So what would be democratized spain be?
- Kingdom of spain(Reino de España)
- Republic of spain(República de España)
Españoles en Vietnam: Franco's last war.
- Thread starter Kurt_Steiner
- Start date
Satan has a special place for him in Hell...
I must admit I have an idea about that, and all it's set to be that, but... I'm also a quite cheeky devil.
Being a Republican myself, I can only agree with you. It's easier to behead a king if you have one
Satan has a special place for him in Hell...
I must admit I have an idea about that, and all it's set to be that, but... I'm also a quite cheeky devil.
Being a Republican myself, I can only agree with you. It's easier to behead a king if you have one
Disgusting.
24. ¿Se va el caimán? (1)
24. ¿Se va el caimán? (1)
Franco had not a good time after 1968. The rest of the year proved quite uneventful for the Spanish troops deployed in Vietnam but for minor skirmishes, but that stopped in 1969. Just as the US troops launched Operation Apache Snow, Spain got her own "Hamburger Hill". In fact, there was neither fighthing for a hill nor a carnage, but the same feeling of waste flew over both operations.
It began in late March, 1969. During one of the many search and destruction patrols that Spanish soldiers were launching in the area of operations, a Spanish platoon was ambushed by VC forces. After calling for artillery and air support, the Spanish soldiers withdrew but returned later, thinking that the enemy had ran way, as usual. However, that was not to be and, by the morning of the next day, March 14th, the whole 1st Batallion of the STFV was busy dealing with the enemy.
Then the nightmare started. The first multi-company attacks achieved nothing but suffered heavy casualties, so, on the next day, the first company of the 1st Battalion, STFV, led by 1st. Lt. Roberto Valor, made probing attacks al allong the supposed enemy strongopoint, a line of bunkers linked with trenches. However, the usual problems caused by the difficult terrain and the enemy defenses disrupted the efforts of the Spanish troops. The waterlogged channels and the dense vegetation provided few natural landing zones in the area, and it also masked the enemy positions, making quite difficult the job of the air and support units. Enemy soldiers, able to maneuver freely, caused havoc among Valor's men and even shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns.
When the VC forces assaulted the logistical support LZs and the command post, forcing deployment of units for security that might otherwise have been employed in other assaults, the Spanish command decided to call off the attack to study the situation before trying again. VC and NVA platoon- and company-sized elements repeatedly struck the withdrawing Spanish forces from the flanks and rear. The problem was, the Spanish officers saw it clearly, that the terrain made difficult not only to move, but also to attack, as the attacking companies were broken by the terrain into squad or platoon points of attack, where they encountered enemy forces with prepared fields of fire. With most engagements taking place at close ranges, the fire support was severely restricted. In many cases, the units had to pull back to call in artillery fire, close air support, and aerial rocket artillery, but the enemy bunkers were well protecte and constructed and were thus able to withstand the enemy bombardment. As the foliage was eventually stripped away by the constant battle, the bunkers exposed, but even then most of them could not be destroyed by indirect fire and naplam, recoilless rifle fire and direct assaults at squad and platoon-level eventually took them out after a gruesome figthing.
However, when the VC and NVA simply vanished from the area when they felt that the battle was turning against them, the Spanish forces advanced to find a empty place, without nothing by the bunkers as a proof that there had been an enemy force in place there. Two days later, a Spanish journalist, José Solís, traveled to the area and interviewed several officers. In his cronicle Solís was to wonder, later on, why infantry, rather than firepower, was used as the primary offensive tool. It goes without saying that Solís article was never published by any Spanish newspaper and he was called back to Spain soon after.
The Spaish commander ordered a coordinated two-battalion S&D operation for March 18. Soon, the leading companies found themselves trading shots with the enemy, who used again with masterly ability another line of bunkers and trenches, However, Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, STFV nearly broke the enemy linesbut experienced severe casualties, including most of its officers. To make it worse, an exceptionally intense thunderstorm reduced visibility to zero and ended the fighting. Again, the Spanish units had to withdraw. On the following day, Colonel Trujillo, the commander of the batallion, decided to commit two fresh companies to the battle and to have one of them relieve the 3/2 STFV in place. The 3/2 STFV's losses had been severe, almost sixty percent of the original men.
And, when the movement was completed and the Spanish troops were ready to strike again, the enemy vanished as the last time, this time to disappear completely without a trace. The three following days reported to enemy contact as the Spanish forces secured the area, which was abandoned a week later as it had no real military value.
Then, Paris Match published Solis article.
(1) "Se va el caimán" (the alligator is leaving) was a song that got censored in spain because it was believed that it was adressed against Franco
Franco had not a good time after 1968. The rest of the year proved quite uneventful for the Spanish troops deployed in Vietnam but for minor skirmishes, but that stopped in 1969. Just as the US troops launched Operation Apache Snow, Spain got her own "Hamburger Hill". In fact, there was neither fighthing for a hill nor a carnage, but the same feeling of waste flew over both operations.
It began in late March, 1969. During one of the many search and destruction patrols that Spanish soldiers were launching in the area of operations, a Spanish platoon was ambushed by VC forces. After calling for artillery and air support, the Spanish soldiers withdrew but returned later, thinking that the enemy had ran way, as usual. However, that was not to be and, by the morning of the next day, March 14th, the whole 1st Batallion of the STFV was busy dealing with the enemy.
Then the nightmare started. The first multi-company attacks achieved nothing but suffered heavy casualties, so, on the next day, the first company of the 1st Battalion, STFV, led by 1st. Lt. Roberto Valor, made probing attacks al allong the supposed enemy strongopoint, a line of bunkers linked with trenches. However, the usual problems caused by the difficult terrain and the enemy defenses disrupted the efforts of the Spanish troops. The waterlogged channels and the dense vegetation provided few natural landing zones in the area, and it also masked the enemy positions, making quite difficult the job of the air and support units. Enemy soldiers, able to maneuver freely, caused havoc among Valor's men and even shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns.
When the VC forces assaulted the logistical support LZs and the command post, forcing deployment of units for security that might otherwise have been employed in other assaults, the Spanish command decided to call off the attack to study the situation before trying again. VC and NVA platoon- and company-sized elements repeatedly struck the withdrawing Spanish forces from the flanks and rear. The problem was, the Spanish officers saw it clearly, that the terrain made difficult not only to move, but also to attack, as the attacking companies were broken by the terrain into squad or platoon points of attack, where they encountered enemy forces with prepared fields of fire. With most engagements taking place at close ranges, the fire support was severely restricted. In many cases, the units had to pull back to call in artillery fire, close air support, and aerial rocket artillery, but the enemy bunkers were well protecte and constructed and were thus able to withstand the enemy bombardment. As the foliage was eventually stripped away by the constant battle, the bunkers exposed, but even then most of them could not be destroyed by indirect fire and naplam, recoilless rifle fire and direct assaults at squad and platoon-level eventually took them out after a gruesome figthing.
However, when the VC and NVA simply vanished from the area when they felt that the battle was turning against them, the Spanish forces advanced to find a empty place, without nothing by the bunkers as a proof that there had been an enemy force in place there. Two days later, a Spanish journalist, José Solís, traveled to the area and interviewed several officers. In his cronicle Solís was to wonder, later on, why infantry, rather than firepower, was used as the primary offensive tool. It goes without saying that Solís article was never published by any Spanish newspaper and he was called back to Spain soon after.
The Spaish commander ordered a coordinated two-battalion S&D operation for March 18. Soon, the leading companies found themselves trading shots with the enemy, who used again with masterly ability another line of bunkers and trenches, However, Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, STFV nearly broke the enemy linesbut experienced severe casualties, including most of its officers. To make it worse, an exceptionally intense thunderstorm reduced visibility to zero and ended the fighting. Again, the Spanish units had to withdraw. On the following day, Colonel Trujillo, the commander of the batallion, decided to commit two fresh companies to the battle and to have one of them relieve the 3/2 STFV in place. The 3/2 STFV's losses had been severe, almost sixty percent of the original men.
And, when the movement was completed and the Spanish troops were ready to strike again, the enemy vanished as the last time, this time to disappear completely without a trace. The three following days reported to enemy contact as the Spanish forces secured the area, which was abandoned a week later as it had no real military value.
Then, Paris Match published Solis article.
(1) "Se va el caimán" (the alligator is leaving) was a song that got censored in spain because it was believed that it was adressed against Franco
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Sorry for the long delay, but the political events here in Spain had kept me a bit down, not even in the mood to enter the forum, to my great shame.
However, the interest and kindness shown by some of you, my dear readers, gave me strenght to put this update into place and I'll keep going on
However, the interest and kindness shown by some of you, my dear readers, gave me strenght to put this update into place and I'll keep going on
Yes, he does lives!
For a while I was thinking about dropping it out altogether, but some people asked about it, and, well... you'll see. Well, you'll read it.