But Daqing changes the timetable for Japan's expansion. They can't avoid being entangled in China and the French Indochina grab is probably too easy an opportunity to pass on. But if you know you can develop your own resources to sustain the Chinese war then why is 1940 or 1945 too late. The imperative to attack the Southern Resource Area just isn't there.
Would the Allies declare war on Japan because of China and Indochina before the defeat of Germany? I don't think so. They didn't IOTL and post the defeat of Germany the appetite for another war in the USA is going to be weak.
If you believe that Japan does have a death wish to attack the Allies irrespective of their economic situation then the timetable is a problem - but I believe Daqing in 1935 would change that.
It was the Japanese government who continuously expressed their hostility towards the Allies and they even signed the Tripartite Pact to publicly declare their allegiance to the Axis powers in Europe. In turn, the Allies had every reason to block the Japanese from acquiring resources and expanding its reach, that's why America instituted embargo, and that's why the Netherlands refused the 1940 Japanese demands for the so-called 13 products including castor, quinine, rubber, tin, nickel, bauxite, manganese, chromium, and others. Which would create exactly the same well-known economic factor and imperative to attack the Southern Resource Area.
And I'm not sure how exactly Daqing helps sustaining the attrition of 'the Chinese war'. If anything, importing plants, technologies, machines, all would eat up a substantial part of Japan's already dwindling capability to obtain war materials. The best choice for the Japanese was to stop persecuting the war in China, regardless for Daqing or no Daqing, but especially with Daqing, they can't have the cake and eat it too.
In this point my opinion is same as 2017. They needs not to instigate the Second Sino-Japanese war to have any meaningful change. But it's not like Tokyo actively instigated that war, it was escalated from a local clash into a full blown war, on its own, and very quickly. It was not the first local clash to happen as well, starting with the infamous Manchuria Incident of 1931, Shanghai 1932, Reha 1933, Suiyuan 1936, all of these major cases were instigated by local Japanese troops without Tokyo's authorization.
So you are ignoring the table on page 11, Table 1 of the source I provided which lists avgas recovery from Sumatra Kerosene and Onomogawa gas oil? Along with more esoteric feedstocks like Soy bean oil and oil from rubber? Daqing is a valuable hydrocarbon feedstock which can be used to provide avgas and other gasoline cuts in quantity using hydrocracking technology the Japanese already had developed.
Property of Sumatra crude needs not be applied to that of Daqing's much heavier, paraffin based crude. Note that your link would keep making notes about naphtha. These weren't ordinary refining tests but desperate efforts to just make do out of unsuitable materials. Uneconomic and unreliable methods to rely upon.
As for 'quantity', recall I said "these facilities operated at low capacities.". The hydrocracking plant at Tokuyama for example barely managed to produce 6,010kl of aviation fuel in 1942, 5,009kl in 1943, and 2,003kl in 1944. From the supposed capacity of 10,000 kl per year stated in the link. What was limiting factor I would like to learn, but I'm sure you can't build refineries and lines everywhere just to support such an inefficient and underdeveloped method of production, and as stated numerous times, building up such capacity requires huge resources and foreign imports to make do.