French Military Sanity Options

I assume this was partially due to limited aircraft availability and a desire to not instantly lose the "few" aircrafts they had. Wouldn't be as much of an issue ITTL.
If I remember correctly, there were many reasons for the low sorties rates :
Transforfation on new types of aircrafts, meaning that a number of groups were unserviceable ;
Lack of spare parts (the industry was just catching up in april) ;
Lack of trained pilots in the later parts of the campaign (training was not producing enough remplacements) ;

Yes, I remember listening to that vid. One of the main points was that there were fears that De Gaulle's armored corps would become a sort of Praetorian Guard which would coup the French government at will.
Léon Blum was particulary virulent about that.
 
Goes off the gold standard earlier and starts liquidating stocks to finance rearmament in 1934 and do it with greater vigor, with more spending on the air force.

Heck, even a less aggressively contractionary policy would have let France fund its military much more while also running a (smaller) surplus. (France increased its share of world gold reserves from 7 percent to 27 per-cent between 1927 and 1932, and failed to monetize most of this accumulation. So they were sitting on huge gold reserves and the money supply was still too tight.)

Things that could change this might be an earlier rise of the reformist right (people were articulating the ideas that would go on to become Gaulism after the war, as well as dabbling in Christian democratic ideas, but it didn't gel in time - perhaps largely due to the hostility of the Pope in Rome), a stronger SFIO, retaining the income tax after WW1, the Franc remaining an international reserve currency (the British and Americans - probably due to France just coming out of a bout of severe inflation - had decided that only dollars and sterling were reserve currency worthy, which started the downward spiral to the French central bank selling all its sterling and dollars to buy gold during the Great Depression - had Britain and the US also held Franc reserves in the early 30s, then things likely unfolded much more differently, but note that this doesn't only change things in France, it also leads to a notably shorter and less severe Great Depression), the Radicals (a more ironic name could not be found - the Radical Party were the most conservative political grouping in French politics after WW1) holding less power during the depression would also help (due to the somewhat loose nature of French politics in this period, even when they didn't lead the government, there usually was someone from the Radical Party in an influential position in government). As would a different ideological outlook on the depression (in France the consensus was that the whole thing was a welcome purge of excess liquidity).

So I guess that boils down to either better Anglo-French coordination or political shifts inside France sidelining the Radicals in favour of either the moderate right, the moderate left, or both.

It's simplistic as France still had huge debts in $ at the time. Paying them off took an important part of the budget. And getting off the gold standard means it's getting worse as the Franc will plumet.
France literally can't get off the gold standard before the US and the UK. They will need to renegate their WW1 dents first.

That's kinda backwards. What France was doing to stay on the gold standard was far worse than coming off it would be. And while their debts were a burden, their own bad policy was far more of a burden.

We have had quite a few threads dealing with what various nations should/could have done to increase their Military potential in WW2, yet it seems that French are a somewhat forgotten, and really could do with a helping hand. So, what could be done to better prepare French Military, to ensure that France does not fall in 1940, and that it drives on to Berlin, once it withstands the initial German attack?

I will start. One area in which French certainly could do with some improvement is communications, they relied on fixed telephone lines and dispatch riders to a too great degree, and had rather limited amount of radios present.

So, thoughts?

Honestly, I think what France needed most for military sanity options was a small war to show up the deficient officers and shake the rust off the military as an organization. Say if they intervened in the Spanish Civil War or if they sent a force into the Rhineland to contest the German re-militarization (it would have been a political disaster, but it would also have tested French mobilization plans in the fire) or perhaps a clash between France and Italy over Tunisia that falls short of full-scale war but is worse than "just" being a series of border clashes - like the border clashes between Japan and the Soviets in the late 30s.

The other way to go is for better inter-war French politics to provide the resources to their army to allow them to make a few mistakes against the Germans to skill up without losing everything.

By building the Maginot Line the French let the whole world know that they expected Germany to re-militarize the Rhineland and wouldn’t prevent it and let the Belgians know that they would use them as a meatshield. The results were completely predictable: Germany re-militarized the Rhineland and Belgium tried futilely tried to stay neutral and not co-operate with the French.

Well, the Belgians were supposed to build their own military fortifications to continue on from the Maginot Line. But Belgium (like everyone else) knew that any defense depended on Britain as well as France - and in every crisis between 1919 and 1939, Britain had reliably leaned pro-German. The one time the French tried to stick to their guns without British support was the occupation of the Rhineland (where they were supported by Italy and Belgium) and that was not considered a success by any of the participants. So in the face of the apparent non-existence of an alliance actually able to halt Germany at the Belgian fortification line, Belgium decided to stop building fortifications and try to be neutral in the hopes that Germany would actually respect such proclamations this time. Honestly, at the time Belgium made this call, it looked more sensible than building fortifications that in the absence of British support could only extend the pain of a future war with Germany.

Then France, rather than making the ruthless call and actually treating the Belgians like meatshields when the Belgians pulled out of any efforts of coordinating defense, built some weak fortifications on the Franco-Belgian border and then hoped the problem would go away...

fasquardon
 

formion

Banned
Closer ties with Belgium should have been pursued with far greater vigor. After the fall of Imperial Russia, France's strategic situation vis-a-vis Germany worsened. I doubt many would think that the newly formed "Little Entente" could be the strategic equivalent of Russia. So, closer ties with Belgium should have been a priority. There are several minor PODs:

- Industrial cooperation. French policy makers should have tried to cultivate more ties with the belgian steel lobby. The Walloon industrialists were the ones that urged for a pro-french policy. The one area that clashed with the french steelmakers was the control of luxemburgish iron and steel. I believe that "gifting" Luxemburg's steel industry to Belgium would help France's overarching goal of closer belgian industrial cooperation. Moreover, something needed to be done with the Flemish logistics industry (read Antwerp). These industrialists traditionally were focused on servicing the german market and the Ruhr especially. It was the most influential pro-german business lobby in Belgium. Perhaps french investments in Antwerp and new shared enterprises could have lessened that group's hostility to France.

But why am I mentioning all these? It was important in the early years after WW1 to form a "Coal and Steel Community " with Belgium and tie the two economies together. However, such avenue would be open only if Belgian industrialists saw themselves as equal partners and were not afraid that they will become clients of the french industry. If such economic cooperation succeeded, then by default closer political ties could have been formed. It is important to remember that in interwar Belgium the most powerful lobbies were the ones of coal & steel and logistics (Antwerp).

- Britain was a major problem during interwar. When Whitehall returned to play the old balance of power game, the French position deteriorated. What could lead to a more friendly Britain? Colonial concessions? Just give the Mosul vilayet to Britain without a hitch? I am not sure. The british stance also influenced Belgium. To quote "Belgium's Dilemma: The Formation of the Belgian Defense Policy, 1932-1940":
J. Wullus-Rudiger warns that one can only properly understand Belgian policy if one keeps in mind the friction between the British and French. Britain and France were no longer joined at the hip and this would complicate Belgian diplomacy because Belgium sought equal treaties with each. A further complication was that Britain had unsuccessfully counseled Belgium not to reject its neutrality.

A January 1934 note by Fernand Van Langenhove declared that" the safeguard of our independence commands us to avoid being drawn into a conflict with Germany where we do not dispose at the same time of the support of England and of France: there is one of the guiding lines of our policy

- Taking into account that Imperial Russia was no more and that Britain had already starting clashing with France diplomatically, then Belgium should have been courted not only in the economic sphere as I mentioned above but also in the diplomatic one. A major concern of both Socialists and Flemish was that Belgium would be drawn in a war with Germany for french interests. Thus, the language of every treaty and accord should have been formed in a way that it would be superficially seem one-way with France drawn by Belgium in conflict to protect it and not the other way. In any case, the french policy was defensive in its nature and an attack on France would be partially at least through Belgium, The French would have conceded only a formality since they didn't plan an offensive war.

The cornerstone of French policy should have been that the next battle will be fought on the Meyse and that from Day 1 the French should be cleared to advance in Belgium. Almost any concession will be worth it to make Belgium a full-pledged ally.

- I agree with @wiking that France should have left the gold standard earlier. After June 1933, it was obvious that the gold bloc of France, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy and Poland was not sustainable without central bank cooperation with the world's major economies. Since the "gold bloc" did not wish to form a trade bloc, it was pretty idiotic to continue on the gold standard while french exports were constantly declining. France spent much of its financial vigor in trying to balance trade and payments while defending the overvaluerd franc. At the same time, deflation became a serious sociopolitical issue with growing discontent.

Let's say France leaves the gold standard in 1933. Even controlled devaluation would lead to problems as it did in 1936-1938. Nevertheless, it would mean that the french financial system would have recovered by late 1935 instead of 1938. If the remilitarization of Rhineland is not averted with this POD, then at least the government would be more free to spend on defence from 1936 onwards. By 1938 and the Sudeten Crisis we may see a significantly stronger France, while the german re-armament is at its infacy.

As a last comment, I have to say that I admire Paul Reynaud. As Minister of Finance did sterling job and helped the french economy to recover. As Prime Minister he demonstrated tenacity and sound judgement. I remember reading in "To lose a Battle" how he grasped tactical realities in some cases better than Gamelin, even though a civilian. Of course in the end he broke, after his country was soundly beaten so quickly, with Germans marching in Paris. Who can sincerely blame him? The comparison with Churchill is moot, as Winston never had the Germans in Milton Keynes while he and his government was in Liverpool.
 
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One of the biggest problem in France during the 30's was government instability, with governments lasting less than 9 months on average. It came mostly from :
  1. The fact that basically every law or vote rejected by the National Assembly or the Senate was considered as a "vote of no confidence" and thus leading to the fall of the government. A government could literally fall on every subjects, no matter how menial it was.
  2. The National Assembly (direct election) and the Senate (indirect election, the senators were elected by communal and departmental representatives) have the same powers and neither have any preponderance. So a law can be blocked for decades by the other chamber (like women suffrage).
  3. Their was a multitude of parties engaged in ever changing alliances. This was reinforced by the electoral law which favored small parties.
  4. The fact that one group of parties, the Radicals, was at the center of every coalitions. So if you were in alliance with them in a government and someone proposed a better deal for them, you have a new government without you.
  5. On top of that, the "Président du Conseil" which was supposed to led the Council of Ministers didn't have any staff linked to his function. So he needed to have an other minister function in the government. This lead to a lack of authority and to a less than ideal capacity to arbitrate any disagreement inside the government.
In OTL, most of those problems in the Third Republic came back in the Fourth and were only resolved with the Fifth. But, if you can tackle those in the 20's or early 30's, the French government will become far more efficient

Then France, rather than making the ruthless call and actually treating the Belgians like meatshields when the Belgians pulled out of any efforts of coordinating defense, built some weak fortifications on the Franco-Belgian border and then hoped the problem would go away...
I don't get it

Considering the actions of the French generals in 1940 can we say he was wrong?
He was wrong, and latter admitted he was.
French generals didn't made a coup in 1940, the French political spectrum abdicated it's power to a Marshall of France.
 
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formion

Banned
In OTL, most of those problems in the Third Republic came back in the Fourth and were only resolved with the Fifth. But, if you can tackle those in the 20's or early 30's, the French government will become far more efficient

Do you have in mind any particular POD for it? Were they any reform efforts to tackle the instability?
 
Do you have in mind any particular POD for it? Were they any reform efforts to tackle the instability?
I'm far from an expert of the period, but I don't know of any articulate reform plan. Many politicians were aware of the instability problem, but they were the product of this political system.

As for a POD, I think the Clemenceau government (post WW1) is the only one with the prestige and stability to tackle the problem as it was the war winning coalition government (Union Sacrée). OTL, they changed the electoral system for the 1919 elections (the previous one returned with some modifications in 1927). Clemenceau might get away with it as the reforms won't apply to him as he wanted to become "Président de la République" (and he was old).
But, even here, it's a stretch as Clemenceau wasn't elected at the "Présidence de la République" by the Assembly in 1920. And every reform promoted by the government was basically opposed by one chamber or the other
 
Taking into account that Imperial Russia was no more and that Britain had already starting clashing with France diplomatically, then Belgium should have been courted not only in the economic sphere as I mentioned above but also in the diplomatic one.

I am curious how you think France could have wooed Belgium better diplomatically?

About all I can think of is France somehow outlasting Germany so that the Rhineland occupation is seen as a narrow French/Belgian/Italian win. Elsewise, it seems to me that France is just unable to offer Belgium enough (since Belgium wants British commitment and the French can't really control the British).

Do you have in mind any particular POD for it? Were they any reform efforts to tackle the instability?

I know you aren't asking me here, but since I have some thoughts as to potential PoDs, I'll butt in anyways.

There were people with ideas on the right lines, and most of them are the sort of people who might end up joining a French Christian Democratic party, so I have always been rather drawn to that as a PoD. The best PoD I've found for that is pre-WW1 though, and since I don't have a great deal of interest in slogging through an alternate WW1 to write a timeline about an interwar France with a Christian Democratic party, it's one of those ideas I've shelved until I can find a post WW1 PoD.

As far as specific policies that could have stabilized French politics... Well, France didn't actually have unstable politics - yes, governments were very short-lived, but if you look at who the "big beasts" in the different governments were, you keep seeing the same fellows doing the same jobs across several governments before moving to another post of high office or taking a break for a couple years before returning to high office. Indeed, in some ways the system was too cozy and stable. However, what is true is that fear of instability was a real problem. Blum kept out of the Spanish Civil War due to fears that intervening would start a French Civil War. The press was constantly filled with extremist doom-mongering about the political groups the paper in question opposed (one of the reasons why some factions in France almost welcomed German occupation is because at least the Germans weren't the baby-eating mass murderers of the "left"). The military was intentionally undermined as an effective fighting force in certain respects due to the fear that this or that part of it had sympathies to this or that political party.

Also, part of the reason for apparent instability is that national politics was not as professional as it was in Anglo-Saxon countries. A member of the parliament of the 3rd Republic would usually have another job that consumed the majority of their time, such as being town mayor of somewhere or a businessman or (as during WW1) a soldier. Parties were much less formal than they were in the US or UK, making pro-active politics very hard. Lastly, the majority of politicians were lawyers, meaning they had little in the way of experience of other fields besides politics and law and thus were full of terrible ideas about things like industrial policy and finance. So the chamber of deputies and French senate did not have as much ability to exert control as the political systems English speakers are more familiar with.

That said, there are things that could push France down a better path, though these things are major changes to the status quo and thus it's hard to see them as being PoDs themselves.

First, is France retaining the income tax after WW1. In OTL this led to serious financial problems that led to a traumatic surge of inflation in the early 20s, that surge of inflation would then lead to the brutally tight policies during the Great Depression. At the very least, an income tax would lead to more reconstruction after WW1, more government economic activity and a more evenly-spread tax burden. At the most, it might reduce the level of the early 20s inflation surge and lead to a lesser reaction during the Great Depression.

Second, women getting the vote earlier. Women at this point in French history tilted towards being more socially conservative, more Catholic, but economically interventionist and uninterested in anti-republican reactionary politics. That is, women getting the vote in France in the interwar period would have meant a strong shift to the right and would most likely have meant a few center-right parties getting relatively high portions of the vote - and thus the political strength to push change and reform. Fear of exactly that is why French women didn't get the vote until 1944.

As for a POD, I think the Clemenceau government (post WW1) is the only one with the prestige and stability to tackle the problem as it was the war winning coalition government (Union Sacrée). OTL, they changed the electoral system for the 1919 elections (the previous one returned with some modifications in 1927). Clemenceau might get away with it as the reforms won't apply to him as he wanted to become "Président de la République" (and he was old).

I can't see it. Not only was Clemenceau the man most associated with an unpopular Versailles peace treaty, he had also imprisoned many political figures who shared his own political leanings in the last years of WW1. This had been done for fear that dissent at home might snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, but those Clemenceau imprisoned would not forgive him. He'd burnt his bridges and had no real prestige or political capital left. Maybe it would have been different if he'd been able to trick his rival Poincaré into being the top French representative in the peace conferences, but Clemenceau was from the most conservative part of the French political spectrum at this time. He might have claimed to be a radical, but it's not like radical republican positions on Boulanger and the Dreyfus Affair were relevant in 1919, while his party opposing the income tax and votes for women certainly was.

I don't get it

In OTL, France did not properly fortify their side of the Belgian border (which would have really ended the chances of the Franco-Belgian alliance being rekindled) and when WW2 started for them, they drove an important part of their forces deep into Belgium to try and protect the country despite lacking the coordination or military infrastructure to make defending eastern Belgium practical.

Actually accepting that France could not defend Belgium if Belgium wasn't an ally would have been far better than OTL.

fasquardon
 

formion

Banned
I am curious how you think France could have wooed Belgium better diplomatically?

To be frank, I am not sure. Most of my knowledge on interwar France is regarding the gold standard and a bit of industrial policy. I don't know enough to propose a reasonable POD there.

Thank you @fasquardon for the very detailed and interesting answer. Quite informative!
 
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