This will be the final entry for this TL. To those who are wondering about Japan, the Ottomans, and Serbia's future I will cover that in the pre-war section of the sequel to this TL. Please enjoy when it comes out. In the meantime, thank you all for your likes and critiques. They have been greatly appreciated.
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Chapter 45: Reflections on What Might Have Been
Historians have often wondered what would have happened if King Albert I had sided with his advisors and refused the Germans passage through Belgium?
It is certain that given the mercurial nature of the Kaiser, the people of Belgium would have paid a heavy price for their king’s defiance. But many military historians argue that delaying the Germans even for a few weeks would have destroyed their timetable and given France and England time to prepare their defenses. The German offensive could have been stopped cold on or near the River Marne.
This is the view of most military scholars. What is less clear is what would have happened afterward. Some posit a short war in the west with the Germans being stopped by the combined forces of the French and English and then rolled back into Germany forcing a German surrender once the Saar industrial basin was threatened.
Others suggest a long and brutal war lasting three or more years would have been the result. With other nations in Europe becoming involved in the conflict and the combatants forced to “dig in” for the prolonged and bitter war.
Those who favor the latter view believe that such a war would have so shocked the collective psyche of the public in the warring nations they would be demanding their leadership seek peace regardless of what the terms might be. Further, the population would not have allowed itself to be dragged into yet another major conflict only three decades later.
The tragedy is, the relatively low casualties of the First World War (2,300,000 killed, injured, wounded and missing) were not enough to scare the various political powers away from seeing war as a viable option to solve conflicts between nations.
This combined with several other factors was a contributing cause to the Second World War. The leadership of the nations of Europe failed to see the danger of using war to resolve conflicts. Instead they saw war in terms of the 18th and 19th centuries instead of the 20th.
Another factor was what one historian called “the revenge factor.” For France, Serbia, and Russia there were very personal reasons for wanting revenge against the former Central Powers. Those reasons would draw these three nations and others together in a mutual alliance with the intent of redrawing the map of Europe and re-writing the wrongs of the First World War.
Still another factor was the technology factor. The First World War saw the beginnings of mobile warfare, aerial warfare and strategic bombing, and submarine warfare. But the fact the war only lasted for two months meant that no one saw the full ramifications of what these new developments, as well as such developments as chemical warfare would entail for armies and for civilian populations. Lessons that might have been learned in the First World War would come to haunt the combatants in the Second.
Finally, the growth of right-wing nationalism in several of the major players in the Second World War played a major factor. The idea of building a greater Italy, or a greater Russia, proved to be too great a temptation for many leaders and their people to ignore. In nations like Italy the public had been fed for years on the “former glory days” of Empire which is a major stock-in-trade for nationalistic movements., Perhaps a longer World War I would have dampened such enthusiasm.
In 1914 when confronted by those in his cabinet who urged him to say no to the German ultimatum King Albert I said, “Which is better going down in one last noble and futile battle or standing at the end knowing we did all in our power to save this nation?” One must wonder looking in retrospect at the cost of the Second World War whether the decision that saved Belgium was worth it.
(From
A Perspective on Two Wars, by Dr. Stephen Ambrose, 1976, Time/Life Press)