It's hard to do the 100 days offensive if you can't attack around the Some (which you can't), harder still to do it without the BEF, and quite possibly impossible with the severe supply disturbance when the chanel ports can't be used, and when the Seine can't be used to supply Paris.And then what?
The German army has just gutted itself doing it - what good is this (quite frankly implausible) victory if the Hundred days is instead launched by the French further to the south
So they gutted themselves OTL not beating the British but by beating the British they suffer less losses?It's hard to do the 100 days offensive if you can't attack around the Some (which you can't), harder still to do it without the BEF, and quite possibly impossible with the severe supply disturbance when the chanel ports can't be used, and when the Seine can't be used to supply Paris.
Amiens seems possible if the Germans focused on that objective from the get go, In Georgette the Germans already rolled a 6 with the Portuguese division being caught right before it was to be removed, would need another 6 event probably, which gets implausible. But if it happened, the Germans wouldn't have any more casualties than OTL where they were attacking all the time, and presumably the British are out of action for a while, so the hundred days would get delayed.And then what?
The German army has just gutted itself doing it - what good is this (quite frankly implausible) victory if the Hundred days is instead launched by the French further to the south
I don't see the Germans capturing the Channel coast beyond Dieppe in 1918. I actually don't even see them capturing Dieppe. From Amiens to Dieppe is about 100km. In the springoffensive they advanced a little more than half that, and then were exhausted.If the Germans capture the French Channel coast beyond Dieppe then it's almost game over for the British. German long range guns will bombard Kent, close Dover forcing the evacuation of the Dover Patrol, German light naval and air forces will make the Dover Narrows a battleground, severely disrupting through-channel coastal shipping and likely leading to the partial evacuation of London. All this while Paris is either captured or under threat.
The Atlantic ports will be the least of the Allies worries.
So they gutted themselves OTL not beating the British but by beating the British they suffer less losses?
Okay then.
And then what?
The German army has just gutted itself doing it - what good is this (quite frankly implausible) victory if the Hundred days is instead launched by the French further to the south
Would such victories by the Germans in their offensives not massively affect French morale?
The BEF at the time of the POD was a peer opponent with superior logistics and supplies. Zabecki can write whatever he likes but the German Army was no more likely to achieve its goals in the spring offensive than it was at Ypres in 1915.It's clearly apparent that you still haven't bothered to actually read his book.
Zabecki writes that Operations Michael and George could have succeeded with the destruction of the BEF and without dehabilitating casualties to the Germans if they had been conducted correctly, i.e. weighted towards Amiens and Hazebrouck.
With the BEF annihlated and the Americans driven out of the continent by the capture of the Channel ports, the French would also have to cope with the loss of their biggest industrial areas.
I just don't see it.
The continued combat-effectiveness of the BEF at the time was totally dependent on the two railroad hubs/junctions at Amiens and Hazebrouck: Zabecki actually explicitly describes the BEF's logistical/supply situation in his book as being "on a thread", so vulnerable to attack it was.The BEF at the time of the POD was a peer opponent with superior logistics and supplies. Zabecki can write whatever he likes but the German Army was no more likely to achieve its goals in the spring offensive than it was at Ypres in 1915.
My source and BEF-Wankery as you put it is 'actual' HistoryThe continued combat-effectiveness of the BEF at the time was totally dependent on the two railroad hubs/junctions at Amiens and Hazebrouck: Zabecki actually explicitly describes the BEF's logistical/supply situation in his book as being "on a thread", so vulnerable to attack it was.
Zabecki's ATL offensive against Amiens would have taken 30 German divisions instead of 50, which would have freed up the full 40 divisions that were required in order to carry out Operation George against Hazebrouck. You can write whatever you like but BEF-wankery with virtually no sources to support your argument will get you nowhere.
So, I take it that the "case" that you are attempting so hard to make here isn't even supported by a single credible author or work?My source and BEF-Wankery as you put it is 'actual' History
It happened!
Therefore incredibly easy to support
The burden off proof needs to be on whomever is suggesting that A: the Germans were some how capable of achieving this victory that was clearly beyond them OTL and then B: As a result that the BEF would then just dissolve, the French would go full cheese eating surrender monkey mode and the Americans would make girly noises and not turn up all of a sudden.
The OP question is interesting in itself but without a reasonable POD explaining how the victory came about with out the OTL savaging of the German army - I cannot buy into it.
The case I am making is that the British were not defeated during the Spring Offensive, why would I need a 'credible author' to back me up when it that's what happened?So, I take it that the "case" that you are attempting so hard to make here isn't even supported by a single credible author or work?
Your ignorance of just how vital the main logistical railheads/centres of Amiens and Hazebrouck were to the continued survival of the BEF in the Flanders as well as descriptions of imaginary German massed tank attacks is telling of your continued lack of actual knowledge about the issue that is at hand. Once the logistical/supply "thread", as Zabecki succinctly puts it, was snapped at its two weak points, nothing would have been able to get through the French/Belgian railroad system from the mainland to the BEF in Flanders.The case I am making is that the British were not defeated during the Spring Offensive, why would I need a 'credible author' to back me up when it that's what happened?
And I do not believe that the German army had it in them to do so as (from 1st Ypers to the beginning of the 100 days offensive) it was easier for the defending force to reinforce than it was for the attacker - this was repeated time after time including during the Spring offensive despite Stormtrooper tactics and massed tank attacks.
The exhausted German Army later that year despite its main logistic centres and main railheads being overrun during the 100 days offensive and its Infantry Regiments gutted and the nation at the end of its endurance, with zero chance of victory and defeat almost a certainty, did not suddenly go 'poof' and dissolve and was still fighting right up to 11 am on the 11th November 1918.
Yet the BEF (a fairly resilient article by all accounts) does - that is is what I find annoying about this premise.
Um no mate - The British quite famously made massed tank attacks! Not the Germans - they only built about 20 very rubbish ones by wars end.Your ignorance of just how vital the main logistical railheads/centres of Amiens and Hazebrouck were to the continued survival of the BEF in the Flanders as well as descriptions of imaginary German massed tank attacks is telling of your continued lack of actual knowledge about the issue that is at hand. Once the logistical/supply "thread", as Zabecki succinctly puts it, was snapped at its two weak points, nothing would have been able to get through the French/Belgian railroad system from the mainland to the BEF in Flanders.
Seriously, go back and read the book itself. And then come back and continue arguing that the BEF could have survived the capture of Amiens and Hazebrouck relatively combat-effective/battle-worthy, which is what you seem to be trying to get at here rather unsuccessfully.
Um no mate - I'm actually amazed at how clueless and uninformed your opinions are here.Um no mate - The British quite famously made massed tank attacks! Not the Germans - they only built about 20 very rubbish ones by wars end.
The point is that even with these Tactical advantages (Improved artillery, Massed "BRITISH" Tank attacks, "GERMAN" Stormtrooper tactics etc etc) other than localised tactical victory's - none of them in spite of providing local tactical victory's overcame the defenders advantage in being able to reinforce the point of attack faster than the attacker could across no mans land with the issue of providing supplies away from railheads etc and allowed for the type of breakthrough required for the victory suggested by the OP.
The Entente could read a map as well as the Germans and understood the threat the German attacks presented and while the Germans 'may' have enjoyed an advantage in the quality of their Staff officers in 1914 that was no longer true in 1918.
What I am suggesting is that the Germans without a very tall "If tree of a POD or PODs" did not have it in them to capture Amiens and Hazebrouck in 1918 and that the BEF in the Spring of 1918 was no less robust than the Germans proved to be when they did actually lose their railheads in Belgium during the 100 days offensive.
The German Spring Offensives of 1918 by Alexander Watson.Ludendorff selected as his battlefield an eighty-kilometer front from La Fère to Arras defended by the British army, regarded as less skilled than its French ally. He refused to set final territorial objectives. This was a gross error, for the British army was highly vulnerable at the rail hubs of Amiens and Hazebrouck and capturing these logistical choke points could have pushed it from the continent. Instead, Ludendorff chose his attack front with two other aims in mind. First, he hoped to punch through at the boundary between the British and French armies here and then turn north to eliminate the British line. Second, tactical and psychological calculations were paramount. The defenders were weak here, raising the likelihood of a breakthrough. Once dislodged, the enemy’s unwieldy command system and troops schooled only in trench combat were expected to collapse quickly under the pressure of mobile war. There were serious command errors. Ludendorff squandered his best chance at victory by missing British logistical vulnerabilities, and he lost a grip on the operations, repeatedly reinforcing mere tactical successes.
LikewiseUm no mate - I'm actually amazed at how clueless and uninformed your opinions are here.
LikewiseLikewise
Anyway can your internet do this?