!
Speaking of science fiction novels on that front, have you read Allen Steele's Tranquility Alternative or V-S Day?
 
Speaking of science fiction novels on that front, have you read Allen Steele's Tranquility Alternative or V-S Day?
I've read some of it as short stories apparently, but haven't read the book. I clearly need to. Cheers!

@Juumanistra for kicks I simmed Tethys. I'll upload pics tomorrow, but here's text.
Tethys, per the above, I built as a single LR87 (with 25AR nozzle, like the LR91 had) on the second stage, and four regular LR87s on the first stage. Design GLOW was 230t including payload, leading to a 1.2 liftoff TWR. 12ft first stage, 10ft second stage, 10ft conical fairing with an 8ft barrel. Tethys is capable of sending 4t to a 100nmi (185km) circular orbit at 28.5 degrees. Optimal apportionment of stages, given the heavy and high-thrust second stage engine, led to a 3min burn time on the second stage and a 2min25s burn time on the first stage. With that kind of time to orbit, rather more payload could be secured going to a 150x285km orbit, I'll test that tomorrow. Burnout TWR on the second stage is 10Gs, too, which is worrying. It makes very clear that the optimum choices would be to either:
* Add a third stage, probably something like Vega (i.e. using a vacuum-optimized derivative of Vanguard's first stage XLR52 engine). This would require either offloading some first-stage propellant or uprating the engines in order to maintain a reasonable liftoff TWR. Given the short time to orbit there's plenty of room (time-wise) to add a third stage, which would be needed anyway for BLEO work (plausibly with a fourth stage a la Juno IV and Atlas-Vega).
* Use a lower-thrust second-stage engine, probably something producing about 140klbf in vacuum (a 25AR nozzle on the LR87 produces 187klbf in vacuum, assuming it reaches the same specific impulse as the LR91). This would extend the burn time to four minutes, but the extra time to orbit would be made up for by the lower burnout mass. Derating LR87 would not lower its mass appreciably, so you'd be in a situation like OTL where LR87 and LR91 were substantially similar but not identical.

I am probably underestimating performance because I used two LR101 verniers on the second stage; a more optimal solution would be the four small verniers used on Titan I's OTL second stage, or gimbaled turbopump exhaust like Titan II (and Jupiter). That said, the verniers are useful for post-boost velocity fine-tuning...
On the other hand, I may be overestimating performance slightly depending on what mass ratios could be achieved in practice vs. my own (via RO) estimates.
 
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That all sounds entirely too plausible, yes! And at least the storables will deflagrate rather than detonate, giving most of Gar's crew time to escape, albeit with elevated cancer risk. Plus, please don't take my nitpicking as implying I am anything but loving this yarn, and feel free to tell me to stuff it as appropriate. :D

Oh, I appreciate the feedback, because on the technical stuff and technical history I am an enthusiastic amateur at best. I am a lawyer by training and that shouldn't be a surprise given that my comfort zone thus far has very much been in the political wranglings of the services.

I mean, the economics of basically any LV come down to flight rate, no? Because the RnD needs to be amortized and the launch infrastructure is (broadly) a fixed cost, with a low marginal cost for extra flights. That's not going to be any different for Sea Dragon, and going from a STS-as-planned flight rate to a worse-than-STS flight rate is going to do about what you'd think it would to the cost-per-ton. Now, as for how to justify 3-500t in LEO per year...while you might well have that aggregate requirement (550t over 2 years is only about 2 Apollo lunar landings a year after all), those payloads are almost certainly not going to the same orbit at the same time. A propellant depot can go some distance to solving this problem--using Sea Dragon as a tanker to send up LH2 (or LCH4 if they realize that's better for NTRs, due to cooling and tank mass ratios) and using nuclear tugs to change plane and altitude of various other payloads lofted by the Big Dumb Booster--but it's still not going to make too much sense. A good OTL example is Ariane V, where SYLDA was used far less than hoped. AFAIK most actual ridesharing has been with tiny satellites that just need to be in orbit and aren't particular about their parameters.
What might be a stepping stone here is Tethys to something like Saturn C-3 (40t to LEO) but done Sea Dragon style as a big dumb booster--probably all-kerolox, too, so something like 2000-2500t all-up for that payload on pressure-fed kerolox. And then with that proved out (and launching the first set of real orbital infrastructure) scaling it up. But that's going to require either orbital forts, or a huge lunar complex, or manufacturing and colonization in the high frontier as justification for monthly-ish (and therefore affordable) Dragon launches. (Which you want, of course, but it's the selling that's the problem.)

Re: launchers and flight rates, absolutely. What I was really meaning to get at was: Might there be a curve to heavy/super-heavy launcher utility, where beyond a certain payload capacity even their low flight volumes and unamortizable expenses are outweighed by the gains in supportable missions via that enhanced throw-weight? I think it's an interesting debate for a space agency to have on the merits of such and that there really isn't a right answer, at least not within a more defined context. (Or, for a less extreme allohistorical example, what are the merits of a Saturn V-lofted moon base versus Project Horizon's stupid number of Saturn I launches.)

And I would love to find a use for either the 120- or 240-flight Sea Dragon launch schedules, but even I had to admit defeat, at least for the time being. When I got to the point where I was lobbing RP-1 and water into orbit, so they could be processed on-site into H2 via RP-1 cracking to produce methane which fueled a steam reformation cycle in positively rocketpunk orbital chemical refinery with variable spin-grav, I knew I had to give up the ghost. I still think Sea Dragon is justifiable as a commitment to lobbing remass for depoting, but because of the nature of the best, that remass needs to be storable for long periods of time and thus that precludes boosting LH2 or methane due to their active cooling needs. (And even, to a lesser degree, ammonia.) It's how I ended up at RP-1 and water, as they're not cryogenic, though water-as-remass really needs some Seventies alternative NTR proposals to gain traction and institutional culture that's willing to trade performance for quality-of-life improvements that come with water versus LH2. As while running water through your NERVA isn't the end of the world, you might as well just use kerolox for all the utility it gives you.

Re: development of Truax's mad designs, in my mind's eye I'd envisioned it similarly, though with obviously different names. Life begins with the Li'l Kahuna, which is the inevitable sea-launched Tethys experiments that are just assumed to produce a viable launcher; this is followed by the Big Kahuna, something in the 40-50-ish tons boosting range and designed using the basic operating principles that made Sea Dragon infamous (simple pressure-fed kerolox engines; built in shipyards out of marine steels; reusable stages that are recovered via controlled sea impact with giant ballutes; and so on); and it culminates in the Titanic Kahuna, which is Sea Dragon that has a payload arbitrarily derived from its predecessors. ("The Titanic Kahuna's payload is equal to a dozen Big Kahunas!") Whether or not politics, international affairs, and the vagaries of actual engineering allow such naive dreams to take flight is another question entirely.

But I think we all want a rocket whose in-house development name is "Big Kahuna" to be a thing that works.

I'm doubtful that the memory will last in pop culture (vs fandom) almost a decade on? Since the galvanizing would be in the mid-50s unless she lies in pre-scrap, pre-museum limbo for a while? Given her OTL scrapping in '58 (and CNV-65 being laid down in 58).
If not Big E, though, Intrepid seems like the best name to go with? Although Yorktown has the better pedigree.

Intrepid is even worse, because that's the name of the ship from Donald Duck, Atomic Midshipman. And at that point it seems like you're purposefully trying to copy it, even if Star Trek and Obviously Not Tom Corbett, Space Cadet are vastly different in their particulars. Which was why I just assumed it'd be Yorktown due to that having been in the mix OTL. Not that it really matters, as there isn't much intersection between Star Trek and the events of the TL, outside of one particular thing that can be characterized as "a bit" rather than anything of narrative substance.

No, the next cultural icon to go into a blender is probably going to be 2001: A Space Odyssey, where Stanley Kubrick's auturism is put to the ultimate test when there's (probably) actual locations to shoot at in orbit which he may or may not actually be able to get access to.

And above all, a precedent vital to the forthcoming WS-117L.
Fun conspiracy theory I've seen (IIRC there was a book on this?): Eisenhower intentionally sabotaged the US's IGY approach so the Soviets would be first, cementing the safety of WS-117L/CORONA.

That's what his clear-skies policy was. Though as conspiracy theory, that makes no sense, as from what I recall Ike was perfectly fine with the Soviets being first, as he'd previously proposed a clear-skies policy to the Soviets but they had refused. So long as it was anything but WS-117L, Ike considered it a win, because it legitimized flying WS-117L.

Hopefully at least some of the Viking engineers stay on for Vanguard, with Tethys not quite as pressing as Titan, and both being Navy. I'm sad for NRL/DoR/BuAstro/whatever without Milt Rosen, however, unless he gets poached back? Further, maybe I'm naïve, but I feel like anyone who's in the loop enough to know him for Vanguard also knows him for Delta (and his other spot-on LV choices for NASA)? Anyway I am so here for this.

You just want to bring on the Astronautical Service, which is fully self-contained Naval organization that takes its marching orders straight through the normal uniformed chain-of-command running down from the CNO, and dispense with the Department of Rocketry at the Naval Research Laboratory, right? Soon™. Oh so very Soon™.

Re: Milt Rosen, it's absolutely understood as a temporary work-sharing with NACA-Langley, because he has no real incentive leave the NRL. As while he may have lost the internal argument over Tethys vs. Viper 3, Tethys is a hell of a toy in and of itself, and he knows the Tyranny of the Rocket Equation means there'll inevitably be pressure for lower-mass payloads and a launcher to support them. What Delta looks like is a question-mark, however, due to the exact fate of Thor TTL. (Delta needs to be Differently Named, preferably a mythological titan, to fit with the theme of Atlas and Tethys. Preferably something overtones of being in the vanguard, as an homage, in its own way. Hyperion, maybe?)

The problem is like most of the 'good' concepts Orion had a shelf life that was arguably shorter than most people know. Never mind the test-ban treaty by the time it had 'matured' enough to get serious it was already past its prime unless there was an ELI headed out way.
You can tell it's still a favorite because it's still studied and referenced in current and ongoing actual work.

I'd vigorously contest that Orion had a shelf-life or that it has passed. Few rocket designs allow for "eh, our mass penalty isn't an issue, just use more steel" as a solution to engineering problems and none other than Orion was buildable using a Fifties technical base. NASA did a not-insubstantial study in 1964 on a 910-day manned mission to Callisto -- with 8 astronauts! -- using the 20m NASA Orion mark-up and thought it feasible with a launch date around 1978. (One of the great tragedies of the Internet is that, of the four volume NASA Orion study collection, one of them is missing. And it's the volume that has all of the 20m-diameter design information in it, with what we do know coming from references in other parts of study collection.) There's certainly some of that good ol' naive NASA optimism going on there, plus some Peak Apollo hubris to boot, but nothing on the drawing board's gotten close to those ambitions since then, at least nothing with any kind of institutional credibility. And while I can't be certain the 20m design was intended to be lofted due to lack of documentation, I assume it was, because that was the intention for the 10m design as well.

Which is to say I am a true believer on this subject and why I was saving up my authorium. So with that that being said, the Partial Test-Ban Treaty is, I think, a red-herring on this front. As by the time of its negotiation, Orion had no institutional home due to NASA's dedication to the Moonshot and the USAF having no use for it other than as the Mother of All Atomic Holocausts. (Props to the Air Force for having multiple flavors of that description, between the Space Battleship Orion and the Doomsday Orion.) And while the USAF certainly wanted it as the Mother of All Atomic Holocausts, Kennedy was allegedly disgusted by the Space Battleship Orion model he was shown, and so the USAF had no idea what to do with after that. My point being that, if you've got different people in different places when those decisions were made, you might have a different outcome, as it's not hard to envision small changes to the language of the PTBT to allow the use of pulse-units.

Not that there aren't oodles of practical problems -- engineering and geopolitical alike -- with flying Orion. But the PTBT is not some insurmountable issue, especially if you're lofting Orion-powered ships rather than ground-launching them, and doubly especially when you're playing with allohistorical scenarios.

Ever heard of the "GABRIELE" (yes it's in all caps in the reports for some reason never clarified) concept? No? Understandable as it only gets mentioned in places like reports on "Externally Pulsed Plasma Propulsion" (EPPP, Orion's "technical" name btw) ideas and concepts.
It's a 'we just found an ELI and we've only got months to do something.
GABRIELE uses an Orion drive as both propulsion and mitigation method. Power your way out to the object and then use pulse units to steer it or break it up.

I was aware of an alphabet soup of EPPP projects that remain below the radar, surface just long enough to publish something, and then skitter back into the shadows before the deluge descends upon them for proposing using atomic cherry bombs under a proverbial tin-cup. NASA keeps coming back to it because the numbers don't lie: The concepts and physics are well understood, the engineering is complex but does not require any breakthroughs, and its first iteration in Orion -- with Fifties-era pulse-unit technology -- yielded anticipated performance that is quasi-torchship, let alone what modern designs might yield.

@NotaHint but "hint" there Juumanistra :)

What's that, Little Timmy? The best revenge against the Air Force's hubris is an SLBM that's obscenely potent as a weapons delivery system?

I think I concur with that sentiment, yes.
 
Re: launchers and flight rates, absolutely. What I was really meaning to get at was: Might there be a curve to heavy/super-heavy launcher utility, where beyond a certain payload capacity even their low flight volumes and unamortizable expenses are outweighed by the gains in supportable missions via that enhanced throw-weight? I think it's an interesting debate for a space agency to have on the merits of such and that there really isn't a right answer, at least not within a more defined context. (Or, for a less extreme allohistorical example, what are the merits of a Saturn V-lofted moon base versus Project Horizon's stupid number of Saturn I launches.)
Above a certain size, it's much more about cost to fly a marginal launch and the resulting rough cost of a kilogram of vehicle mass. Thus, flight rate will almost always be better than pure size (indeed, you can argue one of the best things Starship/Superheavy has going for it is needing 10ish tanker flights for every Artemis lunar mission as a base launch rate). Better a rocket you can fill and use 4-6 times a year or more than one you only fly one every year or so.

As an example, Shuttle averaged a cost of about $2.5b almost regardless of flight rate, so if it flew ten times in a year, the average cost per flight was about $300m while if it flew only twice, the cost as more like $1.5b. (For more information, see the zero-base cost study from the mid-90s.) It's possible to run into operational issues if you're trying to fly more than a launch every two weeks or so, but that still means that as Jeff Greason puts it, the best launcher size is the one you find a mission for one or two dozen times a year. If given the choice of Sea Dragon once a year, or 5/year Saturn Vs, the answer which is correct almost certainly lies with the Saturns. Another question is for something like annual Apollo-class landings, is it better to use one Saturn V, or 5-6 Saturn IBs? The answer I've come to is the latter is almost certainly cheaper and more sustainable (and easier to use the launcher for other things, using the lunar demand as a baseline flight rate) but harder to meet the '69 lunar sprint goal with.

And I would love to find a use for either the 120- or 240-flight Sea Dragon launch schedules, but even I had to admit defeat, at least for the time being. When I got to the point where I was lobbing RP-1 and water into orbit, so they could be processed on-site into H2 via RP-1 cracking to produce methane which fueled a steam reformation cycle in positively rocketpunk orbital chemical refinery with variable spin-grav, I knew I had to give up the ghost. I still think Sea Dragon is justifiable as a commitment to lobbing remass for depoting, but because of the nature of the best, that remass needs to be storable for long periods of time and thus that precludes boosting LH2 or methane due to their active cooling needs. (And even, to a lesser degree, ammonia.) It's how I ended up at RP-1 and water, as they're not cryogenic, though water-as-remass really needs some Seventies alternative NTR proposals to gain traction and institutional culture that's willing to trade performance for quality-of-life improvements that come with water versus LH2. As while running water through your NERVA isn't the end of the world, you might as well just use kerolox for all the utility it gives you.
Depots are actually the perfect stuff for smaller and more frequently flown launchers, because propellant is cheap on the ground and almost infinitely divisible--it's the perfect thing to use to provide a base flight load to a more reasonably sized launch vehicle. It's notable that propellant is the only payload included in the Sea Dragon studies (the baseline vehicle has a tank for carrying 550 tons of hydrogen, and operational allowances for any other payload are rather ), mostly I think because it's easy to handle and they couldn't think of any realistic payloads that huge, but if you only need a few hundred or even a thousand tons of prop a year or so, I think it's much better to address the need with a 50-100 ton vehicle that can also serve other purposes.
 
Speaking of science fiction novels on that front, have you read Allen Steele's Tranquility Alternative or V-S Day?

No and yes. I liked V-S Day but the ending (and yes I get why :) ) was an over-extrapolation that while expected kind of dragged the rest down. Of course it and an althistory Star Trek thread discussion on the Eugenics Wars got me to start looking at a "What if Howard Hughes and Eugen Sanger had got together" notes :)

Randy
 
No and yes. I liked V-S Day but the ending (and yes I get why :) ) was an over-extrapolation that while expected kind of dragged the rest down. Of course it and an althistory Star Trek thread discussion on the Eugenics Wars got me to start looking at a "What if Howard Hughes and Eugen Sanger had got together" notes :)

Randy
If you read V-S day and enjoyed it, you should also check out Tranquility Alternative. I could take issue with some of the details of the world-building, some of which is in service to its themes, but it's a good thriller and a fun look at a world 30 years past the Collier's "Man Will Conquer Space Soon!" future.
 
LH2 (or LCH4 if they realize that's better for NTRs, due to cooling and tank mass ratios) and using nuclear tugs to change plane
Err... Nuclear tugs with methane would underperform the best chemical rockets, surely? Most of the mass is the carbon, which will have a horribly low exhaust speed.... Not to mention coking in the engine.
A good OTL example is Ariane V, where SYLDA was used far less than hoped
Err.... Taking a look at Ariane V launches, the vast majority seemed to be dual satellite to GTO.
SpaceX's "offshore" concept is insane.
??? Why did you say that? They have to deal with noise and beach closure issues ATM and putting a launch pad just far enough out into the Gulf to mitigate those problems while being close enough to easily support seems like the most viable solution to me.
As while running water through your NERVA isn't the end of the world, you might as well just use kerolox for all the utility it gives you.
As with methane, but worse. I can't imagine water in a NERVA would give you a decent ISP at all, and nuclear reactors are HEAVY....
-----
Hunh.
Gives some numbers that are a lot better than what I thought they'd be.
Although his table says 3200K where in the text he says 2750K is the practical limit...
 
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Err... Nuclear tugs with methane would underperform the best chemical rockets, surely? Most of the mass is the carbon, which will have a horribly low exhaust speed.... Not to mention coking in the engine.

As with methane, but worse. I can't imagine water in a NERVA would give you a decent ISP at all, and nuclear reactors are HEAVY....
Atomic Rockets lists the following:
http://www.projectrho.com/public_html/rocket/enginelist2.php#ntrsolidcore

So about 630s for methane, and about 400s with water. Given the density and storability benefits compared to hydrogen NTR (for the former) or hydrogen/oxygen chemical for the latter...it's at least possible to understand looking at. The weight of the engine and such comes into it, and is a major factor above and beyond the basic specific impulse, of course, but smaller tanks and higher storage temperatures isn't something to ignore as a possibility.
 
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