Part 17.5
Extract from ch.12, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green
Operation MENAGERIE commenced on April 1st, some would say appropriately so. Many Allied decision-makers considered it a distraction. Nonetheless the sheer complexity and scale over-awed even the doubters for a time: it was the largest Franco-British amphibious operation of the war, in terms of men, ships and aircraft involved. Two large invasion convoys sailed, from Singapore and Kuching, carrying six divisions. The land-based air umbrella involved a thousand aircraft, mostly mounted from Malaya, while six aircraft carriers added over two hundred more. Japanese air power, by this point, no longer existed. ‘They did not even have enough fuel to fly kamikaze missions,’ noted Admiral Esteva.
In the short term the results exceeded expectations. The Allied fleet included six modern capital ships; as it became apparent that no naval threat existed, these added their firepower to that of the four older battleships supporting the landings. ‘It seemed as much a mystical celebration, a sublime enactment of the power of the Allies, as a military operation,’ wrote Admiral Godefroy. ‘The Japanese could only retreat or perish.’
...the Allies completed their encirclement of Saigon by the third week of April, but the city did not fall immediately. ‘The war in Europe had ended, but the Japs took no notice,’ wrote Montgomery. ‘The IJA had over 50,000 men holding the place, very short of everything including food, but had orders to fight to the last man, orders they obeyed literally.’
Montgomery would have preferred to mask the place and push north, but the French felt both a political and humane imperative to take the place quickly. ‘We feared that the entire civil population must perish in a prolonged siege,’ commented Admiral Esteva. The result was a month-long urban fight with extensive use of artillery. ‘Hard to see how waiting could have been any worse for the locals,’ said Mr. Bevin later, ‘a hellish business.’ Officially, Saigon fell on May 16th, but mopping up lasted for weeks. Out of the Japanese garrison, less than a thousand survived; the Allied troops, mostly British and Indian, suffered nearly ten thousand dead; no-one ever made an official count of civilian casualties.
By this time the Allies had already begun to exploit northwards, aided by subsidiary landings on the coast, one of which took Cam Ranh on May 8th. As they pressed on, Japanese resistance began to ebb, and for the first time in the war significant numbers of prisoners were being taken, initially mostly Koreans, but soon Japanese troops also. ‘We knew they were cracking up once that happened,’ commented General Montgomery…
The absence of IJN units from the South China Sea, and the fall of Okinawa, gave the admirals the opportunity they had been seeking. Both Paris and London wanted to strike directly at the Japanese home islands while they could, and in late May Godefroy took Force A north, refuelling at Manila on the way. Force A comprised Richelieu (flagship), Prince of Wales, Hood, Jean Bart, Indefatigable and Implacable. This was a small force by the standards of the mighty US Pacific Fleet, but big enough to make the desired statement. In late June this force raided targets in Kyushu, including the naval base at Kure, which USN aircraft had previously visited. Among other ships, the giant battleship Yamato lay there, immobile for lack of fuel, already badly hurt by USN bombs and torpedoes. ‘It was little more than target practice,’ wrote Sous-Lieutenant Passy, a French Navy veteran pilot, ‘we hit her six or seven times. One of our bombs appears to have started a fire which reached Yamato’s magazines.’ These, according to Admiral Yamamoto's subsequent investigation, had not been flooded due to previous damage to her pumps. ‘It set off the biggest explosion I have ever seen,’ Passy concluded. ‘So the Marine only sank one Japanese capital ship, but it was their biggest. We had obtained satisfaction for the many blows Japan had rained upon us.’
...As the summer progressed 12th Army made steady progress through Indochina, liberating Cambodia during June. At this point the political logjam in Thailand moved. Phibun bowed to the inevitable, and permitted the Regent to declare that Thailand had entered a state of ‘semi-neutral non-belligerent hostility’ to Japan. This concept was not something ever found in international law, but Bangkok took it to mean that they could release the men of Indian 4th and British 18th Divisions from internment. Japanese forces in Indochina no longer had the means to retaliate. Some of the men, despite their long internment, volunteered to join the closing battles.
A less favourable development emerged during the same period. British forces generally tried to cooperate with the Viet Minh in fighting the Japanese, but found as the liberated area grew, the Viet Minh began to show reluctance to hand over facilities to the returning French authorities. Sporadic fighting broke out, which increased and became of increasing concern to London, especially after the election of the Attlee Government. Mr. Bevin, the new Foreign Secretary, had serious doubts. ‘Here we are, fighting the Japs and then having to fight the people we’ve liberated from them, all for the sake of the French. Is this what the Union means?’ Parliament and the Press paid little attention to this initially, until the assassination of General Montgomery by the Viet Minh on July 18th, which unleashed a storm of disapproval of the Government’s Indochina policy. As a result, Bevin’s distrust of maintaining the Union into peacetime now solidified into opposition.
In parallel, de Gaulle also found the situation unsatisfactory. ‘Victory in Europe is gained - no further need for this unnatural state of affairs,’ he wrote. In July, following several weeks of parliamentary manoeuvres, M. Mandel resigned as Prime Minister, and de Gaulle replaced him. The stage was set for the Tuileries Declaration.
The final blows of the Pacific War came further north. After liberating southern Indochina, 12th Army paused. General Slim, now emerged from internment, took command, and renewed the offensive in late July, but had still not reached Hanoi when the atomic bombs shocked the Japanese Government into surrender... The situation was one of complete chaos on the political front. There were the Japanese to deal with, some of whom refused to surrender, the KMT Chinese took a keen interest in developments, and two distinct factions - the Viet Minh and the Viet Quoc - jostled for power. Looking back on events later, Mandel noted, ‘Arguably a window of opportunity existed for a stable political settlement, perhaps by co-opting the Viet Quoc, but de Gaulle had control of events by this point, and he showed a certain lack of imagination, and on this question allowed men with out-of-date ideas to guide him.’ The stage was therefore set also for the tragic conflict of 1946-55.
Operation MENAGERIE commenced on April 1st, some would say appropriately so. Many Allied decision-makers considered it a distraction. Nonetheless the sheer complexity and scale over-awed even the doubters for a time: it was the largest Franco-British amphibious operation of the war, in terms of men, ships and aircraft involved. Two large invasion convoys sailed, from Singapore and Kuching, carrying six divisions. The land-based air umbrella involved a thousand aircraft, mostly mounted from Malaya, while six aircraft carriers added over two hundred more. Japanese air power, by this point, no longer existed. ‘They did not even have enough fuel to fly kamikaze missions,’ noted Admiral Esteva.
In the short term the results exceeded expectations. The Allied fleet included six modern capital ships; as it became apparent that no naval threat existed, these added their firepower to that of the four older battleships supporting the landings. ‘It seemed as much a mystical celebration, a sublime enactment of the power of the Allies, as a military operation,’ wrote Admiral Godefroy. ‘The Japanese could only retreat or perish.’
...the Allies completed their encirclement of Saigon by the third week of April, but the city did not fall immediately. ‘The war in Europe had ended, but the Japs took no notice,’ wrote Montgomery. ‘The IJA had over 50,000 men holding the place, very short of everything including food, but had orders to fight to the last man, orders they obeyed literally.’
Montgomery would have preferred to mask the place and push north, but the French felt both a political and humane imperative to take the place quickly. ‘We feared that the entire civil population must perish in a prolonged siege,’ commented Admiral Esteva. The result was a month-long urban fight with extensive use of artillery. ‘Hard to see how waiting could have been any worse for the locals,’ said Mr. Bevin later, ‘a hellish business.’ Officially, Saigon fell on May 16th, but mopping up lasted for weeks. Out of the Japanese garrison, less than a thousand survived; the Allied troops, mostly British and Indian, suffered nearly ten thousand dead; no-one ever made an official count of civilian casualties.
By this time the Allies had already begun to exploit northwards, aided by subsidiary landings on the coast, one of which took Cam Ranh on May 8th. As they pressed on, Japanese resistance began to ebb, and for the first time in the war significant numbers of prisoners were being taken, initially mostly Koreans, but soon Japanese troops also. ‘We knew they were cracking up once that happened,’ commented General Montgomery…
The absence of IJN units from the South China Sea, and the fall of Okinawa, gave the admirals the opportunity they had been seeking. Both Paris and London wanted to strike directly at the Japanese home islands while they could, and in late May Godefroy took Force A north, refuelling at Manila on the way. Force A comprised Richelieu (flagship), Prince of Wales, Hood, Jean Bart, Indefatigable and Implacable. This was a small force by the standards of the mighty US Pacific Fleet, but big enough to make the desired statement. In late June this force raided targets in Kyushu, including the naval base at Kure, which USN aircraft had previously visited. Among other ships, the giant battleship Yamato lay there, immobile for lack of fuel, already badly hurt by USN bombs and torpedoes. ‘It was little more than target practice,’ wrote Sous-Lieutenant Passy, a French Navy veteran pilot, ‘we hit her six or seven times. One of our bombs appears to have started a fire which reached Yamato’s magazines.’ These, according to Admiral Yamamoto's subsequent investigation, had not been flooded due to previous damage to her pumps. ‘It set off the biggest explosion I have ever seen,’ Passy concluded. ‘So the Marine only sank one Japanese capital ship, but it was their biggest. We had obtained satisfaction for the many blows Japan had rained upon us.’
...As the summer progressed 12th Army made steady progress through Indochina, liberating Cambodia during June. At this point the political logjam in Thailand moved. Phibun bowed to the inevitable, and permitted the Regent to declare that Thailand had entered a state of ‘semi-neutral non-belligerent hostility’ to Japan. This concept was not something ever found in international law, but Bangkok took it to mean that they could release the men of Indian 4th and British 18th Divisions from internment. Japanese forces in Indochina no longer had the means to retaliate. Some of the men, despite their long internment, volunteered to join the closing battles.
A less favourable development emerged during the same period. British forces generally tried to cooperate with the Viet Minh in fighting the Japanese, but found as the liberated area grew, the Viet Minh began to show reluctance to hand over facilities to the returning French authorities. Sporadic fighting broke out, which increased and became of increasing concern to London, especially after the election of the Attlee Government. Mr. Bevin, the new Foreign Secretary, had serious doubts. ‘Here we are, fighting the Japs and then having to fight the people we’ve liberated from them, all for the sake of the French. Is this what the Union means?’ Parliament and the Press paid little attention to this initially, until the assassination of General Montgomery by the Viet Minh on July 18th, which unleashed a storm of disapproval of the Government’s Indochina policy. As a result, Bevin’s distrust of maintaining the Union into peacetime now solidified into opposition.
In parallel, de Gaulle also found the situation unsatisfactory. ‘Victory in Europe is gained - no further need for this unnatural state of affairs,’ he wrote. In July, following several weeks of parliamentary manoeuvres, M. Mandel resigned as Prime Minister, and de Gaulle replaced him. The stage was set for the Tuileries Declaration.
The final blows of the Pacific War came further north. After liberating southern Indochina, 12th Army paused. General Slim, now emerged from internment, took command, and renewed the offensive in late July, but had still not reached Hanoi when the atomic bombs shocked the Japanese Government into surrender... The situation was one of complete chaos on the political front. There were the Japanese to deal with, some of whom refused to surrender, the KMT Chinese took a keen interest in developments, and two distinct factions - the Viet Minh and the Viet Quoc - jostled for power. Looking back on events later, Mandel noted, ‘Arguably a window of opportunity existed for a stable political settlement, perhaps by co-opting the Viet Quoc, but de Gaulle had control of events by this point, and he showed a certain lack of imagination, and on this question allowed men with out-of-date ideas to guide him.’ The stage was therefore set also for the tragic conflict of 1946-55.
