See preceding quote. Again, The ottomans would presumably join ww2, for about the same reasons they joined ww1.
I have examined that quote and read everything upthread from it. I can't for the life of me see how that can be read as a declaration of "Ottoman Empire survives and does not engage in WW1, but everything else proceeds as OTL." The only mention of those conditions come from you. It does seem that you might be inadvertently defining any contrary views out of the argument.
However, even in the situation you've described, and, as I've said, with massive economic benefits that put them on a level of 1950 GDP, the Ottoman Empire of the boundaries 1914 simply isn't in a position to fight a first rank power of 1940/WW2.
Technically those areas are part of the ottoman empire at this point. I don't think we ever decided what they owned in the area.
Technical does not equal actual control. Kuwait had been a British protectorate since 1899, Oman since 1862 and the Trucial States from a period beginning in 1820. As for Southern Persia, we have to go back to the
1590s. I would suggest that calling those areas 'part of the Ottoman Empire' is perhaps pushing things a little too far. Furthermore, it is before the effective point of departure established in the opening post of the thread of after the Second Balkan War.
Those are the boundaries and times we should be working with here, as they are clear and deliberate.
Looking at some of your other points, I would suggest some research into the logistical capacity of the Hejaz area, necessary aircraft support requirements and the record for anti-ship aircraft in the first half of the Second World War. It would appear that you are considerably overestimating not just the Ottoman capacity to close the Red Sea, but the capacity of anti-ship aircraft of the time altogether.
Warmaking potential in a Second World War context and period is not just a function of the size of the population and theoretical oil reserves. It includes infrastructure, heavy industry, population literacy, universities and other R&D, the raw sinews of industrial era warfare (coal, copper, iron, steel, electricity generation and oil), military experience and doctrine and numerous other factors.
For example, if you would like your nation to have a decent sized air force, it will be a bally big effort for an economy that is the size of Spain or the Netherlands. To shut down the Red Sea, a minimum requirement would be a force of 360 planes, or 150% of Fliegerkorps X. On top of this, you'd need at least 200 fighter or fighter equivalent aircraft to protect Thrace and Constantinople, 200 for the rest of Asia Minor, 300 for Syria and Palestine and 100 for Iraq, Before even counting other bombers, trainers or liasion aircraft, the putative Imperial Ottoman Air Force is pushing the size of the 1941 IJAAF!
A fair observer might think that a tad large to be sustained on $50 billion GDP and neither the Luftwaffe nor the Regia Aeronautica are so overflowing with pilots or aircraft that they can supply them on the level of the German contribution to the Middle Eastern Theatre in the First World War.
All that aside, I think the hardest point for anyone to sustain is a notion of the Ottoman Empire staying together and forging ahead while nothing changes outside. That is trying to tip the scales too far in favour of your chosen side and isn't really alternate history with a point of departure.