Why would it?
After all, Brazil and Argentina never had their countries destroyed in WW2, yet they're all signifcantly poorer than Europe today, no?
This all is going somewhat OT, but I'll answer. I am not only talking about WWII damage, but also assuming that no WWII = no Soviet yoke for Eastern Europe. That might be a wrong assumption, of course, but then I guess it would be tough for Stalin to grab as many neighbouring nations as he did IOTL without sparking a general war at some point.
No WWII will mean a lot more capital to be invested in Europe - more to the point, British, French and German capital. The newly independent nations along the Baltic and in Eastern Central Europe received rival investment from the big industrial nations already in the 20s and 30s: there is no reason the trend would not continue through the next decades. The German investment would concentrate in what was historically seen the German stomping ground in the "near abroad" or Mitteleuropa. The Baltic sphere would be a close priority, due to various reasons, ranging from historical to anti-Soviet policy. The French and the British, naturally, would seek to contain the German influence and thus Eastern Europe would (continue to) benefit from the rivalry of the bigger players.
Czechoslovakia was already a local economic powerhouse by the late 30s, when as Finland, the Baltics, Poland, Hungary all are within comfortable distance, have low wages and a lot of potential to the discerning capitalist. The Balkans would see growth too, and was indeed a target of French-German-Italian trade wars already in the 30s.
The war and post-war Communist rule stopped an already promising growth for the nations ending up in the Soviet bloc - or at least slowed it down considerably. Naturally, Western investment also dried up. Compare the per capita GDP for Sweden and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1960: before the war, those two are nearly on par; 20 years later we can easily see which one has continued to enjoy the blessings of the international market economy. Finland and Estonia offer a similar comparison. In the post-war period, lost areas and war damages notwithstanding, Finland could build on the pre-war growth, whereas most of Eastern Europe could not: without the setbacks brought by the war, that growth would have continued through the 40s also in the rest of the region. There was a lot of catching up to do, and the local conditions would look advantageous to investors for some time.
Eh... I'm not sure that having a significantly poorer series of neighboring states really helps Sweden.
Less competition for foreign investment, less competition in the market, and an possiblity to have a running start in the post-war period when most of Europe was in ruins. In comparison with a no WWII scenario, Sweden was quite well placed to boom in the 50s.