Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL
- Thread starter spkaca
- Start date
Ominous for some, anyway. I've made some assumptions about Italian political dynamics here which I think I should share as a way of assessing the plausibility of the model. OTL Italy faced the disasters of Stalingrad, the fall of Tripoli and Tunis, and the landings in Sicily in January-July 1943. This against a backdrop of worsening economic hardships. In the ATL there has also been the steady and futile drain in Greece (having for Italy somewhat the same attritional effect as the OTL North Africa campaign) plus a much earlier loss of North Africa. Now we have also had the fall of Sicily and Sardinia. This is a litany of disasters perhaps already as bad as OTL. The only thing in il Duce's favour, at this point in the TL, is that the Italian army in Russia still exists, and the economic hardships facing Italy (as of late 1942 ATL) have probably not progressed quite so far as mid-1943 OTL. I think therefore the Army/ Royalist coup will happen significantly earlier than July 1943, one could make a case that it should have already happened.
I also assume that these dynamics are largely opaque to the Allies (they may suspect Mussolini is on borrowed time, but they can't know it), which creates a lot of uncertainties about their planning for the next few months.
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Part 11.6
Extract from Memoires by Guy Lemoine, ch.10
Thoughtless people have sometimes described the Sardinia fighting as a walk-over. “After all,” they say, “there were no Germans there, and we had air supremacy.” In the first place, that is not true: the Germans had Luftwaffe and Navy units there, I saw some of them myself as prisoners. My friends in GC12 could testify to the menace the German anti-aircraft posed. Not long after we moved to Cagliari, I had arranged to meet Clostermann and two others for drinks in one of the few bars open. When I got there I found only Pierre waiting for me. ‘Passy, d’Elbeuf - flak got them,’ he said, sadly. ‘Just this morning.’ They had been attacking a fuel dump near Olbia. I said how sorry I was. ‘Well, that’s how it is,’ he replied. ‘They’ve talked us up into this elite unit, and truly, but it means we get all the tough jobs.’
In any case, even setting aside the Germans, it was no picnic. The Italians knew quite well how to turn a hill into a fortress, and there are plenty of hills in Sardinia. There was one day - my diary says it was the 30th, but I was getting so little sleep I think that must be wrong - when I was on my feet for twenty hours at a stretch, dealing with casualties as they came in - Moroccans mostly, they had been given a particularly hard job. We used an entire regiment to take one hill that had perhaps fifty Italians on it.
So the Italians on Sardinia certainly gained our respect as fighting men. Of course I am no military expert, but in my opinion the main thing that hurt them was their shortage of artillery ammunition. We captured lots of guns - old but serviceable - some of which had not been fired. One day an Italian captain came to me to have his wounds dressed. ‘They rationed us to five rounds per gun per day,’ he said. ‘This was after telling us how this was the decisive battle, the fate of the fatherland depends on you, and so on.’
‘Why so few?’ I asked.
‘The big bosses like to hear how many guns we have, and how many planes, and how many divisions,’ he replied. ‘Actually making sure they have the means to fight, ammunition, fuel and so on - they think that’s beneath them. If it was a talking war we’d have won long ago!’ I wondered how many other Italians thought the same.
Thoughtless people have sometimes described the Sardinia fighting as a walk-over. “After all,” they say, “there were no Germans there, and we had air supremacy.” In the first place, that is not true: the Germans had Luftwaffe and Navy units there, I saw some of them myself as prisoners. My friends in GC12 could testify to the menace the German anti-aircraft posed. Not long after we moved to Cagliari, I had arranged to meet Clostermann and two others for drinks in one of the few bars open. When I got there I found only Pierre waiting for me. ‘Passy, d’Elbeuf - flak got them,’ he said, sadly. ‘Just this morning.’ They had been attacking a fuel dump near Olbia. I said how sorry I was. ‘Well, that’s how it is,’ he replied. ‘They’ve talked us up into this elite unit, and truly, but it means we get all the tough jobs.’
In any case, even setting aside the Germans, it was no picnic. The Italians knew quite well how to turn a hill into a fortress, and there are plenty of hills in Sardinia. There was one day - my diary says it was the 30th, but I was getting so little sleep I think that must be wrong - when I was on my feet for twenty hours at a stretch, dealing with casualties as they came in - Moroccans mostly, they had been given a particularly hard job. We used an entire regiment to take one hill that had perhaps fifty Italians on it.
So the Italians on Sardinia certainly gained our respect as fighting men. Of course I am no military expert, but in my opinion the main thing that hurt them was their shortage of artillery ammunition. We captured lots of guns - old but serviceable - some of which had not been fired. One day an Italian captain came to me to have his wounds dressed. ‘They rationed us to five rounds per gun per day,’ he said. ‘This was after telling us how this was the decisive battle, the fate of the fatherland depends on you, and so on.’
‘Why so few?’ I asked.
‘The big bosses like to hear how many guns we have, and how many planes, and how many divisions,’ he replied. ‘Actually making sure they have the means to fight, ammunition, fuel and so on - they think that’s beneath them. If it was a talking war we’d have won long ago!’ I wondered how many other Italians thought the same.
Part 11.7
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.18
After the end of the campaigns in Sicily and Sardinia, the Allies focussed on Corsica. ‘The government promised the recovery of French territory by the end of the year, and the time has come to make good,’ wrote M. Mandel. ‘We must show we can deliver.’ Making a priority of Corsica had the support of President Roosevelt, even though some of his commanders regarded the Mediterranean as a distraction. ‘There is no military necessity to take Corsica yet, perhaps not at all,’ wrote General Marshall. ‘The French call it a stepping stone into southern France. Eventually we may want to mount an offensive there. But we see risks in becoming too heavily committed in that theatre.’ The President’s wishes, however, prevailed.
The British government accepted the political necessity of retaking Corsica. General Alexander’s concerns were around landing craft - ‘serious attrition of these indispensable vessels in the last few months,’ he noted. ‘Enemy airfields on the continent allow them to contest the air over Corsica strongly. Italian and German tactics lately have focussed on attacking our landing craft. Against this, the sea crossing is short. But many of the likely beaches are overlooked by hills, enemy artillery will make landings hazardous.’
Operation LAFAYETTE, the liberation of Corsica, began with the October full moon, on the 24th. There had been little time to prepare. ‘The Americans worked miracles in Sardinia,’ commented General Olry, ‘they could take a barren site full of trees, and a week later had a fighter group operating. They had two or three such near Alghero, which I inspected, besides several near Olbia.’ The USAAF initially took the lead in air operations over Corsica, employing B-25 and B-26 bombers and a mixture of P-40 and P-38 fighters. They suffered heavy initial losses, mainly as a result of inexperience, but Axis opposition was weak - it appears that the Italian air force was suffering from severe fuel shortages at the time. The US also provided all the transport aircraft that were intended for use by the French airborne troops, but these last once again had their drop cancelled, due to unfavourable weather. This bred frustrations that left the French paras determined not to be thus prevented again...
The US air force impressed the French. ‘The American pilots had the true spirit of fighter combat from the first,’ said the commander of GC12. ‘They showed great willingness to learn new tactics. For instance they learned the trick of dive-bombing by their fighter aircraft - they learned the technique quickly.’ This was just as well. The French were still using their Vultee dive-bombers for precision attacks, and these had built up a reputation - ‘Frenchie Stukas,’ as the Germans called them. But over Corsica they suffered heavy losses as the Germans made them priority targets, and it was the last time the Vultee machines saw front-line service in the ETO. ‘The future is with fighter-bombers, even if they are not quite so accurate,’ noted Pierre Clostermann.
The Americans had to learn the same hard lessons as the British and French about Air-Navy cooperation. On the morning of the 25th, a breakdown in communications allowed German bombers to attack the fleet unmolested. Two destroyers and two supply ships were sunk. The USS Augusta, the cruiser being used as a command ship, was hit, and suffered heavy damage. This attack mortally wounded General Fredendall, the commander of US II Corps. ‘A heavy blow to us so early in the operation,’ noted General Eisenhower, ‘he had the makings of a great leader.’
However, the US and French forces succeeded in securing their beach-heads, and by the end of October had linked up and pushed inland. There were four Axis divisions in the island, two Italian and two German, and the Allied forces noticed that the Italians were losing heart. ‘No surprise,’ wrote one French officer, ‘they had nothing more than rifles, little artillery, many of the prisoners we took had not eaten in days.’ However, the German troops fought stubbornly. US II Corps took Porto Vecchio on the 30th after hard fighting that saw both 1st and 34th Divisions take heavy casualties. ‘Too many of our junior officers showed more courage than sense,’ wrote General Ryder, who had taken temporary command. ‘The terrain was very difficult. We had many vehicles in the beach-head, but too many were of little use, our tanks and tank-destroyers proved very vulnerable.’ General Ward, commanding 1st Armoured Division, also noted this. ‘We were taken by surprise too often,’ he wrote later, ‘the Germans were experts in feigned retreats, ambushes and the like. On one occasion an entire tank battalion was put out of action.’
American commentators in general criticised their own performance quite harshly, but the French, who had a different perspective and expectations, were impressed. ‘Superb artillery, just like 1918 again,’ noted General Bethouart. ‘Repeatedly we saw how enemy defences could only last until they brought up their 105mm howitzers.’ The French and American artillerymen found themselves very much on the same wavelength, despite the language barrier...
Extract from letter from William Dempster Jr. to his father, October 29th 1942
Dad, you’ve probably guessed by now where I am. Colonel Davenport said it was ok to write that we are on DELETED BY CENSOR. You can imagine how much it meant to me, as it must to you, to know that we went into battle alongside the French in an operation to liberate a part of France, an operation called LAFAYETTE. I remember what you told me about the great advance of ‘18, and the flowers, and the songs. Here is a truth the newspaper-columnists tend to forget: for all the ugly, and I’ve already seen plenty, there is so much in war that attracts the mind and enchants it, that I understand why men still show willing to go to the wars...
Our guns are doing great work, believe me. In the first few days we set up next to a French battery, they had some old 155s, and I got to know some of them, talking to them in my bad French. (If you see old Mr. Cox, tell him I’m sorry now I didn’t listen up better in class, he’ll like to hear that.) Now after our first few shoots in Corsica we started to say that there are two kinds of soldiers - gunners and targets. Then I talked to a French officer, I think a colonel, and found they have exactly the same saying. As you always say, ‘Let me not to the marriage of true minds admit impediments!’
I’m sorry to hear about Mrs. McFee going away, but I’m sure she’ll be back from Philly soon enough. I wouldn’t hesitate too long if I were you.
After the end of the campaigns in Sicily and Sardinia, the Allies focussed on Corsica. ‘The government promised the recovery of French territory by the end of the year, and the time has come to make good,’ wrote M. Mandel. ‘We must show we can deliver.’ Making a priority of Corsica had the support of President Roosevelt, even though some of his commanders regarded the Mediterranean as a distraction. ‘There is no military necessity to take Corsica yet, perhaps not at all,’ wrote General Marshall. ‘The French call it a stepping stone into southern France. Eventually we may want to mount an offensive there. But we see risks in becoming too heavily committed in that theatre.’ The President’s wishes, however, prevailed.
The British government accepted the political necessity of retaking Corsica. General Alexander’s concerns were around landing craft - ‘serious attrition of these indispensable vessels in the last few months,’ he noted. ‘Enemy airfields on the continent allow them to contest the air over Corsica strongly. Italian and German tactics lately have focussed on attacking our landing craft. Against this, the sea crossing is short. But many of the likely beaches are overlooked by hills, enemy artillery will make landings hazardous.’
Operation LAFAYETTE, the liberation of Corsica, began with the October full moon, on the 24th. There had been little time to prepare. ‘The Americans worked miracles in Sardinia,’ commented General Olry, ‘they could take a barren site full of trees, and a week later had a fighter group operating. They had two or three such near Alghero, which I inspected, besides several near Olbia.’ The USAAF initially took the lead in air operations over Corsica, employing B-25 and B-26 bombers and a mixture of P-40 and P-38 fighters. They suffered heavy initial losses, mainly as a result of inexperience, but Axis opposition was weak - it appears that the Italian air force was suffering from severe fuel shortages at the time. The US also provided all the transport aircraft that were intended for use by the French airborne troops, but these last once again had their drop cancelled, due to unfavourable weather. This bred frustrations that left the French paras determined not to be thus prevented again...
The US air force impressed the French. ‘The American pilots had the true spirit of fighter combat from the first,’ said the commander of GC12. ‘They showed great willingness to learn new tactics. For instance they learned the trick of dive-bombing by their fighter aircraft - they learned the technique quickly.’ This was just as well. The French were still using their Vultee dive-bombers for precision attacks, and these had built up a reputation - ‘Frenchie Stukas,’ as the Germans called them. But over Corsica they suffered heavy losses as the Germans made them priority targets, and it was the last time the Vultee machines saw front-line service in the ETO. ‘The future is with fighter-bombers, even if they are not quite so accurate,’ noted Pierre Clostermann.
The Americans had to learn the same hard lessons as the British and French about Air-Navy cooperation. On the morning of the 25th, a breakdown in communications allowed German bombers to attack the fleet unmolested. Two destroyers and two supply ships were sunk. The USS Augusta, the cruiser being used as a command ship, was hit, and suffered heavy damage. This attack mortally wounded General Fredendall, the commander of US II Corps. ‘A heavy blow to us so early in the operation,’ noted General Eisenhower, ‘he had the makings of a great leader.’
However, the US and French forces succeeded in securing their beach-heads, and by the end of October had linked up and pushed inland. There were four Axis divisions in the island, two Italian and two German, and the Allied forces noticed that the Italians were losing heart. ‘No surprise,’ wrote one French officer, ‘they had nothing more than rifles, little artillery, many of the prisoners we took had not eaten in days.’ However, the German troops fought stubbornly. US II Corps took Porto Vecchio on the 30th after hard fighting that saw both 1st and 34th Divisions take heavy casualties. ‘Too many of our junior officers showed more courage than sense,’ wrote General Ryder, who had taken temporary command. ‘The terrain was very difficult. We had many vehicles in the beach-head, but too many were of little use, our tanks and tank-destroyers proved very vulnerable.’ General Ward, commanding 1st Armoured Division, also noted this. ‘We were taken by surprise too often,’ he wrote later, ‘the Germans were experts in feigned retreats, ambushes and the like. On one occasion an entire tank battalion was put out of action.’
American commentators in general criticised their own performance quite harshly, but the French, who had a different perspective and expectations, were impressed. ‘Superb artillery, just like 1918 again,’ noted General Bethouart. ‘Repeatedly we saw how enemy defences could only last until they brought up their 105mm howitzers.’ The French and American artillerymen found themselves very much on the same wavelength, despite the language barrier...
*
Extract from letter from William Dempster Jr. to his father, October 29th 1942
Dad, you’ve probably guessed by now where I am. Colonel Davenport said it was ok to write that we are on DELETED BY CENSOR. You can imagine how much it meant to me, as it must to you, to know that we went into battle alongside the French in an operation to liberate a part of France, an operation called LAFAYETTE. I remember what you told me about the great advance of ‘18, and the flowers, and the songs. Here is a truth the newspaper-columnists tend to forget: for all the ugly, and I’ve already seen plenty, there is so much in war that attracts the mind and enchants it, that I understand why men still show willing to go to the wars...
Our guns are doing great work, believe me. In the first few days we set up next to a French battery, they had some old 155s, and I got to know some of them, talking to them in my bad French. (If you see old Mr. Cox, tell him I’m sorry now I didn’t listen up better in class, he’ll like to hear that.) Now after our first few shoots in Corsica we started to say that there are two kinds of soldiers - gunners and targets. Then I talked to a French officer, I think a colonel, and found they have exactly the same saying. As you always say, ‘Let me not to the marriage of true minds admit impediments!’
I’m sorry to hear about Mrs. McFee going away, but I’m sure she’ll be back from Philly soon enough. I wouldn’t hesitate too long if I were you.
I have to say that this sentence is a delightful little slice of life.
Driftless
Donor
Lloyd Fredendall, a favorite future AH topic in this TL's universe. "Oh, what might have been....."
Driftless
Donor
A little of the earlier breezy bravado has been shot away from young Mr. Dempster, but he still sounds upbeat and confident.
On reflection it sometimes feels like the main point of Fascism was to give Mussolini et al. the opportunity to talk as much as they liked, without anyone being able to talk back. I recall once reading that Il Duce once (sometime in the late 30s, I think) asked his Air Force chief (or aviation minister, or some such) why only about a quarter of the air force's planes were actually serviceable, but also added that he was not actually all that bothered about the fact. Fascism was a performance.
Yes, and he'll probably remain so. Of course, he doesn't want to upset his dad; but his dad knows what war is like; and Dempster Jr knows that he knows; so you can bet there's a lot he isn't saying.
Part 11.8
11.8
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.18 (continued)
The liberation of the island took several weeks, mainly due to very tough resistance by the Germans in the mountains of the north, as the weather worsened. ‘Corsica was a very tough place to learn how to fight,’ commented General Allen. ‘By the end of the campaign some of my rifle companies had taken 100 percent casualties. We kept going thanks to replacements, wounded men returning to the front, and by combing out the rear echelons.’
The French were also acutely conscious of attrition. Daladier noted that since the commencement of the central Mediterranean offensive in late June, they had lost a thousand aircraft, and suffered over 20,000 casualties in combat. ‘We must have a prolonged pause in offensive operations, to rebuild our strength,’ he wrote, ‘we cannot go on with such heavy losses.’ General Olry made similar comments to General Alexander when they met on New Year’s Eve. ‘My nine divisions each have 10-15,000 men, at full strength,’ he said, ‘but less than half of that is riflemen. So in all I have maybe 40,000 riflemen. They take most of the losses. In short, I have lost half my rifle strength in taking just three islands.’
General Alexander agreed with the sentiment. ‘Commonwealth forces have suffered over 35,000 combat casualties since June, also many sick. The French face the same problem as we do, only more acutely,’ he wrote to the Prime Minister. ‘They do not have the manpower to accept very large losses. I do not downplay our victories. But we must realise these recent campaigns have been small compared to that which we must expect on the Continent.’
Since the war it has become common to see the months that followed the fall of Sicily as a missed opportunity; it has been argued that the Allies should have pushed onto mainland Italy before the end of the year, or at the latest in the New Year. At the very least, it has been argued, the Allies should have seized Elba, which in December and January was virtually undefended.
Several factors combined to prevent any further operations. The Sardinia and Corsica campaigns drew off numerous Allied assets, including all the French and American land, sea and air forces available. The British did not wish to launch themselves into mainland Italy alone, especially given the bruising campaign in Sicily and the ongoing demands of the Greek front. With hindsight we can see that if Allied forces had been present on the Italian mainland before February, they could have exploited political developments more effectively. However, this was not clear at the time. Most Allied planning focussed on the complex operations that would be needed, and it took time to thrash out different opinions on the right places to land - the British initially favoured Salerno, as being within Spitfire range of Sicily, but the Americans and French pressed for Anzio, as this was closer to Rome and within range of fighters operating from Sardinia. Several weeks passed in these discussions.
Still, the victory in Corsica came before the end of the year, as promised, and the French government had its Christmas present.
Extract from War in the Middle Sea, ch.18 (continued)
The liberation of the island took several weeks, mainly due to very tough resistance by the Germans in the mountains of the north, as the weather worsened. ‘Corsica was a very tough place to learn how to fight,’ commented General Allen. ‘By the end of the campaign some of my rifle companies had taken 100 percent casualties. We kept going thanks to replacements, wounded men returning to the front, and by combing out the rear echelons.’
The French were also acutely conscious of attrition. Daladier noted that since the commencement of the central Mediterranean offensive in late June, they had lost a thousand aircraft, and suffered over 20,000 casualties in combat. ‘We must have a prolonged pause in offensive operations, to rebuild our strength,’ he wrote, ‘we cannot go on with such heavy losses.’ General Olry made similar comments to General Alexander when they met on New Year’s Eve. ‘My nine divisions each have 10-15,000 men, at full strength,’ he said, ‘but less than half of that is riflemen. So in all I have maybe 40,000 riflemen. They take most of the losses. In short, I have lost half my rifle strength in taking just three islands.’
General Alexander agreed with the sentiment. ‘Commonwealth forces have suffered over 35,000 combat casualties since June, also many sick. The French face the same problem as we do, only more acutely,’ he wrote to the Prime Minister. ‘They do not have the manpower to accept very large losses. I do not downplay our victories. But we must realise these recent campaigns have been small compared to that which we must expect on the Continent.’
Since the war it has become common to see the months that followed the fall of Sicily as a missed opportunity; it has been argued that the Allies should have pushed onto mainland Italy before the end of the year, or at the latest in the New Year. At the very least, it has been argued, the Allies should have seized Elba, which in December and January was virtually undefended.
Several factors combined to prevent any further operations. The Sardinia and Corsica campaigns drew off numerous Allied assets, including all the French and American land, sea and air forces available. The British did not wish to launch themselves into mainland Italy alone, especially given the bruising campaign in Sicily and the ongoing demands of the Greek front. With hindsight we can see that if Allied forces had been present on the Italian mainland before February, they could have exploited political developments more effectively. However, this was not clear at the time. Most Allied planning focussed on the complex operations that would be needed, and it took time to thrash out different opinions on the right places to land - the British initially favoured Salerno, as being within Spitfire range of Sicily, but the Americans and French pressed for Anzio, as this was closer to Rome and within range of fighters operating from Sardinia. Several weeks passed in these discussions.
Still, the victory in Corsica came before the end of the year, as promised, and the French government had its Christmas present.
Tough fight but very useful in the long term, since the Allied bloody their divisions. Actually it is more useful to the Americans since the British and French have combat experience. I expect the French to play a very minor role in the coming Italian Campaign, since they need to conserve their manpower for the Metropole.
I wonder the impact the french orders had on american industrial mobilization. How far ahead -if any- is it compared to OTL ?
It is worth mentioning that there is no chance the Italian Armistice can become a bigger clusterfuck than in OTL. The anti-Mussolini coup in OTL messed the situation up in the worst possible manner. Very subtle changes would mean that the Germans can be stopped somewhere in the Po Valley. Then it is the issue of the Italian Occupation Zone in France, Provence is occupied by the Italians and the Allies are based a few hours away in Corsica... I think we might see a bridgehead in Provence sometime in 1943.
I wonder the impact the french orders had on american industrial mobilization. How far ahead -if any- is it compared to OTL ?
It is worth mentioning that there is no chance the Italian Armistice can become a bigger clusterfuck than in OTL. The anti-Mussolini coup in OTL messed the situation up in the worst possible manner. Very subtle changes would mean that the Germans can be stopped somewhere in the Po Valley. Then it is the issue of the Italian Occupation Zone in France, Provence is occupied by the Italians and the Allies are based a few hours away in Corsica... I think we might see a bridgehead in Provence sometime in 1943.
Hi all, I was knocked out of AH by my old 2009 vintage laptop going wonky and refusing to let me visit any sites for alleged security reasons, and had to buy a newer laptop, which took some time. I have done some drive by commenting on TLs new to me but this is one favorite one I was missing a lot! Glad to see it soldiered on in its general high quality vein, author and comments alike are first class.
a) a very small number, possibly zero, of Axis-collaboration inclined people willing to suck up to the Japanese. These might be zero because the mentality to make a willing Quisling is also pretty much inherently racist; conceivably a few might be motivated by sheer greed, to keep possession of lucrative plantations or other enterprises, and indifferent about racist ideology, but to break French patriotism I'd think something more than greed is needed. If the occupiers were German it would be one thing, or even Italian, but the intersection of the sets of Franco-Quisling and tolerant of being bossed around by Asians might well be the empty set. Such persons would also have to suffer from major delusions about the sustainability of the Japanese new order in the face of the combined grand Anglo-Franco-US-Soviet alliance-perhaps a few might be sufficiently fooled by the Axis "triumph of the will" mentality which supposes the liberal/Communist opposition is inherently weak in resolve and liable to sue for peace inevitably, in the first months and maybe year or so, but as the years roll by and the Axis only collapses visibly, with Allied forces ramping up inexorably in numbers and material quality while the fighting corps just get more seasoned and competent even as their supply situation only improves, any such fools will have glum cause for second thoughts, a bit late of course--but if they can run to Thailand they probably will.
b) a perhaps equally vanishingly few might be determined to fight the Japanese alongside Vietnamese and other Indochinese native peoples--on essentially terms set by these natives. This probably rules out most colonists but perhaps not all. They might have very strong left-wing leanings, being actual Communists or anyway radical leftists; they might have married some Vietnamese or Montangard or Cambodian--dunno how frowned on that was in pre-war French Indochina; if I can trust anything from the movie South Pacific, it was at any rate grudgingly permitted in the islands if not in Indochina itself. Even such persons would be well advised to run to Thailand too of course, and certainly would want to bundle their more vulnerable loved ones there; any Europeans remaining in Indochina would stick out like sore thumbs and can survive only by either Japanese protection or by being well hidden away in some jungle/highland bastion of guerrilla resistance.
With French-born colonials, including soldiers and officers of the military forces, so vanishingly few, any who are not collaborators must perforce defer to Vietnamese notions of leadership and objectives. Now of course not a few Vietnamese, and other persons of various ethnicities including I suppose a lot of Khmers, were more or less reconciled with and committed to the French regime. But even numbers of these would be largely forgiven by the nationalists of various stripes if they switched over to the various patriot causes. The question is whether to collaborate with the Japanese versus figuring the Allies are going to win in the long run and they should either negotiate with France or put themselves into a position to defy France post-war. On this latter point, settling for more or less autonomy under a nominal French rule or seeking total independence, many persons otherwise broadly in agreement about expelling the Japanese might differ very bitterly, and also among committed nationalists will be several ideological wings.
I would bet that overall, Vietnamese nationalism comes out of the war, however it is ended in Indochina, at least as strong and probably quite a bit stronger than OTL. OTL nationalist groups organized and acted in a setting where French colonists on the ground were in a position to see what they did and overhear them; here the only French persons around will either be open collaborators with the Japanese (and possibly few to none of them) or largely voluntary converts to one of their nationalistic or anyway autonomy-seeking factions, under their protection.
Any organization of Vietnam in defiance of Japanese wishes will be a Vietnamese built and run one then.
It might be that while the total number of persons coming out of the war who are somewhere on the nationalist-autonomist spectrum is notably higher than OTL, but the factions are deeply divided and they hinder one another more than help, so overall the French find it possible to play them off against each other and thus achieve rule through division.
My guess would be that someone does organize enough of a consensus among the nationalists that there is a set of negotiators who do insist on France granting at least autonomy including a legislature where these factions can operate as a national government. and if the French government won't grant enough of their demands, a unified national liberation movement will wage insurgent war until they win. It may be that because of larger numbers of Vietnamese participating in resistance to Japan that it is not the Viet Minh that controls this national liberation front completely. And of course it may happen that Ho Chi Minh meets an alternate fate personally, is killed or captured, or perhaps is personally discredited, and the Red Third Internationalist movement might have some other name, but I'd be certain they are major players in a national liberation coalition even if they don't dominate it outright, under any name.
The ATL difference being that the nationalists as a group are larger and more assertive than OTL, which foreshadows their victory in some fashion earlier than OTL, at any rate no later, and that the French government must either negotiate some kind of settlement with them immediately upon Japan's defeat to return to power in Indochina on any terms however limited, or anyway get even more support from their allies as well as muster a larger initial force to try to force their way in, and then the only way they could buy any peace in Indochina would be by a combination of carrot and stick--having to mollify at least some wings of patriots demanding at least autonomy, while also having to deploy more force to repress the ones who want more.
There are those who suggest that the USA might have chosen to support Ho Chi Minh who sought to negotiate Vietnamese independence in 1945, but I think there is little grounds to expect any American President likely to be elected to prefer this to restoring the French to power. And in this TL the French are certainly even stronger in their position.
We don't know that FDR will favor adopting Harry Truman as his VP candidate for the 1944 election here; perhaps Henry Wallace will be retained and I suppose he might consider the Vietnamese petition. But I think if Wallace would actually do that, he would get into very hot water politically in the USA on the whole. More likely even he would feel constrained to insist the French get some satisfaction.
Vice versa if the ATL negotiating position of Vietnamese nationalists is strong enough, any US President--a longer lived Roosevelt, Wallace, Truman, some hypothetical Republican victor (I see no reason to expect that kind of overturn of course)--might go so far as to insist the French negotiate some kind of autonomy compromise deal, and conceivably such an arrangement might prove satisfactory enough to enough Vietnamese factions in alliance with the pro-colonial minority to prevail, though surely then some nationalists would make trouble.
As noted above, the Grand Alliance at this point has gone beyond an Anglo-French Entente. By this late date, the Soviets are in alliance, and now the USA; the various British Dominions have their own autonomy; there are the Dutch and Norwegian governments in exile as well as the Poles; no doubt Uncle Sam is trying to get a whole bunch of Latin American republics from Mexico to the Southern Cone to sign on as Allies; I expect to discuss the prospects of Thailand eventually joining, and maybe Turkey and Sweden, and then there are nations like Italy that might undergo regime change and switch sides too.
It has evolved well past a dual-power alliance at this point, and it is about time for them to start talking about "United Nations" as OTL.
Obviously any formal UNO will be a mere instrument of the consensus among the leading Great Powers--France included among them, surely.
I had some concern since I think the P-38 deserves a bit more love than it got OTL, but it seems by now it is getting some honor anyway.
Now these are interesting perspectives! I have often wondered at what a strategy of taking on the Japanese Empire by confronting the IJA where it is most heavily deployed, in China itself, would look like, but have always understood that US conventional wisdom said "avoid a land war in Asia!" Certainly the strategy that evolved OTL in the Pacific under US leadership seems quite diametrically opposed, with favor going again and again to bypassing major Japanese concentrations, in what has been described at least in retrospect as a policy of leaving various Japanese held islands such as their major bastion on Rabaul as de facto POW camps--for the Allied naval forces and air forces would shoot up every transport hull that moved, effectively isolating them and taking them out of the war while conserving Allied manpower against more select objectives.
On one hand deciding to instead take advantage of the existing open (barring terrain issues) Burma Road to come directly to assist Republic of China forces on the ground seems to fly in the face of this wisdom, if wisdom it was.
On the other hand--if direct and extensive logistic contact is made with Chinese forces in southwest China, we can surely expect that while the services, and attrition, of western Allied forces would be considerable on this new front (for them) and face formidable opposition from the "no-surrender" IJA, still much of the heavy lifting of combat would be done by Chinese forces, which would benefit from coordination and most important, open-handed material logistics.
So the overall death rate for US and other Allied forces aiding the Chinese might be dwarfed by that suffered by the Chinese, but between them the IJA would be decimated, at a time when their support from the Home Islands is coming under attack and being reduced toward zero.
Aside from how this affects the timing and outcomes for Japan, it also might have huge bearing on what happens in China in the later 1940s.
Going forward I have to wonder at the ATL effect of giving the French colonists someplace to run to. Musing about it I suppose only two categories of French persons can remain in Japanese ruled Indochina, both of them vanishingly small in numbers:
a) a very small number, possibly zero, of Axis-collaboration inclined people willing to suck up to the Japanese. These might be zero because the mentality to make a willing Quisling is also pretty much inherently racist; conceivably a few might be motivated by sheer greed, to keep possession of lucrative plantations or other enterprises, and indifferent about racist ideology, but to break French patriotism I'd think something more than greed is needed. If the occupiers were German it would be one thing, or even Italian, but the intersection of the sets of Franco-Quisling and tolerant of being bossed around by Asians might well be the empty set. Such persons would also have to suffer from major delusions about the sustainability of the Japanese new order in the face of the combined grand Anglo-Franco-US-Soviet alliance-perhaps a few might be sufficiently fooled by the Axis "triumph of the will" mentality which supposes the liberal/Communist opposition is inherently weak in resolve and liable to sue for peace inevitably, in the first months and maybe year or so, but as the years roll by and the Axis only collapses visibly, with Allied forces ramping up inexorably in numbers and material quality while the fighting corps just get more seasoned and competent even as their supply situation only improves, any such fools will have glum cause for second thoughts, a bit late of course--but if they can run to Thailand they probably will.
b) a perhaps equally vanishingly few might be determined to fight the Japanese alongside Vietnamese and other Indochinese native peoples--on essentially terms set by these natives. This probably rules out most colonists but perhaps not all. They might have very strong left-wing leanings, being actual Communists or anyway radical leftists; they might have married some Vietnamese or Montangard or Cambodian--dunno how frowned on that was in pre-war French Indochina; if I can trust anything from the movie South Pacific, it was at any rate grudgingly permitted in the islands if not in Indochina itself. Even such persons would be well advised to run to Thailand too of course, and certainly would want to bundle their more vulnerable loved ones there; any Europeans remaining in Indochina would stick out like sore thumbs and can survive only by either Japanese protection or by being well hidden away in some jungle/highland bastion of guerrilla resistance.
With French-born colonials, including soldiers and officers of the military forces, so vanishingly few, any who are not collaborators must perforce defer to Vietnamese notions of leadership and objectives. Now of course not a few Vietnamese, and other persons of various ethnicities including I suppose a lot of Khmers, were more or less reconciled with and committed to the French regime. But even numbers of these would be largely forgiven by the nationalists of various stripes if they switched over to the various patriot causes. The question is whether to collaborate with the Japanese versus figuring the Allies are going to win in the long run and they should either negotiate with France or put themselves into a position to defy France post-war. On this latter point, settling for more or less autonomy under a nominal French rule or seeking total independence, many persons otherwise broadly in agreement about expelling the Japanese might differ very bitterly, and also among committed nationalists will be several ideological wings.
I would bet that overall, Vietnamese nationalism comes out of the war, however it is ended in Indochina, at least as strong and probably quite a bit stronger than OTL. OTL nationalist groups organized and acted in a setting where French colonists on the ground were in a position to see what they did and overhear them; here the only French persons around will either be open collaborators with the Japanese (and possibly few to none of them) or largely voluntary converts to one of their nationalistic or anyway autonomy-seeking factions, under their protection.
Any organization of Vietnam in defiance of Japanese wishes will be a Vietnamese built and run one then.
It might be that while the total number of persons coming out of the war who are somewhere on the nationalist-autonomist spectrum is notably higher than OTL, but the factions are deeply divided and they hinder one another more than help, so overall the French find it possible to play them off against each other and thus achieve rule through division.
My guess would be that someone does organize enough of a consensus among the nationalists that there is a set of negotiators who do insist on France granting at least autonomy including a legislature where these factions can operate as a national government. and if the French government won't grant enough of their demands, a unified national liberation movement will wage insurgent war until they win. It may be that because of larger numbers of Vietnamese participating in resistance to Japan that it is not the Viet Minh that controls this national liberation front completely. And of course it may happen that Ho Chi Minh meets an alternate fate personally, is killed or captured, or perhaps is personally discredited, and the Red Third Internationalist movement might have some other name, but I'd be certain they are major players in a national liberation coalition even if they don't dominate it outright, under any name.
The ATL difference being that the nationalists as a group are larger and more assertive than OTL, which foreshadows their victory in some fashion earlier than OTL, at any rate no later, and that the French government must either negotiate some kind of settlement with them immediately upon Japan's defeat to return to power in Indochina on any terms however limited, or anyway get even more support from their allies as well as muster a larger initial force to try to force their way in, and then the only way they could buy any peace in Indochina would be by a combination of carrot and stick--having to mollify at least some wings of patriots demanding at least autonomy, while also having to deploy more force to repress the ones who want more.
There are those who suggest that the USA might have chosen to support Ho Chi Minh who sought to negotiate Vietnamese independence in 1945, but I think there is little grounds to expect any American President likely to be elected to prefer this to restoring the French to power. And in this TL the French are certainly even stronger in their position.
We don't know that FDR will favor adopting Harry Truman as his VP candidate for the 1944 election here; perhaps Henry Wallace will be retained and I suppose he might consider the Vietnamese petition. But I think if Wallace would actually do that, he would get into very hot water politically in the USA on the whole. More likely even he would feel constrained to insist the French get some satisfaction.
Vice versa if the ATL negotiating position of Vietnamese nationalists is strong enough, any US President--a longer lived Roosevelt, Wallace, Truman, some hypothetical Republican victor (I see no reason to expect that kind of overturn of course)--might go so far as to insist the French negotiate some kind of autonomy compromise deal, and conceivably such an arrangement might prove satisfactory enough to enough Vietnamese factions in alliance with the pro-colonial minority to prevail, though surely then some nationalists would make trouble.
As noted above, the Grand Alliance at this point has gone beyond an Anglo-French Entente. By this late date, the Soviets are in alliance, and now the USA; the various British Dominions have their own autonomy; there are the Dutch and Norwegian governments in exile as well as the Poles; no doubt Uncle Sam is trying to get a whole bunch of Latin American republics from Mexico to the Southern Cone to sign on as Allies; I expect to discuss the prospects of Thailand eventually joining, and maybe Turkey and Sweden, and then there are nations like Italy that might undergo regime change and switch sides too.
It has evolved well past a dual-power alliance at this point, and it is about time for them to start talking about "United Nations" as OTL.
Obviously any formal UNO will be a mere instrument of the consensus among the leading Great Powers--France included among them, surely.
Since I multi-quoted this reading further down, to the operation liberating Corsica, it seems the French models have been brought into combat and there is neither praise of them (save some Germans noting the things are a problem for them) nor damnation--it seems that whatever shortcomings the early versions have, overall the twin-tail, twin engine heavy fighter is performing well enough. Presumably then Lockheed can manage to introduce at least some of the OTL fixes and perhaps some ATL improvements. Though of course it might still be that the early model bugs are such that the Mustang does get some extra attention earlier bringing it forward earlier and perhaps attaining or surpassing its OTL development (the latter is a bit dicey since presumably the European Axis will collapse somewhat sooner than OTL and Japan is clearly on the ropes worse than OTL by this date too).
I had some concern since I think the P-38 deserves a bit more love than it got OTL, but it seems by now it is getting some honor anyway.
Now these are interesting perspectives! I have often wondered at what a strategy of taking on the Japanese Empire by confronting the IJA where it is most heavily deployed, in China itself, would look like, but have always understood that US conventional wisdom said "avoid a land war in Asia!" Certainly the strategy that evolved OTL in the Pacific under US leadership seems quite diametrically opposed, with favor going again and again to bypassing major Japanese concentrations, in what has been described at least in retrospect as a policy of leaving various Japanese held islands such as their major bastion on Rabaul as de facto POW camps--for the Allied naval forces and air forces would shoot up every transport hull that moved, effectively isolating them and taking them out of the war while conserving Allied manpower against more select objectives.
On one hand deciding to instead take advantage of the existing open (barring terrain issues) Burma Road to come directly to assist Republic of China forces on the ground seems to fly in the face of this wisdom, if wisdom it was.
On the other hand--if direct and extensive logistic contact is made with Chinese forces in southwest China, we can surely expect that while the services, and attrition, of western Allied forces would be considerable on this new front (for them) and face formidable opposition from the "no-surrender" IJA, still much of the heavy lifting of combat would be done by Chinese forces, which would benefit from coordination and most important, open-handed material logistics.
So the overall death rate for US and other Allied forces aiding the Chinese might be dwarfed by that suffered by the Chinese, but between them the IJA would be decimated, at a time when their support from the Home Islands is coming under attack and being reduced toward zero.
Aside from how this affects the timing and outcomes for Japan, it also might have huge bearing on what happens in China in the later 1940s.
Driftless
Donor
^^^ I could see another category of quisling - Someone who was so alienated in the French colonial society, that pure spite-driven venom, regardless of personal cost. By comparison, I believe one or more of the Norwegian turncoats filled that bill Probably others elsewhere too.
Still, as Shevek23 notes, that's a very small pool of operatives to draw from.
Still, as Shevek23 notes, that's a very small pool of operatives to draw from.
Deleted member 2186
Doubt they will have anything to say soon, also if M. Louis Blanchard is smart, hes stays away from anything related to Vichy France if he want to have a future in a free France.
A smaller role than OTL (where the FEC played a crucial part in DIADEM) but they will want to play some role. I have an idea for how that might play out, using a rejected operational concept from OTL.
My understanding of Tooze is that President Roosevelt took the crucial decisions (above all, the decision to create a massive aero industry) about May-June 1940, a decision that subsequent orders were unlikely to change much in fundamentals.
That challenges my assumptions about how far north the Allies would have thought it possible to advance. I think the key thing here is that Sicily has fallen but Mussolini has not yet been overthrown; which means the Allies have more time to make preparations before the Germans intervene in force; which in turn means they meet further north than OTL; but how far north is the question. I believe OTL the Allies made their main effort at Salerno because Spitfires based in Sicily could get no further north. Presumably fighters from Corsica could provide air cover as far north as Tuscany or even the Po valley - but it would be a bold move, with the entire south & centre to occupy, the Italians to disarm and the Germans (who have 2-3 divisions already present) to fight.
My idea then at present is a multi-pronged invasion once Italy gives in: landings in the south (alt-BAYTOWN) from Sicily, probably a British landing at Salerno (because the factor of air cover from Sicily is still present, and the Allies will want to capture Naples quickly & intact), and US/ French forces (using Corsica & Sardinia as bases) at Anzio (and/ or some other point between Anzio and Lido di Ostia) in order to get Rome quickly. One can object to this concept, or set of operations, in that none of them support each other directly. But this concept would make best use (I think) of the bases & forces available to the Allies in early 1943. The question then is how far north the Allies could get before the Germans solidify their line. Given the difficulties of co-ordinating three major partners, plus liaising with the Italians, the Germans are bound to have the advantage in speed of response.
Possible, but I think London would oppose this strongly. A bridgehead, in itself, is not very useful; its usefulness comes from the operations that one can develop from it. Provence, with mountains basically surrounding it, isn't a great place to begin the liberation, by itself. In conjunction with the cross-Channel invasion, an attack in the Midi is very useful - but again, London decision-makers (above all Brooke, who I've put in his OTL position) don't want to go for alt-OVERLORD in 1943, even in these more favourable circumstances. I'll explore this theme in upcoming updates.
That's a good way to put it! OTL of course Vichy had a weird co-existence with the Japanese in 1941-5, and presumably some Vichy officials got bossed around at times; but they presumably could rationalise that as loyalty to the legitimate government i.e. Vichy. In the ATL that rationalisation couldn't exist.
I could imagine a handful of 'Laurent des Montagnards' types joining guerrilla bands, but few of then would last long.
There's another question, which is how much the Vietnamese will enjoy Japanese occupation. That, rather than the likelihood of Allied victory, will recruit Vietnamese guerrillas.
Absolutely, but there is another player that might take an interest: KMT China. I envisage a resistance front chiefly comprising the Viet Minh and Viet Quoc (the latter under some Chinese influence); though they will only stay united as long as they are fighting the Japanese (and maybe not even that long).
In this ATL the British will have much more say on this, because they have a fleet at Singapore (and an army in the region also). London will definitely support Paris on this question.
The relationships have become somewhat confusing by this point: Washington has a direct line to London and Algiers, but London and Algiers are both trying to run a common policy. The next update will explore this. Certainly the United Nations will be a phrase in use, and will evolve into an organisation.
I doubt the prospect of large Western land forces operating in China. However, Washington has one eye on the immense & exciting prospect of a united, independent and friendly China post-war. They will be pushing aid to China along the Burma Road as fast as possible.
Very much so - although I'm not proposing to take the TL past 1945, a stronger KMT follows inevitably from what has happened so far. I find it impossible to say if that means the KMT can win the Civil War.
Maybe he stayed out of France (probably). If not, there's a high chance the Germans got him, and have still got him locked up - they might not have released him OTL. With no need to show even a trace of respect or interest in any French partners like Vichy, the Occupation will be even harsher than OTL. I haven't written about the internal situation in la Hexagone because I dislike writing things which are even worse than OTL. I once visited the Occupation museum in Falaise, a rather grim experience: among the exhibits, various horrible posters (I can't now remember if originals or facsimiles) from the time of the occupation. These posters (which were written in French and German, a kind of symbol of what the Franco-German partnership dreamt of by Vichy actually meant) were publicly displayed listing the names of the executed, a kind of prissy bureaucratic way of sanitising the horror.
Strictly speaking there is no Vichy France - no unoccupied zone, so the Germans simply set up a pure Quisling regime in Paris, with whatever collaborationist dregs they can scrape together. It gets even less respect than OTL Vichy, from Allies and Germans alike.
Not only smart, he was both patriotic and intensely anti-Nazi and favoured De Gaulle and the Free French OTL. About the last man to cosy up to the Germans.
Driftless
Donor
In this universe, would there be an equivalent group of French VIP's as was interned in Castle Iter? (Nowadays more noted for the unique rescue operation) Not necessarily the same cast of characters, but a comparable group?
Some of the OTL prisoners (from Wikipedia):