How much of our modern consensus of the inevitability of Allied victory in WWII is due to information after the fact?

[CalBear]

Others have pointed out the mathematical and logistical brick wall the Axis was facing...so I guess their only chance is resolve? I suppose they have to call this bluff:

"I have, myself, full confidence, that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made - as they are being made - we shall prove ourselves once more able to defend our island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny,

If necessary for years, if necessary alone.

...that is the resolve of His Majesty's Government - every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation.

...we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and the streets, we shall fight in the hills -

We shall never surrender.

And even if (which I do not for on moment believe), this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving...then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle until in God's good time, the New World with all its power and might steps forth to the rescue and liberation of the old."

You can say what you want about the resolve of people before this speech, but its impact was measurable. (And probably indicated the sentiment of most before it was given anyway - but afterward?).

Made all the more impressive by the fact he sounds absolutely snickered drunk when giving the speech.

To be fair, based on pretty much everyone who knew him, Churchill was pretty much legally intoxicated at all times. Not blotto drunk, but like a lot of functional alcoholics, he was constantly "buzzed".

 

[Simon Darkshade]

I believe that the facts may differ as to that interpretation.

The Myth of Churchill and Alcohol: A Distortion of the Record

Once and for all, by every definition from linguistic to clinical, Churchill was not an alcoholic, nor even an excessive alcohol consumer.

winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu

Mr. Churchill began the day with a scotch and soda so watered down as to be on the level of mouthwash, followed by another before lunch
Alcohol result: Barely statistically noticeable

Lunch: 1 imperial pint of champagne and an ounce of brandy
Alcohol result: 5 standard drinks for the champers + 0.75 standard drinks for the brandy

Dinner: 1 imperial pint of champagne and an ounce of brandy (substitute claret for champagne in some cases)
Alcohol result: 5 standard drinks for the champers + 0.75 standard drinks for the brandy

Other: Further 3-4 scotch and sodas through the day and evening
Alcohol result: Barely statistically noticeable

Combined with this schedule of drinking is 3 decent sized meals and a late afternoon nap of a couple of hours.

The result, or approximately 12-14 standard drinks, is enough nominally for someone to be a bit more than buzzed, but spread out over an entire day from 1030-0200, with three decent sized meals, barely approaches that.

An average non-drinking chap of a decent BMI will likely get 'buzzed' off 2-3 standard drinks, but someone used to drinking will usually take 5 standard drinks in an hour (~2 imperial pints of beer) to start to feel anything. To actually get pissed, call it double that.

In terms of legally intoxicated, or 0.08% on various US and Australian standards to use an example, he'd be there after lunch and dinner by virtue of recent booze intake, as even food doesn't change that in biochemical terms. However, he never drove in any case, let alone going for a bit of a flex after dinner when he'd had a skinful.

Given that an imperial pint of beer (583ml) is ~2.3 standard drinks, the notion of 'buzzed' is very subjective. A very thin chap, which Churchill wasn't, could get 'buzzed' off one if he drank it quickly. In a decent sized bloke who is used to drinking, it won't touch the sides.

(1 standard drink = 10 grams of alcohol)

Long story short: If there were breathalysers back then, he'd probably register. But I don't believe, on the balance of evidence, that he'd be substantially pissed or even buzzed, save for a very ephemeral period directly after lunch or din-dins.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Not arguing that at all. The thing is that Hitler saw the British as "fellow Aryans", to become part of the Greater Reich to be sure, but to be treated rather like the Danes or Norwegians rather than General Government or the Slavs as a group. He didn't see a natural reason for hostility with the "Anglo/Saxon"s.

Even before the Putsch, Hitler was of the opinion that there should be no argument with the English and that they should ally with Germany to destroy the Soviets.
He saw "the English nation will have to be considered the most valuable ally in the world" as he "wrote" in Mein Kampf. His stated belief was that German/English friction was economic, not any sort of natural enemy (which he VERY MUCH considered France to be), and could be worked out to everyone's advantage. Right up to the outbreak of the war Hitler told Speer "The English are out Brothers... We should not fight our brothers."

This does seem to be Hitler's pre-war attitude and carried over into the early war years. So the "unilateral peace offensive" is a possible scenario.

Germany would have done much better had Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Prussian establishment had that attitude in 1890-1905.

 

[Aphrodite]

The notion that Germany had time and money on their side is just painfully wrong and if you need to have it explained in detail then I suggest you read Adam Tooze's 'The Wages of Destruction' which lays out the myriad issues with the Nazi war economy in far greater detail than I can offer. Also nothing you've suggested is exactly new ideas, if you do some searching on the site you can find plenty of prior discussion that go into great detail. That I choose not to rehash some very tired arguments does not make me wrong or you correct.

Compared to Britain's problems in late 1940, the Germans had things pretty easy. That's not minimizing German problems but putting them in perspective

An allied victory only becomes likely with American intervention. Without lend lease and the Soviets hanging on, Britain was in a world of hurt. There are certainly scenarios in 1941-42 where the Soviets collapse.

Only America's entry into the war makes it likely the British are on the winning side. Anyone thinking an allied victory is inevitable before December 7, 1941 is just plain wrong.

 

[TDM]

Actually, I've never quite bought into that part of the "received wisdom".

The Germans actually had a path that could, possibly likely would, had changed that dynamic. It is something that a savvy planning General Staff should have twigged to early on (the WAllies managed a version of it before the war even started). The Soviets 1st.

They needed to ask one question - After the flash knockout of France what country present an existential danger to the Reich? Only one reasonable answer exists, the USSR. The UK was on its heels and had no reasonable prospect of engaging the Reich in anything other than a few commando raids and what was, at the time, quite ineffective bombing. The Reich should have very publicly and loudly, especially in the United States and Canada (were were effectively, then as now, two separate countries that shared one media market, with U.S. radio stations and newspapers almost as available in Toronto as in Buffalo or as in Ottawa as in Erie, PA. or in Vancouver as in Seattle) proclaimed that they were immediately and unilaterally declaring a bombing holiday, with the only exceptions being in response to RAF attacks on civilian targets, and the end of all attacks on civilian shipping in the North Atlantic.

""The German People have no historic argument with our British cousins. We understand that His Majesty's Government* was honor bound to fulfill its obligations to the Polish and French Governments, honor demanded no less, but that fight is at an end. France and Poland have signed Peace Treaties with the German Reich. We offer an end to the war, without any territorial or monetary claims against the United Kingdom."

Goebbels was a special kind of bastard, in some ways worse than Goring, perhaps even Himmler (who, at least, didn't murder his own children to "save them from a world without National Socialism"), but he was, early on, fairly effective as a propagandist. In 1940 there was no particular desire by the American electorate to engage in another European War. The population of the UK was in full "in the fields" mode, but that was because of the Blitz, the U-Boats, and the Western Desert. Those realities were there to exploit.

Would it absolutely have worked? Possibly not, but it is lot easier to accept that there is nothing to come "but blood, toil, tears, and sweat" when the enemy is bombing you, when rationing is happening because so little is getting through the U-boats, and "we have to support our boys" than when the only time German planes appear is after the RAF bombs civilians "quite dastardly, don't you think?" and the only ships being lost is the odd destroyer.

Goes double for the U.S. "Why the Hell is that our Fight?" Isolationism was still a thing in 1940, not as strong as before, but a thing. The way the Nazi's handled France IOTL would play very nicely in this scenario "well, sure they are occupying Paris, but half the country is back under French rule already, and the President there is a WWI war hero who fought alongside Black Jack Pershing!". Country that was on most of the American electorate's radar, if any, was Japan thanks to what they were doing in China.

Even if the ploy failed, it wouldn't really cost the Reich much.

I think the issue is not that the Germans go east automatically equals defeat in all possible circumstances no matter what.

and I agree going east with unfinished business with Britain & Co, is a bad idea

but that there are other issues.

1) Britain and Co is not the only unfinished business. The greater Reich has not been properly brought into a proper economic system designed to let the Germans fully leverage it. Now OTL the Germans kind of bolloxed this up anyway but well they had a lot on their plate OTL and it's not impossible that they couldn't do a better job, (especially if they are not launching the largest invasion in history at the same time)

2). Converting to a proper war economy and lack of key resources is still a massive problem for them,

3). They fundamentally had a bad plan for the Invasion of the USSR, because they made fundamentally errors in their basic assumption about the red army and fighting in the USSR. Now I'm not say there is no possible good plan for an invasion (each plan has it own merits and flaws, narrow vs. broad and so on) but any plan based on fundamentally false information is not going to go well.

And these build on each other so that the sum total of the problem is greater than the sum of the parts (but that goes both ways so each one they solve has greater effect overall)

Also on Britain and Co they're never going to lie down and accept it because they know what's coming next.


Either way the point is for Germany to win in the east they likely have to solve all the above. So it's not just don't get distracted by Britain, it's don't get distracted by Britain, properly leverage the economy of the greater Reich, sort the economy out into a proper war economy, get the basic facts right about the USSR.

The US is the great variable here, I agree there is no fundamental law of nature that says the US must follow a still defiant UK into a world war. But the US will have to work out does it like the idea of sharing a world with a Germany that has conquered mainland Europe, cowed the British and is about the defeat the USSR, take the Mid east etc? And of course Japan's going to do it's thing at some point.


I always thought that if Germany could some how contrive going east first without going west at all, somehow with the west's if not blessing but acceptance, that's their best bet. But that is going to take a very different Nazi Germany for the French and British not to assume what happens next and intervene at an inopportune moment. So it a political POD not a military one and one that gets Germany out from it's key problem that fighting in more than one direction at once against more than one same tier opponent at once will likely not end well.

*I know that is the right term, by it really just LOOKS wrong, ya' know?

It's going to be weird when it comes in again I tell you

 

[jsb]

Another 48 u-boats is something like 2,500 crew (I'm going off wiki but probably close enough) so enough for roughly two Scharnhorsts or 3 Graf Spee class.

What you need to be on a Uboat and a Battleship are very different..... you need far more leadership on the 48 Uboats and far fewer low skill men, also the U boats use far more resources and are far harder to make as structural steel is cheap compared to the expensive fire control parts etc.

The Reich surges boats the RN knows and has time to respond accordingly with now construction,

Or GB just decides that they should be more aggressive on land in Europe earlier......?

 

[Garrison]

Compared to Britain's problems in late 1940, the Germans had things pretty easy. That's not minimizing German problems but putting them in perspective

Except it isn't because the German economic situation in 1940 was far worse than Britain's. Germany had to loot the French railways for rolling stock to keep their own railways running, not to mention the raw materials and fuel they desperately needed. UK output for weapons increased dramatically during the summer of 1940, they overtook German production of fighters for example and they did have that US support, not Lend-Lease but it was there and despite the efforts of the U-Boats they still had access to the resources of the British empire.

 

[Aphrodite]

Except it isn't because the German economic situation in 1940 was far worse than Britain's. Germany had to loot the French railways for rolling stock to keep their own railways running, not to mention the raw materials and fuel they desperately needed. UK output for weapons increased dramatically during the summer of 1940, they overtook German production of fighters for example and they did have that US support, not Lend-Lease but it was there and despite the efforts of the U-Boats they still had access to the resources of the British empire.

no, it wasnt even close to being as dire as the British who are only bailed out by lend lease and the Nazi Soviet war. British production of fighters is a pretty limited meaurement.

UK production is only possible because the Americans are flooding the country with supplies. Lend lease comes in because Britain's production is unsustainable. She simply cant afford minimal consumption needs and war supplies

You also seem to ignore that Britain is also at war with Italy.

Britain is going down in a one on one fight and the British know it. They hold on hoping for the Americans and the Soviets. They get their break with Pearl Harbor.

 

[Garrison]

no, it wasnt even close to being as dire as the British who are only bailed out by lend lease and the Russo Soviet war. British production of fighters is a pretty limited meaurement.

Sorry but this is pure nonsense, and that was just one measure, you seem to be embodying the refusal to engage in 'hindsight' and buying in the myth of the German 'total war economy'.

 

[CalBear]

What you need to be on a Uboat and a Battleship are very different..... you need far more leadership on the 48 Uboats and far fewer low skill men, also the U boats use far more resources and are far harder to make as structural steel is cheap compared to the expensive fire control parts etc.

Or GB just decides that they should be more aggressive on land in Europe earlier......?

It is fairly difficult for the British to really step up beyond the BEF without going into close to full mobilization. Too many places to defend, too few Tommys.

 

[H.Flashman(VC)]

Sorry but this is pure nonsense, and that was just one measure, you seem to be embodying the refusal to engage in 'hindsight' and buying in the myth of the German 'total war economy'.

If that was believed in the time, then it is relevant. Wasn't the purpose of the thread to avoid hindsight?

 

[CalBear]

Compared to Britain's problems in late 1940, the Germans had things pretty easy. That's not minimizing German problems but putting them in perspective

An allied victory only becomes likely with American intervention. Without lend lease and the Soviets hanging on, Britain was in a world of hurt. There are certainly scenarios in 1941-42 where the Soviets collapse.

Only America's entry into the war makes it likely the British are on the winning side. Anyone thinking an allied victory is inevitable before December 7, 1941 is just plain wrong.

Germany's economy was a shell game/Ponzi Scheme. It was constantly trying to squeeze more and more out of the occupied countries with ever diminishing results.

What is sometimes forgotten is that the Heer, in particular, took major losses even ion their "lightning victories". In Poland they suffered close over 20,000 KIA/MIA with 30K WIA (assume around 1/3 of that number "irretrievable loss" due to severity of injuries/state of the medical art at the time) along with over 230 tanks, 800+ other vehicles, and ~240 aircraft. In the oft ignored Norway campaign the took 1,300 KIA out of the total Wehrmacht KIA/MIA of 5,600+ and well over 150 aircraft. France was an enormous butcher's bill with 62,000 KIA/MIA and 111K WIA (so around 100K irretrievable losses). France also cost them around 800 tanks and 1,200 aircraft.

In the EASY first year of the war the Heer took 130,000 irretrievable losses and close to double that WIA, along with over 1,600 tanks and ~3,000 other vehicles. That is roughly an Panzer-grenadier Army Group. This doesn't include losses suffered elsewhere. The entire Wehrmacht had to refit after France, they never really did make up for their losses (which is why you see captured British, Czech, and French armor being used by the Reich all through the war.

 

[Aphrodite]

Germany's economy was a shell game/Ponzi Scheme. It was constantly trying to squeeze more and more out of the occupied countries with ever diminishing results.

What is sometimes forgotten is that the Heer, in particular, took major losses even ion their "lightning victories". In Poland they suffered close over 20,000 KIA/MIA with 30K WIA (assume around 1/3 of that number "irretrievable loss" due to severity of injuries/state of the medical art at the time) along with over 230 tanks, 800+ other vehicles, and ~240 aircraft. In the oft ignored Norway campaign the took 1,300 KIA out of the total Wehrmacht KIA/MIA of 5,600+ and well over 150 aircraft. France was an enormous butcher's bill with 62,000 KIA/MIA and 111K WIA (so around 100K irretrievable losses). France also cost them around 800 tanks and 1,200 aircraft.

In the EASY first year of the war the Heer took 130,000 irretrievable losses and close to double that WIA, along with over 1,600 tanks and ~3,000 other vehicles. That is roughly an Panzer-grenadier Army Group. This doesn't include losses suffered elsewhere. The entire Wehrmacht had to refit after France, they never really did make up for their losses (which is why you see captured British, Czech, and French armor being used by the Reich all through the war.

I agree with this actually. I was pointing out that Britain's economy was in many ways the same shell game propped up only by American largesse which was by no means inevitable.

Shell game or not, the Germans kept their effort going well into 1943 against far stronger opposition. Against Britain alone, the Germans would be doing far far better especially in a Soviet collapse scenario.

An allied victory is really only inevitable after the Soviets survive 1941 and America enters. There are scenarios where the Siviets collapse and America stays neutral

 

[Post]

Germany's economy was a shell game/Ponzi Scheme. It was constantly trying to squeeze more and more out of the occupied countries with ever diminishing results.

What is sometimes forgotten is that the Heer, in particular, took major losses even ion their "lightning victories". In Poland they suffered close over 20,000 KIA/MIA with 30K WIA (assume around 1/3 of that number "irretrievable loss" due to severity of injuries/state of the medical art at the time) along with over 230 tanks, 800+ other vehicles, and ~240 aircraft. In the oft ignored Norway campaign the took 1,300 KIA out of the total Wehrmacht KIA/MIA of 5,600+ and well over 150 aircraft. France was an enormous butcher's bill with 62,000 KIA/MIA and 111K WIA (so around 100K irretrievable losses). France also cost them around 800 tanks and 1,200 aircraft.

In the EASY first year of the war the Heer took 130,000 irretrievable losses and close to double that WIA, along with over 1,600 tanks and ~3,000 other vehicles. That is roughly an Panzer-grenadier Army Group. This doesn't include losses suffered elsewhere. The entire Wehrmacht had to refit after France, they never really did make up for their losses (which is why you see captured British, Czech, and French armor being used by the Reich all through the war.

You left out the workhorse of the Heer: the horse. I remember reading that after their victories in Poland and France they needed a lot of horses to replace the ones that didn't survive the campaigns. I don't remember the exact number but it was in the tenthousands or maybe even over 100,000. Also to make up for the lost trucks since they couldn't replace all of them.

 

[CalBear]

You left out the workhorse of the Heer: the horse. I remember reading that after their victories in Poland and France they needed a lot of horses to replace the ones that didn't survive the campaigns. I don't remember the exact number but it was in the tenthousands or maybe even over 100,000. Also to make up for the lost trucks since they couldn't replace all of them.

And, since they couldn't make enough trucks they needed even more horses (which were then worked to death, or once engaged with the Soviets froze or starved to death).

 

[Garrison]

If that was believed in the time, then it is relevant. Wasn't the purpose of the thread to avoid hindsight?

Only if by hindsight you mean ignoring all the information acquired since the war that shows just how shaky the Nazi economy was. And the post I was responding to did not appear to be couched in terms of what was thought at the time.

 

[Garrison]

Germany's economy was a shell game/Ponzi Scheme. It was constantly trying to squeeze more and more out of the occupied countries with ever diminishing results.

Stripping France of rolling stock, oil and raw material stockpiles crippled the French economy for the rest of the war. Add in France being cut off from imports of fertilizers and other crucial materials and the result was all but inevitable. Similar issues did indeed afflict the rest of the occupied territories, meaning that occupied Europe became a net drain on resources. Even before the war broke out Germany staved off running out of foreign exchange only by the seizure of Austrian and Czech reserves. If anyone does think the Germany economy was on a stable footing they should read up on expedients such as MEFO bills, which were as you say a shell game.

 

[cerebus]

If that was believed in the time, then it is relevant. Wasn't the purpose of the thread to avoid hindsight?

At the time (1940) the British (and the empire) seemed to have been quite confident about eventually defeating Germany and Italy. They seem to have thought mostly in economic terms and like everybody overestimated strategic bombing but at the time they worried about how to win but not about losing. If anything the British seem to have overestimated both German production and the effect of blockade.

 

[marathag]

t is reasonable to assume that a large portion of of the US government believed they had enough supplies in the pipeline to win the war

The US canceled contracts for a number of places that were building Sherman Tanks in 1942 for FY43

 

[durante]

I believe that the facts may differ as to that interpretation.

The Myth of Churchill and Alcohol: A Distortion of the Record

Once and for all, by every definition from linguistic to clinical, Churchill was not an alcoholic, nor even an excessive alcohol consumer.

winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu

Mr. Churchill began the day with a scotch and soda so watered down as to be on the level of mouthwash, followed by another before lunch
Alcohol result: Barely statistically noticeable

Lunch: 1 imperial pint of champagne and an ounce of brandy
Alcohol result: 5 standard drinks for the champers + 0.75 standard drinks for the brandy

Dinner: 1 imperial pint of champagne and an ounce of brandy (substitute claret for champagne in some cases)
Alcohol result: 5 standard drinks for the champers + 0.75 standard drinks for the brandy

Other: Further 3-4 scotch and sodas through the day and evening
Alcohol result: Barely statistically noticeable

Combined with this schedule of drinking is 3 decent sized meals and a late afternoon nap of a couple of hours.

The result, or approximately 12-14 standard drinks, is enough nominally for someone to be a bit more than buzzed, but spread out over an entire day from 1030-0200, with three decent sized meals, barely approaches that.

An average non-drinking chap of a decent BMI will likely get 'buzzed' off 2-3 standard drinks, but someone used to drinking will usually take 5 standard drinks in an hour (~2 imperial pints of beer) to start to feel anything. To actually get pissed, call it double that.

In terms of legally intoxicated, or 0.08% on various US and Australian standards to use an example, he'd be there after lunch and dinner by virtue of recent booze intake, as even food doesn't change that in biochemical terms. However, he never drove in any case, let alone going for a bit of a flex after dinner when he'd had a skinful.

Given that an imperial pint of beer (583ml) is ~2.3 standard drinks, the notion of 'buzzed' is very subjective. A very thin chap, which Churchill wasn't, could get 'buzzed' off one if he drank it quickly. In a decent sized bloke who is used to drinking, it won't touch the sides.

(1 standard drink = 10 grams of alcohol)

Long story short: If there were breathalysers back then, he'd probably register. But I don't believe, on the balance of evidence, that he'd be substantially pissed or even buzzed, save for a very ephemeral period directly after lunch or din-dins.

Used to be a barman so I know what you mean about tolerance (I've seen some with incredible tolerance. I never really had it).

But also he was 5'6 and used to give his speeches directly after din-dins because he felt he was at his most loquacious (probably something to that - being a little buzzed but not drunk. Liquid courage and all that. "C'mon, mate, I'll take you on the beaches! With one arm tied behind me back!")