Japan discovers Daqing oil fields in 1935 - how does it change their foreign policy?

One hundred percent agreed. Which is what I’ve been trying to argue for most of this thread. Yet several times you seem to be arguing the costs of war would preclude their exploitation of the oil.

There was a significant window where Japan had conquered Manchuria, was only facing an insurgency campaign, had secured the Chinese government’s acquiescence in the occupation of Manchuria and had yet to expand their operations to the “rest” of China.

In this window the PoD is the finding of the oil.

I’m saying the Japanese will hold with what they currently have in Manchuria to exploit the oil find, before launching any new combat operations.

You seem, as far as I can tell, to be saying the Japanese will continue on an OTL course of action (for reasons) rather than pursuing the chance to become oil independent.

This is the point of confusion for me. Why would the Japanese pass up the chance to be immune to oil embargoes?
I think no one would deny that the discovery of oilfield in Manchuria would increase its importance. My way of thinking is, that this in turn would fuel the Japanese military's already unhealthy paranoia against the Chinese threats. The Chinese in turn, with oil found, surely would double down their revanchism. In this condition, some sort of war hysteria is bound to happen, which is likely to cause local clashes that could develop into a war, just like real history. Tokyo might try to avoid war, but unless they succeed in disciplining local troops, their efforts would be in vain.

Without further diversion from history, the war is likely to be on the same track as reality - the war in North China would spread to Shanghai, which Japan would react by attacking and capturing Nanjing. and the Western powers supports the Chinese war efforts through Hanoi-Nanning supply line, the commercial treaty between America and Japan is cancelled in 1939, and on.
 
Yet several times you seem to be arguing the costs of war would preclude their exploitation of the oil.
The costs of war wouldn't necessarily preclude the exploitation of the oil, but would likely limit its potential. Or it could go other way around, limiting Japan's war potential and performance.

On this point, I can't stress enough of the cost of exploiting that oil. Back in 2017, I noted that the construction of the Yokkaichi refining facility costed the Imperial Japanese Navy 250 million Yen. The price of one single Yamato-class battleship was 137 million Yen.
 
This is the point of confusion for me. Why would the Japanese pass up the chance to be immune to oil embargoes?
Because to make that happen, the Navy is going to need to give up it's construction program, or the Army is going to give up making war on the rest of China.

Or you're going to need to believe the pervetin-fuelled dreams of 'OF COURSE WE CAN DO THIS BY THE TRIUMPH OF THE WILL ALONE'.
 
Just to be clear, that survey formally began in December 24 1937, but they were boring at Fuxin since 1935 after a local colliery reported finding of oil. It was a dedicated effort from the military but went nowhere after boring 46 holes including a hole of 1700m, and extracting 200l of petroleum.
To be clear just how bad this is, early in the thread I talked about several 1000 bopd wells. A thousand barrels per day, under natural flow. No pumps.

That is several wells that spew out, to ground level, 130 tons a day of oil each.

What they actually found at Fuxin was - and Im being generous here - two hundred kilos of oil.

This is not a good sign for 'Here. This is where we need to put ALL THE WAR EFFORT. Here !'.
 
Because to make that happen, the Navy is going to need to give up it's construction program, or the Army is going to give up making war on the rest of China.

Or you're going to need to believe the pervetin-fuelled dreams of 'OF COURSE WE CAN DO THIS BY THE TRIUMPH OF THE WILL ALONE'.
Given their financial behavior during the war, I expect them to give up neither. They will demand their war expenditure AND oil too. But while they can pass the budget however they like, materials and foreign currencies can't come out of no where, so cuts will be made from here and from there, delaying this and that, something like that. Expense needs to come from somewhere.
 
So the Japanese are unable to choose any other path than what is essentially OTL?

Not much point continuing this thread then is there?

I’m out.
 
So the Japanese are unable to choose any other path than what is essentially OTL?

Not much point continuing this thread then is there?

I’m out.
No, but difficult choices will be made.
Lets say the Emperor make it a known goal, and both IJNand IJA will.have to cross some things off their 1937 and onwards wishlists.
Like the Navy getting one Yamato, and IJA doesn't get the funding for say, 4 divisions.

That has its own effect, later in the War.

Main probkem is, Japanese economy doesn't have a lot of slack after the Great Kanto quake. Economy is the size of Italy, and they no real chance of growth, given the protectionism post Great Depression around the Globe.
The pie is the same size, with news of the discovery.
IJA has made it impossible to get outside funding for a joint project.
So the pie slices of the budget must be thinner, as they don't have the option of easily grabbing a nearby Nations Gold Reserves, or shaking down members of a newly hated, scapegoated minority like the Nazis to fund new projects.
 
To be clear just how bad this is, early in the thread I talked about several 1000 bopd wells. A thousand barrels per day, under natural flow. No pumps.

That is several wells that spew out, to ground level, 130 tons a day of oil each.

What they actually found at Fuxin was - and Im being generous here - two hundred kilos of oil.

This is not a good sign for 'Here. This is where we need to put ALL THE WAR EFFORT. Here !'.
Supposedly they missed much larger finds by less than 1000 feet - reportedly their needs in 1942 approached 40Mb/y. Railways already exist in the area in 1935, Japan has a petrochem industry (Hokkaido and northern Honshu had known oil deposits along with extraction already underway at northern Karafuto/Sakhalin). If memory serves, 22 barrels makes 3 metric tons, so roughly 40 million barrels per year or about 110000 b/d (kbd?) making about 15kt/d. Daqing currently produces somewhere between 9 and 10 times that amount with productivity starting from 1959. With some infrastructure/knowledge base in place I wondered if they could extract at least their 1942 OTL needs by 1938 or 1939. Oil is of course a strategic need for Japan and their synthetic capacity was not remotely sufficient to cover needs. Taking the DEI is one way to alleviate that, Karafuto/Sakhalin (Kamchatka was also doing some oil exploration but I can't find production figures) and other Russian areas would solve the need though at greater cost. Japan also lagged behind the West in armored warfare, understandably given that oil is already at a premium - I believe if oil were no longer a limitation they almost certainly develop tanks more than OTL. That could change parts of the war in China or even the Pacific, especially if the Type 2 Ka-Mi or Type 10 AA gun gives the Type 97 with 120mm gun are further developed or developed earlier. But without a strategic need for oil, their strategic priorities are now different - again, I'd like to know about how people think the foreign policy would change as a result.
 
Here is an example from 1949. 4 years
Wiki leaves a few things out
1948 62 test wells drilled to 1000ft results positive
1949 Matzan 3, 5700ft down results1000bbl/day-Success.
1949-1955 425 wells drilled, production starts.
This area is like 20 miles NE of Vienna, so great infrastructure and industry to back things up.
Also, its 25° API Gravity.
 
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Just to be clear, that survey formally began in December 24 1937, but they were boring at Fuxin since 1935 after a local colliery reported finding of oil. It was a dedicated effort from the military but went nowhere after boring 46 holes including a hole of 1700m, and extracting 200l of petroleum. For the reasons I have pointed on this thread before, Japan's oil industries were dismissive to the military's finding and effort. In the word of an engineer from the Japan Mining Co., "It is stunning that they kept digging with patience under such a situation.".

Liaohe isn't shale, but it's very heavy, heavier than Daqing. For transportation, Daqing's 30℃ pour point is problematic already, but we're now talking about Liaohe's 40℃ pour point. These points were talked back in 2017 so I will not repeat the same argument at length, but below quote should capture the problem with the Liaohe oil easily.

Hmm, I can see your point with regards to Liaohe then although it does bare noting how Japan was able to construct a shale oil industry in the same area that produced on average 30,000 tons per month.
 
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