powerthirteen
Banned
Anyway, people, here is the PDF of the PhD thesis that I was talking about:
The argument has now been solved for the large part.
The argument has now been solved for the large part.
German Spring Offensive succeeds-how does President Wilson react?
- Thread starter powerthirteen
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"compared to their relative importance" is a judgement statement. It also does not address the question of whether the offensive that Zabecki describes would have been able to reach the objective he sets for them considering the differences in conditions that would have existed. The Bulk of British reserves were focused behind Third army, whose centre was more or less at Arras, and behind Fifth Army, which was further south, in the area that Michael attacked. This really does not guarantee that the Germans would reach the Railheads.
IOTL during Michael Foch immediately recognized the importance of holding Amiens and directed the French reserves toward supporting the British and pulled 10 divisions out of the line elsewhere to improve their ability to do that, with the option of an attack to pull German forces away from it considered. The other offensive would be the German one. With so much of Germanies strength trying to overcome the British (and, just as important, the logistical tyranny of trying to follow up their gains far from their established railheads) the French attacks would be facing a much greater proportion of "trench divisions' and fewer forces in general. The German forces in other parts of the line were instructed to withdraw in the face of French attacks at other points. Which works unless and until the French do the same to the Germans that the Germans are trying to do to the British and force a gap in the line, through which a breakthrough is possible
Yeah, no. You do not get to lock discussion behind the pay-wall of an $80 book. If you want to bring discussion from the book, feel free. But do not suggest that posters are unable to contribute to the discussion because they do not own a particular book.
Having looked through, and posted Zabecki's thesis paper, I can say that for all of Zabecki's excellent work in combining German documentation and applying his own experience in modern operational understanding, he does very little to determine that his proposed operations would succeed. He generally assumes that they will because if the OTL operations that he denigrates got close, then his improved ones must do better. This does ignore somewhat that a certain amount of the depth of penetration of Michael in particular was due to its breadth forcing surrounding British formations to withdraw to avoid flanking. This effect would be reduced with more of the German army having to guard their own flanks against intact British formations.
If you look through Zabecki's source list you will notice a pattern. He has an excellent list of sources from German staff documents and the memoirs of staff officers. His list of sources on the British army is most commonly the Official History and Tim Travers books.
I have alot of respect for James Edmonds and his work on the Official History. I think he was a great intelligence officer and his removal from intelligence work was a waste of an asset. I also greatly respect his work on the Official History and his bringing together of so many disparate sources. However, it should also be kept in mind that the man was an obsessive collector of gossip (possibly why he was a good intelligence officer) and did not always take the time to confirm it. Most modern historical work has to take Edmonds with a grain of salt. He is generally good when it comes to troop dispositions (though not perfect) but he is less reliable when it comes to planning and the state of mind of the British military leaders.
Tim Travers has been called out by vast amounts of the historical community for cherry picking information that supports his thesis. His thesis generally is that the British Army leadership was hidebound and stupid and that it took the Canadians and other Dominion troops to show them that the way forward was armour supported "technological warfare". As a Canadian I appreciate his support for our cause but I would rather not have plaudits unearned. The Canadian Corps was very good but not supermen and many of their innovations were ones undertaken along with, not in front of, the British Army. Tanks were not ready for the role that Travers likes to imagine them in, they were still supporting weapons, and the British Army leadership was much more dynamic and forward thinking than Travers allows.
On the whole Zabecki's thesis is a great undertaking on German planning for the Spring offensive, and his belief that the railheads were better targets is, in my opinion, spot on. He does not however, greatly consider the German's opponents and, IMO this causes him to underestimate their ability to resist the attack he proposes.
kham_coc
Banned
I think you are hung up on 'defeated' - If Amiens and Hazebrouck had fallen, the BEF would no longer have a supply chain.
At that point, they would have to withdraw, or be destroyed.
powerthirteen
Banned
Foch only realized this important fact after the Michael offensive had already run out its course without the capture of Amiens.
Had Amiens been captured early during the first few days of the offensive when the road/pathway to the was still relatively open after the initial breakthrough, the French and the British armies would have been split in two, unable to support each other in any way or form. Any hypothetical French offensive at this point of the battle would have had to occur with virtually no inter-Allied coordination with the Anglophone Allies, making its course far from guaranteed in any case.
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powerthirteen
Banned
Considering how even an absurdly diluted Operation Michael very nearly captured the mountain ridge which oversaw the vital Amiens railway station and could and would have been used in order to enfilade the junction with artillery shells in order to render it virtually useless as a logistical/supply base for the BEF, I confidently believe that Zabecki is correct when he writes that a concentrated attack on the station itself could possibly have rapidly captured it by coup de main.
Despite the likelihood (or perhaps lack thereof of this happening), its certainly not ASB, so its worthy of the OP question on how does president Wilson react.
(I certainly agree that Amiens could fall, but I also wonder how it does in a focused attack leaving enough fresh divisions for George)
(Regardless its kind of like the snake eyes and sixes recent thread on the battle of Gazala, where everything goes Rommels way, what would be the result???).
cardcarrier
Banned
How do the Germans not collapse on themselves in an orgy of gluttony? Considering this phenomenon delayed the progress of their storm trooper divisions every time they where utilized
step 1. having elite (but starving) troops, pulverize and bust open enemy front line and take front line units prisoner
step 2. reach enemy rear areas and supply depots
step 3. elite troops stop advancing because they have found fresh bread, meat pasta and eggs that they havent seen in a year and settle into an orgy of gluttony
step 4. attack looses momentum and initiative, and enemy is given time to regroup because of step 3 and the general slow nature of displacing artillery forward across battlefields that resembled the moon
step 1. having elite (but starving) troops, pulverize and bust open enemy front line and take front line units prisoner
step 2. reach enemy rear areas and supply depots
step 3. elite troops stop advancing because they have found fresh bread, meat pasta and eggs that they havent seen in a year and settle into an orgy of gluttony
step 4. attack looses momentum and initiative, and enemy is given time to regroup because of step 3 and the general slow nature of displacing artillery forward across battlefields that resembled the moon
powerthirteen
Banned
Zabecki addresses these German issues in the thesis PDF that I've linked above.
Weighting the Schwerpunkt of Operation Michael directly towards Amiens instead of effectively nowhere as Ludendorff did ITTL would probably have resulted in the early capture of the key supply depots/dumps at Amiens.
After that, with Franco-British C2 having been paralyzed by the capture of the railway junction also in the town, the German Army can feed itself whilst preparing for Operation George against Hazebrouck.
After all, that is exactly what is going on in your North Africa timeline, isn't it?
I am far from an expert on WWI, admittedly I know relatively little about the topic. However, if we get past the argument of if these offensives can be successful, what will the ramifications be?
If the Germans are successful at taking the rail hubs, and the BEF is forced to withdraw, then I would assume there would be little resistance to the Germans then capturing the channel ports. If this happens, I would also assume French morale is negatively impacted in a major way. So then lets say the Germans offer peace terms (pre-war borders in the west, Germans hold gains in the east, Germany gives up German West Africa, etc.), would the demoralized French accept this offer? I don't think I'm knowledgeable enough to answer that.
For the Americans, this gets weird. Its very tough to predict how the American public will react to this sort of thing. For example I could very well see public opinion shift massively into "this was a bad idea, lets end this now". Its my opinion that if Germany fails to end the war after these successes then even with the British being forced off the continent for the time being, they don't have very long left. If the Germans realize this, would it be unrealistic for them to offer significant concessions to the Americans? The thought being that as long as American manpower is in play, Germany is doomed in the long run, but if the Americans are leaning towards going home that the French will have to make peace.
If the Germans are successful at taking the rail hubs, and the BEF is forced to withdraw, then I would assume there would be little resistance to the Germans then capturing the channel ports. If this happens, I would also assume French morale is negatively impacted in a major way. So then lets say the Germans offer peace terms (pre-war borders in the west, Germans hold gains in the east, Germany gives up German West Africa, etc.), would the demoralized French accept this offer? I don't think I'm knowledgeable enough to answer that.
For the Americans, this gets weird. Its very tough to predict how the American public will react to this sort of thing. For example I could very well see public opinion shift massively into "this was a bad idea, lets end this now". Its my opinion that if Germany fails to end the war after these successes then even with the British being forced off the continent for the time being, they don't have very long left. If the Germans realize this, would it be unrealistic for them to offer significant concessions to the Americans? The thought being that as long as American manpower is in play, Germany is doomed in the long run, but if the Americans are leaning towards going home that the French will have to make peace.
Foch's diary writes that on the 26th at the Doullens conference "From the outset all were in Unanimous agreement in recognizing that Amiens had to be saved at all costs". Since they all arrived there in this frame of mind it seems unlikely that they only came to this conclusion then. French and British intelligence services had assessed that the attacks target was Amiens on the 21'st, the first day of the battle.
Diluted? Your notional Michael would have 20 fewer divisions than the OTL one, would involve only the German Second and Eighteenth Armies, leave British Third Army unengaged and, given the strength of it position, available to provide reinforcements to Fifth Army to the south. Alternatively it would involve the bulk of the attack being concentrated against a stronger part of the British line that IOTL a larger Michael failed to penetrate, as did the later Mars. OTL Michael also got as far as it did because Ludendorf stripped much of the logistical support needed for Georgette to reinforce Michael. To the point that Ruprecht said that even an attack smaller than OTL's Georgette was not possible to undertake immediately. If that happened ITTL then Georg, bigger than OTL, would be even more open to disruption.
The attacks Zabecki builds up as a good basis for eventually attacking Amiens are based on Wetzell's earlier plans for sequential attacks against the Cambrai salient and against Armentiers. Both of these attacks were tactical in nature. What became Michael was meant to cut off and reduce the Cambrai salient. What became Georg was aimed at Hazebrouk but its goal was to strike the British forces in the flank and rear, shatter them and roll up the north of the British line (an ambitious goal). It would have taken place two weeks after TTL Michael and used some of the same troops and much of the same artillery, kind of showing the limits of German attack ability at this period.
OTL's Michael's initial goal was also to cut off the Cambrai Salient, with Amiens actually being mentioned as a deep goal (in spite of Zabecki's insistence that it was never considered). It failed in this goal. The reason that Ludendorf is often criticized for not holding to an operational plan is because he reinforced Eitheenth Army's success against British Fifth Army. However, he did that because Second and Seventeenth Armies failed to come close to their objectives on the first day in the Northern Section. They had not reached the British Artillery line in spite of committing almost all of the forces available to them. So reserves were stripped from them to go to Eighteenth. When Eighteenth reached the point where the focus was supposed to shift back to Second Army Eighteenth's commander, Hutier, argued successfully that they could best support Second by continuing their advance. This shifted the whole assault further south, rather than west, with Seventeenth now ordered to support Second and push more south.
I said in my first post, the Germans were successful where the British were weak. For TTL's Michael to achieve its initial condition, and begin pushing to Amiens, they would have had to have been as successful as OTL's Michael but against a portion of the front that they were not at all successful against IOTL, with fewer forces to work with. Alternatively they would have had to have been as successful against the same front (more so than they planned for IOTL), but with more forces available for reinforcements to the North, and expect that a thrust in the wrong direction would open up enough of a gap that they could move on Amiens. And then that they could shift direction and move fast enough (along British lines of communication now) to take it before the British can block them or the French assault their now exposed flank.
To quote David Zabecki's thesis, during the planning for the Spring Offensive "The most serious question facing the planners was whether after affecting a successful breakthrough the field force would be sufficiently mobile to exploit it. Given Germany's shortage of horses, inadequate forage, shortage of trucks, scarcity of fuel, scarcity of rubber for tires, and lack of tanks, the answer was No".
Stormtrooper tactics are often held up as a stroke of genius but I honestly have to question this. They concentrate the best men with the most initiative in the units that will suffer the greatest casualties. They are inevitably manpower based offensives from a nation with little manpower to spare. IOTL the German Spring Offensive broke the best of the German Army, and I doubt it would be any different ITTL.
Therefore, the Germans need the British to withdraw all the way on their own. That is not a bad assumption, as that was GHQ's plan IOTL. However, I have my doubts about Whitehall supporting this plan if GHQ implements it. My guess would be that Lloyd-George forces a new line to be established before the BEF gets to the Channel. Possibly a portion of the BEF is returned to Britain to reduce supply requirements but I highly doubt all of it. The Germans, having shot their load, are unlikely to be able to go for Paris, which gives the French time to respond or to reestablish their own defenses.
Beyond that, I am not sure. I doubt that negotiations would take place. The Germans are even less likely to bend on Belgium at this point and without that, the war will continue. American troops are either landed in Britain or southern France, and the Germans surrender in 1919.
powerthirteen
Banned
The Michael offensive had already diverged away from Amiens at this point, which makes Foch's opinions at the time moot: the intervention of the 10 French divisions only came after Ludendorff had dispersed his limited combat power practically everywhere, and therefore failed to concentrate his remaining forces on Amiens until it was far too late.
Given that Amiens was one of the key weak points in the line, it was extremely far from being the centre of gravity of the BEF. That was Arras: it's clear that you haven't bothered to properly observe the maps. Also, a serious effort against Amiens wasn't even attempted until the last days of the operation, when Ludendorff had wasted away his own limited combat power and allowed the 10 French divisions to reinforce the British defence of Amiens at a relatively comfortable rate. An early capture of Amiens during the Michael offensive would have completely split the French and British from each other by capturing their lines of communication inside the town, leaving them unable to effectively co-ordinate their actions against the Germans together. The French would have been attacking without virtually any British support, rendering the whole operation a historical do-or-die gamble.
“Punch a hole and let the rest follow,”
“We talk too much about operations and too little about tactics”
Zabecki's two quotations of Ludendorff here perfectly encapsulate his "plan" for the Spring Offensives: neither Amiens, Cambria nor Armentiers were relevant objectives in Ludendorff's myopic mind, given how he fully expected the entire Allied lines to simply collapse on themselves once his stormtroopers had achieved an initial breakthrough, not dissimilarly to Hitler's prediction in June 1941 that the Soviet Union would be defeated in just four weeks. You are wrong and Zabecki is correct when he mentions that terrain objectives weren't even a minor objective/factor during Michael: it was encircling and destroying Allied land formations on the ground.
I would suggest you both stop sniping the other 'for something unfortunate is said
Play the Ball.
cardcarrier
Banned
it is strange that the DAK was always starving, and dying of thirst, except for the briefest periods of time; yet when they would surprise party British depots, they didn't become operationally disorganized in an orgy of gluttony, unlike their fathers in 1917-1918; like zero histories or diaries of the war in North Africa ever make that remark, yet every history of Caporetto and Michael/Georgette says the troops stopped fighting to go make omlettes and pasta when they captured British company field kitchens and regimental bakeries
Rommel and his Italian counterparts must have run a really tight ship in the PAA
No, but the 5 French Divisions Petain ordered to be ready on the 21'st would have been available by the 27th. By the 22nd Petain had 7 more divisions preparing to move up to the Somme. On the 23rd Petain had agreed to take over the British line to Perrone and had 6 more divisions ready to move forward. The French First Army was also moved forward to the Avre and was expected to be there on the 26th. On the 25th Third French Army (7 divisions) was in place behind part of British Fifth Army and French First Army (6 Divisions) was moving into the area as well. By the 26th French First Army was forming in front of Amiens.
It was not. Amiens was not a part of the line. It was in fact over 60 km from the front. The part of the line that was the closest to Amiens and the part that in OTL Michael was supposed to form the path from the front to Amiens was the area held by Second Army. This straddled the parts of the British line held by Third Army (to the north) and Fifth Army (to the South).
Ah, like this map perhaps?
There are two ways to pursue the Michael that you suggest. The first is to make use of Eighteenth Army and Second Army in the South. This would be a push against British Fifth Army and would straddle the Somme. Eighteenth would push and try to get between Fifth Army and the French to the South and Third Army and the rest of the BEF to the North. They would then have the option of approaching Amiens from the south side of the Somme, crossing the Avre (which would be defended by the French by the time they got there. Meanwhile Second Army would push against the right flank of Third British in an attempt to move along the North of the Somme, cross the Ancre (which would be defended by the British) and take Amiens. This is effectively what ended up being done IOTL, as Amiens was the stated direction of attack for Second Army, as Zabecki states, his main objection seems to be that the rail lines were not stated as an objective, which kind of seems to be splitting hairs to be honest.
The other option, and the one that the Germans are likely to choose without hindsight is the areas of Seventeenth and Second Army. This was the one advocated by earlier planners. The first objective here would be to surround and reduce the portions of Third and Fifth Army in the Cambrai salient (the area from about the Bullcourt rail line to Saint Quentin. Accomplishing this was hoped to destroy enough of the British army to allow Second Army to advance along the North side of the Somme (as in Option 1) without the British being able to adequately defend the Ancre. The right wing of Seventeenth would face the task of guarding the north Flank of Second army by attacking Third British who are dug in in the highlands south of Arras and all along the Ancre. This was also part of the OTL plan. The initial goal, which Seventeenth and Second were very much unable to accomplish in OTL with about the same number of divisions as they would have ITTL (17 divisions for Seventeenth, 16 for Second).
The Germans were starting to feel the strain of the advance on the 23rd when they were near the red dotted line. In spite of getting all the support Eighteenth was unable to advance anywhere close to what was expected of them by the 26th (when they were at the Black line). And by the 26th French forces were in front of Amiens irrespective of what the British were doing. So basically the Germans have 4, maybe 5 days to get to Amiens. A distance of between 60 and 70 km from Second Armies starting position, ignoring the flow of the Somme that they would need to follow.
Of the two, the first seems to have the better chance but is less likely to be pursued, and it leaves Third Army largely free to form a defensive along the Ancre and the French to put forces in front of Amiens. It also requires the greater distance to be traveled, which puts still greater strain on the logistics system. The second option requires that Second and Seventeenth preform considerably better ITTl than they did IOTL with the same forces, and no attack to the south to force the British to pull back to avoid flanking.
This was effectively the case by the 25th. Third Army was now tasked with defending the south of the BEF and not with maintaining contact with Fifth Army and Fifth Army was now placed under French command. The battle went on.
Well, I am glad we have got that settled.
The two are not mutually exclusive. Pocketing the Cambrai Salient means that those troops within it are not there to resist or flank you when you push on for Amiens. Whether it is the better option to pocket them before moving on or try to push through and hope they cannot flank you depends on the circumstances. In this case, i am not sure either option would have got the Germans to Amiens, but I understand the draw to destroying the army first. The problem was they were not able to do that either.
powerthirteen
Banned
A rapid capture of Amiens by Ludendorff would have precluded such a measure, given how the railway running through the Amiens junction was critical for the troop transfers to the endangered/critical sectors of the front at the time.
They were able to do so precisely because their lines of communication running through Amiens had been minimally affected by the German advance at the time. Without their continued hold on the vital town, there would have been no C2 at all between the French and the British armies.
Splitting the Entente forces in two through the capture of the Amiens junction would have forced the French and British on either side of the Amiens salient to launch their counter-offensives against von Hutier piecemeal/understrength and un-coordinated, given just how essential the railway through Amiens was essential for the troop transfers via train that I just mentioned above.
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powerthirteen
Banned
The German armies were under strain early during their offensive because they were attempting to accomplish everything at once with insufficient forces, which further diluted the weight of their main effort and eventually ended up achieving precisely nothing.
As Zabecki stated, a concentrated/weighted German drive towards Amiens may very well have ended up succeeding. This was precisely the reason for Haig's order to the BEF to "stand with their backs to the wall" in front of Amiens and Hazebrouck - unlike many of his own colleagues, he was astute enough to realise just how big the size of the military catastrophe for the BEF would be if Ludendorff got hold of both objectives.
Assuming we allow the 5 days rather than 4, and assuming we figure from the closest point (Around Havrincourt - 61 km) and not the furthest point (St. Quentin - 71 km) of Second Army's line (Eighteenth had farther to go), then we can figure that the Germans had to cover 12 km per day for each of those 5 days. If we figure on the 4 days or points further out it is more still. This is actually the depth that OHL was hoping they would make (making me believe that Zabecki is too quick to dismiss Amiens as the target).
At the end of the 21st (Day 1) Seventeenth had managed 4-5 km. Second Army was about the same on its right (to the North) and had done slightly better on its left but still not made its objectives. By the End of the 22nd they were still just shy of the objectives from the 21st. Even with Eighteenth, who got all the reserves and logistical support and had little resistance in front of them (though they did have further to go) only averaged 11 km per day up to the 26th on which day they only managed 4.
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