How would the war have ended if Goering became fuhrer in early 1941 and there’s no German-Soviet War?

I think that this is much closer to the forum consensus than what the OP describes.
It's very much the consensus on the preceding WI Hitler did in 1940-1941 threads. The discussion usually turned into whether the Wehrmacht would attempt a coup, a potential Nazi inner struggle and whether Stalin of all people would be the one to initiate conflict. Here, we are going with the interpretation that there is no war and the discussion now is about how might the war with the British specifically might end in this scenario.
 
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It's very much the consensus on the preceding WI Hitler did in 1940-1941 threads. The discussion usually turned into whether the Wehrmacht would attempt a coup, a potential Nazi inner struggle and whether Stalin of all people would be the one to initiate conflict. Here, we are going with the interpretation that there is no war and the discussion now is about how might the war with the British specifically might end in this scenario.
The results of the poll in that first one says something different. Only 37% would expect it to be completely different from OTL.

The other threads are really old and/or short. Not really reprensentative.
 

TheSpectacledCloth

Gone Fishin'
It's very much the consensus on the preceding WI Hitler did in 1940-1941 threads. The discussion usually turned into whether the Wehrmacht would attempt a coup, a potential Nazi inner struggle and whether Stalin of all people would be the one to initiate conflict. Here, we are going with the interpretation that there is no war and discussion how might the war with the British specifically might end in this scenario.
Well, Goering's bound to invade the Soviet Union at some point and the longer he waits, the worse off the Reich would be militarily.

Without Hitler to keep in check, he's guaranteed to waste the Luftwaffe's resources on fighting Britain alone. And based on Goering's incompetence as a commander, Germany might capitulate 1 or 2 years earlier than OTL. The drug addict was a captivating politician, but his military strategy was horrendous.

Hell, Goering was heavily underestimated America's fighting power and was in favor of declaring war against them after Pearl Harbor..

The Wehrmacht was much too spineless to coup the Nazis this early, since many of them were content with Nazism. von Brauchitsch and Halder would likely be allowed to run the Eastern campaign, and it would still end in disaster for the Reich.

It's more likely, if Goering chooses not to invade Russia, that he ends up poisoned by the SS and Rudolf Hess becomes the new Fuhrer.

BTW, you really need some newer and more updated sources.
 
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Barbarossa proceeds in 1941 because the soviet union is the next target, and preparations were in train since France fell. If you delay to 42 or 43 the soviets get more time to prepare and reorganise and Britain may be in a position to cause more problems.

Germany has to attack as soon as the rasputitsa is over to have the best chance of victory, so it has to be late spring or early summer (unless as OTL the rasputitsa lasts longer than usual).

The combination of underlying philosophy, ongoing preparations and military practicalities mean that Barbarossa goes ahead in summer 1941, irrespective of Hitler's presence.
 
There were a lot of people trying to convince Hitler the Barbarossa was a bad idea, the Soviets were incompetent commies, no ability to be a threat, always going to be a primary resource provider, racial superiority theories run both ways. Georing was less of a risk taker than Hitler, wanted to die in a bed, also with Hitler out of the way he might convince himself that Britain might make peace with a more reasonable person than Hitler. Himself!
I was going to mention this. Any possibility there might be a peace without Hitler. I don't see Goering as any more trustworthy.
Also, as mentioned, his belief the Luftwaffe could force Britain into submission suggests he might not be interested.
 
The Wehrmacht was much too spineless to coup the Nazis this early, since many of them were content with Nazism. von Brauchitsch and Halder would likely be allowed to run the Eastern campaign, and it would still end in disaster for the Reich.

Very correct. Halder and Brauchitsch are both spineless, and not particularly competent. And Halder was directly involved in drafting the criminal orders for Operation Barbarossa.

It cannot be emphasised enough that at this point in time the conservative opposition is pitifully weak. Most of the officers associated with Operation Valkyrie (plans for which did not exist until late 1943) are either totally on board with the regime or dislike certain aspects of it, but are happy that Germany rules most of Europe. As far as they're concerned, they've been going from success t success over the last few years.

The oppositionists who do exist are isolated figures (and some have a delusional view of Göring being more 'moderate' and acceptable. Examples for this would be Popitz and Ulrich von Hassell). Neither Ludwig Beck or Carl Friedrich Goerdeler are particularly inspiring. Sure, Hans Oster genuinely hates the regime and has actual courage unlike most, but he doesn't have the means to do much. At this stage there's no one who could lead a coup and rally enough of the military to actually pull it off. Göring is the legitimate successor, hasn't massively messed up and the vast majority of the military is very okay with the regime.

Frankly, the historical Operation Valkyrie shows how difficult a coup would be. Most of the army followed the chain of command, and suppressed the putsch without any help from the Party or the SS. And that was when the Third Reich was clearly losing.
 
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He certainly wanted to present himself that way at the end of the war but nothing about how he ran the luftwaffe suggests that to me.
There was the Milch affair - when the Gestapo came for Goering's deputy on the grounds that he was Jewish Goering fought them off, got Milch's ancestry aryanised (his father was Jewish and Milch's mother was persuaded to say Milch was the result of an affair with somebody suitably aryan) and ended up declaring "I will decide who is Jewish in the Air Ministry". He also protected his brother Albert, who was a genuinely principled anti-Nazi who would probably be remembered alongside the likes of Oskar Schindler if it wasn't for his embarrassing family name.

None of this is to suggest that Goering was any sort of nice guy of course, but it does suggest he was only as much of a Nazi as he needed to be to succeed in the movement and not one out of some deep sense of principle.
 
I was going to mention this. Any possibility there might be a peace without Hitler. I don't see Goering as any more trustworthy.
Also, as mentioned, his belief the Luftwaffe could force Britain into submission suggests he might not be interested.
I don't think Goring actually believed his Luftwaffe could force Britain into submission by 1941, he begrudgingly declared the BoB as a draw while Milch was bemoaning in his ear how it ended in failure. His depression was also playing up on his mind, which made him turn towards the closing of the Mediterranean as a way to defeat the British than any operations on the Isle.
 

Garrison

Donor
There were a lot of people trying to convince Hitler the Barbarossa was a bad idea, the Soviets were incompetent commies, no ability to be a threat, always going to be a primary resource provider, racial superiority theories run both ways. Georing was less of a risk taker than Hitler, wanted to die in a bed, also with Hitler out of the way he might convince himself that Britain might make peace with a more reasonable person than Hitler. Himself!
The specific timing and version of Barbarossa, but the political and economic impetus to launch it was inescapable. Germany remained dependent on Soviet food and oil while at the same time many of the good they paid for it with strengthened the Soviet military industries. Its take control or wait for the Soviets to be strong enough to dictate terms to Berlin.
 

thaddeus

Donor
There were a lot of people trying to convince Hitler the Barbarossa was a bad idea, the Soviets were incompetent commies, no ability to be a threat, always going to be a primary resource provider, racial superiority theories run both ways. Georing was less of a risk taker than Hitler, wanted to die in a bed, also with Hitler out of the way he might convince himself that Britain might make peace with a more reasonable person than Hitler. Himself!

Hitler dies, we do not know the circumstances under this OP, so assume it is unclear at the time also, his designated successor has flown to England?

how could they exploit this scenario with the (paranoid) Soviets? present it that the British were trying to entice Germany into invading East, that Hitler was resisting, the ringleader inside Germany has "flown the coop"

msg. to Stalin "we believe the British are scheming to have Germany attack the USSR while they intend to capture your oil producing region from the south."

more of an effort could be made in Syria, present it to the Soviets that they had "reinforced" the Vichy French there to stop any British use of the air bases planned for Operation Pike.

Goering probably legit wanted to pursue a Med Strategy rather than have the responsibility for air operations in the USSR, if the regime could prompt the Soviets to take some (any) action against the British, that is a perfect "out" from Barbarossa?
 
Hitler dies, we do not know the circumstances under this OP, so assume it is unclear at the time also, his designated successor has flown to England?

how could they exploit this scenario with the (paranoid) Soviets? present it that the British were trying to entice Germany into invading East, that Hitler was resisting, the ringleader inside Germany has "flown the coop"

msg. to Stalin "we believe the British are scheming to have Germany attack the USSR while they intend to capture your oil producing region from the south."

more of an effort could be made in Syria, present it to the Soviets that they had "reinforced" the Vichy French there to stop any British use of the air bases planned for Operation Pike.

Goering probably legit wanted to pursue a Med Strategy rather than have the responsibility for air operations in the USSR, if the regime could prompt the Soviets to take some (any) action against the British, that is a perfect "out" from Barbarossa?
Good point about Hess, the OP suggests Hitler dies in January. Hess actions would have butterflies for sure.
I think people are overthinking Georings commitment to Nazi ideology at this point. The boy is corrupt. Now in charge he is going to be grafting big, not taking the biggest of risks. He will negotiate a new trade agreement with the Soviets with a piece of the action for himself.

Any such suggested action on the Soviets part, and the British will seize Soviet shipping on the high seas. I can see the Soviets taking the threat seriously and stacking aircraft around though. Preemptive action would for sure invite a British attack on the oil fields, best to wait and see.
 
Howdy, don't mean to interrupt a disagreement here, but please don't take anything Goering said after the war at face value. Goering was a cunning sociopath. He knew exactly what people wanted to hear and told it to them. Read those Nuremberg interview/interrogation transcripts, they are a masterclass in manipulation.

Goering had a slew of weaknesses, moral, psychological and intellectual, but he projected well and he understood how to manipulate those around him that he could understand. He knew how to speak "street" when giving a tub-thumping speech to the Brown Shirts, he spoke of middle class fears when addressing the good burghers, and he loved to play the aristocrat when he was among the nobility. He could be all things to all people. Time after time, seasoned diplomats sent to Berlin all would say he was the most normal of the Nazi lot and spoke about his charm. He was as effective one-on-one as he could be addressing a beer hall. But that was show. Who Goering was deep down, when he was left to his own devices was an intellectually lazy, shallow thinking, brute who wanted to play at being a great man. His aims were limited to what were immediately within his reach, provided someone put him within reach of something.

There are no grand ideas bouncing about his skull of the sorts which made Rosenberg and Himmler sweat in giddy anticipation, or made Hitler rant for hours at a time about how exactly German farmsteads would look in the East, or even the muddled notions of Goebbels or any of the ideologues within the Party. Goering was not that sort of fella. He wanted power, but what exactly to do with it afterwards, well, so long as his needs are addressed, he can frolic about in the woods of a sprawling estate, have access to rare animals, wear gaudy jewelry and gaudier uniforms, he really could not care.

During the Munich Crisis, his main concerns were: to be seen as the true taskmaster of German foreign policy (sidelining Ribbentrop) and to avoid war. He was stunned when he realized Hitler was merely buying time and provoking the British. He wanted to play peacemaker, because he loved the limelight and his popularity was sky high when he let it be known he was trying to make the peace happen. Hitler for his part was stunned by how much the German people welcomed the phony peace. He thought them more war-like than they were. All of this is to say, Goering was more in tune with the needs and fears of the German populace than Hitler in '38, which granted is not saying much.

By early '41, Nazi Germany is fighting a war against the mightiest empire on Earth. Would Goering want to expand the war in the East against the Russians? Not really, but he could be talked into it. Nobody is as easily manipulated as those who manipulate others. They think themselves immune and don't realize it is happening. If there are enough hardliners to bang the drum and demand a drive to the East, Goering would go along and make fine speeches on the need for war. If there are enough doves around him saying it won't go well and let's just an eye on the Bolshies, he'd go along as well, and make a fine speech on Germany's peaceful intentions.

As to the War in the West, Goering had a remarkable divorce from reality of modern warfare. Luftwaffe combat pilots were stunned to have the grand man come into their cabin on flights when they'd be dragooned into transporting him and hearing him offer ridiculously of out of date advice. Goering's understanding of how the war is going could be influenced by the people around him telling him what he wanted to hear and showing him reports which are far from reality. Goering understood he was being soft-soaped, but he did not prod or push. He went along to get along. And Goering the Supremo of Nazi Germany, the universally (in his mind) acclaimed and much beloved benign ruler of his people, would be living in his own world for quite a bit, but if right facts and figures were presented, he'd push for a settled peace with the British.

As to Goering getting power and retaining it. Well, in Early '41, he has quite a few factor going in his favor. Himmler and the SS are talking expanding their armed forces, which makes the German army very, very nervous and the German armed forces could talk themselves into supporting Goering, provided he'd curtail SS powers and expansion. Please note, however, German armed forces would not automatically support Goering. For starters, the much ballyhooed oath was to Hitler, personally, not to the Chancellor or whomever. Goering has no automatic rights to Army support. Secondly, Goering just embarrassed himself in presiding over a kangaroo court which purged Fritsch on trumped up charges. There is a lot of bad blood in the army over how Goering handled the affair. He lost a lot of prestige, but between SS and Goering, the monocles would find it an easy choice.

Air Force support would be absolute. The Navy could be negotiated. And as for police, there were enough people even in SS who did not like Himmler, who could talk themselves into Goering. The Party would be easier still. Goering has impeccable Old Fighter credentials, he took a bullet during the Putsch, and he is a former commander of the Brown Shirts. As for Goebbels, well, the bad doctor has monopoly on the radio, but he does not have monopoly on the newspapers or books, those are run by different propaganda outfits and while Goebbels has an obsession over Goering (there is a psychotically revealing remark in Goebbels's diary on the day Goering married his second wife - "Why must he always do better than me?"), Goering regarded Goebbels as a lightweight and in a one on one fight, Goering would be able to shove him in the corner. That leaves the machinery of power of government, which was in the hands of Bormann by this point, and while the two men HATED each other later in the war, by his point, Bormann might find in Goering yet another figure broad enough behind whose back a lot of things could be done.

As to the rest of the domestic policy, it would be equally tricky. Free speech is gone, single-party rule, and endemic corruption all stay. The treatment of Jews could go on as in OTL to its horrific conclusion, or linger on as a brutal discrimination. Recall, it was Goering's signature on the document Heydrich waved about to get the Final Solution into its deadliest gears, but would that still happen in OTL? Depends on who rolls up on Goering and how they sell it to him. Goering's anti-Semitism was public school boy before the War, after the War it got a boost from his crazed neo-pagan first wife and hanging around Rosenberg and Hitler every weekend. Yet, Goering's anti-Semitism was of the snobbish variety, casual and distant. Certainly nothing of the sort Rosenberg banged on about, much less Himmler or Hitler. And yet, his signature is on that document and there is no guarantee things would be better ITTL for the Jews than in OTL. None.
 

thaddeus

Donor
Goering probably legit wanted to pursue a Med Strategy rather than have the responsibility for air operations in the USSR, if the regime could prompt the Soviets to take some (any) action against the British, that is a perfect "out" from Barbarossa?

Any such suggested action on the Soviets part, and the British will seize Soviet shipping on the high seas. I can see the Soviets taking the threat seriously and stacking aircraft around though. Preemptive action would for sure invite a British attack on the oil fields, best to wait and see.

understand your point, but I wonder the British strategy with continued Nazi-Soviet cooperation anyway? (meaning without overt Soviet actions they are still supplying the Germans)

and the Vichy regime was a perfect barometer of German success, absent the invasion of the USSR, they might (likely?) have concluded some agreement with Germany. (that aids a Med Strategy)
 
understand your point, but I wonder the British strategy with continued Nazi-Soviet cooperation anyway? (meaning without overt Soviet actions they are still supplying the Germans)

and the Vichy regime was a perfect barometer of German success, absent the invasion of the USSR, they might (likely?) have concluded some agreement with Germany. (that aids a Med Strategy)
Continued Soviet economic aid helps Germany, as well as continued direct communication with Japan across the Trans Siberian. German agents could still flaunt themselves in Iran and continued Soviet German peace would be depressing for Great Britain, I just don't see how the Soviets can contribute meaningfully without getting in a hot war with Britain. Stalins OTL actions were always pragmatic if anything. It's one guy's decisions though so I suppose it's possible and if the British are compelled to reinforce the Persian gulf at the expense of Egypt it would only help the Axis.
 

Garrison

Donor
I mean if you really want something different with Goering in charge I suppose you could have him decide the way to defeat Britain is to launch a fresh massive air campaign and reallocate resources from the Heer to the Luftwaffe, postponing the build up for Barbarossa until the British are crushed. Stalin sits and watches with polite interest as his ideological foes batter each other from the air for the next year or two until the Luftwaffe has been reduced to a shell and Bomber Command is raining fire on the Ruhr to stop the production of new aircraft, assisted by the Americans when the Nazis finally give Roosevelt a pretext to declare war.
 
People forget that’s world war is a strategic conflict not won by singular battles but by obtainment of advantages and resources that either guarantee victory or ensure impossibility of defeat. Germany has no way whatsoever of forcing Britain to give in as long as Britain refuses to. Which it will as long as there is hope that remaining two major powers, US and USSR may intervene. On top of it, Britain was as well aware as Germany was of Germanys strategic resource shortages. Entire Franco British war strategy centered on idea of containment and blockade until economic and moral collapse forces Germany to surrender. Nothing has changed from WW1 in terms of German access to valuable resources. The premise was still valid. And sooner or later even with France defeated and Europe conquered Germany will starve of oil if not food. After which it can no longer defend its skies, seas or use mechanized forces.

Well what about Romania and trading with Soviets? Romania oil was enough to cover half the Wehrmachts needs at best. The rest was a shortfall that had to be imported from the Soviets. Soviets were willing to trade but never enough to actually offset the shortfall and always for hard currency or technology. Even with Soviet trade Germany was set to run out of oil reserves sufficient for offensive operations in Autumn of 1941. Hitler alive or dead that still remains. Even with no war, Germany would sell of ships, tractors and machinery it itself desperately needs for its own agriculture, forcing it to buy even more food from Soviets all while losing any posibility of seizing initiative again against the Soviets making them unassailable. Gradually Germans are choked off similar to WW1, with Soviets invading when the war is clearly decided akin to their intervention against the Japanese, despite non aggression and whatever else Japanese offered.

We’d be here talking about how doomed Germany was but that it should’ve taken a Hail Mary shot that may have worked over a decision that resigns them to defeat in several years for certain. Goering would get blamed for invading or not invading and losing the war either way. Hitler might be remembered more in line with Napoleon than what historically happened.
 
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