How does France defeat the German Attack in 1940

[naraic]

My understanding is that France had to choose between the army and Air Force, and prioritised spending on the army. The Brits went for Air Force plus navy. The Germans went for army AND Air Force by spending money they just imagined into existence. So the French Air Force in 1940 was the sort of shitshow the RAF would have been a couple years earlier when they were just getting modern aircraft, and it’s not like the RAF were on the cutting edge tactically.

The French planes were relatively good. The pilots were relatively good from their success rate in combats.

The problem was with the sortie rate (0.9 a day for fighters in theater, compared to 2-3 from raf fighters and 3-4 from German fighters) and the plane numbers in theater (roughly 25% of French fighters were on the front line at the start of the battle of France).

 

[Rufus Shinra]

Invade the Rhineland in 1939. Fight on German soil.

The French had little or no resistance to their limited offensive that they launched and pulled back in September of 1939.

While the French did not have the troops to launch a major attack across the Rhine, the regular French Army was probably strong enough to take the Rhineland in 1939 and maybe some bridgeheads across the Rhine

That changes the strategic situation dramatically. It may buy some time for the Poles, because it might cause the Germans to pull troops from Poland to defend the West.

The Germans will have to spread their troops all along the frontier and cannot concentrate in the North to attack through the Northern Netherlands because of a potential Allied attack in the South.

With No Phony war the French will get a chance to work out the problems that bedeviled them in OTL May 1940 and still have time to apply the lessons learned in combat.

The French Air Force will also be forced to get combat experience to cover the offensive and will be able to learn the same lessons and get the same breathing space.

Nope, that one wouldn't work either. At best, the French would get some limited gain and would start losing irreplaceable troops, due to the mobilization system in France, where the professional troops - AKA those available in 1939 - were supposed to be the core allowing the conscripts to get up to speed and be combat-worthy. Launch a full-scale attack there and each soldier lost for a couple of km of impossible to hold terrain will cost you 10 to 20 soldiers later on, when Germany comes back. The Poles were so outmatched that it couldn't have saved them. As the others said, turtling would have worked.

Another possibility, probably the ideal one for France, would have been Belgium either siding a few weeks earlier with France or holding the line for a week before collapsing. This would have allowed the French and British troops to set up a pretty good defensive line on the Belgian rivers, blunting the German offensive long enough for logistics to wake up and tell Manstein "Hey, you motherducker, you ain't allowed to use tanks without fuel!", at which point Germany is screwed.

 

[LegionoftheUnitedStates]

I'm still not certain I know how the French really did lose the Battle of France in 1940. I mean they just sat there and did nothing whilst the Germans broke through and flanked their army, and then just gave up at the first chance.

That's got to be complete ASB surely? The French Army - considered by many to be the strongest in the world at the time - being cut to pieces in a few weeks? Despite having more divisions, more guns, more tanks and being the defenders sat behind a well prepared defensive line for much of the frontier, and having the British at their backs and flank?

No, I'm not having it history. Come back with a realistic scenario, not a Hitler wank so that we can see him go nuts with power and invade the USSR.

Really bad luck.

1. The Allied offensive into Belgium played into German plans with the Sickle cut further South.

2. The most powerful portion of the German Army (The Panzer Divisions) hit the weakest portion of the French Army (Reserve Units that were not fully combat ready).

3. Those weakest units were at the hinge of the move into Belgium, and lacked reserve support, giving the Germans the ability to create a large hole in the allied line, and a straight shot to the Sea cutting the armies in Belgium off from their logistics.

4. Assisting the Germans was very poor French command, control, and communications. Orders were slow to reach units and out of date by the time they arrived.

Maps:

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/def...artments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope10.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/def...artments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope11.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/def...artments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope12.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/def...artments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope15.pdf

 

[LegionoftheUnitedStates]

Nope, that one wouldn't work either. At best, the French would get some limited gain and would start losing irreplaceable troops, due to the mobilization system in France, where the professional troops - AKA those available in 1939 - were supposed to be the core allowing the conscripts to get up to speed and be combat-worthy. Launch a full-scale attack there and each soldier lost for a couple of km of impossible to hold terrain will cost you 10 to 20 soldiers later on, when Germany comes back. The Poles were so outmatched that it couldn't have saved them. As the others said, turtling would have worked.

Another possibility, probably the ideal one for France, would have been Belgium either siding a few weeks earlier with France or holding the line for a week before collapsing. This would have allowed the French and British troops to set up a pretty good defensive line on the Belgian rivers, blunting the German offensive long enough for logistics to wake up and tell Manstein "Hey, you motherducker, you ain't allowed to use tanks without fuel!", at which point Germany is screwed.

There were plans in place for a French Occupation of the Rhineland. The German forces in the West were very weak. Also it is is going to take time to move the German Army and Air Force from Poland to the Rhine, and they were low on munitions after the Polish campaign.

I still think a Rhineland attack is the best option to prevent the debacle of 1940.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

Another possibility, probably the ideal one for France, would have been Belgium either siding a few weeks earlier with France or holding the line for a week before collapsing. This would have allowed the French and British troops to set up a pretty good defensive line on the Belgian rivers, blunting the German offensive long enough ...

In the Ardennes as little as 48 hours could have made a difference. The French screening force arrived on the Orq river & were setting up their first delaying position on the 11th, expecting 24-48 hours before the Belgians passed thru. Instead at noon Belgian survivors retreated past, with over 1500 tanks from seven armored divisions on their heels. The French hardly had time to place the first mine, or fill a sand bag when the positions were swarmed by tanks and motorized infantry. The two Belgian light divisions screening the frontier had from the fist hours been hammered by the seven armored three motor infantry divisions, and several fast stepping infantry corps. It's suprising the Belgians delayed the 30 hours they did, and any survived.

 

[Rufus Shinra]

There were plans in place for a French Occupation of the Rhineland. The German forces in the West were very weak. Also it is is going to take time to move the German Army and Air Force from Poland to the Rhine, and they were low on munitions after the Polish campaign.

I still think a Rhineland attack is the best option to prevent the debacle of 1940.

Still a useless waste of lives. Congrats, you not only get in a bad defensive but now you also doubled the size of the frontline you must defend, from the Swiss border to the Channel. Because, oh, right, the French didn't have the manpower to cover all this area, which is the very bloody reason why they built the Maginot Line, to force Germany to go through the Lower Countries, thus reducing the frontline to something manageable (that they fail to manage it OTL is another issue altogether). Occupying the Rhineland doesn't bring any substantial advantage and exposes your forces to destruction while their backs are to a large river and the enemy has air superiority.

 

[michael1]

I think the French lost because the German command at all levels could respond more quickly, combined with a lack of strategic depth (compared to the desert and the Eastern Front), the ability to move units more quickly than in WW1 and the lack of French reserves. So avoiding defeat needs a different French command doctrine and the abandonment of the Breda variant to keep a high quality mobile reserve. A different French doctrine could open up the possibility of a successful advance into the Ruhr in 1939 but this may be going too far without ASB.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Have a DCR ready in place to execute an immediate counterattack and roll into the Sedan Bridgehead by the May 12-14 timeframe. Historically, there was a DCR in the region, but it wasted so much time from delayed orders, muddled staff work, hideous coordination with other forces, and logistical mishaps that it still wasn’t in position to launch an attack on May 15th when the German panzers stormed out of their bridgehead and overran it.

There were plans in place for a French Occupation of the Rhineland. The German forces in the West were very weak. Also it is is going to take time to move the German Army and Air Force from Poland to the Rhine, and they were low on munitions after the Polish campaign.

Unsupportable nonsense. The Germans had 45 German divisions in fortified positions. The entire French Army in September effectively amounted to 40 divisions and five of those were fortress divisions and hence immobile, five were placed on the Italian frontier, and many of the rest were in the process of being broken up into the cadres for the formation of the 100+ division force that the French would come to field in 1940, as per their mobilization plan for war. Had Gamelin cancelled the cadre-creation process, thereby basically shotgunning the expansion of the French army, he could have committed about 20 divisions to such an offensive... which would mean he would be attacking an enemy who outnumbered him 2:1 and had air superiority over him. Given that even these active divisions (based on the historical Saar offensive) would be going in with obsolete Lebel rifles, no engineers, and no heavy artillery, they’d achieve absolutely nothing except their own slaughter and be positively obliterated after the Germans finish off Poland and their forces westward. With the core of the French army having obliterated itself, there would be no need for the Germans to wait until 1940 or go through the Low Countries: they could have immediately moved on to breakthrough the now-cripplingly-undermanned Maginot Line and basically have a particularly violent joyride in occupying France.

 

[Palantir]

The French planes were relatively good. The pilots were relatively good from their success rate in combats.
The problem was with the sortie rate (0.9 a day for fighters in theater, compared to 2-3 from raf fighters and 3-4 from German fighters) and the plane numbers in theater (roughly 25% of French fighters were on the front line at the start of the battle of France).

The problem was also that the French Air Force was re equipping as a whole and was planning a long war even more than the 2 other services. So there was a "preserve our forces to endure" mentality. So much so, that you can argue that, at the Armistice (ie 22 June), the AdA was stronger than at the beginning of the campaign.
But, personally, I think

I think the French lost because the German command at all levels could respond more quickly, combined with a lack of strategic depth (compared to the desert and the Eastern Front), the ability to move units more quickly than in WW1 and the lack of French reserves. So avoiding defeat needs a different French command doctrine and the abandonment of the Breda variant to keep a high quality mobile reserve. A different French doctrine could open up the possibility of a successful advance into the Ruhr in 1939 but this may be going too far without ASB.

Exactly. But "the lack of French reserves" is more due to the fact that the German spearheads moved faster (due to motorization) than the French Reserves moving by train. And that most of said reserves were out of place, some were behind the Maginot Line and some were, at first guarding against a Swiss Variant. This is where the 7th Army used for Breda would have been really needed, being previously held close to Sedan.

 

[Paulo the Limey]

How about changes to the Mechelen Incident? There might not be strong causal links to say that it predetermined the final German plan, but it certainly tilted the odds in their favour.

 

[michael1]

Exactly. But "the lack of French reserves" is more due to the fact that the German spearheads moved faster (due to motorization) than the French Reserves moving by train. And that most of said reserves were out of place, some were behind the Maginot Line and some were, at first guarding against a Swiss Variant. This is where the 7th Army used for Breda would have been really needed, being previously held close to Sedan.

Wasn't abandoning the Breda variant precisely what I suggested?

 

[Rufus Shinra]

How about changes to the Mechelen Incident? There might not be strong causal links to say that it predetermined the final German plan, but it certainly tilted the odds in their favour.

Given the number of critical hits that went in Germany's favour in Spring 1940, one can seriously argue that a couple of them going wrong would have changed World History in unimaginable ways indeed.

 

[Garrison]

Don't have the German battleplan fall into Allied hands. If the French didn't capture it they wouldn't have reallocated their reserves to the Dyle line and the Germans would probably have stuck to their original plan, which was the very one the Dyle plan was designed to counter. odds are good the German attack would have utterly failed.

 

[Palantir]

Wasn't abandoning the Breda variant precisely what I suggested?

My bad, I wasn't going against your argument.
My point was that there was reserves OTL, but they were out of place. And, just like you, I think that ditching Breda meant you had reserves just were you needed them to counterattack (more) rapidly, and possibly more decisively than OTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Don't have the German battleplan fall into Allied hands. If the French didn't capture it they wouldn't have reallocated their reserves to the Dyle line and the Germans would probably have stuck to their original plan, which was the very one the Dyle plan was designed to counter. odds are good the German attack would have utterly failed.

The Dyle Plan was not the result of the Melechin incident, & lost bombing schedules (Was not the complete plan, just a target list and schedule.) In one form or another the Dyle as executed went back to the mid 1930s. The plans were all rewritten when German rearmament was started post 1933, & further reworked after the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Earlier war plans for advances across Belgium extend back to the 1920s.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Really bad luck.

1. The Allied offensive into Belgium played into German plans with the Sickle cut further South.

2. The most powerful portion of the German Army (The Panzer Divisions) hit the weakest portion of the French Army (Reserve Units that were not fully combat ready).

3. Those weakest units were at the hinge of the move into Belgium, and lacked reserve support, giving the Germans the ability to create a large hole in the allied line, and a straight shot to the Sea cutting the armies in Belgium off from their logistics.

4. Assisting the Germans was very poor French command, control, and communications. Orders were slow to reach units and out of date by the time they arrived.

Maps:

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope10.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope11.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope12.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope15.pdf

I don't think the bolded item can be emphasized too much. On 10 May Georges, commander of the NW Front, had access to 16 divisions assigned to the "Reserve Stratigique" These were unassigned to any specific army and positioned properly for supporting any threatened sector. Contingent plans were in place for sending these to the forward armies. This strategic reserve consisted of the three DCR & thirteen Infantry and Motorized Infantry divisions. On 10 May only one was moved in response to the attack on Belgium. That was the 71st ID, a 3rd echelon Series B formation without refresher training. It was returned to the Sedan sector where it had been doing construction labor to the end of April. Over the next two days the three DCR, the 3rd Motor Inf, and the 53rd ID, were ordered to reinforce the 1st, 9th, and 2d Armies. The 53rd was another Series B Inf Div that had done construction work all winter and spring, training a average of one day each week. Ten other divisions of the reserve sat idle for several more days. Of the reserve divisions committed from the 10th thru 14th only the 3rd MI was a first rate Active Series formation that had completed a full training cycle. Other Active & A class divisions were available in this reserve, but sat idle until after the 14th.

2. The most powerful portion of the German Army (The Panzer Divisions) hit the weakest portion of the French Army (Reserve Units that were not fully combat ready).

At Sedan the Series B 55th & 71st ID were supported by a single trained frontier regiment, a Series A formation. To the west directly in the path of Guderians break out the Series B 53rd ID was misplaced. North of Givet yet another Series B ID, the 63rd, was shattered in a day by a corps of two armored divisions. Better quality formations like the 101st Fortress Div, made up of Series Active and A units; or the Series A 18th ID held against the armored onslaught for a couple days, until 9th Army commander Corap ordered a retreat. to the French border. In other words two of the three armored corps in Kliests Panzer Group struck the four worst trained infantry divisions in the two French armies Kliest engaged. That no reserves effectively supported these four guaranteed their failure.

 

[Palantir]

The Dyle Plan was not the result of the Melechin incident, & lost bombing schedules (Was not the complete plan, just a target list and schedule.) In one form or another the Dyle as executed went back to the mid 1930s. The plans were all rewritten when German rearmament was started post 1933, & further reworked after the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Earlier war plans for advances across Belgium extend back to the 1920s.

I think Garrison meant that the German plan changed due to the Melechin incident, moving from a Schlieffen Mk2 to the Sickle cut. (I'm not sure, but it seems that Hitler wasn't a fan and would have force the change any way.

Before the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Belgium and France were allied, so it was more of the French Forces reinforcing Belgium and then moving on to the Rhineland (specially before German rearmament). Because the French didn't move during this crisis, the Belgian pulled off the alliance, declaring neutrality and France lost the strategic initiative. French forces could not (realistically) intervene in Belgium before any German invasion, hence the Dyle plan.

 

[sendô]

Really bad luck.

1. The Allied offensive into Belgium played into German plans with the Sickle cut further South.

2. The most powerful portion of the German Army (The Panzer Divisions) hit the weakest portion of the French Army (Reserve Units that were not fully combat ready).

3. Those weakest units were at the hinge of the move into Belgium, and lacked reserve support, giving the Germans the ability to create a large hole in the allied line, and a straight shot to the Sea cutting the armies in Belgium off from their logistics.

4. Assisting the Germans was very poor French command, control, and communications. Orders were slow to reach units and out of date by the time they arrived.

Maps:

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope10.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope11.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope12.pdf

https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII Europe/WWIIEurope15.pdf

Yes. Thanks.

I was really just making a tongue in cheek joke about how if what really happened was suggested as AH by someone, everyone else would round on them as suggesting something unrealistic for expecting the French to be so stupid, unresponsive and unlucky.

I mean, attacking the French head on, with the British assisting them, after they've had a full 8 months to prepare and war game, and over running them within 5 weeks?

 

[Bougnas]

I'm still not certain I know how the French really did lose the Battle of France in 1940. I mean they just sat there and did nothing whilst the Germans broke through and flanked their army, and then just gave up at the first chance.

That's got to be complete ASB surely? The French Army - considered by many to be the strongest in the world at the time - being cut to pieces in a few weeks? Despite having more divisions, more guns, more tanks and being the defenders sat behind a well prepared defensive line for much of the frontier, and having the British at their backs and flank?

No, I'm not having it history. Come back with a realistic scenario, not a Hitler wank so that we can see him go nuts with power and invade the USSR.

Given how De Gaulle had surprisingly good insight on the war and Germany's early luck I think that WW2 actually was a Franco-German time-travel war. This is just too ASB

 

[Rufus Shinra]

Yes. Thanks.

I was really just making a tongue in cheek joke about how if what really happened was suggested as AH by someone, everyone else would round on them as suggesting something unrealistic for expecting the French to be so stupid, unresponsive and unlucky.

I mean, attacking the French head on, with the British assisting them, after they've had a full 8 months to prepare and war game, and over running them within 5 weeks?

Given how De Gaulle had surprisingly good insight on the war and Germany's early luck I think that WW2 actually was a Franco-German time-travel war. This is just too ASB

The entirety of the French situation for World War II was ASB. Come on, couldn't the writer find a more original name than "de Gaulle" for the blatant Mary Sue who somehow manages to salvage an unbelievably shitty situation, who somehow gets the communists, radicals, royalists and others to work together AND build a democratic government after convincing the US and USSR to give him a permanent seat at the UNSC? The less said about the heroic field marshall who suddenly becomes traitor to make de Gaulle (what next, British Prime Minister Albia and German Chancellor Deutsch?) look cool, the better. Or that Leclerc guy who starts as a captain and becomes a general officer in like two years without an army?

Whoever wrote this is a hack!