Well without Prussia instead is pretty likely seeing an eventual modernization of the Holy Roman Empire (who is the German Empire) in some years... Habsburgs are already the hereditary rulers there from long time so a reorganization and reinforcing of the HRE instead of his dismissal during the Napoleonic wars can very well end in the creation of an ATL analogue of the OTL Germany, only including Austria and Bohemia and under the Habsburgs...
King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
- Start date
Well without Prussia instead is pretty likely seeing an eventual modernization of the Holy Roman Empire (who is the German Empire) in some years... Habsburgs are already the hereditary rulers there from long time so a reorganization and reinforcing of the HRE instead of his dismissal during the Napoleonic wars can very well end in the creation of an ATL analogue of the OTL Germany, only including Austria and Bohemia and under the Habsburgs...
I wonder if this could lead an earlier ARW, and to France and Spain both jumping in to support the American rebels immediately. If so, it could lead to a less favorable result for Britain than OTL
I am so for the US rising as well TTL because, I feel Corsica may benefit long term from American friendship and trade...
Austria gaining permanent and total control of all of Germany would in all probability involve Austria winning against a coalition of all her neighbours. Conceivably, the eastern front might be secured by having good relations with a particularly dim-witted tsar, but France would not in any circumstances allow Austria to gain total control of all of Germany and Britain is not going to give up Hannover without a fight. The house of Savoy would see a united HRE as an existential threat as well. If the tsar and the kaiser are allied, then that would be seen as a serious threat by the Turks, meaning that they would also join the anti-Austrian coalition in such an event.
No, this not need to be necessarily after a military victory or all in one time... Austria need to be in the situation to recover power over the other states of Germany (and Britain do not need to lose Hannover with the force, as an English Queen Regnant soon is pretty likely) and also France can very well, being distracted by other troubles, internals or foreigns... Savoy well is small and quite powerless so do not matter, Ottomans are uninterested by that developement while Russian can be favorable as Austrian shifting its attention back to Germany imply the renounce to expansion at south-east (leaving that area of influence to Russia and/or Venice)...
I doubt it. As I said upthread, many of the reasons for the colonists to rebel are likely to be reduced for now ITTL.
Reduced somewhat, but color me skeptical that they would be butterflied completely. There's still almost certainly going to be a Proclamation of 176x reserving Western lands for the natives, which is going to ruffle colonial feathers. And I would imagine there's still going to be a heightened level of taxation that is going to frustrate colonists. It could be that the lesser need for revenue means that the situation could be resolved with an Albany Convention or whatever, but it may not be as well and if it's not then France and Spain will be standing by waiting to exploit tensions between the colonists and the mother country.
EDIT: Also the trade issue. The shorter war definitely isn't going to butterfly Britain's desire to create a more mercantilistic empire that is going to lock down trade, which is going to be one of the most major pain points for the colonists.
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From what little we know of Peter, it seems to me that his main foreign policy interest was in the North Sea, and for good reason - he had claims to both Schleswig and Sweden. To that end Courland is probably a sensible acquisition.
I do wonder to what extent Austria will oppose Russian aims in the immediate aftermath of the war. I can’t imagine there is much excitement about the prospect of Peter's Danish adventure in Vienna, and although the Austrians won’t actually oppose Peter’s expedition with force they might conceivably try to make it more difficult. The Austrians have quite a bit of leverage over Saxony and Brandenburg in 1761, and might pressure them to deny Russian forces access to their lands/ports. IOTL Peter planned to launch his campaign from Kolberg in Pomerania with the connivance of the Prussians, which is a lot more convenient than launching it from Courland or Livonia. That said, I don’t really know what the established situation was with Russian military access in Poland. Could Augustus III have successfully opposed the transit of a Russian army to Russian-held Königsberg? If not, it might be wiser for the Russians to hang on to East Prussia, at least long enough to accomplish their aims in Denmark.
The prospect of an anti-Ottoman alliance seems problematic to me. The last time the Austrians and Russians joined forces against the Turks, the Austrians backed out and made a separate peace - not only because they were losing, but because they feared that Russia was doing too well. That fear of Russian expansion still exists, and may be heightened by Peter’s ambitions in northern Germany. Just as importantly, an Austrian war against the Turks also seriously endangers the French alliance, for despite their pivot to Austria in 1756 the French were still trying to maintain their traditional friendship with the Ottomans to safeguard their Levantine trade interests. IOTL, they tried to assure the sultan that their alliance with Austria was only against Prussia; the Ottomans were skeptical, and began negotiations with Prussia (although these talks obviously did not come to a fruitful conclusion before the war ended). Any Austrian war against the Turks is going to put France in an impossible position.
The “Theodore’s Colony” pitch runs aground first and foremost on the issue of emancipation, but even if Theodore had no issue with slavery I still consider it a pretty big ask. Corsica, after all, is not one of the victors of 1760. It’s one thing for Britain to throw a bone to a minor ally, but Corsica is a minor neutral. Britain has allies who actually fought for them (Brunswick, Hesse-Kassel) and got nothing out of the war except British subsidies; giving a Caribbean colony (however small) to a state which literally did nothing would be a bit baffling, particularly given Britain’s relatively limited victory ITTL. The British are already doing them a huge solid by forcing the annulment of the French debt.
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Peter stands a better chance of reigning true, though it doesn’t mean it wouldn’t be crazy dangerous of him to move against his wife (and, in any event, he won’t be sending her to a monastery... at least, I wouldn’t think so).
Even Catherine needed some level of popular sentiment against him to move. If that isn't there, her scheme becomes too dangerous to be practical, and likely unwinds in the opening stages, making it easier, not harder, for Peter to remove her.
It's not likely to happen soon. OTL unification took another century.
However, with Frederick gone and Brandenburg gelded, Austria is The Big Dog. To start with, Austria can pull off the Bavaria-for-Belgium swap. That adds considerably to the German component of the Habsburg realm (which also has Silesia back).
Consolidation of the HRE is coming. OTL, it was imposed by Revolutionary France and Napoleon. But it seems pretty clear that Germans were eager to join in; i.e the mid-to-large states were happy to scarf up little states, ecclesiastical realms, and Free Cities. AFAICT, Austria got almost nothing except Salzburg, and gave up a bunch of land in SW Germany. But they had just picked up Venetia, and they were cut off from the rest of Germany by Bavaria.
I note that ITTL, Austria just glommed onto a chunk of the Rhineland; that indicates Austria's interested in acquiring more of core Germany, which OTL they were not AFAIK.
@Carp, thank you for yet another amazing update. Although I like your focus on Corsica and conservative approach to butterflies it is really interesting to see some wider divergences from time to time.
While I am by no means a specialist on the Seven Years War, I do think TTL variant is very plausible and eagerly await for future developments (as many people have already commented there would probably be changes all over Europe, although many of these changes could still diverge to close to OTL outcomes ) .
I do however have two cents to add on the topic of East Prussia.
My statements are heavily based on a 2014 work by M. Anisimov (who is specializing of Elizaveta Petrovna’s Russia foreign policy and has a bunch of works on the subject) “EAST PRUSSIA IN RUSSIA’S MILITARY PLANS DURING THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR (1756-1763)”. Here is the full text of the article in Russian (unfortunately I was not able to find an English translation, so you have to either trust me retelling it or use google translate).
The issues mentioned in the previous discussion were dealt with in the article, so I will give M. Anisimov’s answers to them (and add some my own perceptions):
I.
Quoting the article: “Many studies overestimate the importance of East Prussia’s inhabitants swear of allegiance to Elizaveta Petrovna and treat is as a sign of a final decision to annex the province. However in 1742-1743 the population of the whole Finland was also forced to swear allegiance to Elizaveta Petrovna which did not prevent the empress to return by peace treaty the overwhelming majority of Finland to Sweden”.
This example IMHO shows that swear of allegiance does not guaranty the determination of Elizaveta Petrovna’s government to keep the territory no matter what.
More importantly, however, is the text of special declaration to Russian-Austrian convention of March 22, 1760 (which is more than a year later than East Prussians swear of allegiance in 1758) states (again, summarizing from the article):
Duchy of Prussia shall be given to Russia as a fair compensation for the losses caused by war (conditional on Austria recovering Glatz and Silesia). Russia is committed to stating negotiations with PLC for “resolving East Prussia’s question to mutual benefit” and Maria Theresa guaranties to support Russia in these negotiations.
The Russian desire not to keep East Prussia, but to exchange it is further confirmed by Russian missive to Marquis de l’Hopital of February 2nd, 1761: “…and thus Russia intends to exchange East Prussia with Poland after negotiations with Warsaw.”
To sum up despite the swear of allegiance Russia never intended to keep East Prussia, it was only a bargaining chip to get adequate compensation from PLC. This proposed schema was a part of official declarations and diplomatic messages and was either officially supported by Russia’s allies ( by Austria) or accepted (by France).
ITTL peace treaty is signed in October 1760, and Elizaveta would have more than a year to strike a deal with Augustus. So it looks like by the start of Peter III’s rules the exchange would already have been made.
II. Another important question is what territories Russia would get from Poland as a compensation for East Prussia. Usually Courland is mentioned sometimes with Polish Livonia (Lettgallia).
What looks weird is that this exchange is very much in favor of PLC:
While East Prussia is considered a poor province by German standards, in 1760 it probably has around 700 thousand people (1 million in 1807; source) and more importantly East Prussia controls the mouth of Neman (Memel) and has some control over mouth of Vistula (Marienwerder and its area on right bank of Vistula before splitting, Pillau and Konigsberg control Vistula Lagoon aka Frisches Haff control several branches of Vistula) – thus threatening both Polish and Lithuanian export. Additionally Konigsberg is a large (50000ish) and rich city.
Courland probably has the relative wealth close to East Prussia's but is much smaller (population grew from 210 to 290 thousands over XVIII, so probably around 250000 in 1760s; source), Lettgallia is relatively more poor(as are other territories mentioned below) and has around 150000 popultion (grew from 103 to 190 thousands over XVIII; same source). The strategical importance is incomparable: while Daugava is important for trade, Polish magnates export almost exclusively by Vistula and for Lithuanians Neman is more important than Daugava (especially since Russia controls the latter’s mouth at Riga anyway).
On top of that Courland is not even part of PLC-proper. It is a vassal over which PLC does not have any real control (and Russia does have a lot of control over Courland through Biron's family). While officially recognizing the de-facto situation that Courland is Russia’s, not PLC’s is extremely important, its value cannot be compared to the value of East Prussia even if PLC adds Lettgallia to the table.
I personally was always puzzeled why Russia (which has just proved its military might and that has a very considerable influence over PLC up to a point that it can almost be considered Russian dependency) would be willing to make such a disadvantageous exchange with unarguably much weaker PLC.
M. Anisimov’s article provides me an answer for this paradox.
He writes that Russia did not expect PLC to part with just Courland. He claims that Russia wanted to additionally annex border territories in Belarus and Ukraine. He also quotes to documents shedding light on Russian plan:
“…[Russia] shall take not only Courland but such a rounding of borders from Polish side that not only numerous troubles that are present would be resolved, but also we would obtain a possibility to connect Baltic and Black Sea trades and by this receive a fair share of Levantine trade”.
Connecting Baltic and Black Sea trade heavily suggests securing Daugava and Dnieper. This perception is further secured by another description of desired territories:
“provinces adjacent to Smolensk and Pskov regions”.
Now let us look at the map of PLC and find such provinces: these are Polish Livonia, Polotsk, Vitebsk and Mstislavl voivodeships and part of Minsk voivodeship on the left bank on Dniepr (to the south of Mstislavl and North of Chernigov).These territories also match first the describtion: Russia becomes the controller of both banks of Daugava, of the Left bank of Dnieper all the way to the Crimean border and also controls the land between those two rivers (thus allowing for connection of Baltic and Black sea trades).
Now combining this with recognizing the de-facto situation of Courland being part of Russia creates a treaty a much stronger party forces upon much weaker.
Next a question has to be answered if the disparity is too much and Augustus and Sejm would reject it outright?
I have already analyzed the value of East Prussia. Now let 's analyze the value of Russian claims.
Courland as is already mentioned has around 250 thousand people but is not de-facto controlled by PLC.
Regarding other territories we ironically have a good estimate of those. Let us look at Russian gains by First Partition in 1772 interestingly enough they are almost exactly the same as the demands described* (which can be seen on this map). Thus we know the population of the described territories: 1.3 million people in the Russian part of First Partition and 190000 in 1790 in parts of Polotsk and Vitebsk voivodeships retained by PLC. We can approximate the total population of these territories by 1.3 millions combined (and 250 thousands in Courland).
The relative wealth of these territories is definitely smaller than that of East Prussia.
*IMHO that may allow us to conjecture that Russia annexed the territories it had designes 10 years previously; that attempt was blundered by Peter, but the plans remained but for Courland and two small parts of Vitebsk and Polotsk voivodeships
Now this is of course still a treaty that favors Russia. In my opinion it can be accepted by following reasons.
1. Russia obviously has leverage over PLC: military leverage(undoubtfully), diplomatic leverage (Maria Theresa pledged to support Russia in the negotiations) and political (Russia has a lot of clients in PLC Sejm)
2. The described previously strategic importance of East Prussia for securing export grain trade. Also worth mentioned is that people who most profit from this trade are also the ones who make the decision.
3. Augustus III can also benefit from this greatly. Potentially East Prussia (or more probably some part of it) given to him or to his son. Not only it would increase his personal power in the realm, it will also give him German-speaking personal vassals in PLC borders. For German prince such as himself it can be important.
Also Russia probably provides additional guaranties of his son election, and having more guaranties cannot hurt.
4. Maybe Russia can also pay monetary compensation to PLC to sweeten the deal (and these money would probably be effectively split between the decision-makers as legalized bribes)
To sum up:
a. Russia was absolutely determined to swap East Prussia for Polish territory and made declaration about it long after the swearing of allegiance (also Finland precedent reduces the importance of allegience).
b. Since after the war end Elizaveta has more than a year to implement swap, she will probably be able to do this before Peter gains the throne, so his thoughts on East Prussia become less important
c. Getting just Curland (or even Curland and Polish Livonia) is a very weird move since it greatly influences Poland. There is evidence that Russia intended to gain Courland and territories close to Russian part of First Partition.
d. While such a deal obviously favors Russia there are arguments why such treaty can be accepted. While IMHO it is not guaranteed it would not be implausible either.
P. S. Sorry for such a wall of text. I wanted to prove my point as detailed as possible. Hope it isn’t too much
While I am by no means a specialist on the Seven Years War, I do think TTL variant is very plausible and eagerly await for future developments (as many people have already commented there would probably be changes all over Europe, although many of these changes could still diverge to close to OTL outcomes ) .
I do however have two cents to add on the topic of East Prussia.
My statements are heavily based on a 2014 work by M. Anisimov (who is specializing of Elizaveta Petrovna’s Russia foreign policy and has a bunch of works on the subject) “EAST PRUSSIA IN RUSSIA’S MILITARY PLANS DURING THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR (1756-1763)”. Here is the full text of the article in Russian (unfortunately I was not able to find an English translation, so you have to either trust me retelling it or use google translate).
The issues mentioned in the previous discussion were dealt with in the article, so I will give M. Anisimov’s answers to them (and add some my own perceptions):
I.
Quoting the article: “Many studies overestimate the importance of East Prussia’s inhabitants swear of allegiance to Elizaveta Petrovna and treat is as a sign of a final decision to annex the province. However in 1742-1743 the population of the whole Finland was also forced to swear allegiance to Elizaveta Petrovna which did not prevent the empress to return by peace treaty the overwhelming majority of Finland to Sweden”.
This example IMHO shows that swear of allegiance does not guaranty the determination of Elizaveta Petrovna’s government to keep the territory no matter what.
More importantly, however, is the text of special declaration to Russian-Austrian convention of March 22, 1760 (which is more than a year later than East Prussians swear of allegiance in 1758) states (again, summarizing from the article):
Duchy of Prussia shall be given to Russia as a fair compensation for the losses caused by war (conditional on Austria recovering Glatz and Silesia). Russia is committed to stating negotiations with PLC for “resolving East Prussia’s question to mutual benefit” and Maria Theresa guaranties to support Russia in these negotiations.
The Russian desire not to keep East Prussia, but to exchange it is further confirmed by Russian missive to Marquis de l’Hopital of February 2nd, 1761: “…and thus Russia intends to exchange East Prussia with Poland after negotiations with Warsaw.”
To sum up despite the swear of allegiance Russia never intended to keep East Prussia, it was only a bargaining chip to get adequate compensation from PLC. This proposed schema was a part of official declarations and diplomatic messages and was either officially supported by Russia’s allies ( by Austria) or accepted (by France).
ITTL peace treaty is signed in October 1760, and Elizaveta would have more than a year to strike a deal with Augustus. So it looks like by the start of Peter III’s rules the exchange would already have been made.
II. Another important question is what territories Russia would get from Poland as a compensation for East Prussia. Usually Courland is mentioned sometimes with Polish Livonia (Lettgallia).
What looks weird is that this exchange is very much in favor of PLC:
While East Prussia is considered a poor province by German standards, in 1760 it probably has around 700 thousand people (1 million in 1807; source) and more importantly East Prussia controls the mouth of Neman (Memel) and has some control over mouth of Vistula (Marienwerder and its area on right bank of Vistula before splitting, Pillau and Konigsberg control Vistula Lagoon aka Frisches Haff control several branches of Vistula) – thus threatening both Polish and Lithuanian export. Additionally Konigsberg is a large (50000ish) and rich city.
Courland probably has the relative wealth close to East Prussia's but is much smaller (population grew from 210 to 290 thousands over XVIII, so probably around 250000 in 1760s; source), Lettgallia is relatively more poor(as are other territories mentioned below) and has around 150000 popultion (grew from 103 to 190 thousands over XVIII; same source). The strategical importance is incomparable: while Daugava is important for trade, Polish magnates export almost exclusively by Vistula and for Lithuanians Neman is more important than Daugava (especially since Russia controls the latter’s mouth at Riga anyway).
On top of that Courland is not even part of PLC-proper. It is a vassal over which PLC does not have any real control (and Russia does have a lot of control over Courland through Biron's family). While officially recognizing the de-facto situation that Courland is Russia’s, not PLC’s is extremely important, its value cannot be compared to the value of East Prussia even if PLC adds Lettgallia to the table.
I personally was always puzzeled why Russia (which has just proved its military might and that has a very considerable influence over PLC up to a point that it can almost be considered Russian dependency) would be willing to make such a disadvantageous exchange with unarguably much weaker PLC.
M. Anisimov’s article provides me an answer for this paradox.
He writes that Russia did not expect PLC to part with just Courland. He claims that Russia wanted to additionally annex border territories in Belarus and Ukraine. He also quotes to documents shedding light on Russian plan:
“…[Russia] shall take not only Courland but such a rounding of borders from Polish side that not only numerous troubles that are present would be resolved, but also we would obtain a possibility to connect Baltic and Black Sea trades and by this receive a fair share of Levantine trade”.
Connecting Baltic and Black Sea trade heavily suggests securing Daugava and Dnieper. This perception is further secured by another description of desired territories:
“provinces adjacent to Smolensk and Pskov regions”.
Now let us look at the map of PLC and find such provinces: these are Polish Livonia, Polotsk, Vitebsk and Mstislavl voivodeships and part of Minsk voivodeship on the left bank on Dniepr (to the south of Mstislavl and North of Chernigov).These territories also match first the describtion: Russia becomes the controller of both banks of Daugava, of the Left bank of Dnieper all the way to the Crimean border and also controls the land between those two rivers (thus allowing for connection of Baltic and Black sea trades).
Now combining this with recognizing the de-facto situation of Courland being part of Russia creates a treaty a much stronger party forces upon much weaker.
Next a question has to be answered if the disparity is too much and Augustus and Sejm would reject it outright?
I have already analyzed the value of East Prussia. Now let 's analyze the value of Russian claims.
Courland as is already mentioned has around 250 thousand people but is not de-facto controlled by PLC.
Regarding other territories we ironically have a good estimate of those. Let us look at Russian gains by First Partition in 1772 interestingly enough they are almost exactly the same as the demands described* (which can be seen on this map). Thus we know the population of the described territories: 1.3 million people in the Russian part of First Partition and 190000 in 1790 in parts of Polotsk and Vitebsk voivodeships retained by PLC. We can approximate the total population of these territories by 1.3 millions combined (and 250 thousands in Courland).
The relative wealth of these territories is definitely smaller than that of East Prussia.
*IMHO that may allow us to conjecture that Russia annexed the territories it had designes 10 years previously; that attempt was blundered by Peter, but the plans remained but for Courland and two small parts of Vitebsk and Polotsk voivodeships
Now this is of course still a treaty that favors Russia. In my opinion it can be accepted by following reasons.
1. Russia obviously has leverage over PLC: military leverage(undoubtfully), diplomatic leverage (Maria Theresa pledged to support Russia in the negotiations) and political (Russia has a lot of clients in PLC Sejm)
2. The described previously strategic importance of East Prussia for securing export grain trade. Also worth mentioned is that people who most profit from this trade are also the ones who make the decision.
3. Augustus III can also benefit from this greatly. Potentially East Prussia (or more probably some part of it) given to him or to his son. Not only it would increase his personal power in the realm, it will also give him German-speaking personal vassals in PLC borders. For German prince such as himself it can be important.
Also Russia probably provides additional guaranties of his son election, and having more guaranties cannot hurt.
4. Maybe Russia can also pay monetary compensation to PLC to sweeten the deal (and these money would probably be effectively split between the decision-makers as legalized bribes)
To sum up:
a. Russia was absolutely determined to swap East Prussia for Polish territory and made declaration about it long after the swearing of allegiance (also Finland precedent reduces the importance of allegience).
b. Since after the war end Elizaveta has more than a year to implement swap, she will probably be able to do this before Peter gains the throne, so his thoughts on East Prussia become less important
c. Getting just Curland (or even Curland and Polish Livonia) is a very weird move since it greatly influences Poland. There is evidence that Russia intended to gain Courland and territories close to Russian part of First Partition.
d. While such a deal obviously favors Russia there are arguments why such treaty can be accepted. While IMHO it is not guaranteed it would not be implausible either.
P. S. Sorry for such a wall of text. I wanted to prove my point as detailed as possible. Hope it isn’t too much
So with a neutered Hohenzollern realm stripped of royal dignity, Poland possessing EPR, and Russia having already proven it can push the PLC around pretty much wherever it wants, whenever it wants, we can reasonably expect no partition of Poland now?
Yes, if OTL Prussia is destroyed and reduced to Brandeburg with Prussia proper again part of Poland AND at the same time Russia had already the Polish lands they wanted while Austria’s center of gravity is heavily oriented on Germany, the survival of Poland is guaranteed...
The Bavaria/Austrian Netherlands swap will likely happen here but in either case I see easily all the OTL Benelux being included in the ATL Germany...
Definitely not the Netherlands, which had been independent of the HRE since 1648, and even before that were not considered part of "Germany".
*Belgium is also unlikely, as most of it is French-speaking, and also France would object to any other power taking that area, if France itself doesn't grab it.
Luxembourg, who cares?
Britain also has a tradition of strongly objecting to powers she does not like taking that area, particularly powers who happen to control large adjacent territories. However, if this tradition and the equally well-established one of being rivals with France happen to be at cross-purposes, it may get diffucult.*
*ATL. IOTL, Britain had little doubt in standing by France when a vaguely similar choice presented itself.
Thank you - and thank you for your post as well. I really appreciate the effort to help me fill in areas where I'm lacking in knowledge. This kind of contribution is extraordinarily helpful to me.
Your points are well-taken, and they illuminate some issues for me - I had also wondered why Courland was considered a fair trade for Ducal Prussia. If Russia was also expecting some significant gains from the eastern PLC, that trade starts to make much more sense. It's a convincing case, so I see no reason not to implement it ITTL - although I'll have to think about where exactly the new Russian border will fall. (Not that it's super relevant to the main plot of the TL, but I suppose it would be helpful for a map...)
Assuming East Prussia is ceded to Poland before Paul's accession, that does leave open the question of whether Paul will actually be able to gain the use of Königsberg (or a Prussian port) to launch his planned Danish campaign, or whether that will have to be conducted from Livonia. I'm not sure whether the latter would be merely an inconvenience or whether it would seriously impair the campaign, perhaps leading to a negotiated solution rather than actual war.
Back in the War of the Austrian Succession, when Augustus was briefly part of the anti-Austrian alliance, the allies agreed at Nymphenburg to a partitioning of the Habsburg lands within the empire. Saxony's share was supposed to be Moravia - not because Augustus particularly cared about Moravia, but because it was suggested that Moravia could be raised to a kingdom (splitting it from the Bohemian crown). This would give the Wettins a heritable crown, ensuring that the dynasty would remain royal no matter how the Polish elections went.
Obviously this did not happen, but your suggestion raises an interesting possibility. There is now precedent that "Prussia" is a royal title, and that this title is derived from ownership of Ducal Prussia; thus the reason why the Hohenzollern title was "King in Prussia." We've already discussed that Brandenburg ITTL, having lost Ducal Prussia, is arguably back to being a mere electorate. But by the same token, if Augustus could acquire Ducal Prussia as a personal title, rather than merely an addition to the crown of Poland, might he not claim on that basis to be hereditary King in Prussia, finally gaining the inalienable crown he failed to acquire in the WAS?
You thought this was a Corsican TL, but it was a Poland wank all along! Really, you all should have suspected it when I mentioned Theodore's wife was the daughter of the last Piast...
This may be a controversial opinion, but I'm not so sure. My understanding is that Austria's policy - really Kauntiz's policy - of consolidating and growing Austria's lands within the Empire was a reaction to Prussian strength. Prussia had grown to be a serious threat to Austria, even a peer competitor. If Prussia could not be cut down to size by direct military means - as the SYW demonstrated - then the only other way for Austria to regain her dominance within the Empire was to expand at the expense of other princes, thus compensating for Silesia's loss and consolidating Austria's "German core." As a large, wealthy, German-speaking state adjacent to the main Austrian territories, Bavaria was the obvious target - and it helped that after 1777, Bavaria had a ruler who was interested in a trade.
ITTL, however, the main impetus for this policy no longer exists. Silesia has been regained and Prussia has been trimmed (albeit not destroyed), demonstrating Austria's dominance in Germany for all to see. With or without Bavaria, Austria is the top dog. While acquiring Bavaria might be nice - more land is always good, and it would make the borders prettier - it is no longer driven by an urgent need to make up for the loss of Silesia and regain German hegemony. Without that urgency the Austrians may not press the issue very hard, if they pursue it at all.
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