You know, I would be interested in seeing how South Korean troops will interact with the Spanish. I mean South Korea did send troops to Vietnam. Plus like Spain, both countries were under dictatorship at the time with Park Chung-hee ruling South Korea under a Junta. Also in Vietnam, the Viet Cong were scared shitless by the Koreans since South Korean troops were pretty ruthless.
Españoles en Vietnam: Franco's last war.
- Thread starter Kurt_Steiner
- Start date
Well, they are both known for their hatred towards anything that looked Communist. Perhaps the Spaniards may learn a trick or two from the Korean soldiers.... mmmm... I have an idea...
Let me guess... Spanish learn how to counter gurrillas from south korea. Because south korea have defeated Communist insurgency after Korean War..
They are going to learn something. Whether to how to defeat guerrillas or anything else is to be seen.
There's always the great Spanish movie Apocalipsis ahora.
"¿Oliendo eso? Es napalm. Me encanta el olor del napalm en la mañana. Huele a . . . victoria."
"Carlito no lo hace surf."
"Eres un chico de recado, enviado por los vendedores de comestibles, para recoger una factura."
And of course the terrifying last line:
"El horror, el horror."
But for some minor corrections, I think we have a wonderful script for a film... if we keep Almodovar away from it.
I've just caught up with this original TL, it's good to see something that ventures off the beaten path
Thanks a lot, mate!
I always try to go out of the usual topics, at least in the post 1900 section.
Let's see if I can keep your attention.
Knowing how the Spanish at that point thought, the likely takeaway was probably that the French failings came from insufficient political will and ability to support their forces. The French government during the time was incredibly unstable to the nature of the Fourth Republic's structure, so there was never a consistent policy and there was even regular sabotage by the strong French Communist movement. I don't know enough about Francoist Spain to say for sure but it wouldn't have surprised me at all if Franco used the Fourth Republic for propaganda to claim that democracy equals chaos and Communism.
Franco would most strike the note that the "discipline at the top" in his governing model would prevent the failures of "degenerate" France or something like that and that American resources, numbers, and ability to support their troops far exceeded that of France and that this would prevent any Dien Bien Phu reruns with Spanish boys.
In the end, I thought they can be useful to me...
Similar heritage but, in that moment of history, living politically in two very different worlds. What Asp says summarizes my thoughts.
I can imagine the Francoist propaganda pointing at the French failure to enhace the "shortcommings" of democracy and to sing about the "peace and prosperity" given by Franco, that's for sure.
18. ¡No en mi nombre! (1)
18. ¡No en mi nombre! (1)
Unknown to him, when Martin Luther King Jr spoke at Riverside church in New York about the war (April 4th, 1968), Salvador de Madariaga (in the picture above), paraphrased him a few weeks later, on April 19th. Madariaga (1886-1978) stated that "this madness has to stop now. We cannot allow this to happen, to remain unmoved while another country is laid to wate, its innhabitants murdered and its culture subverted.We canniot follow the path we have taken because it is wrong. This war as to stop now".
Madariaga, a former Republican minister who had been the soul of the so-called "Contubernio de Munich" that had gathered most of the oppositors against Franco, expressed in this way what not only him but many Spaniards within its borders and abroad, thought about the Vietnam War. Then, on April 30th, 1967 in Barcelona some 60 young men including a few university students came together to burn their draft cards in. More people joined them, including uniformed Army Reservist Anselmo Carrasco (2). As many as 78 cards were burned that day. On May 2 Carrasco was arrested at his home and held in a prison cell, as well as being charged with several crimes. Penalties he faced included up to twenty years in prison, and an additional eleven-months in jail for wearing his uniform without approval. During his trial, three men burned their draft cards.
On June 5-6 300 peace activists gathered at Madrid and created the Comité Nacional para Acabar la Guerra en Vietnam (CONAV - the National Committee to end the War in Vietnam). An underground organization with some links with the ilegal Federación Universitaria Democrática Española (Democratic Federation of Spanish Universities), they planned a large demonstration in Madrid on September 21, 1967. However, after the long months of worker's protests in Vizcaya (from November 1966 to April 1967), the regime was anxious to quell any protests and the secuirty forces had informers within the CONAV, and the committe was soon disbanded and most of its members arrested. Some professors (such as José Luis López Aranguren, Enrique Tierno Galván and Agustín García Calvo) that had dared to support the protests of the students were soon dismissed.
Then, the Francoist regime received a terrible flow. José Rico (3), a veteran who had returned from Vietnam, participated in a protest on November 6, 1967. On December 30, Rico and ten like-minded men attended a peace demonstration in Madrid and were arrested and court-martialed by the Francoist authorities. But they were not alone. On January 16 a day of widespread war protest organized by the remnants of the CONAV took place in 10 cities across Spain, with some 600 draft cards burned.
It was just the beginning.
(1) Not in my name!
(2) and (3) Even if I made up these characters, the names are taken from two of the 37 army men and four civilians that conspired to kill Franco on July 18-20th, 1936. They were court-martialed in April 1937, and 7 were executed.
Unknown to him, when Martin Luther King Jr spoke at Riverside church in New York about the war (April 4th, 1968), Salvador de Madariaga (in the picture above), paraphrased him a few weeks later, on April 19th. Madariaga (1886-1978) stated that "this madness has to stop now. We cannot allow this to happen, to remain unmoved while another country is laid to wate, its innhabitants murdered and its culture subverted.We canniot follow the path we have taken because it is wrong. This war as to stop now".
Madariaga, a former Republican minister who had been the soul of the so-called "Contubernio de Munich" that had gathered most of the oppositors against Franco, expressed in this way what not only him but many Spaniards within its borders and abroad, thought about the Vietnam War. Then, on April 30th, 1967 in Barcelona some 60 young men including a few university students came together to burn their draft cards in. More people joined them, including uniformed Army Reservist Anselmo Carrasco (2). As many as 78 cards were burned that day. On May 2 Carrasco was arrested at his home and held in a prison cell, as well as being charged with several crimes. Penalties he faced included up to twenty years in prison, and an additional eleven-months in jail for wearing his uniform without approval. During his trial, three men burned their draft cards.
On June 5-6 300 peace activists gathered at Madrid and created the Comité Nacional para Acabar la Guerra en Vietnam (CONAV - the National Committee to end the War in Vietnam). An underground organization with some links with the ilegal Federación Universitaria Democrática Española (Democratic Federation of Spanish Universities), they planned a large demonstration in Madrid on September 21, 1967. However, after the long months of worker's protests in Vizcaya (from November 1966 to April 1967), the regime was anxious to quell any protests and the secuirty forces had informers within the CONAV, and the committe was soon disbanded and most of its members arrested. Some professors (such as José Luis López Aranguren, Enrique Tierno Galván and Agustín García Calvo) that had dared to support the protests of the students were soon dismissed.
Then, the Francoist regime received a terrible flow. José Rico (3), a veteran who had returned from Vietnam, participated in a protest on November 6, 1967. On December 30, Rico and ten like-minded men attended a peace demonstration in Madrid and were arrested and court-martialed by the Francoist authorities. But they were not alone. On January 16 a day of widespread war protest organized by the remnants of the CONAV took place in 10 cities across Spain, with some 600 draft cards burned.
It was just the beginning.
(1) Not in my name!
(2) and (3) Even if I made up these characters, the names are taken from two of the 37 army men and four civilians that conspired to kill Franco on July 18-20th, 1936. They were court-martialed in April 1937, and 7 were executed.
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I wondered why Spanish involvment was said to end in 1971, now we have a hint of answer.
19. Rest and recreation.
19. Rest and recreation.
Theoretically, any Spanish soldier fighting in Vietnam had a week of rest and recreation (R&R) outside Vietnam in any place of his choosing (Hong Kong, Singapur, Bangkok, Penang, Taipei) but hardly any of them applied for that trip and used the week along with the three days that they could spent in any coastal city (Da Nang, Chu Lai, Qui Nonh, Nhan Trang, Cam Ranh and Vung Tau or created their own "holiday centers" in the rearguard of their area of responsability. As Saigon was so close to their barracks, the average Spanish soldier spent quite a lot of time in the capital of South Vietnam. Furthermore, to increase the number of VC prisoners captured by their troops, the Spanish officers promised them extra free days in exchange for an amount of captured VCs.
For any Spaniard in Vietnam there was a problem. The US soldiers were able to spent huge amounts of money that, among many other side-effects, cause a rise of 170% in the South Vietnamese inflation rate. As the Spanish soldiers had not the same economic resources as the US grunt that gave way to a growing sense of resentment among some but not all the Spaniards in Vietnam. Anyway, that resentment caused hardly any troubles between US and Spanish soldiers.
Furthermore, the vivacious way of life that the Spaniards led there was to cause some frictions with the Vietnamese population. This, along with the initial misundertandings and the different cultures of the two sides was to worse those troubles. However, as time went on, the Spaniards improved their relations with the Vietnamese, just by the simple fact that they had not so much money to spent and thus they did not offend the Vietnamese sensitivity, which, anyway, was already offended by the easy-going way of life of the US grunts. Furthermore, the Spanish soldiers used to visit the R&R area used by the Australians soldiers placed between Long Hau and Vung Tai.
Theoretically, any Spanish soldier fighting in Vietnam had a week of rest and recreation (R&R) outside Vietnam in any place of his choosing (Hong Kong, Singapur, Bangkok, Penang, Taipei) but hardly any of them applied for that trip and used the week along with the three days that they could spent in any coastal city (Da Nang, Chu Lai, Qui Nonh, Nhan Trang, Cam Ranh and Vung Tau or created their own "holiday centers" in the rearguard of their area of responsability. As Saigon was so close to their barracks, the average Spanish soldier spent quite a lot of time in the capital of South Vietnam. Furthermore, to increase the number of VC prisoners captured by their troops, the Spanish officers promised them extra free days in exchange for an amount of captured VCs.
For any Spaniard in Vietnam there was a problem. The US soldiers were able to spent huge amounts of money that, among many other side-effects, cause a rise of 170% in the South Vietnamese inflation rate. As the Spanish soldiers had not the same economic resources as the US grunt that gave way to a growing sense of resentment among some but not all the Spaniards in Vietnam. Anyway, that resentment caused hardly any troubles between US and Spanish soldiers.
Furthermore, the vivacious way of life that the Spaniards led there was to cause some frictions with the Vietnamese population. This, along with the initial misundertandings and the different cultures of the two sides was to worse those troubles. However, as time went on, the Spaniards improved their relations with the Vietnamese, just by the simple fact that they had not so much money to spent and thus they did not offend the Vietnamese sensitivity, which, anyway, was already offended by the easy-going way of life of the US grunts. Furthermore, the Spanish soldiers used to visit the R&R area used by the Australians soldiers placed between Long Hau and Vung Tai.
20. Learning new tricks.
20. Learning new tricks.
Infantrymen of the Republic of Korea's 26th Regimental Combat Team
swing their rifles and shout "Meng Ho" (Fierce Tiger) as they arrive in South Vietnam. in 1966
Operation Hong Kil Dong (July 9 – August 26, 1967) was not only the largest South Korean operation of the Vietnam war, but also the beginning of a "special" relationship a among Allies. The 48-day-long operation was claimed by Seoul as a major success as they claimed to have thwarted the VPA/NLF infiltration efforts in friendly areas. The results of the operation were a kill ratio of 24:1 according to the Korean's report: 638 Vietnamese to 26 South Koreans. 98 heavy machine guns and mortars and 359 rifle, light machine guns and assault rifles were captured in the aftermath.
In adittion to the hatred that most Koreans felt towards Communism, what one official called “the holy war in defense of the free world”, Seoul had its own reasons to be there. It was alarmed by the United States’ plan to move part of its units stationed in South Korea to Vietnam and what that would mean for its security in relation to North Korea. South Korea also wanted to turn its Vietnam experience into a springboard for its own economic development, remembering Japan’s economic recovery after the destruction of World War II and against the backdrop of the destruction of the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953.
South Korea’s top brass and politicians bragged about the efficacy of their armies in counterinsurgency warfare resulting from the Korean War experience — something the American Army, experienced in conventional warfare, was allegedly less familiar with. Thus, Madrid thought it would be a good idea to send observers to join the Korean forces in Vietnam and to learn from them. Initially, the ruthless methods of the South Korean soldiers shocked the Spaniards, as, for instance, they did not take prisoners. Instead of them, they simply executed them. "A Communist cannot be redeemed", replied a South Korean officer to a shocked Spaniard when he made some objections after seeing the execution of some unarmed VC prisoneros of war. However, this "philosohpy" found an apt soil among the volunteers from the Legión, and the Batallón Mixto was the first Spanish unit to apply the "Korean" ways of war, which soon were also adopted by the two remaining batallions.
Another reason for the success of the Korean-Spanish relation is came from a similar situation. In spite of their idealism about fighting against Communism alongside Americans, the racial reality quickly became a source of profound disappointment and disillusionment with American power both among the Korean and Spanish soldiers, perhaps a bit more in the former case. As the Spanish soldiers, at least those "used" to deal with Asian people, were not so "racially owrried", once the initial mutual surprise was gone, the collaboration among both sides went quite smoothly.
Soon both the MACVSOG and the VC/NVA were to notice the change.
Infantrymen of the Republic of Korea's 26th Regimental Combat Team
swing their rifles and shout "Meng Ho" (Fierce Tiger) as they arrive in South Vietnam. in 1966
Operation Hong Kil Dong (July 9 – August 26, 1967) was not only the largest South Korean operation of the Vietnam war, but also the beginning of a "special" relationship a among Allies. The 48-day-long operation was claimed by Seoul as a major success as they claimed to have thwarted the VPA/NLF infiltration efforts in friendly areas. The results of the operation were a kill ratio of 24:1 according to the Korean's report: 638 Vietnamese to 26 South Koreans. 98 heavy machine guns and mortars and 359 rifle, light machine guns and assault rifles were captured in the aftermath.
In adittion to the hatred that most Koreans felt towards Communism, what one official called “the holy war in defense of the free world”, Seoul had its own reasons to be there. It was alarmed by the United States’ plan to move part of its units stationed in South Korea to Vietnam and what that would mean for its security in relation to North Korea. South Korea also wanted to turn its Vietnam experience into a springboard for its own economic development, remembering Japan’s economic recovery after the destruction of World War II and against the backdrop of the destruction of the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953.
South Korea’s top brass and politicians bragged about the efficacy of their armies in counterinsurgency warfare resulting from the Korean War experience — something the American Army, experienced in conventional warfare, was allegedly less familiar with. Thus, Madrid thought it would be a good idea to send observers to join the Korean forces in Vietnam and to learn from them. Initially, the ruthless methods of the South Korean soldiers shocked the Spaniards, as, for instance, they did not take prisoners. Instead of them, they simply executed them. "A Communist cannot be redeemed", replied a South Korean officer to a shocked Spaniard when he made some objections after seeing the execution of some unarmed VC prisoneros of war. However, this "philosohpy" found an apt soil among the volunteers from the Legión, and the Batallón Mixto was the first Spanish unit to apply the "Korean" ways of war, which soon were also adopted by the two remaining batallions.
Another reason for the success of the Korean-Spanish relation is came from a similar situation. In spite of their idealism about fighting against Communism alongside Americans, the racial reality quickly became a source of profound disappointment and disillusionment with American power both among the Korean and Spanish soldiers, perhaps a bit more in the former case. As the Spanish soldiers, at least those "used" to deal with Asian people, were not so "racially owrried", once the initial mutual surprise was gone, the collaboration among both sides went quite smoothly.
Soon both the MACVSOG and the VC/NVA were to notice the change.
Finally.. South koreans making an appearance..20. Learning new tricks.
Infantrymen of the Republic of Korea's 26th Regimental Combat Team
swing their rifles and shout "Meng Ho" (Fierce Tiger) as they arrive in South Vietnam. in 1966
Operation Hong Kil Dong (July 9 – August 26, 1967) was not only the largest South Korean operation of the Vietnam war, but also the beginning of a "special" relationship a among Allies. The 48-day-long operation was claimed by Seoul as a major success as they claimed to have thwarted the VPA/NLF infiltration efforts in friendly areas. The results of the operation were a kill ratio of 24:1 according to the Korean's report: 638 Vietnamese to 26 South Koreans. 98 heavy machine guns and mortars and 359 rifle, light machine guns and assault rifles were captured in the aftermath.
In adittion to the hatred that most Koreans felt towards Communism, what one official called “the holy war in defense of the free world”, Seoul had its own reasons to be there. It was alarmed by the United States’ plan to move part of its units stationed in South Korea to Vietnam and what that would mean for its security in relation to North Korea. South Korea also wanted to turn its Vietnam experience into a springboard for its own economic development, remembering Japan’s economic recovery after the destruction of World War II and against the backdrop of the destruction of the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953.
South Korea’s top brass and politicians bragged about the efficacy of their armies in counterinsurgency warfare resulting from the Korean War experience — something the American Army, experienced in conventional warfare, was allegedly less familiar with. Thus, Madrid thought it would be a good idea to send observers to join the Korean forces in Vietnam and to learn from them. Initially, the ruthless methods of the South Korean soldiers shocked the Spaniards, as, for instance, they did not take prisoners. Instead of them, they simply executed them. "A Communist cannot be redeemed", replied a South Korean officer to a shocked Spaniard when he made some objections after seeing the execution of some unarmed VC prisoneros of war. However, this "philosohpy" found an apt soil among the volunteers from the Legión, and the Batallón Mixto was the first Spanish unit to apply the "Korean" ways of war, which soon were also adopted by the two remaining batallions.
Another reason for the success of the Korean-Spanish relation is came from a similar situation. In spite of their idealism about fighting against Communism alongside Americans, the racial reality quickly became a source of profound disappointment and disillusionment with American power both among the Korean and Spanish soldiers, perhaps a bit more in the former case. As the Spanish soldiers, at least those "used" to deal with Asian people, were not so "racially owrried", once the initial mutual surprise was gone, the collaboration among both sides went quite smoothly.
Soon both the MACVSOG and the VC/NVA were to notice the change.