King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
- Start date
Who does Ragusa compare to in this vein of thought? Always in the shadow of a giant, but damned persistent.
Ragusa is the smart little shit that happily sucked up to big bro ottoman sempai and managed to stay alive the longest albeit irrelevant but hey still not Genoa UwU
Depends on whether the Ligurian Republic counts as "Genoa." In terms of strict government continuity, Genoa only lasted a month longer than Venice - the Venetian government voted to abolish itself on May 12th of 1797, while the Mombello Convention which disbanded the old Genoese Republic was approved by the Genoese on June 9th of the same year and came into effect with the creation of the Ligurian Republic on the 14th.
If you include the Genoese provisional government, which was headed by the ex-doge, you can extend that by another six months; if you include the entire lifespan of the Ligurian Republic you can say that they lasted all the way to 1805. But this had nothing to do with the resilience of Genoese institutions, only the fact that Venice's territory was useful for buying peace with Austria while Genoa's was not, allowing Genoa to stumble on for a while as a "sister republic."
Wonder if the war will lead to Corsica becoming more centralized and raising taxes more efficiently, and if that will similarly lead to the army getting even slightly more professional and larger. It seems at the current time the war is straining the state to its limits so I assume something might happen.
Possible. If King Theo can present the war as a personal victory he could use that to push reforms; but even in the best case it will be a question of how much. Even the best victory for Corsica here will be one they have to recover from I would say with the strain this has put on them.
Hmm I was just going on the driect miltary occupation times,I would count Liguria republic though as it remained a defaco gentian entity
Intervention
Intervention
Cala Francese, Maddalena. Sardinia is visible in the background.
Cala Francese, Maddalena. Sardinia is visible in the background.
On March 8th 1782, two feluche landed a small party of soldiers of the Royal Sardinian Army on the island of Maddalena. They occupied the tiny abandoned “fort” constructed by Corsican soldiers of King Federico in 1773 - the Corsican flag and gun had long since been removed - and raised the Sardinian flag over it.
Turin had been waiting to play this card for some time. Maddalena and its surrounding islands, known as the Isole delle Bocche (“Isles of the Straits”) or Isole Intermedie (“Intermediate Isles”), were of little economic value, used only for seasonal grazing by a few Corsican shepherds. Yet their position and the sheltered roadstead they provided to ships gave them considerable strategic importance, particularly to Sardinia, as they could conceivably be used as a foothold for an invasion of the island. Turin’s claim to them was based more on geography than law: the Treaty of the Hague of 1720 which had transferred Sardinia to the Savoyards had not mentioned the islands, which despite their proximity to Sardinia had long been administratively part of the Genoese territory of Bonifacio. King Carlo Emanuele III had asserted his claim in 1773 against King Federico’s brief occupation of Maddalena but had refrained from actually seizing the isles.
The new Corsican foreign minister Giovan Francesco Cuneo d’Ornano, appointed at the end of 1780, had seized upon the three-way dispute over the islands as a means to further the country’s policy aims. As he saw it, the isles were of little value to Corsica but of much greater value to Sardinia. Federico’s claim upon them was an unhelpful obstruction to good Corso-Sardinian relations, which Corsica needed if it was to successfully prosecute a war against Genoa. Cuneo d’Ornano had conducted secret talks with the Sardinian envoy in Bastia, Count Amadeo Tana di Santena, exploring the possibility of Corsica dropping its claim to some or all of the islands in exchange for diplomatic and military aid. If this aid resulted in the successful conquest of Bonifacio, that acquisition would be well worth the loss of a few grassy rocks off the Sardinian coast.
The so-called “Tana Agreement” remains a matter of historical conjecture; there was no written accord, and we cannot know exactly what, if anything, the Corsican government (or Cuneo d’Ornano specifically) had promised to the Sardinians. Nevertheless, some sort of concession can be inferred from Turin's cooperation during the war and Corsica's evident lack of surprise when the Sardinians occupied Maddalena. Although Sardinia remained formally neutral, its ports gave special treatment to Corsican warships and privateers, while ports on Sardinia turned away Genoese boats seeking provisions for besieged Bonifacio. Turin’s diplomats in Paris and Vienna had lobbied those governments on Corsica’s behalf, and King Vittorio Amadeo III had given his blessings for certain Piedmontese volunteers like Agostino Orengo, General Petriconi’s captain of artillery, to enter Corsican service. The Sardinian embassy in Genoa passed intelligence directly to the Corsican government, including information on the ships of the grande armamento as it was being assembled.
Of course Sardinia did not really need Corsica’s approval to seize the islands - Corsica could not meaningfully oppose them - but supporting the Corsicans had other benefits. In particular, Turin was interested in gauging the extent of the great powers’ commitment to the Genoese Republic. The acquisition of the Marquisate of Finale had only whetted Sardinia’s appetite for Liugrian territory and Vittorio Amadeo was eager to widen Piedmont's “window on the sea” into a proper door, but the Savoyard state had to proceed cautiously in the current diplomatic environment. The response of the powers to Theo’s aggression would give the Sardinians useful information, and if it backfired catastrophically Turin would lose nothing. Yet to their surprise - and delight - by March the French had done almost nothing to interfere, apparently allowing Bonifacio to fall even though a single French frigate might have been sufficient to save it. If the powers were truly ambivalent to Genoa’s fate, this was an opportunity that could not be missed.
While the Sardinians dipped their toes in the water, Admiral Lorenzo continued to prosecute the naval war. The admiral received word while repairing his ships in Livorno that the “second squadron” had successfully resupplied Capraia. Although he had met his objective, Lorenzo regarded the Naval Battle of Capraia as a very close call - had his own ship taken any more damage aloft, or had his crew been less quick in repairing it, he might have been caught and defeated. Facing the grande armamento again would be tempting fate. The admiral decided to cruise off La Spezia to interfere with Genoese shipping to Capraia, but the strong coastal defenses and the presence of the Genoese galley fleet prevented him from trying anything too audacious. Lorenzo was also wary of being caught by the armamento if they decided to double back to La Spezia - which was, in fact, exactly what Commissioner-General Lomellino was planning. On February 23rd, Lomellino sailed north with seven ships hoping to catch Lorenzo between his fleet and La Spezia, but Lorenzo had departed just one day earlier.
Lorenzo decided that the best course of action was to return to raiding. While Lomellino’s invasion had not met with much success on Capraia, it had successfully ended much of the threat to Genoese shipping by putting the Corsican Navy on the defensive. Only a handful of small Corsican privateer vessels had been left to pursue the guerre de course. Now that the Capraia garrison had been strongly reinforced and was in no immediate danger, there was no need to seek another “battle,” and with all of the Republic’s naval assets between La Spezia and Capraia the rest of the Ligurian Sea was practically undefended. Plundering Genoese shipping would make more of an impact on the Republic than fruitlessly trying to harass a blockade which wasn’t working very well anyway. That, at least, was the admiral’s justification; the fact that commerce raiding was also in Lorenzo’s personal interest probably also factored in his decision making. The “pirate-admiral” was still a pirate at heart.
For more than a month, Lorenzo’s fleet enjoyed nearly free reign over the Ligurian coast. This plundering had to be done tactfully, as Genoese vessels often used false flags, and even vessels known to be Genoese might be carrying foreign nationals or foreign-owned goods that were inadmissible as prizes. Nevertheless, Lorenzo and his captains made several lucrative captures. On March 17th, the crews of the Lacedemone, Idra, and Medusa cooperated in an amphibious descent on the town of Cervo, a local hub of Ligurian coral fishing. The local militia heroically defended Castello Cervo, a 13th century fortified church, but they could not stop the Corsicans from bombarding and then burning the town, demolishing the watchtower on the Capo del Cervo, and destroying most of the boats in the harbor. The admiral declared it to be revenge for the Genoese ravaging of Capraia, and promised that more would follow.
Cervo, largely destroyed by the Corsicans in 1782
While it endured these indignities, the Genoese government was growing increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with the Capraia campaign. The Serene College had authorized the expedition with considerable reluctance, motivated more by fear of popular unrest than anything else, and their concerns that the campaign would turn into a fruitless and expensive boondoggle seemed to have materialized. By late March, Genoa had been besieging Capraia for two months and had nothing to show for it. Colonel Augustin Grenier had managed to lose most of his artillery in the aftermath of the Battle of Capraia, which the Republic could not easily replace without further despoiling its Ligurian fortifications. Lomellino found a creative solution to this problem by ordering several 36-pounder guns to be removed from the state galleys to be used as siege guns, but this effectively reduced the galley fleet to impotence, and Lomellino could not summon provisions and money quite so easily.
The government allowed the siege to limp along for a while, but the combination of Sardinian military posturing and Lorenzo’s raiding campaign proved to be unbearable. The common citizens of Genoa may have supported the Capraia expedition, but the merchants were furious that their commerce was left to be preyed upon by Admiral Lorenzo despite the fact that Genoa had an entire fleet stationed off Capraia doing nothing of any apparent value. Likewise, while sending a fifth of the Republic’s standing army to Capraia may have seemed reasonable when Genoa only had to worry about the Corsicans, leaving those troops abroad when the Sardinians were making moves on the Republic’s territory bordered on strategic malpractice.[1] Having apparently gotten away with their seizure of Maddalena, the Sardinians had started moving battalions to the Ligurian frontier. Whatever the dangers of popular opinion, the welfare of the state and its most important stakeholders - that is, the patricians and merchants - had to come first.
On March 22nd, Lomellino received orders from the War Office to end the operation and facilitate the return of Grenier’s men to Genoa. Instead of complying, Lomellino appealed this action directly to the Serene College. But the government had made up its mind, and while Lomellino had broad authority over the Republic’s naval affairs he did not command the Genoese army. It was impossible to keep these orders a secret from Colonel Grenier forever, and on the 30th Lomellino informed him of the situation and asked if taking the fort by storm was practicable. Grenier replied that it was not. A final “grand cannonade” (albeit with only about half a dozen heavy guns) was made against Fort Federico on March 31st-April 1st with all the powder and shot Grenier could muster, but this did not change his appraisal of the situation. Although Fort Federico was heavily damaged and had lost the use of most of its artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Paganelli’s men had dug trenches and built breastworks around the fort which were not as vulnerable to direct fire, and Grenier did not have the numerical advantage to simply overrun them. On April 5th Grenier’s forces began embarking on transports and completed their evacuation on the 7th, destroying anything they could not take with them. Paganelli observed this movement but made no attempt to harass the enemy; there was no reason to get more men killed in a battle that was already won. After 77 days, the Siege of Capraia was over.
These developments finally convinced the French government to take more strenuous action. Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes had been satisfied to wait and observe the results of Genoa’s counterattack. If Genoa managed to take Capraia; so much the better; France could step in and negotiate something resembling a return to the status quo. But Genoa’s failure reinforced what Vergennes had suspected since the fall of Bonifacio - that the Genoese Republic was militarily impotent and could not defend its overseas territories even against the likes of Corsica. The war was now stalemated, with neither state possessing the ability to force its demands upon the other through military action. If it was allowed to continue, the only possible outcomes would be either an inconclusive, low-intensity naval war, or overt Sardinian intervention. Neither of these outcomes was in France’s interest. On April 25th, Vergennes issued an ultimatum to the Corsicans and Genoese “requesting” a general armistice.
The Genoese government agreed to this demand immediately. Having failed to take Capraia, there was nothing more the Republic could gain from war. Privately, Vergennes had promised the Republic protection from any further aggression, and while he had been evasive about the ultimate status of Bonifacio many in the Genoese government hoped that France’s intervention might finally result in the restoration of their territory. Even if this did not materialize, however, at the very least accepting French demands would head off a possible Sardinian invasion. Just two weeks before the ultimatum was issued, Sardinian and Genoese forces had clashed at the border village of Olivetta and the government was on the verge of ordering a general mobilization of the militia. A war with its far more powerful neighbor was to be avoided at all costs.
The ultimatum was received somewhat less enthusiastically by the Corsicans, as despite holding Bonifacio and Capraia they had hoped that continued interference with Genoese shipping would compel the Republic to make further concessions, particularly the payment of an indemnity. In recent weeks, however, the naval situation had become much less favorable. The Serene College had considered removing Lomellino after dragging his feet in the execution of their orders, but with Lorenzo on the loose - and particularly after the sack of Cervo - it seemed best to retain his skills as a corsair-hunter.
Lomellino organized the best of his ships into a “hunting squadron” to pursue the Corsicans, and dispersed the rest of the grande armamento on convoy escort duty. On April 12th, Lomellino’s squadron surprised the Medusa as it was boarding a Genoese merchantman. Captain-Lieutenant Giuseppe Ramarone fled, but was overtaken by the xebec Veloce. Despite being significantly outgunned (the Veloce had fourteen 6pdr guns to the Medusa’s twelve 4pdr guns) Ramarone battled the Veloce for some time, but as the rest of the Genoese squadron drew up on him he decided to purposefully run his ship aground and then burned it to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Ramarone and his crew were subsequently captured by Genoese land forces and interned for the remainder of the war. Admiral Lorenzo was forced to consolidate his remaining ships and managed to avoid further action with Lomellino, but the “hunting squadron” did succeed in capturing two Corsican privateer feluche (including the Giraglia, which had participated in the relief of Capraia). Pessimistic about scoring any further victories and reasoning that they could not win a naval war of attrition against a state with far more money, sailors, and shipbuilding capacity, Theo’s council of state concluded that it was time to end the war and recommended promptly accepting the French ultimatum.
On May 10th, Count Stefano Michele Durazzo and Marquis Francesco Spinola signed an armistice at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. While this act ended hostilities, however, hammering out a final treaty would take more time. Despite Genoese hopes that the French would demand the return of Bonifacio, Vergennes had come to the conclusion that a lasting peace could only be founded on the cession of the city. Lomellino’s achievements notwithstanding, Genoa had been defeated - they had lost Bonifacio and failed to take Capraia. Genoa clearly lacked the strength to hold Bonifacio, and if the city was returned to them it would only be a source of future discord (to say nothing of the grave injury it would inflict upon Theo and his government). The conquest of Bonifacio might not be just, but Vergennes believed it was the outcome most likely to produce regional stability.
The great question that remained was that of Genoa’s compensation. Vergennes was unwilling to simply despoil the Republic and offer it nothing in return. The Genoese may have lost physical control of Bonifacio, but there was no reason for them to give up their claim to Bonifacio unless they were given some further incentive for doing so. Monetary compensation would be the easiest option, but the Corsicans refused to consider any “purchase” of the city, declaring haughtily that victors did not pay indemnities. Privately, their opposition was more practical - the war had cost far more than they had expected, and the government was hoping that Genoese indemnities would help right the fiscal ship. Critically, however, the Genoese also refused any suggestion of monetary compensation. Vergennes initially presumed this to be sheer obstinacy, and there were certainly those in Genoa who believed that accepting compensation in any form would be tantamount to legitimizing Theo’s naked act of aggression and accepting the loss of a city they still hoped to reclaim by diplomatic means.
But the Genoese elite also had good reasons for opposing monetary compensation specifically. Firstly, the state did not really need the money; unlike in 1748, when the Republic was faced with total financial collapse, the Genoese Republic in 1782 was solvent. Raising the grande armamento had been a great expense that required taking loans, but the Republic had paid off the last of its old war debt in the 1770s and could manage its present debt burden without excessive difficulty. Secondly, Genoa had accepted money for Finale in 1748 and accepted more money for Corsica in 1749 - they had sold these territories under duress and against their will, but they had sold them all the same. If they sold Bonifacio as well, the government worried it would create the impression that the Republic would accept any theft of its territory so long as the thief threw some money at them. Finally, the patricians feared what the reaction of the Genoese public might be if they learned that their leaders had once more agreed to sell out Genoese citizens for cash. Even if Theo offered them a king’s ransom, the people would only see thirty pieces of silver.
Footnotes
[1] The potential intervention of the Sardinians at sea also had to be considered. The Savoyard monarchy had scrapped its galley fleet in the 1760s and began assembling a sailing navy based out of Villefranche. Like Corsica, Sardinia struggled with building this program from scratch and had encountered setbacks along the way, but by 1782 the Royal Sardinian Navy included the 36-gun frigate San Vittorio, the 32-gun frigate San Carlo, and two corvettes (technically “armed transports”) of 20 guns. The frigates had 12-pounder main batteries, far outclassing anything Lomellino possessed. If Sardinia joined the war, this squadron could conceivably land a devastating blow almost immediately by sailing to Capraia, scattering or destroying the grande armamento, and forcing the surrender of Grenier’s entire expeditionary force.
Intervention
Cala Francese, Maddalena. Sardinia is visible in the background.
On March 8th 1782, two feluche landed a small party of soldiers of the Royal Sardinian Army on the island of Maddalena. They occupied the tiny abandoned “fort” constructed by Corsican soldiers of King Federico in 1773 - the Corsican flag and gun had long since been removed - and raised the Sardinian flag over it.
Another great chapter Carp!
Its nice to see the Sardinian get involved, especially since King Theo attended the Military academy there. I was curious if he'd have a pro-Turin foreign policy and if the rumors in this chapter are anything to go by it seems like it.
I imagine since neither side wanting to hand over / buy Bonifacio for money it's gonna be a pain for the French to make both sides come to a deal. The only thing I can imagine is if the two sides agree to a "lease" style agreement (e.g. Bonifacio stays in Genoa's hands for 15 to 20 years then gets handed over to Corsica, with tax exemption for Genoese traders for ______ number of years after.) But that could only happen if cooler heads prevail and considering how icy Corsico-Genoese relations are that idea is easier said than done.
Also, is King Theo gonna reward the Greeks for their defence of Capria with land there that they can finally call home?
I love the narrator's tone here, it's normally good but especially good in this chapter.
Sure in a few generations when the king of one inherits the crown of the other...
Was wondering if the Sardinians might get involved. Amazing chapter, can't wait to see how the peace shakes out and what concessions will be made. Hopefully this has lead to closer ties between Corsica and Sardinia, king Theos future son or perhaps his younger brother receiving a sardinian bride would greatly improve the whole family's prestige. And maybe, just maybe, some of those Sardinian volunteers stick around Corsica as trainers/ drill sergeants? The Sardinian army was pretty disciplined and organized, the Corsicans learning from them would be beneficial to Corsica which has less than well disciplined and well organized/supplied forces. King Theo has managed to win the war and finish his grand uncles dream and he's not even 30 yet, he still has much more he can do for the island and its inhabitants before his time as king is over. Very exciting
Might facilitating the safe transit of any Genoese citizens of Bonifacio who would rather move to Genoa be an acceptable peace term?
As for the Corsican-Sardinian friendship, I think it's quite a lot more brittle than it looks. The moment that Genoa goes form a minor nation to a non-entity rump state wherein Turin has aquired yet more of the Ligurian coast. Corsica goes from useful ally of Turin to 'logical next acquisition whenever convenient', being right between the nominal source of the royal title and the actual heartland of the Savoyard monarchs.
As for the Corsican-Sardinian friendship, I think it's quite a lot more brittle than it looks. The moment that Genoa goes form a minor nation to a non-entity rump state wherein Turin has aquired yet more of the Ligurian coast. Corsica goes from useful ally of Turin to 'logical next acquisition whenever convenient', being right between the nominal source of the royal title and the actual heartland of the Savoyard monarchs.
Almost certainly, the Sardinians were quite opportunistic historically and often played the greater powers around them off one another. But Corsica can likely do the same, as Sardinia may one day want Corsica, but the great powers may easily decide Sardinia would be getting too big for it's britches at that point and so may block Sardinias attempts to gain Corsica, pure speculation but still. This is part of the reason Genoa still exists, the great powers don't want to give Sardinia too much, if I remember correctly Sardinia was on the way to completely crushing Genoa last war and was saved by the peace. So it's my hope that as states who both have to be opportunistic to grow and continue to exist, that they can reach an understanding and mutually beneficial relationship, king Theo was educated in Turin after all.
That was in extremely poor taste.At least Genoa hasn't aged like John F. Kennedy.
As someone who lives not far from Dallas, I think that a sandwich left to go stale in Dallas Love Field for weeks would taste more poorly than that.