If the Italians get everything they were promised in the Treaty of London (which they probably should if they occupy the territory and with the different circumstances of the peace conference) will it still even be a "mutilated victory"?
For Want of a Word – Stolypin endures
- Thread starter Stenkarazin
- Start date
You're right. I was at work and didn't bother to check Wrangel's career during WW1, I was clearly bent on pouring everyone of Civil's war notoriety on board. Forgot poor Kaledin.... and also forgot about this splendid horseman of Carl Emil. I will edit the installment to put Kaledin in stead of Wrangel (who will have to wait for his place in the sun). Will need to find something for Mannerheim at some point.
As for the Cossacks with pikes: yeah, I got carried away by the 1812 parallels ;-)
Well it's called the 'myth of the mutilated victory' because honestly it's a myth; on the pratical part, Italy received the most important part of what promised, a good defensive line in Istria and with Saseno she can close the Adriatic to merchant ships...buuuut (yes there is always a but) the big problem from the italian pow was that Wilson (with the tacit consent of the other two big) basically treated Italy as a minor nation that need to be told what was good for her and was humiliated to pubblic stage, making the liberal goverment look very weak (a fact that both Benny and the comunist milked as much as possible).
Plus there is Jugoslavia, the nation once created looked from Italy as a new version of the A-H and the next adversary/competition in the balkan, plus she desired not only all what was promised to Italy in the 1915 Treaty but also territory that was italian from the third independence war, the general mood of the day was that the other great power had supported the creation of Jugoslavia to stop italian ambition in the balkans (and there is more than a sailt of grain in such truth)...only later that nation was considered too weak and divided to really menace the country
Yes, thanks to no Caporetto and the success of the 12th Isonzo, Italy is in a much better position once the dust settles... But Wilson won't be the only spanner in the works for Italy: Sazonov (or his replacement) will support maximal gains for Serbia (while denying Serbia the annexation of Montenegro). Yes, Russia was part to the Treaty of London, but I don't think they are going to feel really bound to it.
re: fascism. The excerpt of Vernadsky didn't imply that Muss is going to become dictator on schedule, but it hints at the fact that "fascism", in one way or another (ie., an ideology borne of the suffering of the WW1 combined with the failings of the old liberal order), will play a role in Italian history. Actually I have in mind everyone's favourite Fascist to replace Mussolini and become PM under a more conservative version of fascism.
Well, the OTL mindset was strongly influenced by the German military and their high reputation won against Austria and France. And for the military planners paranoia is a natural state of mind. OK, they prevailed and Germany is defeated and seriously damaged economically. Prestige of the military is not the same as it was before the war and not the same as in OTL when they could argue that success on the Eastern Front made surrender unnecessary: they are beaten on all fronts and Ludendorff tells Kaiser that it is time to make a peace. No betrayal at home, no anti-war feelings among the troops, nobody to blame.
The future relations are going to be defined by a variety of factors and relative importance of these factors is going to depend on a broad geopolitical situation.
What we have is Germany being defeated and losing parts of its territory to France and newly-created Polish state. But not to Russia.
France wants Germany forever crippled with a demilitarized border zone and tiny army. France also is going to try to squeeze German financially both to cripple it and to address the domestic issues.
Newly created Poland is saddled with a noticeable German population (size depends on what exactly it gets) and, depending upon who is in charge may want more based upon the “historic reasons” even if not all the way to post-wwii scale. It most probably is going to look for the Russian parts of the Polish lands but this is not too realistic. France is going to support both Poland and Czechoslovakia (also has a noticeable German minority).
Russian position is anybody’s guess because there are at least two seriously different scenarios:
1. Russia keeps supporting France with paranoia being a prevailing factor (as per your scenario). In that case Germany keeps being squeezed on both sides, not allowed to rebuilt its industry and army and pushed into a continued decline with a high probability of a revolutionary explosion (communist or nationalist, does not really matter). What is reaction of the squeezing powers and how far are they ready to go to maintain control over the situation. In OTL when push came to shove France (and Britain) did nothing. So in this scenario Russia is expected to start playing “gendarme of Europe” and being blamed by the (former) allies? IMO, whatever the TL Russian government is going to be it should be really stupid to play this scenario.
2. Russia starts looking for its own interests being (finally) taught by the previous experience (even just the Russian gold being frozen by France should teach something). Paranoia is just fine but the almost inevitable problems with the Poles, domestically and abroad, are a good way to channel it. The priority issues are foreign debt (and possibility to restructure it), economy, land reform (with the huge losses in war the pressure is temporarily lessened), modernization of the army, probably a political reform as well. At least for a while preparation to the next war is on a back burner. At least some politicians and ‘important people’ are going to argue that the good economic relations with Germany are going to remove cause for the next confrontation because even the last one was caused by the conflicting interests of the “3rd parties” (AH and Serbia) and excessively close relations with France. And if, as most probably is going to be the case, on the issue of debt France keeps putting “interests of the French citizens first” and refuses to write off at least part of the debt, there is going to be a serious review of the feelings toward France. Not breaking of the relations but developing a more balanced approach.
Don’t take my comment too seriously: whatever the probability (and it is not zero because he was going up fast), Wrangel would be a much better candidate for the mission you described because Kaledin seems to be much less creative and inspiring commander under whom people like Shkuro and Mamontov could be used to their full potential. Kaledin may keep his service under Brusilov. After all, you have Russian military decision makers much more intelligent than they were in OTL.
Mannerheim was at that time in retirement but surely a person of his abilities can be used for something meaningful. Especially if you are planning something on the Far East.
And, speaking of the weapons, you “missed” an opportunity to introduce “super-weapon” of the RCW, a machine-gun cart. Of course, it was most widely spread on the Ukraine and its mass usage is credited to certain anarchist leader but there were few machine gun carts during WWI. Of course, they are important only in a massive deployment and you already finished the war so the change is gone.... 😂
Regarding the Treaty of London, well...it's complicated, even the British and the French were not too keen of Italy gaining so much, still defy openly the treaty was considered a big no no due to the can of worm that will open diplomatically speaking...for this reason they give tacit support to Wilson in doing that, as he was not bound by that and frankly he don't give a damn about it (not considering that the Serbian maximal proposal was to give Italy just the border city of Monfalcone and some land around* and if the Russian support this they will be considered some 'not very wise' negotiator)
Russia position will be even more troubled, as from one hand they support Serbia against Italy, still they have their gain to consider and Wilson will surely not give them a free hand or have any interest in the previous treaty signed; so not supporting the London Treaty give at Wilson a big opening for going against Russia in Middle East and other place. Basically the Paris conference has become even more chaotic, plus Russia well it's not internally in a position of strenght and this will have repurcussion at the negotiation table.
ITTL there is also the fact that with Russia still existing even with all her problems, the United Kingdom will be even more justified (in his own eyes) to play 'balance of power' and while from one side there is not trying to screw too much Germany, on another side there is the need of a continental ally and Italy can be considered one due to the general clash of interest with France and indirectly with Russia due to Serbia, so this time Rome can be less isolated than OTL
*Yes, the first Serbian/Jugoslavian proposal was really that; naturally Italy was not ok with that and the Anglo-French negotiators done the first of many facepalm
D'Annunzio can be just a figurehead, he is totally uncapable and uninterested in the political day to day work and general administration; during the occupation of Fiume he let all the work to the council while he stayed in his villa with a lot of booze, drugs and women. Any regime with him in charge will not last a year, plus he was seen as too revolutionary by the king and the rest of the enstablishment, while Benny (that was first a politician) was considered more mainstream and manageable
Probably, it will be just in characterNext you'll tell me he was also a Juventus support.
I suspect that you are making Wilson into an excessively powerful figure. Of course, he could pontificate and read his Articles but they were extremely vague and, when push comes to shove, he did not have any boots on the relevant patches of ground and it was quite clear that the US is not going into a new war to support his “principles”. In OTL France and Britain partitioned the Middle East under the guise of “protectorates” and the resulting borders were not based upon any “national principle”, just on the oil deposits.
Of course, the small potatoes like Serbia could be easily put to order if their demands were considered excessive but Serbia ended up as Yugoslavia and the “national principle” was highly questionable.
But what would he going to do if one of the major players says “no”? Lecture everybody regarding the moral values? What would be Wilson’s “big opening” about Russia and the Middle East if, AFAIK, Russia did not have clearly expressed interests in the region outside the Ottoman territories it occupied which, would be mostly Armenia (if it fits the definition of “Middle East”, which I doubt), the issue of the Straits agreed upon with the Allies (“you were not present? It is just too bad. Perhaps if the US joined war earlier your opinion would be of some value...”) and spheres of interest in Persia had been agreed upon with Britain few years before the war. Russian domestic situation hardly would be an argument or lever unless somebody can offer a really BIG carrot and Wilson can not: the trade relations would or would not strengthen based upon interests of the private businesses. Britain and France potentially have a leverage but they are most probably not going to use it because restructuring or cancelling Russian debt would potentially hit them (actually, in OTL they ended up cancelling it and no catastrophe happened but I doubt that the imperial government would be as adamant on not paying as the Bolsheviks). Not that Britain is free from the “domestic” problems in Ireland and India.
Plus, domestic troubles or not, in this scenario Russia still possesses the biggest army and this is an army which broke the German’s back. And it holds few serious aces. By the obvious geographic reasons creation of the Polish state can’t be accomplished without its agreement (post-war empire may look favorable at this idea but, with the pros and contras balanced, it also may object and it is a very long way from Tipperary or Paris to Posen 😂). The same goes about the general attitude toward Germany: France wants a piece of it and needs serious support, potentially, with a willingness to provide a military help in a future). In OTL Russian empire was gone, the Bolshevik state had to deal with RCW and other types of entertainment so Poland and Czechoslovakia could be considered as the potential allies. Here the Empire is alive and kicking, Poland is planned as a long narrow stretch of a territory and the Czech Legions are just returning from the war which they fought on the Russian (not French or British). Most probably the new state ends up being in the Russian orbit. In which position France is going to find itself if Russia is going to improve relations with Germany?
Of course Italian-Serbian dispute is a very interesting issue but I doubt that in this TL support of the Serbian interests would be Russian top priority, especially taking into an account that Serbia grew into Yugoslavia.
I think it also depends whether Poland will be an autonomous region with the Tsar as the head of state and its army controlled by STAVKA or an indepedent country. In general the degree of autonomy and the russian influence in the new entity. Congress Poland was way to rich and developed for Russia to completely wave control without losing a war.
In any case, whatever the degree of polish autonomy, Poland needs Danzig or else they depend economically on the whims of Berlin. That is a dangerous situation, giving influence over your "vassal" to a Great Power. Or else you have to provide vast sums to develop Gdynia from scratch and even so have Danzig as the better port (it sits on Vistula) to take most of the market share from the expensive Gdynia.
That was what I had been trying to say, although coming from a different point of view. Russia's own interests depend on not being invaded by a Great Power. The only Power capable of doing so is Germany. A Germany on par with France - and not capable of waging a two front war, is the best Russia can aspire to. If Germany's ability to wage a two front war (not its leadership in previously mentioned sectors) is reduced or nullified, then Russia doesn't need France. Basically Russia doesn't need any strategic partner when it comes to national security. The more powerful in military terms Germany gets, the greater is the russian dependence on France. That means coal and steel- not the aspirine patents, or the prosperity of IG Farben.
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Wilson will be less influential than OTL due to the shorter war and the fact that the AEF had not partecipated at the war...still as OTL the USA had an enormous economic influence due to the war debt and the general economic situation of the continent (as they need american money to rebuild) and for this reason the rest of the entente had put up with someone like him.
Basically everyone need him or better need american money and everybody is already greatly indebted with them, even if indirectly through the UK...so like it or not, they need to take him seriously and not dismiss him, expecially nation that are just nominally in the big boys club like Italy or Russia and while in OTL he was outmanovered in many case, it had forced France and UK to work hard to do it.
Yep, Russia can have the biggest army on the block but honestly it's not only almost irrilevant but also a burden that weaken her position...such army is very expensive to mantain and more time the men are kept enlisted, more time they are kept out of the economy increasing the general dissaffection with the goverment and frankly people want just go home as they are tired of all this war.
Yep the internal situation will seriously affect the diplomatic situation at the conference and the general negotiation capacity and objective of the various delegation and sure the Empire is alive but hardly in any good condition, hell from an external pow is barely holding between the loss and destruction due to the war, the political unrest and the weak position of the Tsar and the general enstablishment after the conflict is finished and there is a lot less need to rally around the flag, plus all the nationalist unrest (Polish in primis).
Regarding Russia not paying his debt and no catastrophe happening, sure but it's like say that after all the situation is all ok because instead of dieing you have just lost your legs...yes it's bearable but it's not funny and bring a lot of pain.
Sure the British had their share of internal problem, still are in a much much better situation of everyone else and even the situation in Ireland is a lot easier than OTL as due to timing and general situation the conscription crisis of 1918 can be seriously butterflied away
Yes. We shouldn't make too much of Russia's strategic position regarding Central Europe (or the Middle East...) during the Paris Conference. Sure, it will be strong in the first months, but eventually the government will have to gradually de-mobilize and bring back the soldiers home, like Britain and France IOTL and ITTL.
Poland - Underground and above ground
Poland - Underground and above ground
The Central Powers’ Act of 5th November 1916 had had compelled the Allies to offer their own declarations in favour of Poland. In December 1916, the Italian Parliament had supported the independence of Poland. At the same time, US President Woodrow Wilson also publicly expressed his support of a free Polish state. In Russia, it had emboldened Foreign Minister Sazonov to plead for an autonomous Poland. His lobbying had led to an encouraging declaration of the Tsar, but the Poles were (understandably) wary of Russia’s promises. Some of them, especially those who had collaborated with the German-sponsored Provisional Council, hoped that if they proclaimed their independence before the end of the war, they could perhaps gain the recognition of some of the Western Allies (particularly president Wilson, but perhaps also France).
In late May 1918, Polish nationalists led by Ignacy Daszyński proclaimed an independent Polish State in Lublin, with the passive acquiescence of the German authorities.
It was short-lived. On the first of June, Pilsudski was back in Kongresowka, with only a fraction of the Polish Legions. Most of the Legionaries which had gone east had been sacrificed by the Germans in rear-guards actions and captured by the Russians. All in all, maybe 5.000 Legionaries (most of them still in training) were available to defend Poland against the upcoming Russian counter-offensive.
Pilsudski had always been a pragmatic man. He knew that he was discredited in the eyes of the Allies by his association with the Central Powers. It was time to let Pro-Entente leaders like Dmowski and Paderewski take the lead. But it didn’t mean his own work was over. After a lifetime of semi-clandestine revolutionary activity, he didn’t care much to die in a glorious but useless “baroud d’honneur” against the Russians. He quickly dismissed Daszyinski’s dreams, and ordered what was left of the Legions to disband and go underground. That’s what he had done his entire life: now once again it was time to retreat underground, carefully and patiently build a network of secret revolutionary cells, and wait for the next opportunity. The German-sponsored governing body was left in place as a sitting duck, for the Russians to disband it once they arrived in Warsaw.
During the next two weeks, before and after the Armistice, as despondent German troops retreated through Poland, Pilsudski and his men worked feverishly to lay the structures of the Polish underground organization: this was relatively easy, since it basically amounted to expand the existing Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW), the secret organization that Pilsudski had created in parallel to the Polish Legions. The main obstacle to this strategy came from Legionaries who didn’t accept to go without a fight, or else wanted to evacuate in fighting order to Galicia, something that Pilsudski thought completely unrealistic.
The situation was different in the parts of Poland which belonged to the Central Powers, where the local elites still believed they had a faint chance of escaping Russian domination.
A few days before the Austrian surrender, a “National Council” formed in Krakow proclaimed the independence of the “Galician Polish State” and addressed an appeal to the Western Allies (particularly France and the USA), while a group of former K. und K. officers worked frantically to build up something of a Galician army. The next day, however, another faction of the Galician National Council proclaimed its willingness to consider retaining ties with Vienna, “in a democratic federation”. It made no difference: when the Russian troops entered Lemberg and Krakow as per the terms of the Armistice, the National Council was disbanded and the ephemeral Galician army disarmed without so much of a gunshot, but many of this army’s cadres went underground and joined the POW.
In Galicia, the arrival of the Russian army was relatively peaceful, at least for a while, because Galicia was still technically part of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, and its fate was to be decided by international negotiations. In Congress Poland, on the other hand, the restoration of the Tsar’s authority was ruthless and heavy-handed. Poles who had participated in the German sponsored Provisional Council of State were rounded up by the Russians and presented to a military court. Amongst them were prominent Polish intellectuals, magnates and clerics. They were all swiftly convicted and deported to Siberia. Russian brutality was only strengthened by the terrorist attacks which took place here and there across Kongressowka: more often than not, it was a lone legionary firing against Russian soldiers on his own initiative, but it invariably led to disproportionate retribution: after four years of war, the Russians were in no mood to be forgiving to the treacherous lyakhy.
In August, another “National Council” was formed in Poznan. It was not so much a government, rather a provisional organization which aimed to unite the Polish parties in German Poland and support on the ground the efforts of Roman Dmowski and Jan Paderewski at the upcoming Peace Conference. This was the only Polish body borne of the war not immediately put down, because it existed in some kind of a grey area: it was within the German borders, and the Germans, who expected to lose Poznan anyway, didn’t dare to forcibly put it down: thus, for a few months, the Polish National Council would co-exist with the German authorities, carefully avoiding to antagonize them while trying to get a seat at the Paris Conference through Dmowski’s lobbying.
The Central Powers’ Act of 5th November 1916 had had compelled the Allies to offer their own declarations in favour of Poland. In December 1916, the Italian Parliament had supported the independence of Poland. At the same time, US President Woodrow Wilson also publicly expressed his support of a free Polish state. In Russia, it had emboldened Foreign Minister Sazonov to plead for an autonomous Poland. His lobbying had led to an encouraging declaration of the Tsar, but the Poles were (understandably) wary of Russia’s promises. Some of them, especially those who had collaborated with the German-sponsored Provisional Council, hoped that if they proclaimed their independence before the end of the war, they could perhaps gain the recognition of some of the Western Allies (particularly president Wilson, but perhaps also France).
In late May 1918, Polish nationalists led by Ignacy Daszyński proclaimed an independent Polish State in Lublin, with the passive acquiescence of the German authorities.
It was short-lived. On the first of June, Pilsudski was back in Kongresowka, with only a fraction of the Polish Legions. Most of the Legionaries which had gone east had been sacrificed by the Germans in rear-guards actions and captured by the Russians. All in all, maybe 5.000 Legionaries (most of them still in training) were available to defend Poland against the upcoming Russian counter-offensive.
Pilsudski had always been a pragmatic man. He knew that he was discredited in the eyes of the Allies by his association with the Central Powers. It was time to let Pro-Entente leaders like Dmowski and Paderewski take the lead. But it didn’t mean his own work was over. After a lifetime of semi-clandestine revolutionary activity, he didn’t care much to die in a glorious but useless “baroud d’honneur” against the Russians. He quickly dismissed Daszyinski’s dreams, and ordered what was left of the Legions to disband and go underground. That’s what he had done his entire life: now once again it was time to retreat underground, carefully and patiently build a network of secret revolutionary cells, and wait for the next opportunity. The German-sponsored governing body was left in place as a sitting duck, for the Russians to disband it once they arrived in Warsaw.
During the next two weeks, before and after the Armistice, as despondent German troops retreated through Poland, Pilsudski and his men worked feverishly to lay the structures of the Polish underground organization: this was relatively easy, since it basically amounted to expand the existing Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW), the secret organization that Pilsudski had created in parallel to the Polish Legions. The main obstacle to this strategy came from Legionaries who didn’t accept to go without a fight, or else wanted to evacuate in fighting order to Galicia, something that Pilsudski thought completely unrealistic.
The situation was different in the parts of Poland which belonged to the Central Powers, where the local elites still believed they had a faint chance of escaping Russian domination.
A few days before the Austrian surrender, a “National Council” formed in Krakow proclaimed the independence of the “Galician Polish State” and addressed an appeal to the Western Allies (particularly France and the USA), while a group of former K. und K. officers worked frantically to build up something of a Galician army. The next day, however, another faction of the Galician National Council proclaimed its willingness to consider retaining ties with Vienna, “in a democratic federation”. It made no difference: when the Russian troops entered Lemberg and Krakow as per the terms of the Armistice, the National Council was disbanded and the ephemeral Galician army disarmed without so much of a gunshot, but many of this army’s cadres went underground and joined the POW.
In Galicia, the arrival of the Russian army was relatively peaceful, at least for a while, because Galicia was still technically part of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, and its fate was to be decided by international negotiations. In Congress Poland, on the other hand, the restoration of the Tsar’s authority was ruthless and heavy-handed. Poles who had participated in the German sponsored Provisional Council of State were rounded up by the Russians and presented to a military court. Amongst them were prominent Polish intellectuals, magnates and clerics. They were all swiftly convicted and deported to Siberia. Russian brutality was only strengthened by the terrorist attacks which took place here and there across Kongressowka: more often than not, it was a lone legionary firing against Russian soldiers on his own initiative, but it invariably led to disproportionate retribution: after four years of war, the Russians were in no mood to be forgiving to the treacherous lyakhy.
In August, another “National Council” was formed in Poznan. It was not so much a government, rather a provisional organization which aimed to unite the Polish parties in German Poland and support on the ground the efforts of Roman Dmowski and Jan Paderewski at the upcoming Peace Conference. This was the only Polish body borne of the war not immediately put down, because it existed in some kind of a grey area: it was within the German borders, and the Germans, who expected to lose Poznan anyway, didn’t dare to forcibly put it down: thus, for a few months, the Polish National Council would co-exist with the German authorities, carefully avoiding to antagonize them while trying to get a seat at the Paris Conference through Dmowski’s lobbying.
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August 1918 - Thank you for your service, Peter Arkadyevich
August 1918 - Thank you for your service, Peter Arkadyevich
“You should let him [Stolypin] go, The victory is yours and yours alone and you should not let lesser men share in a glory that is not theirs. He should not be at the parade in Moscow, […]. Now that the war is over, you need someone close to your heart who will enact your desire of reconciliation with Willy’s son. Stürmer maybe ? You know is he is a good man.”
“The people love you and love you alone. You should never reconvene the Duma – and never recall all those nasty people who partook in treason during the war. You should appoint Stürmer, as he is faithful to you, and get rid of this useless Manifesto that they extorted of you in 1905. But of course I’m just your silly Wify, what do I know about politics? But what I know for sure is that you are the Emperor and you should rule absolute. Our friend told me so”.
Letters of Alix to Nicholas, June - August 1918.
The renewed influence of the Empress and the Court on Nicholas was evident in the cabinet reshuffle operated by the latter in August 1918 on the eve of the Paris Conference.
The first and foremost to be let go was Stolypin, who was thanked for his services and allowed a “much-deserved rest”. Piotr Arkadyevich retreated to his estate of Kovno, where, surrounded by his family, he would write his memoirs and live the quiet life of a gentleman farmer, while still following closely Petrograd politics through his close links with political allies like Krivoshein and Schcherbatov.
The second stint of Stolypin as Prime Minister had mirrored the first: called by the Court in a time of crisis, his energy and charisma had saved the Monarchy in February 1917 like in 1905-1907. And, like in 1912, once the Court had felt sufficiently secured, he had been swiftly let go.
It is telling that, in his last memorandum to the Tsar, Stolypin advocated a program of incremental, careful concessions : the Emperor being at the height of his popularity and the revolutionary parties utterly defeated, now, reckoned Stolypin, was the time to grant a general amnesty to all people involved in the February Emergency, to call new elections for the Duma, and to appoint moderate conservative bureaucrats who could act as a bridge between the government and the liberal parties, so that the necessary socio-economic reforms could be pursued in a pacified atmosphere.
This advice, as we know, was not heeded. Basking in the afterglow of the great victory of 1918, the Emperor felt secure enough to revert to the old ways. Following Stolypin, most of the wartime ministers were replaced by sycophants or ultra-reactionary courtiers: A.F. Trepov was appointed Prime Minister (appointing the Empress' darling, Boris Stürmer, would have been too much, even for the Tsar). N.A. Maklalov was put in charge of Internal Affairs. The architect of the war effort, War Minister Polivanov, was replaced by none other than N.N. Yanushkevich, who had been an incompetent and sycophantic Chief-of-Staff in 1914-1915, before following Grand-duke Nikolay Nikolayevich to the Caucasus.
The only ministers to keep their positions were Agriculture Minister A. Krivoshein, to whom the Emperor had a personal liking, and Foreign Minister S. Sazonov. Sazonov was hated by the Court for many things: his lobbying in favour of Poland during the war, his coziness with France and Britain, his extreme Panslavist views, etc., but it would have looked bad to dismiss him on the eve of the Peace Conference. It was reckoned that Sazonov’s good relationship with his Western counterparts would offset his irresponsible pro-Polish inclinations. Nevertheless, the Court took no chance: Sazonov was to be accompanied at the Conference by a new deputy, prince Kudashev, former chargé d'affaires to Vienna, whose mission was to make sure that Sazonov remained mindful of Petrograd’s instructions.
“You should let him [Stolypin] go, The victory is yours and yours alone and you should not let lesser men share in a glory that is not theirs. He should not be at the parade in Moscow, […]. Now that the war is over, you need someone close to your heart who will enact your desire of reconciliation with Willy’s son. Stürmer maybe ? You know is he is a good man.”
“The people love you and love you alone. You should never reconvene the Duma – and never recall all those nasty people who partook in treason during the war. You should appoint Stürmer, as he is faithful to you, and get rid of this useless Manifesto that they extorted of you in 1905. But of course I’m just your silly Wify, what do I know about politics? But what I know for sure is that you are the Emperor and you should rule absolute. Our friend told me so”.
Letters of Alix to Nicholas, June - August 1918.
The renewed influence of the Empress and the Court on Nicholas was evident in the cabinet reshuffle operated by the latter in August 1918 on the eve of the Paris Conference.
The first and foremost to be let go was Stolypin, who was thanked for his services and allowed a “much-deserved rest”. Piotr Arkadyevich retreated to his estate of Kovno, where, surrounded by his family, he would write his memoirs and live the quiet life of a gentleman farmer, while still following closely Petrograd politics through his close links with political allies like Krivoshein and Schcherbatov.
The second stint of Stolypin as Prime Minister had mirrored the first: called by the Court in a time of crisis, his energy and charisma had saved the Monarchy in February 1917 like in 1905-1907. And, like in 1912, once the Court had felt sufficiently secured, he had been swiftly let go.
It is telling that, in his last memorandum to the Tsar, Stolypin advocated a program of incremental, careful concessions : the Emperor being at the height of his popularity and the revolutionary parties utterly defeated, now, reckoned Stolypin, was the time to grant a general amnesty to all people involved in the February Emergency, to call new elections for the Duma, and to appoint moderate conservative bureaucrats who could act as a bridge between the government and the liberal parties, so that the necessary socio-economic reforms could be pursued in a pacified atmosphere.
This advice, as we know, was not heeded. Basking in the afterglow of the great victory of 1918, the Emperor felt secure enough to revert to the old ways. Following Stolypin, most of the wartime ministers were replaced by sycophants or ultra-reactionary courtiers: A.F. Trepov was appointed Prime Minister (appointing the Empress' darling, Boris Stürmer, would have been too much, even for the Tsar). N.A. Maklalov was put in charge of Internal Affairs. The architect of the war effort, War Minister Polivanov, was replaced by none other than N.N. Yanushkevich, who had been an incompetent and sycophantic Chief-of-Staff in 1914-1915, before following Grand-duke Nikolay Nikolayevich to the Caucasus.
The only ministers to keep their positions were Agriculture Minister A. Krivoshein, to whom the Emperor had a personal liking, and Foreign Minister S. Sazonov. Sazonov was hated by the Court for many things: his lobbying in favour of Poland during the war, his coziness with France and Britain, his extreme Panslavist views, etc., but it would have looked bad to dismiss him on the eve of the Peace Conference. It was reckoned that Sazonov’s good relationship with his Western counterparts would offset his irresponsible pro-Polish inclinations. Nevertheless, the Court took no chance: Sazonov was to be accompanied at the Conference by a new deputy, prince Kudashev, former chargé d'affaires to Vienna, whose mission was to make sure that Sazonov remained mindful of Petrograd’s instructions.
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Could you give the full name of Prince Kudyshev? I can't find information about him on the internet. By the way, I really like your ralistic description of situation in Poland , although I believe that you overestimate the strength of the court, they should at least be reasonable enough not to appoint commanders associated with defeats for higher military positions or don't have enough influence to do something like that.
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