Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

By all accounts, Umberto was kind of a decent guy, though he shines in comparison to his family, which sets quite a low bar actually.
I certainly don't disagree with this...
Are the Germans able to create a puppet Fascist Republic here, or do they have to just set up a military administration as occupiers?
I assume that the somewhat half-baked arrangements for keeping Mussolini secure haven't changed, so the Germans will get him and use him as a figurehead, as OTL.
It looks like Italy's switch of sides is more clearly cut ITTL, which should make Italian forces more cohesively resisting the Germans.
I hope I haven't made it look too clear-cut. The account given above is evidently much simplified and perhaps sanitised. However, I think there's a major factor here which is different, namely the status of Italian forces outside Italy, chiefly in the Greek theatre. OTL many or even most of these were disarmed and (not to put too fine a point on it) enslaved by the Germans. In the ATL they have a much better chance of being able to resist or (more likely) escape to Allied lines. Some at least of these will volunteer to join the Italian co-belligerent forces.
I guess that liberating Albania is very easily within the Allies' capabilities now?
Parts of it at least - though Albania is basically on the Greek army's sector, so it will depend on how much support (logistical and air) the Franco-British forces will give. The US, as I've tried to emphasise, doesn't want to get too engaged in the eastern Med, because they think (correctly) that it is a sideshow as far as the primary objective of beating Germany is concerned. The Allies might also have worries - rightly or wrongly - about possible Greek territorial ambitions. The Northern Epirus Question would be an awkward issue to handle. They will be wary of anything that might lead to London & Algiers having to referee a Greek-Albanian dispute, and certainly would not want Epirus to distract from the wider war. Still the Allies might also feel that Athens, having fought bravely and effectively, deserved a favourable hearing for its claims. Can I call @X Oristos for an expert view on this?
 
I certainly don't disagree with this...

I assume that the somewhat half-baked arrangements for keeping Mussolini secure haven't changed, so the Germans will get him and use him as a figurehead, as OTL.

I hope I haven't made it look too clear-cut. The account given above is evidently much simplified and perhaps sanitised. However, I think there's a major factor here which is different, namely the status of Italian forces outside Italy, chiefly in the Greek theatre. OTL many or even most of these were disarmed and (not to put too fine a point on it) enslaved by the Germans. In the ATL they have a much better chance of being able to resist or (more likely) escape to Allied lines. Some at least of these will volunteer to join the Italian co-belligerent forces.

Parts of it at least - though Albania is basically on the Greek army's sector, so it will depend on how much support (logistical and air) the Franco-British forces will give. The US, as I've tried to emphasise, doesn't want to get too engaged in the eastern Med, because they think (correctly) that it is a sideshow as far as the primary objective of beating Germany is concerned. The Allies might also have worries - rightly or wrongly - about possible Greek territorial ambitions. The Northern Epirus Question would be an awkward issue to handle. They will be wary of anything that might lead to London & Algiers having to referee a Greek-Albanian dispute, and certainly would not want Epirus to distract from the wider war. Still the Allies might also feel that Athens, having fought bravely and effectively, deserved a favourable hearing for its claims. Can I call @X Oristos for an expert view on this?
Fair enough. Compared with the unholy mess that was the Italian surrender and side-switch IOTL, your scenario looks positively orderly, but again, it's a matter of incredibly low bars.
 
Parts of it at least - though Albania is basically on the Greek army's sector, so it will depend on how much support (logistical and air) the Franco-British forces will give. The US, as I've tried to emphasise, doesn't want to get too engaged in the eastern Med, because they think (correctly) that it is a sideshow as far as the primary objective of beating Germany is concerned. The Allies might also have worries - rightly or wrongly - about possible Greek territorial ambitions. The Northern Epirus Question would be an awkward issue to handle. They will be wary of anything that might lead to London & Algiers having to referee a Greek-Albanian dispute, and certainly would not want Epirus to distract from the wider war. Still the Allies might also feel that Athens, having fought bravely and effectively, deserved a favourable hearing for its claims. Can I call @X Oristos for an expert view on this?

My two cents worth of a comment: I think the situation in TTL is vastly different to OTL. The majority of the Greek Army has survived and the diplomatic position of Greece is stronger. It is not as in OTL when the greek government had a handful of warships and a brigade as assets.

First and foremost, I expect Attica to be turned into a cluster of airbases in order to bomb Ploesti. There is no reason at all to develop Crete or Rhodes as an airbase, when you have Attica that includes one of the biggest ports in the Mediterranean (Piraeus). When we talk logistics, it is rather easy to develop a cluster of bomber airfields in Attica.

Having said that, when the Italians invaded Greece, Albanian militias were attached to italian formations ( source: Battistelli's "The Balkans 1940-1941"). From Athens' POV, Albania is acting as an italian co-belligerent/satelite, rather than an occupied territory. The Epirus Front continues to be active and most propably there was active albanian participation in the occupation of greek Epirus until the Italian Armistice. I believe that the greek government will push hard for an annexation of North Epirus/South Albania and at this point, the Great Powers have no interests that are contrary to a greek annexation. Albania is not a communist vassal at this point, but rather an italian vassal. There is no reason as all to appease Stalin if the Red Banner is not over Tirana.

What will be the next step of greek foreign policy would be a more defensible border with Bulgaria. When it comes to the region in question in contrast to North Epirus there are is no greek population. The mountains in question are inhabited by the muslim Pomaks (muslim Bulgarians). I am under the impression that at this point of history the Pomaks would prefer the Greeks over the Bulgarians. During the Interwar, Greece was oppressing its bulgarian minority, while the muslim minority in Thrace was considered the loyal one. Moreover, the muslim minority supported the Royalists after 1933, the ones currently in power. In any case, I doubt the Pomaks will be asked about their future by any Power, I just write this to establish the framework.

At the same time, it is plausible to see a greater bulgarian participation in the war, as the Germans would prioritize the Eastern Front and they would either need more bulgarian formations in occupying Greece or even a bulgarian corps active in the Thessalian Front. Greater bulgarian participation will increase both greek anxiety and demands during and after the war.

The reason Greece wanted to annex some mountains of zero economic value was pure geopolitical: 3 times in the past 30 years Greece was invaded by Bulgaria. Athens doesn't want economic resources, nor to liberate a greek popoulation, but to anchor the border on defensible terrain. In OTL there were various greek propositions ranging from "humble" to much more ambitious. A median proposition between the extremes of greek demands follows the Arda River. The success or not of greek plans depends mostly on which Ally occupies Bulgaria first. If the Red Army occupies first Bulgaria and installs a puppet communist government, then it is in Moscow's interest to keep Bulgaria intact. The the Western Allies may or may not find worth it to burn diplomatic capital over the bulgarian border. But if it is the Western Allies that occupy first Bulgaria, then I expect Greeks annexing some parts of the Rhodope Mountains.
 
I certainly don't disagree with this...

I assume that the somewhat half-baked arrangements for keeping Mussolini secure haven't changed, so the Germans will get him and use him as a figurehead, as OTL.

I hope I haven't made it look too clear-cut. The account given above is evidently much simplified and perhaps sanitised. However, I think there's a major factor here which is different, namely the status of Italian forces outside Italy, chiefly in the Greek theatre. OTL many or even most of these were disarmed and (not to put too fine a point on it) enslaved by the Germans. In the ATL they have a much better chance of being able to resist or (more likely) escape to Allied lines. Some at least of these will volunteer to join the Italian co-belligerent forces.

Parts of it at least - though Albania is basically on the Greek army's sector, so it will depend on how much support (logistical and air) the Franco-British forces will give. The US, as I've tried to emphasise, doesn't want to get too engaged in the eastern Med, because they think (correctly) that it is a sideshow as far as the primary objective of beating Germany is concerned. The Allies might also have worries - rightly or wrongly - about possible Greek territorial ambitions. The Northern Epirus Question would be an awkward issue to handle. They will be wary of anything that might lead to London & Algiers having to referee a Greek-Albanian dispute, and certainly would not want Epirus to distract from the wider war. Still the Allies might also feel that Athens, having fought bravely and effectively, deserved a favourable hearing for its claims. Can I call @X Oristos for an expert view on this?
Aside from what has been written already, De Gaulle in OTL was very much pro-Greek on the question, the British somewhat sympathetic and even the US congress put on a pro-Greek resolution. I suspect the answer depends on who has boots on the ground and here the Greeks are likely much more important than any Albanian resistance movement, they have what my ballpark estimation is ~400,000 men under arms at the moment? That's a dozen plus divisions.

Three more obvious questions

1. Who is arming the Greek army TTL? my guess given pre-war ties is the Greeks are tied up with the French and like the French are getting most their equipment by now from the Americans. British influence should be much more pronounced in the navy and air force.
2. How internal Greek politics have gone? The royal dictatorship continuing seems to me unlikely. Which means Venizelists are back into government (with French and some British backing) along with moderate Royalists. And for that matter the 1936 parliament since new elections are impossible.
3. What's happening in occupied Albania? Aside from Axis collaborators you have at least 4 factions around between the communists, Bali Kombetar, the royalists and the North Epirote Liberation front. The last is certainly receiving aid from the Greeks. Bali Kombetar is in a problematic position just like OTL when they ended on the German side.
 
I assume that the somewhat half-baked arrangements for keeping Mussolini secure haven't changed, so the Germans will get him and use him as a figurehead, as OTL.
I don't know if I'd call them Half-Baked. The operation the Germans pulled off to liberate him was, in a word, insane.
 
First and foremost, I expect Attica to be turned into a cluster of airbases in order to bomb Ploesti. There is no reason at all to develop Crete or Rhodes as an airbase, when you have Attica that includes one of the biggest ports in the Mediterranean (Piraeus). When we talk logistics, it is rather easy to develop a cluster of bomber airfields in Attica.
This would be the main reason the Americans have no interest in making further territorial gains in the theatre - Attica is all they want & need as a base to strike Ploesti. However, because the British & French tried to raid Ploesti already (see parts 5.2 and 8.2), the Germans & Rumanians became keenly aware of the risk, and Ploesti, by this point, is probably at least as well defended as OTL. What that means I'm not certain - the much shorter range might make attacks much more effective.
From Athens' POV, Albania is acting as an italian co-belligerent/satelite, rather than an occupied territory. The Epirus Front continues to be active and most propably there was active albanian participation in the occupation of greek Epirus until the Italian Armistice. I believe that the greek government will push hard for an annexation of North Epirus/South Albania and at this point, the Great Powers have no interests that are contrary to a greek annexation. Albania is not a communist vassal at this point, but rather an italian vassal. There is no reason as all to appease Stalin if the Red Banner is not over Tirana.
You've convinced me that Athens will make annexation of North Epirus a war aim, and the Allies will go along with it - especially since the war will certainly end with Greek forces in occupation of the area - so a fait accompli that no-one will care much about reversing. Even if the Communists do take power in Tirana (doubtful at this point: it's likely the Greek army will be there by 1945), I doubt if Stalin would want to make much of the issue - if the KKE supports the annexation, Moscow may feel that good relations with the KKE are more important - but I have no idea how that would play out.
The reason Greece wanted to annex some mountains of zero economic value was pure geopolitical: 3 times in the past 30 years Greece was invaded by Bulgaria. Athens doesn't want economic resources, nor to liberate a greek popoulation, but to anchor the border on defensible terrain. In OTL there were various greek propositions ranging from "humble" to much more ambitious. A median proposition between the extremes of greek demands follows the Arda River. The success or not of greek plans depends mostly on which Ally occupies Bulgaria first. If the Red Army occupies first Bulgaria and installs a puppet communist government, then it is in Moscow's interest to keep Bulgaria intact. The the Western Allies may or may not find worth it to burn diplomatic capital over the bulgarian border. But if it is the Western Allies that occupy first Bulgaria, then I expect Greeks annexing some parts of the Rhodope Mountains.
Thinking rather off the cuff here: with the military situation as it is, it is virtually certain the British (who are holding the eastern sector of the front) will get to the Rhodope mountains first. They might not want to go much further if the Percentages Agreement still happens. However, I doubt if it would happen in the same way. London might doubt Bulgaria's value as a post-war ally, since on the one hand, an ally with a Black Sea coast helps to contain Moscow; on the other hand, Bulgaria has a pro-Russian policy tradition, so London would find it difficult to persuade Sofia to go along with containment. And of course Sofia would become hostile if London had allowed Athens to make the Rhodope annexation. So as far as London is concerned, there are substantial policy implications to the military question of how far to go towards the north-east.
In military terms, once the British liberate Salonika (likely in 1943 or 44 at the latest) they will have to decide whether to concentrate on pushing north to Sofia or north-east. But if the Germans just abandon the Balkans in 1944 Bulgaria might sue for peace anyway. (They might not even wait that long.) Sofia might feel that it has some leverage - they could say to the British "we'll backstab Berlin if you guarantee our territory". London would probably find that an attractive offer, as it would unhinge the entire German position in the Balkans - southern Yugoslavia and Rumania suddenly become vulnerable. But Sofia would have to time such a diplomatic manoeuvre cleverly - too late and they lose their leverage, too early and they risk German invasion.
In turn, making such a deal with Sofia, which would disappoint Athens, would strengthen the argument for rewarding Athens with North Epirus. I will need to do more work on this, I haven't yet written much about the close-out of the war in this theatre, but will clearly need to do so.
Who is arming the Greek army TTL? my guess given pre-war ties is the Greeks are tied up with the French and like the French are getting most their equipment by now from the Americans.
Yes. Greek quartermasters probably spent most of 1941-2 tearing their hair out: the Greek armed forces would have been using a mixture of British, French, captured Italian and later American equipment. But hey, there's good news: soon they'll have captured German equipment to use as well! Joking apart, like the French they will progressively get US kit, I expect during 1943 they will complete the process.
The royal dictatorship continuing seems to me unlikely. Which means Venizelists are back into government (with French and some British backing) along with moderate Royalists.
Offstage there have certainly been political developments. London & Algiers would have encouraged a political accommodation between the Royalists & Venizelists (especially if the Communists look like becoming more numerous). I envisage something like a National Defence Front (which G-Translate tells me would be 'Métopo ethnikís ámynas', so MEA).
What's happening in occupied Albania? Aside from Axis collaborators you have at least 4 factions around between the communists, Bali Kombetar, the royalists and the North Epirote Liberation front
I expect very similar ATL - I don't see much reason they would differ, though the North Epirots would be much stronger since Greece itself can provide substantial aid.
I don't know if I'd call them Half-Baked.
I was thinking of how the guards didn't actually resist the Germans - presumably because they were so surprised. It could presumably have gone differently - but I have a different fate in mind for Sr. Mussolini.
 
I don't know if I missed it somewhere but, what is the status of the Pope right now? Is he still in Rome or was he able to get out to some place elese?
 
I expect very similar ATL - I don't see much reason they would differ, though the North Epirots would be much stronger since Greece itself can provide substantial aid.
Well, the Italian forces in Albania are resisting the Germans instead of being interned, aren't they? That could make some difference. OTOH, Greek annexationism might create a self-fulfilling prophecy: more Albanians are likely to collaborate with the Germans, resulting in Albania regarded more as an Axis minor than a victim of Fascist aggression (which of course it also was). Which would make the Allies more sympathetic to the Greek view.
 
Well, the Italian forces in Albania are resisting the Germans instead of being interned, aren't they? That could make some difference. OTOH, Greek annexationism might create a self-fulfilling prophecy: more Albanians are likely to collaborate with the Germans, resulting in Albania regarded more as an Axis minor than a victim of Fascist aggression (which of course it also was). Which would make the Allies more sympathetic to the Greek view.
The cynic in me would note first that Fighting Greece probably is getting a LOT of propaganda in the United States and elsewhere, being the sole European minor to not just stand up to the Axis but survive doing so. And that Balli Kombetar which begun as a resistance group went full collaborationist in very short order.
 
The cynic in me would note first that Fighting Greece probably is getting a LOT of propaganda in the United States and elsewhere, being the sole European minor to not just stand up to the Axis but survive doing so. And that Balli Kombetar which begun as a resistance group went full collaborationist in very short order.
I don't much about Balli Kombetar, but clearly Greece is going to gather a LOT of respect.
 

Driftless

Donor
The cynic in me would note first that Fighting Greece probably is getting a LOT of propaganda in the United States and elsewhere, being the sole European minor to not just stand up to the Axis but survive doing so. (snip)
"Let them look to Greece!" An AH quote from this universe's FDR. Probably with allusions to Greece as the cradle of democracy, etc.

From OTL's "Look to Norway" speech by FDR:
"If there is anyone who still wonders why this war is being fought, let him look to Norway. If there is anyone who has any delusions that this war could have been averted, let him look to Norway; and if there is anyone who doubts the democratic will to win, again I say, let him look to Norway. "
 
"If there is anyone who still wonders why this war is being fought, let him look to Greece.* If there is anyone who has any delusions that this war could have been averted, let him look to Greece*; and if there is anyone who doubts the democratic will to win, again I say, let him look to Greece*. "
Just, you know, ignore that fact that Greece was basically a Royal Dictatorship until we had some stern words with their Ministers. :p
 
Just caught up with this wonderfull timeline. I thing Greece receiving North Epirus (or at least parts of it) ITTL is almost a certainty. Besides this, when the Allies start liberating Salonika along with Macedonia and Thrace and find out the Bulgarian attrocities comitted there, a stronger Greece will have much more leverage to gain a more defensible border with Bulgaria. However the Turks will be very uneasy about a strong Greece and that is something that the British and the Americans will have to take into consideration.
 
Just caught up with this wonderfull timeline. I thing Greece receiving North Epirus (or at least parts of it) ITTL is almost a certainty. Besides this, when the Allies start liberating Salonika along with Macedonia and Thrace and find out the Bulgarian attrocities comitted there, a stronger Greece will have much more leverage to gain a more defensible border with Bulgaria. However the Turks will be very uneasy about a strong Greece and that is something that the British and the Americans will have to take into consideration.
The Turks were allied to Greece at the time. If you want to get funny the Foreign office or elements of it actually proposed union of Cyprus with Greece in 1946, was stopped by arguments the Communists might win the civil war. Here though? And lets not forget who was the instigator of the original proposal to give Cyprus to Greece back in 1913... a certain Winston Churchill.
 
I don't know if I missed it somewhere but, what is the status of the Pope right now? Is he still in Rome or was he able to get out to some place elese?
I assume he would not want to leave the Vatican, as per OTL. One perhaps interesting point - his palace at Castelgandolfo is close to the front line now.
Well, the Italian forces in Albania are resisting the Germans instead of being interned, aren't they?
It's a mixed bag. Some will resist, some will join the Germans, perhaps a plurality will just try to reach Allied lines.
"Let them look to Greece!" An AH quote from this universe's FDR.
And maybe one or two American warships get Greek-themed names.
the Turks will be very uneasy about a strong Greece and that is something that the British and the Americans will have to take into consideration.
That might argue for the Turks joining the Allies rather earlier than in 1945, as OTL; but probably not while there are Germans in Bulgaria.
If you want to get funny the Foreign office or elements of it actually proposed union of Cyprus with Greece in 1946, was stopped by arguments the Communists might win the civil war. Here though?
That would imply Enosis might actually happen in the ATL - I can't see a very strong reason why the FO would oppose it under these circumstances (possibly to avoid trouble with Turkey?), but this would be an area of policy where one or two particular individuals might have an outsize influence.
 
Part 12.5
Extract from A Pilgrim to Mount Lebanon, by Marc Malik

...during 1941 the French Army’s policy in this respect had vacillated, both over time and even between units, and many of us felt frustrated by this inconsistency at a time when, as we felt, all civilisation hung in the balance. Finally in January 1942 the Governor overrode the remaining obstacles and announced that we could indeed apply for commissioned rank. (Not only Maronites were included in this dispensation, but I believe we provided more officer candidates than any other community.) My father had made this a condition of my becoming a soldier. My mother, by contrast, had insisted that I get married and provide her with grandchildren, which I had done: therefore all my filial duties had been performed...

All that remained was for me to pay a final call on Father Owlthwaite, who gave me many wise words of encouragement. On my way to the harbour I saw the latest batch of propaganda posters, in French, Greek and Arabic, posters which gave great prominence to the American flag along all the others: the words ran, ‘the victory of the United Nations is now assured’. I prayed that in this case the propaganda should prove true. Thus, along with my old school friends (and now comrades-in-arms) Charles and Bachir, I boarded the transport taking the latest batch of replacements to the theatre of war...

Upon arrival in Piraeus, it seemed that the army, with its usual wisdom, had forgotten we were coming, and we spent some nights in great discomfort. At length they shunted us onto a train, with a new American locomotive, which took us to Megara, where we bought some (expensive, but passable) cheese and figs, before bringing us back to Athens. Our picnic-day-trip, we called it, and it seemed to have served no purpose whatsoever. A few days later, when we boarded the train again, this time ending up at Thebes, or Thiva as they call it now. ‘They must have heard we have studied the classics,’ said Charles, ‘they are truly giving us the tour.’ This time it was for real, and we began a long march into the hills.

We had all heard of the exploits of the 192nd, the “Mountain Goats”. To young men who knew Mount Lebanon, the hill-country of Greece held few terrors. We knew, of course, that the enemy posed a terrible danger, as they had shown only a few months earlier. But the progress of Allied arms in Sicily and elsewhere encouraged us. I would not say that we had received the best possible training; nonetheless we felt confidence as we climbed into the hills, a curious caravan of men, mules and a handful of tractors carrying artillery ammunition. We all noted how much better the shells, and even the animals, were treated than the men. I pointed this out to a French colonel, returning to his command after taking a wound during the retreat - I think his name was Beaufre - and he replied, ‘well, we humans have a good deal less value, it would seem.’ He chided some of the men for urging the mules on with more alacrity than caution.

My friends joined rifle companies of the Regiment du Liban. Divisional staff, however, picked me, as a fluent English-speaker, to liaise with the English division on our right flank. This seemed like a plum post, and I said so. ‘Oh certainly,’ said the chief of staff, with a somewhat sly look, ‘our previous two liaison officers both got killed by artillery. Only one road connects our positions with the English, the Boche have their guns trained on it.’ Therefore, at first, I had some doubts whether I had been wise to pay so much attention to Father Owlthwaite’s lessons, and become his star pupil...

As Christmas 1942 approached, it became clear that neither side intended to make any move that year. All our plans were to build up our strength, above all in artillery, for an advance in February or March, this was the plan known as TIRADE. An endless stream of mules and vehicles - particularly the new American light trucks - bringing artillery and ammunition up from the plains. The Germans, doubtless, could see this, but could do little to interfere, since by now we had command of the air. On one of the rare days when the weather permitted flying, I saw three German bombers try to strike the road, but Greek fighters - Type 81s, said Bachir, who had actually paid attention during our aircraft-recognition classes - intercepted them. One bomber crashed behind our lines, and we all took the opportunity to take souvenirs: I still possess the scrap of metal, printed with a Gothic writing, that I took from the wreck.

Meanwhile I spent the winter making trips - usually by night - down the mountain to talk to my opposite number, the English liaison officer at the HQ of the 2nd Armoured, the “Hoplites”, whose tanks would surely play a large part in the offensive. This officer, a cultured gentleman named Captain Willbond, liked the jesting nickname ‘Parmenion’, and spoke Greek and French fluently. He took much delight in showing off the British tanks and guns, and I often lingered beyond the time required to perform my duties, out of my pleasure in his company.

On New Year’s Eve Charles and Bachir accompanied me on one of my visits to the Captain, as we planned to toast the New Year in the hope it would bring good fortune. We fell to talking about the prospects, and I recall this somewhat tipsy conversation for the way it illustrated the differences in perspective that may occur even between friends and allies.

‘I’ll wager we’ll turn the Hun out of Greece before next Christmas,’ said Parmenion.

‘A noble aim,’ I said. ‘I won’t take that wager.’ Bachir and I laughed.

‘It’ll take time to reach Berlin, though,’ he went on. ‘Still with splendid chaps like yourselves, no doubt of the result. Then your country will get its independence, no doubt, too. Empires have had their day.’

‘Now that I do believe,’ I said. ‘But I hope we will stay friends with France after the war.’

The Captain swirled his tumbler. ‘I expect afterwards I’ll turn into some old duffer always yarning on about the war. Tell me, Marc, what do you expect to do in peacetime? It will seem quite dull after all this.’

Charles, who had gone rather red, interjected. ‘Peacetime? What a word. Captain, we come from different worlds.’ He paused, the Englishman looked puzzled, his brow furrowed. ‘This war is your real war, Captain. For us, not so much.’

‘I’m afraid I don’t quite follow you, old chap.’

‘You will go home to England and tell - yarns - in your club. Good, you deserve no less. We will go home - God willing - and prepare for the next war.’ He paused again. ‘This war is a pastime to us. Do you not understand? For us, the real war is more likely to come to us, at home, on Mount Lebanon itself.’ His voice trembled.

‘Well, it’s a rough part of the world, I know…’ said the Captain.

Charles collected himself, and spoke in some evident bitterness of heart. ‘You have heard, maybe, about the Armenians, the Assyrians. How did your grandparents perish, Captain? All mine died in the famine of 1917.’

I felt he had gone far enough, and I could see Bachir agreed. ‘I fear that perhaps we do not endear ourselves to our neighbours, though,’ he put in. ‘The Syrians never wanted French rule - they got it anyway, by force, and no little bloodshed. We have perhaps not done well by tying our fortunes so closely to the French.’ Bachir, I knew, had begun to toy with nationalism, precisely as a way to diffuse, so he hoped, the sectarian enmities that have always plagued us.

Parmenion gave him a quizzical look. ‘But here you are, old chap, in a French uniform,’ he pointed out.

Bachir smiled. ‘I never pretended to be consistent.’

Charles looked like he wanted to say more, but he had drunk more than was good for him, and I doubted such talk would do much good. Yet clearly he had many fears for the future. Looking back, I can understand his anxiety, who would not, but thankfully his worst fears have not come to pass. At the time, Bachir and I said our farewells and half carried Charles back up the mountain. Halfway up, he seemed to become lucid for a moment. ‘Is this Mount Lebanon?’ he asked. No, we told him. ‘A pity,’ he said, ‘I would have liked to see home again. I never will.’
Most of our conversations were less emotional. It was with some relief that I resumed my visits in the New Year of 1943, and watched the Hoplites re-equip with new heavy tanks, specially designed, they said, to cope with hills. Yet more guns and shells arrived in the hills, and German planes became a rare sight.

All this gave us heart. Still, the prospect of having to drive a determined enemy, well-supplied with machine guns and mortars, out of prepared hilltop positions, did not appeal. Throughout the winter, we lost men in many little skirmishes. Poor Charles led a platoon on one patrol and suffered a dozen casualties, some of whom he had to leave behind, which pained him much. I fear my letters home to my wife and parents must have made poor reading for them during this period. I was too preoccupied to write much, or well. We felt a little like condemned men waiting for the guillotine; the veterans among us talked darkly of the hard fights they had been in against the Boche. And then, like sunrise, came the news of the fall of Mussolini.

This transformed the situation. The Italian armies which faced the Greeks (to our west) more or less disintegrated, the Greeks took tens of thousands of prisoners, and we also picked up many. Even though they had been enemies, our hearts were moved to see them, many of them wearing rags, many had not eaten for days, and they fell on our American rations eagerly. We found common ground with them when they came to our church services, and this helped us to trust them. A few even begged to remain with us. For instance there was one signals officer, whose name was Ruggieri, who said to me, ‘the Germans have occupied Lombardy, I cannot go home. I want to stay with you, and obtain satisfaction for all the injuries and insults the Germans have done to us.’ Usually we had to turn down such requests, but the Colonel turned a blind eye in some cases - particularly men like Tenente Ruggieri, with skills in short supply.

On 19th February we moved cautiously forward and found the German positions abandoned. With picked our way through with a mixture of caution (the Germans loved to booby-trap everything they could), curiosity (they left behind some strange tin tubes, which we initially though might be glue, but turned out to be food) and disgust (especially for the trashy Nazi propaganda leaflets, adorned as they were with unflattering pictures of Englishmen, Africans and Jews). We found a good use for these last. Sometimes, though, we found more humane detritus, such as thin volumes of Goethe and even, on one memorable occasion, a record of Beethoven’s 7th. This we took to HQ, as we knew that Captain Bouchard, the intelligence officer, had a portable record-player. In the following days, the sound of Beethoven often soared over the high valleys in the evenings, and took us for a time away from thoughts of war.

The Germans, preoccupied with the need to occupy Albania and disarm their erstwhile Italian allies, could not resist for some time, and we advanced all along the lines. The days passed, and our excitement grew, as the Hoplites freed Larissa and the Greeks retook Ioannina, then pushed further north quickly and entered Albania. The English followed up with a heavy blow against the Bulgarians, who retreated past Olympus, enabling them to resume their old Haliakmon line, though the Germans and Bulgarians just managed to hold Salonika. In effect the enemy traded space for time, giving up Thessaly to secure Albania. The Greeks, exhausted by their great efforts, had to stop short of Vlore, as the collapse of Italian resistance to the Germans enabled the latter to form a defensive line in the hills north of Gjirokaster, where Greek I Corps made a brave, but unsupported attack that the Germans repulsed.

Meanwhile we pushed north in the centre, reaching the narrow, rushing Venetikos river (which I fell into, and had some alarming moments before my comrades pulled me out), and so took Grevena in March. We all felt great pride that, despite facing the hard terrain of the mountains, we had kept pace with the English as they advanced on our right, and the Greek Army on our left. The Colonel assembled his staff. ‘Two years ago,’ he said, ‘we stood here. What an effort, how many sacrifices it has taken to stand here again! But from now on, we shall only go forward.’

He spoke truly. The Germans had not quite finished retreating, and we kept the pressure on. A few days later we gazed down upon lake Orestiada. Bachir, Charles and I dared each other to swim in its chilly waters, a baptism that left us frozen yet joyous. It was a blessed moment, which I hope I shall always recall clearly.

The next day, Charles was leading his men forward when he entered an abandoned farmhouse. He disturbed a booby-trap, which detonated and killed him instantly.
 
Part 12.6
Extract from A History of Modern India by Warren Semyonoff

After the outbreak of the war in Asia, all the major players in Indian politics faced new challenges and opportunities. Each had to carry out a balancing act of sorts. Congress had to preserve its own unity, somewhat tested by the demands of war and the need to maintain political momentum in the face of opposition from both the Viceroy and London. With hindsight, it has become clear that the Congress lacked a policy to deal with the demands of the League that might have prevented Partition. But the League had ‘already let that genie out of the bottle in 1940,’ as the Viceroy commented, ‘there is no way they could entice him back in, even if they wanted to.’ In all likelihood there was nothing that Congress could do at this point to achieve the kind of relationship with the League that might have maintained national unity.

The League, for its part, played its hand shrewdly, remaining more co-operative than the Congress and therefore ‘playing the blue-eyed boy of London,’ as Nehru accused in late 1942. Mr. Jinnah’s concern as 1942 progressed was to prevent Washington’s influence from leading to any sudden demarche on London’s part. He need not have worried - once it became clear that Singapore would be held, the Churchill government felt it could resist the pressure, both from Washington and its own Labour Party supporters, for any new initiatives. Politically, then, the year passed in a state of outward tranquility, disguising frantic activity...

Therefore, London got what it wanted. Without any major political developments, India mobilised for war on a grand scale, and several Indian Army divisions would become available for the planned offensive of 1943. Under the surface, though, something decisive did occur in 1942. General Wavell meditated on the experience some years later, in conversation with General Chaudhuri. ‘Nothing appeared to have changed. At year’s end, all the same men were in the same places. There were no mass movements, remarkably few protests even, considering the weight of taxes. Yet it was in 1942 that the mind of the nation was made up, and almost without argument, both Indians and British administrators began to openly talk about the inevitability of Dominion status, or even independence - not as a distant prospect, but as a fruit of war. The great mobilisation of the Indian people made all of this seem quite natural.’

Algiers was also able to extract a modest benefit from all this. By taking London’s side in all discussions on colonial questions, they compelled London to return the favour. Schemes to support the burgeoning resistance to the Japanese in Indochina therefore fell squarely into the purview of the French administration. Their efforts mostly proved unavailing, chiefly due to the differences in political outlook between the French liaison officers and the Vietnamese activists who dominated the movement. This too frustrated the Americans somewhat, but not to the point of risking any real damage to the core relationships between Washington, London and Algiers. On one occasion, after a spate of aggrieved memoranda on the subject, Cordell Hull said privately, ‘Indochina does not have importance enough to warrant so much as harsh words to anyone. Once the war is over I hope never to hear about it again.’
 
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