Hitler invades the Soviet Union in 1940

[DerWonderWaffles]

Found this while surfing the web yesterday, talks about Germany attacking the USSR in 1940 rather than 1941. I recommend you read the file before commenting, it's short around 80 pages, so you should be done with it in a half hour.

http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=theses

Now, as in every alternate history story, there will be holes to poke and I very welcome it. I don't see any in here, but if there are, than it provides greater opportunity for me to be informed and learn.

Why I believe the idea sounds feasible.

-the year between the defeat of France and the invasion of the Soviet union alarmed Stalin and gave him to work up the industry, the file states that in July 1940, Stalin had seen Germany as the biggest threat to Russia in Europe.

-In the aftermath if the Winter War against the Finns, Stalin saw how incompetent the Red Army was, and how his purges had hurt them. From March of 1940 to June 1941, they had 15 months to buildup their forces, invading Russia instead of France in May 1940 would not be enough time to prepare as they were still recovering from the Winter War

-In World War 1 the Germans were able to provide decent offensives against France and Russia, in this alternate scenario, the Germans could build their own form of defenses such as the Maginot line against a possible invasion of France. It's unlikely that France would want to invade Germany had they put their own set of defenses

-Would France even intervene? Many French people had hoped not to go to war, during the Sitzkrieg, they had conducted no major offensive operations against Germany, even when Denmark and Norway fell, they had still sat in their defenses, also wouldn't the French see an attack on Russia by Germany as something of good coming out of it. Not to say they would like it, but France in 1940 had a much more shaky relationship with Russia than in 1914, due to the difference of ideologies(of course they disliked Germany's ideology as well, but some disliked Communism more than fascism).

-How could France and Britain prepare? They had no capable strategic bombers and if they did, would do little harm to German industry at all. British bombers were in few and during bombing raids on Germany they often missed their target by many miles. I am making an educated guessing statement but, if Hitler had succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union in three to four months, they would be blessed with a huge amount of natural resources. I understand it would take around a year to finally be able to use the resources and then have the enslaved population do the armaments work, it's fair to believe that in the time Germany could defeat the Soviet Union in three to four months, when it was much unprepared and had less tanks and planes, then the war for france would take around a year and Hitler could then have control over Europe. The invasion of Britain might also happen with the use of the Soviet Union's resources as they can build more ships to challenge the Royal Navy.

I am looking for a fun, yet mature debate.

 

[jmc247]

So May of 1940 Hitler tells his generals to invade East instead of West?

Short of having a Paris/London/Berlin pact in hand at the time they would be questioning his sanity a fair bit earlier.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The study entirely focuses on how the Red Army changed in 1940-41 while completely ignoring how the Heer changed in 1940-41. While it is true that in absolute terms the Soviets were weaker in 1940... so were the Germans. In relative terms, the Germans were weaker compared to the Soviets in 1940 then they were in 1941. The short-term windfall in resources from the swift and relatively painless conquest of Western Europe was crucial for the German performance in 1941. To just single out one example: the looting of Western Europe provided fully half of the motor pool used for Barbarossa. Without those trucks, it would have been impossible for the Germans to even make it to the P'skov-D'niepr line, much less the gates of Moscow. When placed in that context, things like this statement...

Because of these shortcomings the German leadership spent a lot of time and energy planning for Barbarossa’s logistical requirements. This proved to not be time well spent, or effective. Göring accurately predicted in February 1941 that logistics would “endanger the entire operation.” German staff officers simply assumed that the roads and railroads west of the Dvina and Dnepr rivers would be superior to those east of that line; but that was only partially true; they would find that maneuverability was an issue as soon as they crossed the border in 1941. This was the quagmire now facing Germany, it needed the resources of the Soviet Union, but did not have enough of its own to defeat Russia and secure those resources. It was evident that by 1941 there would be troubles invading deep into the Soviet Union this late in the war. Therefore, it would seem logical that an operation against the Soviet Union in 1940, rather than against France would have been more.

... become downright hilarious. How does invading the USSR when Germany has less resources to try and overcome the above challenges make an invasion more logical?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The study entirely focuses on how the Red Army changed in 1940-41 while completely ignoring how the Heer changed in 1940-41. While it is true that in absolute terms the Soviets were weaker in 1940... so were the Germans. In relative terms, the Germans were weaker compared to the Soviets in 1940 then they were in 1941. The short-term windfall in resources from the swift and relatively painless conquest of Western Europe was crucial for the German performance in 1941. To just single out one example: the looting of Western Europe provided fully half of the motor pool used for Barbarossa. Without those trucks, it would have been impossible for the Germans to even make it to the P'skov-D'niepr line, much less the gates of Moscow. When placed in that context, things like this statement...

... become downright hilarious. How does invading the USSR when Germany has less resources to try and overcome the above challenges make an invasion more logical?

Not to mention that the French and Brits were waiting to invade Germany at the same time.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Not to mention that the French and Brits were waiting to invade Germany at the same time.

Not the same time, precisely. They had tentative plans for offensive operations, but in 1941 at the earliest. For 1940, they were predicting a defensive fight against a German invasion through Belgium that they would defeat while the effects of the economic blockade wore down Germany. 2 out of 3 right wouldn't be bad, if it weren't for the fact that the one they got wrong (defeating the German invasion) was kind-of a deal breaker.

So for the Anglo-French, a German attack on the USSR in 1940 would be a pleasant surprise. The German and Soviet armies would tear at each other in Belarus and Western/Central Ukraine in a bloody attritional slugfest while the Anglo-French are able to spend 1940 getting ready for their 1941 offensives in peace.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Not the same time, precisely. They had tentative plans for offensive operations, but in 1941 at the earliest. For 1940, they were predicting a defensive fight against a German invasion through Belgium that they would defeat while the effects of the economic blockade wore down Germany. 2 out of 3 right wouldn't be bad, if it weren't for the fact that the one they got wrong (defeating the German invasion) was kind-of a deal breaker.

So for the Anglo-French, a German attack on the USSR in 1940 would be a pleasant surprise. The German and Soviet armies would tear at each other in Belarus and Western/Central Ukraine in a bloody attritional slugfest while the Anglo-French are able to spend 1940 getting ready for their 1941 offensives in peace.

Do you really think that the Allies are going to pass of the chance to attack in 1940 if the Germans go mostly in on the offensive in the East??? Even if we buy into the conceit that the Allies wouldn't attack until 1941 to let the Soviets and Nazis wear each other down, the Germans will have to keep major forces in the West to forestall the chance of that happening, which means fatally weakening their offensive in the East.

 

[hammo1j]

The problem is Germany has to go through Poland to get to Russia. Poland was protected by France and Britain so any attack on Russia would trigger a two front war.

The only way this could work is an earlier pod where germany is seen as a bastion against communism and is given free rein and support from the rest of Europe.

 

[Hammurabi]

The only way this could work is an earlier pod where germany is seen as a bastion against communism and is given free rein and support from the rest of Europe.

For that, you would need a far more aggressive Stalin, which would require a different Stalin.

Could this maybe work if Trotsky is in power? I know that he was a very big proponent of international Communism.

 

[pattersonautobody]

I agree with Obsessed. Germany lacked the resources to get it done in 1940, as Stalin's reserves would be fatally out of Germany's reach. They could not win a quick war, as the Russians had less men and reserves on the border and the Germans can get less far.

 

[hammo1j]

For that, you would need a far more aggressive Stalin, which would require a different Stalin.

Could this maybe work if Trotsky is in power? I know that he was a very big proponent of international Communism.

Very good point. Stalin was not expansionist. It would not take overt aggression to panic the west but covert support of leftist elements revealed might do that. If a single western country falls, perhaps Spain, then the capitalists rally behind Germany.

 

[Johnrankins]

Do you really think that the Allies are going to pass of the chance to attack in 1940 if the Germans go mostly in on the offensive in the East??? Even if we buy into the conceit that the Allies wouldn't attack until 1941 to let the Soviets and Nazis wear each other down, the Germans will have to keep major forces in the West to forestall the chance of that happening, which means fatally weakening their offensive in the East.

I think they would wait. Why wouldn't they? It isn't like they had a great love for the Soviets either. The smartest thing for them to do is to stay out of it until they smash each other pretty badly. Once it looks like the Russians are winning you invade.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I think they would wait. Why wouldn't they? It isn't like they had a great love for the Soviets either. The smartest thing for them to do is to stay out of it until they smash each other pretty badly. Once it looks like the Russians are winning you invade.

Like I said even in that situation the Germans would have to leave so many men and so much equipment in the West in case of an invasion that it would fatally cripple any attack East. Of course this entire what if relies on completely ignoring that reality and why the Germans didn't want to fight a two front war in the first place, so signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and relied on the Soviets to feed them through the famine of 1940.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Do you really think that the Allies are going to pass of the chance to attack in 1940 if the Germans go mostly in on the offensive in the East?

Yes. They didn't launch anything more then probing attacks in 1939 despite the fact that the German's overwhelming focus was on Poland and the forces they had in the west were pretty much just barely enough to man the Franco-German border. With the two great totalitarian powers of Europe crashing into each other, there is plenty of incentive for the WAllies to take their time.

Even if we buy into the conceit that the Allies wouldn't attack until 1941 to let the Soviets and Nazis wear each other down, the Germans will have to keep major forces in the West to forestall the chance of that happening, which means fatally weakening their offensive in the East.

It's entirely concievable that Hitler might denude the west in a gamble that they won't attack him. That's pretty much what he did planned for both Czechoslovakia and Poland. A German attack in the East in 1940 is going to be fatally weak regardless. Most likely they'll smash through the frontier region pretty handily but, as pattersonautobody noted, most of the Soviet forces would still be manning the Stalin line which means that the Germans will have already traversed a few hundred kilometers over godawful terrain and infrastructure by the time they make contact with the bulk of the Red Army. Given that the Heer was still a pretty finely honed instrument in 1940 and the manifest faults of the Red Army, the Germans will likely still breakthrough the Stalin line and take Minsk and Zhitomir, but only after a prolonged struggle that see's the Heer too exhausted to properly exploit, with the Red Army successfully fall back to a new defensive line running approximately from north of Odessa (no Balkan allies to stage out of from the south!), through to west of Kiev, up along the Berezina river, and then either the Daugava or west of P'skov depending on the details of what happens in the Baltic States. That is where the Germans stall out on. With that, the Germans will have shot their only bolt to seize most of Belarus and nearly half-of Ukraine, probably taking hundreds of thousands of casualties in the process. But unlike with OTL Barbarossa, they only have one bolt and there is no Fall of France to regenerate it. The Soviets will likely suffer more heavily, but much less then they did IOTL 1941. Furthermore, they'll have retained all of their prime industrial, agricultural, manpower, and raw material regions, they would have commenced full-scale wartime mobilization a full year early, and have kick-started the learning process they underwent without having to spend as much time struggling to just survive.

There is likely a winter offensive by the Soviets in the winter of 1940-41, it probably makes decent headway against the economically crippled Germans but otherwise only succeeds in racking up a massive body count on both sides. It's still a valuable learning experience for the Soviets and they can afford the casualties waaaay more then the Germans can. Without the access to Soviet grain supplies, the Germans are probably going to resort to mass murder against Poles, Jews, and Czechs far faster just to keep their own citizens from starving to death. Similarly, the lack of raw materials begins to push their war industry into full collapse. By the spring/summer 1941 campaign season, the Soviets will have enough experience and mass-produced equipment under their belt to launch proper combined-arms offensive. Which means by the summer of '41, Germany's going to be caught between two offensives in the west and east right while it's armaments industry is in total free fall.

The only question is if the Red Army shakes hands with the Anglo-French on the Oder or the Elbe.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Why are we arguing so much about this when we fundamentally agree the premise is flawed?

Yes. They didn't launch anything more then probing attacks in 1939 despite the fact that the German's overwhelming focus was on Poland and the forces they had in the west were pretty much just barely enough to man the Franco-German border. With the two great totalitarian powers of Europe crashing into each other, there is plenty of incentive for the WAllies to take their time.

The situation in 1939 was very different than the one in 1940. In 1939 the Germans defeated the Poles in roughly 2-3 weeks, which was long before the French could make any progress and German reserves freed up from Poland were transferred West. The British weren't even deployed to the continent yet. In 1940 the Germans would have a huge indefinite commitment in the East that would require 90% of the army and at least 2/3rds of the Luftwaffe, while the French were far more ready to attack in 1940 than in 1939 AND the British was ready to fight, a situation very different from September 1939.

It's entirely concievable that Hitler might denude the west in a gamble that they won't attack him. That's pretty much what he did planned for both Czechoslovakia and Poland. A German attack in the East in 1940 is going to be fatally weak regardless. Most likely they'll smash through the frontier region pretty handily but, as pattersonautobody noted, most of the Soviet forces would still be manning the Stalin line which means that the Germans will have already traversed a few hundred kilometers over godawful terrain and infrastructure by the time they make contact with the bulk of the Red Army. Given that the Heer was still a pretty finely honed instrument in 1940 and the manifest faults of the Red Army, the Germans will likely still breakthrough the Stalin line and take Minsk and Zhitomir, but only after a prolonged struggle that see's the Heer too exhausted to properly exploit, with the Red Army successfully fall back to a new defensive line running approximately from north of Odessa (no Balkan allies to stage out of from the south!), through to west of Kiev, up along the Berezina river, and then either the Daugava or west of P'skov depending on the details of what happens in the Baltic States. That is where the Germans stall out on. With that, the Germans will have shot their only bolt to seize most of Belarus and nearly half-of Ukraine, probably taking hundreds of thousands of casualties in the process. But unlike with OTL Barbarossa, they only have one bolt and there is no Fall of France to regenerate it. The Soviets will likely suffer more heavily, but much less then they did IOTL 1941. Furthermore, they'll have retained all of their prime industrial, agricultural, manpower, and raw material regions, they would have commenced full-scale wartime mobilization a full year early, and have kick-started the learning process they underwent without having to spend as much time struggling to just survive.

There is likely a winter offensive by the Soviets in the winter of 1940-41, it probably makes decent headway against the economically crippled Germans but otherwise only succeeds in racking up a massive body count on both sides. It's still a valuable learning experience for the Soviets and they can afford the casualties waaaay more then the Germans can. Without the access to Soviet grain supplies, the Germans are probably going to resort to mass murder against Poles, Jews, and Czechs far faster just to keep their own citizens from starving to death. Similarly, the lack of raw materials begins to push their war industry into full collapse. By the spring/summer 1941 campaign season, the Soviets will have enough experience and mass-produced equipment under their belt to launch proper combined-arms offensive. Which means by the summer of '41, Germany's going to be caught between two offensives in the west and east right while it's armaments industry is in total free fall.

The only question is if the Red Army shakes hands with the Anglo-French on the Oder or the Elbe.

Completely different situation in 1940 vs. 1938-39. The Wallies are much more prepared and have actually declared war, plus the French army is mobilized, while the BEF and supporting RAF are on the continent.

At least we agree that a 1940 attack East in a two front war is insane.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Why are we arguing so much about this when we fundamentally agree the premise is flawed?

Eh, we do that all that time.

The situation in 1939 was very different than the one in 1940. In 1939 the Germans defeated the Poles in roughly 2-3 weeks, which was long before the French could make any progress and German reserves freed up from Poland were transferred West.

You say that as if they were really trying to make an effort. Had the French committed to a major offensive, 2-3 weeks would have been plenty of time to smash through the Westwall. But they just weren't set up for it in terms of doctrine, leadership, or motivation.

The Wallies are much more prepared and have actually declared war, plus the French army is mobilized, while the BEF and supporting RAF are on the continent.

Their a lot more mobilized then in '38 or '39, yes, but not quite fully and they still have a ways to go in terms of training up, sorting out their forces, getting modern equipment out in-quantity, and planning everything. Add onto that the desire to win the war spilling the least amount of Anglo-French blood possible and that they just don't move very fast in tactical-operational terms.

Really, until the Germans came in and bull-dozed them, the Anglo-French were being very lax in the pace with which they prosecuted the war until the Germans rolled into them. Hitler losing his marbles two-three years ahead of time and striking the Soviets isn't exactly going to discourage that.

At least we agree that a 1940 attack East in a two front war is insane.

Quite. Even Hitler isn't that crazy. He's a gambler, but even without hindsight it is obvious this isn't gambling... it's outright suicide.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You say that as if they were really trying to make an effort. Had the French committed to a major offensive, 2-3 weeks would have been plenty of time to smash through the Westwall. But they just weren't set up for it in terms of doctrine, leadership, or motivation.

They were probing to set up a major offensive, but the Poles collapsed months before planning said they would. The French weren't mobilized for a major offensive in 2-3 weeks. Their initial attack force ran into trouble and by the time the require 40 divisions were in place, the Poles had already fallen apart and Soviet entry sealed the deal. And the Germans were counterattacking. The French just couldn't gather enough forces to attack in the required strength quickly enough.

Their a lot more mobilized then in '38 or '39, yes, but not quite fully and they still have a ways to go in terms of training up, sorting out their forces, getting modern equipment out in-quantity, and planning everything. Add onto that the desire to win the war spilling the least amount of Anglo-French blood possible and that they just don't move very fast in tactical-operational terms.

Right, which is why the Saar offensive didn't work. In 1940 its a different story, because they have a mechanized assault force ready, which IOTL was able to push into Belgium and fight a major campaign. Had the German army moved East they could have just done the same in the Saarland.

Really, until the Germans came in and bull-dozed them, the Anglo-French were being very lax in the pace with which they prosecuted the war until the Germans rolled into them. Hitler losing his marbles two-three years ahead of time and striking the Soviets isn't exactly going to discourage that.

They were lax because they were fighting the full weight of the German army and needed time to make up for the lack of armaments during peace time. It wasn't simply a matter of taking their time, they were softening up the Germans with blockade first while they made up for the major deficits they had built up over the 1930s. That takes time. Of course if the vast majority of the German army is headed East then you don't need time to make up for things when you suddenly have a decisive advantage in firepower and numbers.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

They were probing to set up a major offensive, but the Poles collapsed months before planning said they would.

2-3 weeks is a ridiculously long time to conduct probing attacks as a precursor to a major offensive.

The French weren't mobilized for a major offensive in 2-3 weeks. Their initial attack force ran into trouble and by the time the require 40 divisions were in place, the Poles had already fallen apart and Soviet entry sealed the deal. And the Germans were counterattacking. The French just couldn't gather enough forces to attack in the required strength quickly enough.

Which was entirely a function of all the timidity that hindered them in 1940 as well. Had they actually been of offensively minded, they would have assembled those divisions and planned the assault in the summer of 1939, during the build-up to war. But their own strategy and doctrine meant that was not going to happen. And the timidity they showed in it was ridiculous: entire divisions were stopped by single machine gun nests.

And in any case, the whole thing only ran a little over a single week from September 7-16. Poland didn't collapse until October...

In 1940 its a different story, because they have a mechanized assault force ready, which IOTL was able to push into Belgium and fight a major campaign.

According to a plan that had been drafted long before the war and which they had taken months to prepare to implementation. And then they proceeded to fight the campaign in a way that precluded decisive action completely even ignoring the fiasco in the Ardennes. Take the Battle of Hannut: General Prioux dispersed 3e DLM over a wide defensive front (17km) to contain the advancing Germans. This surrendered the initiative to the Germans, who duly concentrated their forces against one portion of the French lines. The French won the first day's fighting when the Germans ran into heavier resistance than they'd expected, but the French didn't have enough forces in any one place to really gut 3 and 4 Panzer, and were too dispersed in small defensive groupings to launch a major counter attack, leaving the Germans free to try again the next day. On the second day the Panzers attacked again, and the French were eventually forced to withdraw when the Germans continued to concentrate their forces and simply overwhelmed them. The problem was the defensive deployment of the French could give the Germans problems on their attack, but it could not stop them from attacking. Unless the Germans beat themselves bloody on the French defenses, they would eventually succeed somewhere - as they did. Armored losses on both sides were heavy, with the Germans getting the worst of it, but since the Germans now controlled the battlefield they recovered most of their knocked out panzers, while the French lost all of theirs.

Hannut wasn't a serious defeat for the French. In many ways it was a draw, even a victory, since it bought time for stronger defenses to be established at Gembloux. The French tanks proved individually superior to the Panzers, damaged them quite seriously, and were able to delay the Germans and then withdraw in good order without being encircled or routed. The battle basically went according to how the French expected the war would play out. But it still showed all the flaws in the French way of war. Their continuous front was simply outmatched by the German methods. It sacrificed the initiative to the Germans and dispersed French forces so they could never achieve decisive local superiority. As also seen at Stonne, their preference was to race their tanks forward... and then spread them out over a wide front while establishing defensive positions, to wait for the Germans instead to attack them.

Had the French had a more offensive doctrine at Hannut they had the forces not to play just for a costly draw, but for an outright victory. With two armored divisions and more forces on the way, with superior tanks, and with the Germans spread out on the advance, outnumbered overall (remember that the whole northern attack was a diversion to draw the best of the Allied armies deeper into Belgium, while the best of the German army slipped through the Ardennes to the south) and unclear about what lay before them, a better French army could instead have counter attacked in strength at Hannut, and potentially destroyed two Panzer divisions. As it stood, the methodical nature of French tactics meant there was never any chance of this.

What this shows is that French doctrine, even when doing what it was designed to do, was sub-optimal. It sacrificed firepower and responsiveness by continually dispersing troops in the name of maintaining an unbroken line. The strategy was built on political concerns (not giving up an inch of France's "sacred soil," and avoiding too large a politically dangerous professional army) at least as much as military ones, and it suffered as a result. With its continual focus on the tactical defense it sacrificed any chance for real operational success. All of that is going to dog them if they attack the Germans in mid-1940 just as much as it did during the end of 1939 or at Sedan in 1940. French problems in 1940 ran deep, and even when they solved one, another reared it's ugly head.

They were lax because they were fighting the full weight of the German army and needed time to make up for the lack of armaments during peace time.

Which means their laxity makes even less sense, not more. If you idle away the precious time against an enemy you know is going to come against you sooner and not later then don't be surprised that you get smashed. The Phony War for the Germans may have been just a mask, but for the Allies it was reality. While the Germans were training feverishly for the coming invasion, the British and French took the peacefulness war as a fact, and whiled the time away playing sports and lazing. As a result, they were far less prepared when the assault came than they should have been and in May of 1940 found themselves scrambling to suddenly sort out issues that relentless training would have identified and solved months previously.

Of course if the vast majority of the German army is headed East then you don't need time to make up for things when you suddenly have a decisive advantage in firepower and numbers.

In all likelihood, the first the Anglo-French know of the German attack on Russia is when it happens. They were remarkably blind to German intentions in 1940 and running on blithe assumptions. Their liable to be just as surprised as the Russians when it happens and even less prepared to take advantage of it.

 

[The Red]

Why are we arguing so much about this when we fundamentally agree the premise is flawed?

I'm still waiting for you two to finally marry each other, the whacky sidekick to get that kiss with the girl way out of his league that he's been creepily stalking for 90 minutes and for everything to wrap up fairly conclusively with All Star by Smash Mouth playing over the credits.

 

[Johnrankins]

2-3 weeks is a ridiculously long time to conduct probing attacks as a precursor to a major offensive.



Which was entirely a function of all the timidity that hindered them in 1940 as well. Had they actually been of offensively minded, they would have assembled those divisions and planned the assault in the summer of 1939, during the build-up to war. But their own strategy and doctrine meant that was not going to happen. And the timidity they showed in it was ridiculous: entire divisions were stopped by single machine gun nests.

And in any case, the whole thing only ran a little over a single week from September 7-16. Poland didn't collapse until October...



According to a plan that had been drafted long before the war and which they had taken months to prepare to implementation. And then they proceeded to fight the campaign in a way that precluded decisive action completely even ignoring the fiasco in the Ardennes. Take the Battle of Hannut: General Prioux dispersed 3e DLM over a wide defensive front (17km) to contain the advancing Germans. This surrendered the initiative to the Germans, who duly concentrated their forces against one portion of the French lines. The French won the first day's fighting when the Germans ran into heavier resistance than they'd expected, but the French didn't have enough forces in any one place to really gut 3 and 4 Panzer, and were too dispersed in small defensive groupings to launch a major counter attack, leaving the Germans free to try again the next day. On the second day the Panzers attacked again, and the French were eventually forced to withdraw when the Germans continued to concentrate their forces and simply overwhelmed them. The problem was the defensive deployment of the French could give the Germans problems on their attack, but it could not stop them from attacking. Unless the Germans beat themselves bloody on the French defenses, they would eventually succeed somewhere - as they did. Armored losses on both sides were heavy, with the Germans getting the worst of it, but since the Germans now controlled the battlefield they recovered most of their knocked out panzers, while the French lost all of theirs.

Hannut wasn't a serious defeat for the French. In many ways it was a draw, even a victory, since it bought time for stronger defenses to be established at Gembloux. The French tanks proved individually superior to the Panzers, damaged them quite seriously, and were able to delay the Germans and then withdraw in good order without being encircled or routed. The battle basically went according to how the French expected the war would play out. But it still showed all the flaws in the French way of war. Their continuous front was simply outmatched by the German methods. It sacrificed the initiative to the Germans and dispersed French forces so they could never achieve decisive local superiority. As also seen at Stonne, their preference was to race their tanks forward... and then spread them out over a wide front while establishing defensive positions, to wait for the Germans instead to attack them.

Had the French had a more offensive doctrine at Hannut they had the forces not to play just for a costly draw, but for an outright victory. With two armored divisions and more forces on the way, with superior tanks, and with the Germans spread out on the advance, outnumbered overall (remember that the whole northern attack was a diversion to draw the best of the Allied armies deeper into Belgium, while the best of the German army slipped through the Ardennes to the south) and unclear about what lay before them, a better French army could instead have counter attacked in strength at Hannut, and potentially destroyed two Panzer divisions. As it stood, the methodical nature of French tactics meant there was never any chance of this.

What this shows is that French doctrine, even when doing what it was designed to do, was sub-optimal. It sacrificed firepower and responsiveness by continually dispersing troops in the name of maintaining an unbroken line. The strategy was built on political concerns (not giving up an inch of France's "sacred soil," and avoiding too large a politically dangerous professional army) at least as much as military ones, and it suffered as a result. With its continual focus on the tactical defense it sacrificed any chance for real operational success. All of that is going to dog them if they attack the Germans in mid-1940 just as much as it did during the end of 1939 or at Sedan in 1940. French problems in 1940 ran deep, and even when they solved one, another reared it's ugly head.



Which means their laxity makes even less sense, not more. If you idle away the precious time against an enemy you know is going to come against you sooner and not later then don't be surprised that you get smashed. The Phony War for the Germans may have been just a mask, but for the Allies it was reality. While the Germans were training feverishly for the coming invasion, the British and French took the peacefulness war as a fact, and whiled the time away playing sports and lazing. As a result, they were far less prepared when the assault came than they should have been and in May of 1940 found themselves scrambling to suddenly sort out issues that relentless training would have identified and solved months previously.



In all likelihood, the first the Anglo-French know of the German attack on Russia is when it happens. They were remarkably blind to German intentions in 1940 and running on blithe assumptions. Their liable to be just as surprised as the Russians when it happens and even less prepared to take advantage of it.

Most importantly if the Russians and Germans are fighting each other what is the rush? Let the Communists and the Nazis smash each other to pieces and when things either start to turn or start getting dangerous looking go in then.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I'm still waiting for you two to finally marry each other, the whacky sidekick to get that kiss with the girl way out of his league that he's been creepily stalking for 90 minutes and for everything to wrap up fairly conclusively with All Star by Smash Mouth playing over the credits.

Well, there's a first that certainly wasn't on my bucket list. Getting shipped with someone online...