Emerald of The Equator: An Indonesian TL

[SkylineDreamer]

Please ignore my previous post: The map has lots of flaws in Malaya, that is not really your fault by the looks of it.

Considering the time we are approaching, perhaps there could an election coming up in one of the Kingdom if the manners of the some of the members of the aforementioned royal family are as IOTL.

Spoiler

(Bendahara restoration anybody?)

It seems like the mayor (and the Federal District administration) would be a direct elected office eventually, which as for the former is much better than the arrangement KL-ites have now IOTL.

This particular map is much better than the pervious map (with the exception of Malacca losing Alor Gajah and gaining Tangkak, while Johor losing the latter and Segamat). But that is an extremely minute detail that would be better to be ignored.

I did have a long term plan for this, much as a balance on how lucky Indonesia had been for the last 20 years (smirk), but I won't spoil too much for the fun.

I think that ITTL, what I can say Malaysia as part of Indonesia may have better representation in elected bodies (in contrast to mostly monarchist OTL). I don't really consider how ITTL Malaysians accepted the rapid tranformation to a more republican system, but considering the growth Indonesia is going I can say those people might just accept the new dynamic (if Indonesia suffers a recession, or maybe a monetary crisis, it could change rapidly). Geopolitic wise, Malaysia's incorporation to Indonesia IMO is a serious blow to Islamist trying achieving their Islamic dream (although ITTL Islamic World is drastically different than OTL same year, i.e Communist French Africa, Nasser-ite Arab Republic and Pro-US Shah of Iran, leaving Saudi Arabia as the only Islamic nation ), as Indonesia's Pancasila ideology is nowhere lenient to Islamic law.

The sultanate politics is also another mess to look into, and another field I think am challenged to immerse.

Thanks for the input, TL has been a passion and a learning experience for me.

 

[Dude...]

I kinda wonder the situation of the Military. I mean the TL Indonesia is bigger from IRL. Seeing the map and the situation of the country I have a suggestion. Follow US system of geographical Unified Combatant Command and unify all armed services between 3 Combatant Commands. Which are:
A. Central Command with area of responsibility in - Nusantara State Republic
- Cocos Keeling Island
- Christmas Island
- Mainland South East Asia
- South China Sea
- Philippines
- Eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean.
B. Pacific Command with area of responsibility in
- Papua State Republic
- Melanesia State Republics
- Arafura, Solomon, Coral Sea (basically most of the Southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean)
- Philippine Sea (and most of the West Pacific)
C. Indian Ocean Command
- Madagascar State Republic
- Chagas Archipelago
- Gulf of Aden and Red Sea (basically covering till the Suez Canal)
- Arabian Sea
- Middle East
- East Africa and South Africa (basically main command for handling operations in Africa)
- basically anything in Southeast, east, north east, and central Indian Ocean
Between the 3, Central Command will be the most heavily armed because of China, Indian Ocean Command will be the one that has the most expeditionary capability (and probably action knowing that region of the world is messy), and Pacific Command will be heavy on Navy (simply the one who deploy the most around West Pacific)

 

[XiaoJuice]

It's a bit random but does Indonesia manage to prevent the extinction of Javanese Tiger ITTL?

 

[SkylineDreamer]

It's a bit random but does Indonesia manage to prevent the extinction of Javanese Tiger ITTL?

Judging with the events around Java around 50s-70s, highly unlikely. But there's still a chance.

 

[SkylineDreamer]

The Dominant Three of Indonesian Demographics

Within the general theme of demographics. Indonesia’s population undergo significant strides as each culture attempts to outperform the other in numbers, influence, and dominance. However, the general proposal of the players, and the people involved, remain the same in Indonesian politics. Its heart was the reasonable question: should Indonesia become a melting pot nation, or a salad bowl nation? Even with the stress of urbanization, the society of Indonesia maintains a degree of separation between each people. Minor differences in customs, traditions, and historical biases, have made significant segregation among the ethnic groups involved. Yet, endeavours to infuse them as a single Indonesian civilisation have been going on since the early days of the Indonesian revival movement.

Indonesia’s ethnic groups, in total, consist of more than 1500 groups, the most amount ever accumulated in any nation in modern history. From the baobab habitats of Madagascar to the little islands of Solomon Island, Indonesia’s government have massive pressure on uniting these groups into a single, unified, Indonesian identity. Naturally, the larger groups of Austronesian ethnicities have attempted to dominate the integration process as a single Indonesian identity, none of these famous lists are Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay. Here, it is explained the ethnicity's main values, supposed culture centres, regions of influence and relations with other ethnicities and religions.
​

Indonesia Ethnicity Composition, 1990​

ꦗꦮ (Jawa), the Elder

The infamous Aidit quote of “Jawa adalah Kunci” came from the general idea that whoever commands Java, commands the dominant group of Indonesian society, thus claiming as the true leader of the Federal Republic. Java ethnicity itself, is a beast of a culture group, claiming 33% of the total Indonesian population of nearly 250 million people. One of the oldest civilizations in Southeast Asia, Java’s early origins include native reverence for ancestral and natural spirits, a long history with different religious values, and to a lesser extent, a cordial to Western and modern philosophy. Javanese culture values harmony and social order and abhors direct conflicts and disagreements. However, traditional Javanese culture has started to be challenged by an egalitarian culture, especially by urban settlers which made a sort of Neo-Javanism, a mixture of Javanese and foreign ideas with significant cultural reforms.

The Sultanate of Jogjakarta (Kasultanan Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat) and Sunanate of Surakarta (Kasunanan Surakarta Hadiningrat) are regents who self-proclaim as the bastion of “traditional Javanese values”. Born during Dutch imperialism and consolidated as a stable polity since the early days of Indonesian independence, these sultanates contribute a massive war chest to Indonesia’s effort for independence, thus granting rewards as they should be from the federal government. It was also part to make Indonesia a federation of sultanates, envisioned by most Indonesian nobles (with increasing support from Malaysian sultanates). However, the strong influence of republicanism from Sukarno, and Nasution, had made attempts particularly futile. Although politically, these sultanates had personal struggles, these figures had become the “elder” of Javanese society, so revered that they might be considered the cultural head of the ethnicity.
​

40 Years of Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX Reign, 18 March 1940, seen with Queen Juliana of Netherlands​

These sultanates, despite the ethnicity’s cultural stereotypes, have agreed on an aggressive migration program as means of assimilating other Austronesian cultures into the Javanese fold. With combined efforts of Nasution’s pro-Java administration, it pushed Javanese overpopulated citizens into Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Papua, and even Madagaskar, as part of the Javanization program. In the Subandrio administration, these efforts continued with a slightly different objective, as the Javanese workforce had been Indonesia’s most preferable option (skilled yet particularly cheap), for Indonesia’s rapid industrialization. This was apparent in major boomtowns, Pekanbaru and Palembang for that matter, with the native population slowly diminishing with the growing migrants from Java.

Javanese culture was divided into two groups. The traditional Java culture adopted by the monarchs and clergy of the Javanese people, and the modern neo-Javanese culture. The traditional Java culture, with the self-acclaimed leaders from Sultans and Sunans, also a co-ally but not necessarily welcoming clergy of Nahdlatul Ulama (the syncretic Islam religious organization that fuses old Javanese norms) had tried to defend the old Javanese forms against modern changes (those being Islamic Salafism, Communism or Liberalism). These conservative people adopted the true sense of Javanese harmonious identity, forming a sort of slow integration of culture into Javanese. These groups formed into the conservative Partai Umat Islam of the NU Faction, and the significant follows of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan moderate balance. They promoted Islam as the dominant faith, increasing spiritualism in political life, and adopting a calmer multiculturalism method. In administrative affairs, the group is strictly divided into old and new Javanese traditions, the old approve of whatever compromise the political system had made, and a strong supporter of non-aligned foreign policy.
​

Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX

Sri Susuhunan Pakubuwono XII with Sukarno, 1946​

Neo-Javanism, on the other hand, gave Indonesia the identity of fast-paced industrialization, as well as the extreme nationalism of the 1970s. Aggravated by the meteoric rise of Parindra in the 50s, Indonesia’s sense of “pride and legacy” infused in Neo-Javanism as the sense to make Indonesia great. These cultures, instead of the calm and collected traditionalists, prefer the fast-paced, progress-oriented, highly energetic culture of the modern world. Every moderate value had been turned for the extremes. But the core Javanese culture of tolerance, harmonious identity, and unity remained integral to this growing culture. Neo-Javanese people did not identify themselves as Javanese, instead the larger Indonesian identity. Because of this, many have preferred Neo-Javanese called Nusantara Culture, because of the member’s unwillingness to put “Java” in their name, despite the core being Javanese.

Neo-Javanism culture, unlike the former traditional version, had experimented with different opinions on how this ideal can be fulfilled. With three core ideals of harmony, tolerance and unity, Javanese culture has settled into three modern ideologies (communist, liberal, and nationalist), each according to one ideal. The communist wing that pushed harmony to the extreme attracted many of Neo-Javanism working class under the appealing Partai Pekerja Indonesia (even with pulling themselves into more moderate socialist efforts). This wing even saw Guntur Sukarnoputra, the son of the first president, as their new Satria Piningit. The liberal wing pushed the extreme version of tolerance by acknowledging all ethnicity, proposed by PPP’s Barisan Progresif, and has been an ardent follower of LKY’s main policies. Finally, the nationalist wing, formed by the second President Nasution, had made pan-Indonesian the culture’s focus, which had been voting PNI-R for most of the time (die-hard patriots, one might say). This was the main source of Pan-Nusantara identity, the pan-nationalist identity promoted by Parindra at that time, which put Greater Indonesia as their territorial ambition. In geographical distribution, the Neo-Javanism population were on the northern coasts of Java, and the important diaspora of Javanese outside of Java island (particularly in Sumatra, Madagaskar, and Papua). The new culture had a strong unified indicator: a strong proponent of republicanism and proposed the ideal version of the Federal Republic, one without appointed monarchs as heads of provinces.

Javanese control of influence had been centred around the central and eastern portions of Java, which had been the core of Javanese history. But Javanese is also a dominant group in Jakarta, Banten and parts of West Java. Javanese had thrived beyond the island through centuries of transmigration programs. Javanese are also present in the Malay Peninsula. They are also prevalent in Lampung, South Sumatra, Jambi, North Sumatra, and parts of Kalimantan to increase labourers and farmers for plantations and new opportunities. Even internationally, Javanese has also been partly significant in Suriname.
​

Javanese settlers in Aceh, part of Nasution's transmigration program​

Javanese relations with other minorities had inconclusive returns throughout the independence period. For one time, Javanese had endured centuries of Dutch imperialism, much so as suffering for many of its people. However, the Australian Aggression made stories about Dutch-Indonesian patriots helping the common Indonesians change their minds, and more Western nations acclaiming Indonesia for its defence of liberty, democracy and pursuit of progress made the Javanese common proud of themselves. To most Javanese intellectuals, even with different skin tones, they were treated quite fairly. To most Javanese common folks, their humble attitude appeased factory leaders (sometimes Chinese or Western ethnicity) to be considerate with better benefits. And, with the success of Nasution’s administration having Indonesia to the biggest extent it has ever seen (spanning oceans), the Javanese cannot help themselves but feel pride in their work, partly because this Indonesian idea had been claimed by them from the start. Under LKY’s premiership, the standard of living had risen dramatically, thus easing the tensions between the Javanese and Chinese populations. This good reputation came from fortunate minority figures (Nasution [Batak], LKY [Chinese], Frans Kaisepo [Papua], had significantly improved the relations of the said groups). However, there are some portions of the Javanese people that endorsed ethnic-nationalism, particularly Malay’s Bumiputera sentiment, which had caused a strain in a few parts of Indonesia, especially regions with minority-majority populations of ethnic Chinese, Papuans, or foreigners. However, overall, the Javanese common sentiment has been rather civic nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism, which was different from the culture of Malay and Sundanese.

Javanese ethnicity, even though shows little discrimination against other groups, has not received the same treatment on the opposing side. In various ethnic groups, especially in Sumatra, Madagaskar and Papua, many have shown an unconvincing attitude toward Javanese’s kindness towards these ethnicities, instead accusing them of “out-numbering” the native culture it has dominated. Papuan tribes, for example, had increasing resentment of ethnic Javanese when their numbers exploded for the last decade, not to mention the creation of cities with mostly Javanese descendants. In Sumatra and Kalimantan, the same rhetoric echoed with native Dayak, Banjar, Palembang, and Riau. The least affected ethnic tensions were between Javanese and Batak (or Chinese) since both had decent appeasement during Nasution’s administration.

Javanese relations with other religious outside Islam were also drastically better than most Austronesian ethnicities. Anthropologists have made astounding evidence of co-existing neighbourhoods with different religions that were perplexing to even the experienced. For example, the heart of Jogjakarta and Surakarta has had a significant Catholic Javanese population living amongst Islamic families. Moreover, the Javanese also own their religion, Kejawen, which dominated the mountainous regions near Bromo. Still, Javanese relation with Islam is also apparent in the creation of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, two of the most important religious organization in Indonesian history, with significant moderate proposals that have been campaigned by these two bodies in contrast to extreme versions formed by other cultures.

أورڠ ملايو (Malays), the Leader

Javanese is the de-facto leader of Austronesian people, but the Austronesian culture stemmed from the Peninsular ethnicity of Malay which made Malay culture the natural leader. This also came on Bahasa Indonesia as the lingua franca. Malay ethnicity had been the leader of Indonesia, despite the population of 21 million people (barely 8.5% and third largest) of the total population. Unlike Javanese common folks that are both an inland and maritime community, Malay ethnicities are maritime-based, thus its cultural values are fluid and egalitarian. Also, many disputed that Malay ethnicity isn’t necessarily a Malay ethnicity as many Javanese descendants in Malaya and Singapore had identified themselves as Malay. Malay, moreover, consider themselves as the result of centuries of immigration and assimilation of various regional ethnicities and tribes within Maritime Southeast Asia. The main distinction of Malay ethnicity is that Malay is a major ethnoreligious group with Islam as the centre. This had made them, unlike Javanese culture, much more Islamist. Unlike Javanese culture that splits between traditional Javanese and the modern adaptation of it, Malay ethnicity conforms to a singular, Islamic, reformist culture.

The supposed centre of this culture was the rules under the Federation of Malaya formed in 1948, as well as the Sultanate of Brunei. Supposedly ten rules (Kedah, Kelantan, Johor, Perlis, Pahang, Selangor, Terengganu, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Brunei) guides the culture of Malay. However, due to Indonesia’s forceful attempts to reduce monarchism across the Federal Republic, the sultan's powers diminished into three (Kedah, Johor, and Brunei) with other non-recognized regents remaining thirsty for power across Malaysia. Because of Malaya’s strong connection with the monarchy, the population in the Malaya region has been the least enthusiastic pro-republican citizen across Indonesia. Only the simplification of administrative affairs, the drastic changes under the LKY premiership, and the good governance of the State Republic of Nusantara Malaya have had amicable acceptance of the new status quo. Malay, comparing other ethnicities, had been the strongest monarchist ones in Indonesia, even with the strength slowly waning with Malayans more accustomed to the elected system in place of Malaya Province of Nusantara State Republic.​

Council of Rulers, monarchs from Malaya, 2000 [1]​

Malay culture, coincidentally, is also the biggest ethno-nationalist group in Indonesia. Aspires to the racial concept of Ketuanan Melayu (which was campaigned as Bumiputera Policy for general attraction), Malay preeminence in the Malaya region gave the reason for Malay's special position and special rights as a polity. This came with different perceptions from Malays to other cultures, but mostly as Indonesian attempts at assimilation made Malay culture inclusive to other Austronesian cultures like Javanese, Sundanese, and many others. The key to reducing exclusivity was Malay’s strong Islamic tendency. Unlike other population groups, the Malays have been vocal about increasing Islam's influence on Indonesia’s government. This was apparent in UMNO’s (United Malays National Organization) broad coalition of pro-Bumiputera and pro-Islam politicians. This political body (under PPP’s Kesejahteraan Rakyat) became a strong source of alternative conventional Islamic movements beyond the PUI’s Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. Moreover, Malay Islam, unlike Javanese Islam, had a more reformist Salafist culture, thus advocating for stricter adherence to the revival of purism.
​

Muhammad Taib Muhamad, Muhyiddin Yasin, Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir Mohammad and Najib Razak in a UMNO-PPP Rally, 1983​

Malay culture has dominated the Malaya Peninsula, but it is also prevalent in portions of Sumatra, Bangka Belitung Islands, and dan Riau Islands. Malay ethnic group also lives in coastal Borneo, with regions like Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah under their dominance. Southern parts of Thailand (especially Pattani) had Malay-dominated regions with the intention of leaving Thailand to join part of Indonesia.

Malay’s relations with other cultures, unlike the Javanese, are successful, especially with similar Austronesian subgroups. Balancing between ethnonationalism and Islamism, the Malay culture has successfully become the alternate leader of “soft” Javanese that proposed less Islamism. Abusing the sentiments other ethnicities have with Java’s increasing population, they treated Malay as the “big brother” of smaller cultures, uniting under the banner of Islamism and Malay nationalism. This attacked Indonesia’s government's status of civic nationalism.

Malay as a voter bloc, simply put, has been strongly unified. They will choose candidates that promote more attempts to involve Islam in government affairs, reaffirming native status as the leading culture of Indonesia, and the strong advocate of Malay assimilation. Until Subandrio’s presidency, Malay voters unified with Chinese Malayans that endured Nasution’s regional discrimination, pushing as the unified coalition of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. However, as the Federal Republic promote no more regional discrimination to Malaya, the inevitable clash between ethnic Malay and Chinese sparked once more, culminating during Mahathir’s struggle for the premiership as a member faction of Kesejahteraan Rakyat. Bumiputera policy, brushing off LKY’s legacy, and inciting tensions from multiple partisan riots, have made Malay relations with the Chinese specifically worse. Still, this proposal promoted the made Malay culture to the broader native Indonesian groups of their ethno-nationalist vision. Malay’s resentment of ethnic Chinese by their status had been apparent for a long, but newer cracks have opened on ethnic Papuans, Madagaskar, and foreigners, which made political pundits especially surprised at how long the PPP (a party that holds these people together) has held on.

Malay relations with other religious other than Islam are also very poor, due to its strong Islamic tendency as an ethnoreligious group. Their attempts to subvert Pancasila’s first principle with a more Islamic clause gave religious minorities opposition to these attempts. That made regions such as Batak State, Timor State, Papua State Republic, Melanesia State Republic, and inner tribes of Kalimantan especially hostile to Malay attempts at Islamization. However, it gained bridges with pro-Islamic cultures, like Aceh and Sundanese for that matter.

Sundanese, the Lucky

Indigenous ethnic group on the western region of Java Island, the Sundanese ethnicity is the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia. This is more of an inland ethnicity that has a population of 33 million people (13.5%) of the total Indonesian population. Sundanese, in stereotypical essence, is the lively and more active version of Javanese. It is a more egalitarian tribe than commonly feudal Javanese, as well as demonstrative Islam culture in comparison to rather secular Javanese. This, beyond the location and people’s common occupation, made Sundanese a mirror image of ethnic Malays.
​

A road sign with Sundanese Sanskrit, 1990​

Unlike the previous culture, the Sundanese centre of culture is the main metropolitans around Western Java. Fortunate to their proximity to Jakarta, the Sundanese culture had a more educated, advanced, and slightly pro-modern rather than traditional Javanese. The capital alone had improved their standard of living substantially, as well as the population boom higher than any ethnicities. the Sundanese cultural centre might be the universities of Bandung (ITB) and Bogor (IPB) themselves.

However, Sundanese is the largest hardline Islamist in Indonesia. Putting a much higher emphasis on Islam compared to Malay counterparts, Sundanese had been the strongholds of Islamic teachings, sometimes radical Islamism, in Indonesia. This is also the heart of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, an Islamist rebellion challenging Pancasila ideology from leader Kartosuwiryo. Cities like Depok and Bandung formed small cults of Islamic fundamentalism, extreme Arab sentiment, as well as hardcore fanatics. However, contrary to popular belief, Sundanese ethnicity has progressed further than any other ethnicities in Indonesia (mainly to the benefit of Jakarta at their doorstep) but most Sundanese intellectuals have risen across the decade. Unlike ethnic Malays, Sundanese has also strong republican tendencies, but with an Islamist twist. Instead of a Federal Republic with elected and crowned heads of provinces, Sundanese’s common vision mostly was a democratic Islamic republic, similar to Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Sundanese ethnicity dominated the Western portion of Java Island, but the group has travelled to Sumatra and Kalimantan as the same transmigration Javanese had had for centuries. However, due to its smaller size, its region of influence mainly revolves only around Lampung and Bengkulu.

Sundanese relations with other cultures had been fluctuating at best across the board. Although the myth of Javanese and Sundanese rivalry (dated since Majapahit times) is partly true, Sundanese had nowhere the hatred it has as people had believed. Instead, Sundanese may have the same sentiment as Malays had toward the Javanese, two smaller groups envied the dominant culture and wished to outperform it. Because of this, Sundanese commonly is a natural ally of Malay in an ethnic sense. Moreover, they have the same disdain for ethnic Chinese, contributing to many discriminatory incidents occurring across Jakarta. Sundanese is also ripe with Malay’s Bumiputera spirit, supported by a strong emphasis on Islamic culture.

Sundanese as a voter bloc is extremely conservative, and much in opposition to the Nasution’s presidency and LKY’s premiership. The people will choose the most pro-Islam politicians of the bunch, with strong support for Bumiputera. Sundanese is also an opposer of civic nationalism, even sometimes ignoring Pancasila to exist. Sundanese has also been unfriendly to minority groups like Chinese and Papuans, but they mostly hated foreigners (because of Walini City) of European or American descent. In other cultures, Sundanese mostly had amicable relations (if Malay also approves of it, Sundanese most likely agree). Politically, Sundanese has opposed the Javanese due to the latter dominance in Indonesian politics.

If Sundanese relations with other ethnic groups are fine, Sundanese relations with other religious groups are somewhat awful, sometimes more awful than Malays. Not only do they try to ignore Pancasila, but they have also been attempts to slowly erode Pancasila from the government and promote Indonesia as an Islamic Republic. Sundanese is also the strongest missionaries that went to Papua and Madagaskar, contributing significant religious tension to the natives there that was reluctant to convert.

The Other

The three ethnicities made up almost 55% of the Indonesian population. But there are so many smaller ethnicities that have not been taken into account. Reducing Madagaskar, Papua and Solomon Island native ethnicities, the remaining native ethnic groups constitute nearly 28% of the population. These smaller groups, although did not dominate federal politics, had contributed to their play on the balance of regimes throughout Indonesian independence.

The division of remaining ethnic tribes may be divided into two simple categories, those who promoted Islam and those who advocate for Pancasila as the centre of politics. Ethnicities with a majority Islam (Aceh, Madura, Buginese, Minangkabau, Bantenese, Banjares, etc) supported pro-Islam policies and Bumiputera. While non-Islam or diverse religious ethnicities (Batak, Minahasan, Balinese, Flores, Ambon, etc) supported civic nationalism and Pancasila ideology.

Melting Pot or Salad Bowl?

Despite Indonesia’s diverse ethnicities, the question of unity remains a significant ordeal to the future of the Federal Republic. Each ethnicity, despite heterogeneous thought, had a common denominator that the ethnicity’s politicians have reverberated for all the group. This, is fundamentally, rooted in the main idea of what Indonesia should be. Differences in minor details may differ from one identity to another, but the big picture remains two contrasting views, a multiculturalist (salad bowl) or assimilationist (melting pot) group.

The multiculturalist, currently holding dominance since the early days of Indonesia, holds dear that Indonesia has always been a nation of diversity, with people with nothing in common sharing one divine goal invented by the same ideal: a prosperous and just society. This was a direct response to centuries of colonialism; abuse and atrocities conducted by people deemed as superior. The result was an attempt to erase that superiority, claiming that all ethnicities have an equal status in Indonesia, no higher no lower. People should have an equal chance of opportunity, and that is self-evident for the natural good of the world.

Salad Bowl supporters, surprisingly, have no definite ideology (left or right wing) that can cling to. It is because the communist, liberal, and nationalist groups have pushed multiculturalism as their main policy, which made the question of multiculturalism more religious than political. The nationalist sentiment had advocated for civic nationalism (putting the Indonesian nation as the unifying rally). The communists and liberals had put multiculturalism due to their ideology’s blindness to race, colour, and ethnicity (for all the different reasons). This pan-coalition, as fragile as it may seem, had put Bumiputera policy under significant backlash; nothing had been passed even with the deep divisions each group has among each other.

The supporter of multiculturalism had no apparent location, rather than it is more from the government’s popularity. In Indonesia’s most thriving places, the inhabitants would have a more tolerant position of other races, in contrast to those that have “envy issues” or have less prosperity than the neighbour surrounding it. However, multiculturalism has a stronger presence in non-Islam populations.

Assimilationists only became rather dominant when Malaya’s Kesejahteraan Rakyat wing soared from the Labour Law 1986 victory against the Federal government. But the idea had a history before PPP’s ascension. Early Parindra days had significant proposals to make Indonesia a super-Malayan nation. PNI-R's early days had pan-Malayan sentiment, the reason why Indonesia annexed Madagaskar. However, the assimilationist did not progress further because the group itself shifted from ethnic nationalism to ethnic and religious nationalism. Instead of just pan-Malay nationalism, melting pot supporters put Islam too as their common religion, which put more ethnicities against it. The apparent changes were seen during the PNI-R’s gradual chasm with the PUI wing (at that time still PNI-R). Nasution which did not accept assimilationists to include Islam, has moved its way into multiculturalism (showing with higher acceptance of foreign immigrants to Indonesia).

Melting pot has become stagnant when the general sentiment of it has not become unifying Austronesian nation, but unifying Indonesia as one Islamic identity. It alienated regions with minority religions (Maluku, Batak, Bali, Flores, Dayak, and Papua), putting those coincidentally isolated regions at higher risk of regional insurgency. However, assimilationist has grown in Indonesia, even with hard-Islam identity, as Mahathir and his faction had created breakthroughs in making this idea mainstream from Bumiputera policy.

The supporter of the melting pot theory, without a doubt, had cores in pro-Islam communities, specifically reformist ones like Salafism or modernist Islam. It also has significant inroads within Malay and Sundanese populations, with smaller ethnicities (Bugis, Gorontalo, Lombok, Madura, Banten, Cirebon and Bengkulu). Some of them (Minang and Acehnese) had a stronger emphasis on Islam, but still adhere to the melting pot enthusiasts.
​

---

[1] As of 1988, the Council of Rulers is a ceremonial body as well as a political message to the Federal Government of Indonesia for their existence, possibly aiming for the reclamation of their rightful territories.

Wow, I just talked about three ethnicities only. As you can see, I deliberately miss very prominent minority groups and regional areas, which will be the subsequent chapter (immigration and particular regions).

 

[Dude...]

The Dominant Three of Indonesian Demographics

Within the general theme of demographics. Indonesia’s population undergo significant strides as each culture attempts to outperform the other in numbers, influence, and dominance. However, the general proposal of the players, and the people involved, remain the same in Indonesian politics. Its heart was the reasonable question: should Indonesia become a melting pot nation, or a salad bowl nation? Even with the stress of urbanization, the society of Indonesia maintains a degree of separation between each people. Minor differences in customs, traditions, and historical biases, have made significant segregation among the ethnic groups involved. Yet, endeavours to infuse them as a single Indonesian civilisation have been going on since the early days of the Indonesian revival movement.

Indonesia’s ethnic groups, in total, consist of more than 1500 groups, the most amount ever accumulated in any nation in modern history. From the baobab habitats of Madagascar to the little islands of Solomon Island, Indonesia’s government have massive pressure on uniting these groups into a single, unified, Indonesian identity. Naturally, the larger groups of Austronesian ethnicities have attempted to dominate the integration process as a single Indonesian identity, none of these famous lists are Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay. Here, it is explained the ethnicity's main values, supposed culture centres, regions of influence and relations with other ethnicities and religions.
​

View attachment 844042
Indonesia Ethnicity Composition, 1990​

ꦗꦮ (Jawa), the Elder

The infamous Aidit quote of “Jawa adalah Kunci” came from the general idea that whoever commands Java, commands the dominant group of Indonesian society, thus claiming as the true leader of the Federal Republic. Java ethnicity itself, is a beast of a culture group, claiming 33% of the total Indonesian population of nearly 250 million people. One of the oldest civilizations in Southeast Asia, Java’s early origins include native reverence for ancestral and natural spirits, a long history with different religious values, and to a lesser extent, a cordial to Western and modern philosophy. Javanese culture values harmony and social order and abhors direct conflicts and disagreements. However, traditional Javanese culture has started to be challenged by an egalitarian culture, especially by urban settlers which made a sort of Neo-Javanism, a mixture of Javanese and foreign ideas with significant cultural reforms.

The Sultanate of Jogjakarta (Kasultanan Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat) and Sunanate of Surakarta (Kasunanan Surakarta Hadiningrat) are regents who self-proclaim as the bastion of “traditional Javanese values”. Born during Dutch imperialism and consolidated as a stable polity since the early days of Indonesian independence, these sultanates contribute a massive war chest to Indonesia’s effort for independence, thus granting rewards as they should be from the federal government. It was also part to make Indonesia a federation of sultanates, envisioned by most Indonesian nobles (with increasing support from Malaysian sultanates). However, the strong influence of republicanism from Sukarno, and Nasution, had made attempts particularly futile. Although politically, these sultanates had personal struggles, these figures had become the “elder” of Javanese society, so revered that they might be considered the cultural head of the ethnicity.
​

40 Years of Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX Reign, 18 March 1940, seen with Queen Juliana of Netherlands​

These sultanates, despite the ethnicity’s cultural stereotypes, have agreed on an aggressive migration program as means of assimilating other Austronesian cultures into the Javanese fold. With combined efforts of Nasution’s pro-Java administration, it pushed Javanese overpopulated citizens into Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Papua, and even Madagaskar, as part of the Javanization program. In the Subandrio administration, these efforts continued with a slightly different objective, as the Javanese workforce had been Indonesia’s most preferable option (skilled yet particularly cheap), for Indonesia’s rapid industrialization. This was apparent in major boomtowns, Pekanbaru and Palembang for that matter, with the native population slowly diminishing with the growing migrants from Java.

Javanese culture was divided into two groups. The traditional Java culture adopted by the monarchs and clergy of the Javanese people, and the modern neo-Javanese culture. The traditional Java culture, with the self-acclaimed leaders from Sultans and Sunans, also a co-ally but not necessarily welcoming clergy of Nahdlatul Ulama (the syncretic Islam religious organization that fuses old Javanese norms) had tried to defend the old Javanese forms against modern changes (those being Islamic Salafism, Communism or Liberalism). These conservative people adopted the true sense of Javanese harmonious identity, forming a sort of slow integration of culture into Javanese. These groups formed into the conservative Partai Umat Islam of the NU Faction, and the significant follows of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan moderate balance. They promoted Islam as the dominant faith, increasing spiritualism in political life, and adopting a calmer multiculturalism method. In administrative affairs, the group is strictly divided into old and new Javanese traditions, the old approve of whatever compromise the political system had made, and a strong supporter of non-aligned foreign policy.
​

Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX

Sri Susuhunan Pakubuwono XII with Sukarno, 1946​

Neo-Javanism, on the other hand, gave Indonesia the identity of fast-paced industrialization, as well as the extreme nationalism of the 1970s. Aggravated by the meteoric rise of Parindra in the 50s, Indonesia’s sense of “pride and legacy” infused in Neo-Javanism as the sense to make Indonesia great. These cultures, instead of the calm and collected traditionalists, prefer the fast-paced, progress-oriented, highly energetic culture of the modern world. Every moderate value had been turned for the extremes. But the core Javanese culture of tolerance, harmonious identity, and unity remained integral to this growing culture. Neo-Javanese people did not identify themselves as Javanese, instead the larger Indonesian identity. Because of this, many have preferred Neo-Javanese called Nusantara Culture, because of the member’s unwillingness to put “Java” in their name, despite the core being Javanese.

Neo-Javanism culture, unlike the former traditional version, had experimented with different opinions on how this ideal can be fulfilled. With three core ideals of harmony, tolerance and unity, Javanese culture has settled into three modern ideologies (communist, liberal, and nationalist), each according to one ideal. The communist wing that pushed harmony to the extreme attracted many of Neo-Javanism working class under the appealing Partai Pekerja Indonesia (even with pulling themselves into more moderate socialist efforts). This wing even saw Guntur Sukarnoputra, the son of the first president, as their new Satria Piningit. The liberal wing pushed the extreme version of tolerance by acknowledging all ethnicity, proposed by PPP’s Barisan Progresif, and has been an ardent follower of LKY’s main policies. Finally, the nationalist wing, formed by the second President Nasution, had made pan-Indonesian the culture’s focus, which had been voting PNI-R for most of the time (die-hard patriots, one might say). This was the main source of Pan-Nusantara identity, the pan-nationalist identity promoted by Parindra at that time, which put Greater Indonesia as their territorial ambition. In geographical distribution, the Neo-Javanism population were on the northern coasts of Java, and the important diaspora of Javanese outside of Java island (particularly in Sumatra, Madagaskar, and Papua). The new culture had a strong unified indicator: a strong proponent of republicanism and proposed the ideal version of the Federal Republic, one without appointed monarchs as heads of provinces.

Javanese control of influence had been centred around the central and eastern portions of Java, which had been the core of Javanese history. But Javanese is also a dominant group in Jakarta, Banten and parts of West Java. Javanese had thrived beyond the island through centuries of transmigration programs. Javanese are also present in the Malay Peninsula. They are also prevalent in Lampung, South Sumatra, Jambi, North Sumatra, and parts of Kalimantan to increase labourers and farmers for plantations and new opportunities. Even internationally, Javanese has also been partly significant in Suriname.
​

Javanese settlers in Aceh, part of Nasution's transmigration program​

Javanese relations with other minorities had inconclusive returns throughout the independence period. For one time, Javanese had endured centuries of Dutch imperialism, much so as suffering for many of its people. However, the Australian Aggression made stories about Dutch-Indonesian patriots helping the common Indonesians change their minds, and more Western nations acclaiming Indonesia for its defence of liberty, democracy and pursuit of progress made the Javanese common proud of themselves. To most Javanese intellectuals, even with different skin tones, they were treated quite fairly. To most Javanese common folks, their humble attitude appeased factory leaders (sometimes Chinese or Western ethnicity) to be considerate with better benefits. And, with the success of Nasution’s administration having Indonesia to the biggest extent it has ever seen (spanning oceans), the Javanese cannot help themselves but feel pride in their work, partly because this Indonesian idea had been claimed by them from the start. Under LKY’s premiership, the standard of living had risen dramatically, thus easing the tensions between the Javanese and Chinese populations. This good reputation came from fortunate minority figures (Nasution [Batak], LKY [Chinese], Frans Kaisepo [Papua], had significantly improved the relations of the said groups). However, there are some portions of the Javanese people that endorsed ethnic-nationalism, particularly Malay’s Bumiputera sentiment, which had caused a strain in a few parts of Indonesia, especially regions with minority-majority populations of ethnic Chinese, Papuans, or foreigners. However, overall, the Javanese common sentiment has been rather civic nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism, which was different from the culture of Malay and Sundanese.

Javanese ethnicity, even though shows little discrimination against other groups, has not received the same treatment on the opposing side. In various ethnic groups, especially in Sumatra, Madagaskar and Papua, many have shown an unconvincing attitude toward Javanese’s kindness towards these ethnicities, instead accusing them of “out-numbering” the native culture it has dominated. Papuan tribes, for example, had increasing resentment of ethnic Javanese when their numbers exploded for the last decade, not to mention the creation of cities with mostly Javanese descendants. In Sumatra and Kalimantan, the same rhetoric echoed with native Dayak, Banjar, Palembang, and Riau. The least affected ethnic tensions were between Javanese and Batak (or Chinese) since both had decent appeasement during Nasution’s administration.

Javanese relations with other religious outside Islam were also drastically better than most Austronesian ethnicities. Anthropologists have made astounding evidence of co-existing neighbourhoods with different religions that were perplexing to even the experienced. For example, the heart of Jogjakarta and Surakarta has had a significant Catholic Javanese population living amongst Islamic families. Moreover, the Javanese also own their religion, Kejawen, which dominated the mountainous regions near Bromo. Still, Javanese relation with Islam is also apparent in the creation of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, two of the most important religious organization in Indonesian history, with significant moderate proposals that have been campaigned by these two bodies in contrast to extreme versions formed by other cultures.

أورڠ ملايو (Malays), the Leader

Javanese is the de-facto leader of Austronesian people, but the Austronesian culture stemmed from the Peninsular ethnicity of Malay which made Malay culture the natural leader. This also came on Bahasa Indonesia as the lingua franca. Malay ethnicity had been the leader of Indonesia, despite the population of 21 million people (barely 8.5% and third largest) of the total population. Unlike Javanese common folks that are both an inland and maritime community, Malay ethnicities are maritime-based, thus its cultural values are fluid and egalitarian. Also, many disputed that Malay ethnicity isn’t necessarily a Malay ethnicity as many Javanese descendants in Malaya and Singapore had identified themselves as Malay. Malay, moreover, consider themselves as the result of centuries of immigration and assimilation of various regional ethnicities and tribes within Maritime Southeast Asia. The main distinction of Malay ethnicity is that Malay is a major ethnoreligious group with Islam as the centre. This had made them, unlike Javanese culture, much more Islamist. Unlike Javanese culture that splits between traditional Javanese and the modern adaptation of it, Malay ethnicity conforms to a singular, Islamic, reformist culture.

The supposed centre of this culture was the rules under the Federation of Malaya formed in 1948, as well as the Sultanate of Brunei. Supposedly ten rules (Kedah, Kelantan, Johor, Perlis, Pahang, Selangor, Terengganu, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Brunei) guides the culture of Malay. However, due to Indonesia’s forceful attempts to reduce monarchism across the Federal Republic, the sultan's powers diminished into three (Kedah, Johor, and Brunei) with other non-recognized regents remaining thirsty for power across Malaysia. Because of Malaya’s strong connection with the monarchy, the population in the Malaya region has been the least enthusiastic pro-republican citizen across Indonesia. Only the simplification of administrative affairs, the drastic changes under the LKY premiership, and the good governance of the State Republic of Nusantara Malaya have had amicable acceptance of the new status quo. Malay, comparing other ethnicities, had been the strongest monarchist ones in Indonesia, even with the strength slowly waning with Malayans more accustomed to the elected system in place of Malaya Province of Nusantara State Republic.​

Council of Rulers, monarchs from Malaya, 2000 [1]​

Malay culture, coincidentally, is also the biggest ethno-nationalist group in Indonesia. Aspires to the racial concept of Ketuanan Melayu (which was campaigned as Bumiputera Policy for general attraction), Malay preeminence in the Malaya region gave the reason for Malay's special position and special rights as a polity. This came with different perceptions from Malays to other cultures, but mostly as Indonesian attempts at assimilation made Malay culture inclusive to other Austronesian cultures like Javanese, Sundanese, and many others. The key to reducing exclusivity was Malay’s strong Islamic tendency. Unlike other population groups, the Malays have been vocal about increasing Islam's influence on Indonesia’s government. This was apparent in UMNO’s (United Malays National Organization) broad coalition of pro-Bumiputera and pro-Islam politicians. This political body (under PPP’s Kesejahteraan Rakyat) became a strong source of alternative conventional Islamic movements beyond the PUI’s Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. Moreover, Malay Islam, unlike Javanese Islam, had a more reformist Salafist culture, thus advocating for stricter adherence to the revival of purism.
​

Muhammad Taib Muhamad, Muhyiddin Yasin, Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir Mohammad and Najib Razak in a UMNO-PPP Rally, 1983​

Malay culture has dominated the Malaya Peninsula, but it is also prevalent in portions of Sumatra, Bangka Belitung Islands, and dan Riau Islands. Malay ethnic group also lives in coastal Borneo, with regions like Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah under their dominance. Southern parts of Thailand (especially Pattani) had Malay-dominated regions with the intention of leaving Thailand to join part of Indonesia.

Malay’s relations with other cultures, unlike the Javanese, are successful, especially with similar Austronesian subgroups. Balancing between ethnonationalism and Islamism, the Malay culture has successfully become the alternate leader of “soft” Javanese that proposed less Islamism. Abusing the sentiments other ethnicities have with Java’s increasing population, they treated Malay as the “big brother” of smaller cultures, uniting under the banner of Islamism and Malay nationalism. This attacked Indonesia’s government's status of civic nationalism.

Malay as a voter bloc, simply put, has been strongly unified. They will choose candidates that promote more attempts to involve Islam in government affairs, reaffirming native status as the leading culture of Indonesia, and the strong advocate of Malay assimilation. Until Subandrio’s presidency, Malay voters unified with Chinese Malayans that endured Nasution’s regional discrimination, pushing as the unified coalition of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. However, as the Federal Republic promote no more regional discrimination to Malaya, the inevitable clash between ethnic Malay and Chinese sparked once more, culminating during Mahathir’s struggle for the premiership as a member faction of Kesejahteraan Rakyat. Bumiputera policy, brushing off LKY’s legacy, and inciting tensions from multiple partisan riots, have made Malay relations with the Chinese specifically worse. Still, this proposal promoted the made Malay culture to the broader native Indonesian groups of their ethno-nationalist vision. Malay’s resentment of ethnic Chinese by their status had been apparent for a long, but newer cracks have opened on ethnic Papuans, Madagaskar, and foreigners, which made political pundits especially surprised at how long the PPP (a party that holds these people together) has held on.

Malay relations with other religious other than Islam are also very poor, due to its strong Islamic tendency as an ethnoreligious group. Their attempts to subvert Pancasila’s first principle with a more Islamic clause gave religious minorities opposition to these attempts. That made regions such as Batak State, Timor State, Papua State Republic, Melanesia State Republic, and inner tribes of Kalimantan especially hostile to Malay attempts at Islamization. However, it gained bridges with pro-Islamic cultures, like Aceh and Sundanese for that matter.

Sundanese, the Lucky

Indigenous ethnic group on the western region of Java Island, the Sundanese ethnicity is the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia. This is more of an inland ethnicity that has a population of 33 million people (13.5%) of the total Indonesian population. Sundanese, in stereotypical essence, is the lively and more active version of Javanese. It is a more egalitarian tribe than commonly feudal Javanese, as well as demonstrative Islam culture in comparison to rather secular Javanese. This, beyond the location and people’s common occupation, made Sundanese a mirror image of ethnic Malays.
​

A road sign with Sundanese Sanskrit, 1990​

Unlike the previous culture, the Sundanese centre of culture is the main metropolitans around Western Java. Fortunate to their proximity to Jakarta, the Sundanese culture had a more educated, advanced, and slightly pro-modern rather than traditional Javanese. The capital alone had improved their standard of living substantially, as well as the population boom higher than any ethnicities. the Sundanese cultural centre might be the universities of Bandung (ITB) and Bogor (IPB) themselves.

However, Sundanese is the largest hardline Islamist in Indonesia. Putting a much higher emphasis on Islam compared to Malay counterparts, Sundanese had been the strongholds of Islamic teachings, sometimes radical Islamism, in Indonesia. This is also the heart of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, an Islamist rebellion challenging Pancasila ideology from leader Kartosuwiryo. Cities like Depok and Bandung formed small cults of Islamic fundamentalism, extreme Arab sentiment, as well as hardcore fanatics. However, contrary to popular belief, Sundanese ethnicity has progressed further than any other ethnicities in Indonesia (mainly to the benefit of Jakarta at their doorstep) but most Sundanese intellectuals have risen across the decade. Unlike ethnic Malays, Sundanese has also strong republican tendencies, but with an Islamist twist. Instead of a Federal Republic with elected and crowned heads of provinces, Sundanese’s common vision mostly was a democratic Islamic republic, similar to Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Sundanese ethnicity dominated the Western portion of Java Island, but the group has travelled to Sumatra and Kalimantan as the same transmigration Javanese had had for centuries. However, due to its smaller size, its region of influence mainly revolves only around Lampung and Bengkulu.

Sundanese relations with other cultures had been fluctuating at best across the board. Although the myth of Javanese and Sundanese rivalry (dated since Majapahit times) is partly true, Sundanese had nowhere the hatred it has as people had believed. Instead, Sundanese may have the same sentiment as Malays had toward the Javanese, two smaller groups envied the dominant culture and wished to outperform it. Because of this, Sundanese commonly is a natural ally of Malay in an ethnic sense. Moreover, they have the same disdain for ethnic Chinese, contributing to many discriminatory incidents occurring across Jakarta. Sundanese is also ripe with Malay’s Bumiputera spirit, supported by a strong emphasis on Islamic culture.

Sundanese as a voter bloc is extremely conservative, and much in opposition to the Nasution’s presidency and LKY’s premiership. The people will choose the most pro-Islam politicians of the bunch, with strong support for Bumiputera. Sundanese is also an opposer of civic nationalism, even sometimes ignoring Pancasila to exist. Sundanese has also been unfriendly to minority groups like Chinese and Papuans, but they mostly hated foreigners (because of Walini City) of European or American descent. In other cultures, Sundanese mostly had amicable relations (if Malay also approves of it, Sundanese most likely agree). Politically, Sundanese has opposed the Javanese due to the latter dominance in Indonesian politics.

If Sundanese relations with other ethnic groups are fine, Sundanese relations with other religious groups are somewhat awful, sometimes more awful than Malays. Not only do they try to ignore Pancasila, but they have also been attempts to slowly erode Pancasila from the government and promote Indonesia as an Islamic Republic. Sundanese is also the strongest missionaries that went to Papua and Madagaskar, contributing significant religious tension to the natives there that was reluctant to convert.

The Other

The three ethnicities made up almost 55% of the Indonesian population. But there are so many smaller ethnicities that have not been taken into account. Reducing Madagaskar, Papua and Solomon Island native ethnicities, the remaining native ethnic groups constitute nearly 28% of the population. These smaller groups, although did not dominate federal politics, had contributed to their play on the balance of regimes throughout Indonesian independence.

The division of remaining ethnic tribes may be divided into two simple categories, those who promoted Islam and those who advocate for Pancasila as the centre of politics. Ethnicities with a majority Islam (Aceh, Madura, Buginese, Minangkabau, Bantenese, Banjares, etc) supported pro-Islam policies and Bumiputera. While non-Islam or diverse religious ethnicities (Batak, Minahasan, Balinese, Flores, Ambon, etc) supported civic nationalism and Pancasila ideology.

Melting Pot or Salad Bowl?

Despite Indonesia’s diverse ethnicities, the question of unity remains a significant ordeal to the future of the Federal Republic. Each ethnicity, despite heterogeneous thought, had a common denominator that the ethnicity’s politicians have reverberated for all the group. This, is fundamentally, rooted in the main idea of what Indonesia should be. Differences in minor details may differ from one identity to another, but the big picture remains two contrasting views, a multiculturalist (salad bowl) or assimilationist (melting pot) group.

The multiculturalist, currently holding dominance since the early days of Indonesia, holds dear that Indonesia has always been a nation of diversity, with people with nothing in common sharing one divine goal invented by the same ideal: a prosperous and just society. This was a direct response to centuries of colonialism; abuse and atrocities conducted by people deemed as superior. The result was an attempt to erase that superiority, claiming that all ethnicities have an equal status in Indonesia, no higher no lower. People should have an equal chance of opportunity, and that is self-evident for the natural good of the world.

Salad Bowl supporters, surprisingly, have no definite ideology (left or right wing) that can cling to. It is because the communist, liberal, and nationalist groups have pushed multiculturalism as their main policy, which made the question of multiculturalism more religious than political. The nationalist sentiment had advocated for civic nationalism (putting the Indonesian nation as the unifying rally). The communists and liberals had put multiculturalism due to their ideology’s blindness to race, colour, and ethnicity (for all the different reasons). This pan-coalition, as fragile as it may seem, had put Bumiputera policy under significant backlash; nothing had been passed even with the deep divisions each group has among each other.

The supporter of multiculturalism had no apparent location, rather than it is more from the government’s popularity. In Indonesia’s most thriving places, the inhabitants would have a more tolerant position of other races, in contrast to those that have “envy issues” or have less prosperity than the neighbour surrounding it. However, multiculturalism has a stronger presence in non-Islam populations.

Assimilationists only became rather dominant when Malaya’s Kesejahteraan Rakyat wing soared from the Labour Law 1986 victory against the Federal government. But the idea had a history before PPP’s ascension. Early Parindra days had significant proposals to make Indonesia a super-Malayan nation. PNI-R's early days had pan-Malayan sentiment, the reason why Indonesia annexed Madagaskar. However, the assimilationist did not progress further because the group itself shifted from ethnic nationalism to ethnic and religious nationalism. Instead of just pan-Malay nationalism, melting pot supporters put Islam too as their common religion, which put more ethnicities against it. The apparent changes were seen during the PNI-R’s gradual chasm with the PUI wing (at that time still PNI-R). Nasution which did not accept assimilationists to include Islam, has moved its way into multiculturalism (showing with higher acceptance of foreign immigrants to Indonesia).

Melting pot has become stagnant when the general sentiment of it has not become unifying Austronesian nation, but unifying Indonesia as one Islamic identity. It alienated regions with minority religions (Maluku, Batak, Bali, Flores, Dayak, and Papua), putting those coincidentally isolated regions at higher risk of regional insurgency. However, assimilationist has grown in Indonesia, even with hard-Islam identity, as Mahathir and his faction had created breakthroughs in making this idea mainstream from Bumiputera policy.

The supporter of the melting pot theory, without a doubt, had cores in pro-Islam communities, specifically reformist ones like Salafism or modernist Islam. It also has significant inroads within Malay and Sundanese populations, with smaller ethnicities (Bugis, Gorontalo, Lombok, Madura, Banten, Cirebon and Bengkulu). Some of them (Minang and Acehnese) had a stronger emphasis on Islam, but still adhere to the melting pot enthusiasts.
​

---

[1] As of 1988, the Council of Rulers is a ceremonial body as well as a political message to the Federal Government of Indonesia for their existence, possibly aiming for the reclamation of their rightful territories.

Wow, I just talked about three ethnicities only. As you can see, I deliberately miss very prominent minority groups and regional areas, which will be the subsequent chapter (immigration and particular regions).

IRL Indonesia already had a challenge uniting the ethnicities between the Islands. AU Indonesia will be more challenging as they are a multi ocean country with many ethnicities, qnd religion. I bet the people in AU Indonesia will still be confused of how the hell they manage to stay united for so long, even though with the many race, religion, and ethnicities that exists in their country. At the end, like IRL Indonesia, maybe they just assume it’s just “Luck”.

 

[MappingFanatic4009]

The Dominant Three of Indonesian Demographics

Within the general theme of demographics. Indonesia’s population undergo significant strides as each culture attempts to outperform the other in numbers, influence, and dominance. However, the general proposal of the players, and the people involved, remain the same in Indonesian politics. Its heart was the reasonable question: should Indonesia become a melting pot nation, or a salad bowl nation? Even with the stress of urbanization, the society of Indonesia maintains a degree of separation between each people. Minor differences in customs, traditions, and historical biases, have made significant segregation among the ethnic groups involved. Yet, endeavours to infuse them as a single Indonesian civilisation have been going on since the early days of the Indonesian revival movement.

Indonesia’s ethnic groups, in total, consist of more than 1500 groups, the most amount ever accumulated in any nation in modern history. From the baobab habitats of Madagascar to the little islands of Solomon Island, Indonesia’s government have massive pressure on uniting these groups into a single, unified, Indonesian identity. Naturally, the larger groups of Austronesian ethnicities have attempted to dominate the integration process as a single Indonesian identity, none of these famous lists are Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay. Here, it is explained the ethnicity's main values, supposed culture centres, regions of influence and relations with other ethnicities and religions.
​

View attachment 844042
Indonesia Ethnicity Composition, 1990​

ꦗꦮ (Jawa), the Elder

The infamous Aidit quote of “Jawa adalah Kunci” came from the general idea that whoever commands Java, commands the dominant group of Indonesian society, thus claiming as the true leader of the Federal Republic. Java ethnicity itself, is a beast of a culture group, claiming 33% of the total Indonesian population of nearly 250 million people. One of the oldest civilizations in Southeast Asia, Java’s early origins include native reverence for ancestral and natural spirits, a long history with different religious values, and to a lesser extent, a cordial to Western and modern philosophy. Javanese culture values harmony and social order and abhors direct conflicts and disagreements. However, traditional Javanese culture has started to be challenged by an egalitarian culture, especially by urban settlers which made a sort of Neo-Javanism, a mixture of Javanese and foreign ideas with significant cultural reforms.

The Sultanate of Jogjakarta (Kasultanan Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat) and Sunanate of Surakarta (Kasunanan Surakarta Hadiningrat) are regents who self-proclaim as the bastion of “traditional Javanese values”. Born during Dutch imperialism and consolidated as a stable polity since the early days of Indonesian independence, these sultanates contribute a massive war chest to Indonesia’s effort for independence, thus granting rewards as they should be from the federal government. It was also part to make Indonesia a federation of sultanates, envisioned by most Indonesian nobles (with increasing support from Malaysian sultanates). However, the strong influence of republicanism from Sukarno, and Nasution, had made attempts particularly futile. Although politically, these sultanates had personal struggles, these figures had become the “elder” of Javanese society, so revered that they might be considered the cultural head of the ethnicity.
​

40 Years of Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX Reign, 18 March 1940, seen with Queen Juliana of Netherlands​

These sultanates, despite the ethnicity’s cultural stereotypes, have agreed on an aggressive migration program as means of assimilating other Austronesian cultures into the Javanese fold. With combined efforts of Nasution’s pro-Java administration, it pushed Javanese overpopulated citizens into Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Papua, and even Madagaskar, as part of the Javanization program. In the Subandrio administration, these efforts continued with a slightly different objective, as the Javanese workforce had been Indonesia’s most preferable option (skilled yet particularly cheap), for Indonesia’s rapid industrialization. This was apparent in major boomtowns, Pekanbaru and Palembang for that matter, with the native population slowly diminishing with the growing migrants from Java.

Javanese culture was divided into two groups. The traditional Java culture adopted by the monarchs and clergy of the Javanese people, and the modern neo-Javanese culture. The traditional Java culture, with the self-acclaimed leaders from Sultans and Sunans, also a co-ally but not necessarily welcoming clergy of Nahdlatul Ulama (the syncretic Islam religious organization that fuses old Javanese norms) had tried to defend the old Javanese forms against modern changes (those being Islamic Salafism, Communism or Liberalism). These conservative people adopted the true sense of Javanese harmonious identity, forming a sort of slow integration of culture into Javanese. These groups formed into the conservative Partai Umat Islam of the NU Faction, and the significant follows of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan moderate balance. They promoted Islam as the dominant faith, increasing spiritualism in political life, and adopting a calmer multiculturalism method. In administrative affairs, the group is strictly divided into old and new Javanese traditions, the old approve of whatever compromise the political system had made, and a strong supporter of non-aligned foreign policy.
​

Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX

Sri Susuhunan Pakubuwono XII with Sukarno, 1946​

Neo-Javanism, on the other hand, gave Indonesia the identity of fast-paced industrialization, as well as the extreme nationalism of the 1970s. Aggravated by the meteoric rise of Parindra in the 50s, Indonesia’s sense of “pride and legacy” infused in Neo-Javanism as the sense to make Indonesia great. These cultures, instead of the calm and collected traditionalists, prefer the fast-paced, progress-oriented, highly energetic culture of the modern world. Every moderate value had been turned for the extremes. But the core Javanese culture of tolerance, harmonious identity, and unity remained integral to this growing culture. Neo-Javanese people did not identify themselves as Javanese, instead the larger Indonesian identity. Because of this, many have preferred Neo-Javanese called Nusantara Culture, because of the member’s unwillingness to put “Java” in their name, despite the core being Javanese.

Neo-Javanism culture, unlike the former traditional version, had experimented with different opinions on how this ideal can be fulfilled. With three core ideals of harmony, tolerance and unity, Javanese culture has settled into three modern ideologies (communist, liberal, and nationalist), each according to one ideal. The communist wing that pushed harmony to the extreme attracted many of Neo-Javanism working class under the appealing Partai Pekerja Indonesia (even with pulling themselves into more moderate socialist efforts). This wing even saw Guntur Sukarnoputra, the son of the first president, as their new Satria Piningit. The liberal wing pushed the extreme version of tolerance by acknowledging all ethnicity, proposed by PPP’s Barisan Progresif, and has been an ardent follower of LKY’s main policies. Finally, the nationalist wing, formed by the second President Nasution, had made pan-Indonesian the culture’s focus, which had been voting PNI-R for most of the time (die-hard patriots, one might say). This was the main source of Pan-Nusantara identity, the pan-nationalist identity promoted by Parindra at that time, which put Greater Indonesia as their territorial ambition. In geographical distribution, the Neo-Javanism population were on the northern coasts of Java, and the important diaspora of Javanese outside of Java island (particularly in Sumatra, Madagaskar, and Papua). The new culture had a strong unified indicator: a strong proponent of republicanism and proposed the ideal version of the Federal Republic, one without appointed monarchs as heads of provinces.

Javanese control of influence had been centred around the central and eastern portions of Java, which had been the core of Javanese history. But Javanese is also a dominant group in Jakarta, Banten and parts of West Java. Javanese had thrived beyond the island through centuries of transmigration programs. Javanese are also present in the Malay Peninsula. They are also prevalent in Lampung, South Sumatra, Jambi, North Sumatra, and parts of Kalimantan to increase labourers and farmers for plantations and new opportunities. Even internationally, Javanese has also been partly significant in Suriname.
​

Javanese settlers in Aceh, part of Nasution's transmigration program​

Javanese relations with other minorities had inconclusive returns throughout the independence period. For one time, Javanese had endured centuries of Dutch imperialism, much so as suffering for many of its people. However, the Australian Aggression made stories about Dutch-Indonesian patriots helping the common Indonesians change their minds, and more Western nations acclaiming Indonesia for its defence of liberty, democracy and pursuit of progress made the Javanese common proud of themselves. To most Javanese intellectuals, even with different skin tones, they were treated quite fairly. To most Javanese common folks, their humble attitude appeased factory leaders (sometimes Chinese or Western ethnicity) to be considerate with better benefits. And, with the success of Nasution’s administration having Indonesia to the biggest extent it has ever seen (spanning oceans), the Javanese cannot help themselves but feel pride in their work, partly because this Indonesian idea had been claimed by them from the start. Under LKY’s premiership, the standard of living had risen dramatically, thus easing the tensions between the Javanese and Chinese populations. This good reputation came from fortunate minority figures (Nasution [Batak], LKY [Chinese], Frans Kaisepo [Papua], had significantly improved the relations of the said groups). However, there are some portions of the Javanese people that endorsed ethnic-nationalism, particularly Malay’s Bumiputera sentiment, which had caused a strain in a few parts of Indonesia, especially regions with minority-majority populations of ethnic Chinese, Papuans, or foreigners. However, overall, the Javanese common sentiment has been rather civic nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism, which was different from the culture of Malay and Sundanese.

Javanese ethnicity, even though shows little discrimination against other groups, has not received the same treatment on the opposing side. In various ethnic groups, especially in Sumatra, Madagaskar and Papua, many have shown an unconvincing attitude toward Javanese’s kindness towards these ethnicities, instead accusing them of “out-numbering” the native culture it has dominated. Papuan tribes, for example, had increasing resentment of ethnic Javanese when their numbers exploded for the last decade, not to mention the creation of cities with mostly Javanese descendants. In Sumatra and Kalimantan, the same rhetoric echoed with native Dayak, Banjar, Palembang, and Riau. The least affected ethnic tensions were between Javanese and Batak (or Chinese) since both had decent appeasement during Nasution’s administration.

Javanese relations with other religious outside Islam were also drastically better than most Austronesian ethnicities. Anthropologists have made astounding evidence of co-existing neighbourhoods with different religions that were perplexing to even the experienced. For example, the heart of Jogjakarta and Surakarta has had a significant Catholic Javanese population living amongst Islamic families. Moreover, the Javanese also own their religion, Kejawen, which dominated the mountainous regions near Bromo. Still, Javanese relation with Islam is also apparent in the creation of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, two of the most important religious organization in Indonesian history, with significant moderate proposals that have been campaigned by these two bodies in contrast to extreme versions formed by other cultures.

أورڠ ملايو (Malays), the Leader

Javanese is the de-facto leader of Austronesian people, but the Austronesian culture stemmed from the Peninsular ethnicity of Malay which made Malay culture the natural leader. This also came on Bahasa Indonesia as the lingua franca. Malay ethnicity had been the leader of Indonesia, despite the population of 21 million people (barely 8.5% and third largest) of the total population. Unlike Javanese common folks that are both an inland and maritime community, Malay ethnicities are maritime-based, thus its cultural values are fluid and egalitarian. Also, many disputed that Malay ethnicity isn’t necessarily a Malay ethnicity as many Javanese descendants in Malaya and Singapore had identified themselves as Malay. Malay, moreover, consider themselves as the result of centuries of immigration and assimilation of various regional ethnicities and tribes within Maritime Southeast Asia. The main distinction of Malay ethnicity is that Malay is a major ethnoreligious group with Islam as the centre. This had made them, unlike Javanese culture, much more Islamist. Unlike Javanese culture that splits between traditional Javanese and the modern adaptation of it, Malay ethnicity conforms to a singular, Islamic, reformist culture.

The supposed centre of this culture was the rules under the Federation of Malaya formed in 1948, as well as the Sultanate of Brunei. Supposedly ten rules (Kedah, Kelantan, Johor, Perlis, Pahang, Selangor, Terengganu, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and Brunei) guides the culture of Malay. However, due to Indonesia’s forceful attempts to reduce monarchism across the Federal Republic, the sultan's powers diminished into three (Kedah, Johor, and Brunei) with other non-recognized regents remaining thirsty for power across Malaysia. Because of Malaya’s strong connection with the monarchy, the population in the Malaya region has been the least enthusiastic pro-republican citizen across Indonesia. Only the simplification of administrative affairs, the drastic changes under the LKY premiership, and the good governance of the State Republic of Nusantara Malaya have had amicable acceptance of the new status quo. Malay, comparing other ethnicities, had been the strongest monarchist ones in Indonesia, even with the strength slowly waning with Malayans more accustomed to the elected system in place of Malaya Province of Nusantara State Republic.​

Council of Rulers, monarchs from Malaya, 2000 [1]​

Malay culture, coincidentally, is also the biggest ethno-nationalist group in Indonesia. Aspires to the racial concept of Ketuanan Melayu (which was campaigned as Bumiputera Policy for general attraction), Malay preeminence in the Malaya region gave the reason for Malay's special position and special rights as a polity. This came with different perceptions from Malays to other cultures, but mostly as Indonesian attempts at assimilation made Malay culture inclusive to other Austronesian cultures like Javanese, Sundanese, and many others. The key to reducing exclusivity was Malay’s strong Islamic tendency. Unlike other population groups, the Malays have been vocal about increasing Islam's influence on Indonesia’s government. This was apparent in UMNO’s (United Malays National Organization) broad coalition of pro-Bumiputera and pro-Islam politicians. This political body (under PPP’s Kesejahteraan Rakyat) became a strong source of alternative conventional Islamic movements beyond the PUI’s Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. Moreover, Malay Islam, unlike Javanese Islam, had a more reformist Salafist culture, thus advocating for stricter adherence to the revival of purism.
​

Muhammad Taib Muhamad, Muhyiddin Yasin, Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir Mohammad and Najib Razak in a UMNO-PPP Rally, 1983​

Malay culture has dominated the Malaya Peninsula, but it is also prevalent in portions of Sumatra, Bangka Belitung Islands, and dan Riau Islands. Malay ethnic group also lives in coastal Borneo, with regions like Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah under their dominance. Southern parts of Thailand (especially Pattani) had Malay-dominated regions with the intention of leaving Thailand to join part of Indonesia.

Malay’s relations with other cultures, unlike the Javanese, are successful, especially with similar Austronesian subgroups. Balancing between ethnonationalism and Islamism, the Malay culture has successfully become the alternate leader of “soft” Javanese that proposed less Islamism. Abusing the sentiments other ethnicities have with Java’s increasing population, they treated Malay as the “big brother” of smaller cultures, uniting under the banner of Islamism and Malay nationalism. This attacked Indonesia’s government's status of civic nationalism.

Malay as a voter bloc, simply put, has been strongly unified. They will choose candidates that promote more attempts to involve Islam in government affairs, reaffirming native status as the leading culture of Indonesia, and the strong advocate of Malay assimilation. Until Subandrio’s presidency, Malay voters unified with Chinese Malayans that endured Nasution’s regional discrimination, pushing as the unified coalition of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. However, as the Federal Republic promote no more regional discrimination to Malaya, the inevitable clash between ethnic Malay and Chinese sparked once more, culminating during Mahathir’s struggle for the premiership as a member faction of Kesejahteraan Rakyat. Bumiputera policy, brushing off LKY’s legacy, and inciting tensions from multiple partisan riots, have made Malay relations with the Chinese specifically worse. Still, this proposal promoted the made Malay culture to the broader native Indonesian groups of their ethno-nationalist vision. Malay’s resentment of ethnic Chinese by their status had been apparent for a long, but newer cracks have opened on ethnic Papuans, Madagaskar, and foreigners, which made political pundits especially surprised at how long the PPP (a party that holds these people together) has held on.

Malay relations with other religious other than Islam are also very poor, due to its strong Islamic tendency as an ethnoreligious group. Their attempts to subvert Pancasila’s first principle with a more Islamic clause gave religious minorities opposition to these attempts. That made regions such as Batak State, Timor State, Papua State Republic, Melanesia State Republic, and inner tribes of Kalimantan especially hostile to Malay attempts at Islamization. However, it gained bridges with pro-Islamic cultures, like Aceh and Sundanese for that matter.

Sundanese, the Lucky

Indigenous ethnic group on the western region of Java Island, the Sundanese ethnicity is the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia. This is more of an inland ethnicity that has a population of 33 million people (13.5%) of the total Indonesian population. Sundanese, in stereotypical essence, is the lively and more active version of Javanese. It is a more egalitarian tribe than commonly feudal Javanese, as well as demonstrative Islam culture in comparison to rather secular Javanese. This, beyond the location and people’s common occupation, made Sundanese a mirror image of ethnic Malays.
​

A road sign with Sundanese Sanskrit, 1990​

Unlike the previous culture, the Sundanese centre of culture is the main metropolitans around Western Java. Fortunate to their proximity to Jakarta, the Sundanese culture had a more educated, advanced, and slightly pro-modern rather than traditional Javanese. The capital alone had improved their standard of living substantially, as well as the population boom higher than any ethnicities. the Sundanese cultural centre might be the universities of Bandung (ITB) and Bogor (IPB) themselves.

However, Sundanese is the largest hardline Islamist in Indonesia. Putting a much higher emphasis on Islam compared to Malay counterparts, Sundanese had been the strongholds of Islamic teachings, sometimes radical Islamism, in Indonesia. This is also the heart of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, an Islamist rebellion challenging Pancasila ideology from leader Kartosuwiryo. Cities like Depok and Bandung formed small cults of Islamic fundamentalism, extreme Arab sentiment, as well as hardcore fanatics. However, contrary to popular belief, Sundanese ethnicity has progressed further than any other ethnicities in Indonesia (mainly to the benefit of Jakarta at their doorstep) but most Sundanese intellectuals have risen across the decade. Unlike ethnic Malays, Sundanese has also strong republican tendencies, but with an Islamist twist. Instead of a Federal Republic with elected and crowned heads of provinces, Sundanese’s common vision mostly was a democratic Islamic republic, similar to Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Sundanese ethnicity dominated the Western portion of Java Island, but the group has travelled to Sumatra and Kalimantan as the same transmigration Javanese had had for centuries. However, due to its smaller size, its region of influence mainly revolves only around Lampung and Bengkulu.

Sundanese relations with other cultures had been fluctuating at best across the board. Although the myth of Javanese and Sundanese rivalry (dated since Majapahit times) is partly true, Sundanese had nowhere the hatred it has as people had believed. Instead, Sundanese may have the same sentiment as Malays had toward the Javanese, two smaller groups envied the dominant culture and wished to outperform it. Because of this, Sundanese commonly is a natural ally of Malay in an ethnic sense. Moreover, they have the same disdain for ethnic Chinese, contributing to many discriminatory incidents occurring across Jakarta. Sundanese is also ripe with Malay’s Bumiputera spirit, supported by a strong emphasis on Islamic culture.

Sundanese as a voter bloc is extremely conservative, and much in opposition to the Nasution’s presidency and LKY’s premiership. The people will choose the most pro-Islam politicians of the bunch, with strong support for Bumiputera. Sundanese is also an opposer of civic nationalism, even sometimes ignoring Pancasila to exist. Sundanese has also been unfriendly to minority groups like Chinese and Papuans, but they mostly hated foreigners (because of Walini City) of European or American descent. In other cultures, Sundanese mostly had amicable relations (if Malay also approves of it, Sundanese most likely agree). Politically, Sundanese has opposed the Javanese due to the latter dominance in Indonesian politics.

If Sundanese relations with other ethnic groups are fine, Sundanese relations with other religious groups are somewhat awful, sometimes more awful than Malays. Not only do they try to ignore Pancasila, but they have also been attempts to slowly erode Pancasila from the government and promote Indonesia as an Islamic Republic. Sundanese is also the strongest missionaries that went to Papua and Madagaskar, contributing significant religious tension to the natives there that was reluctant to convert.

The Other

The three ethnicities made up almost 55% of the Indonesian population. But there are so many smaller ethnicities that have not been taken into account. Reducing Madagaskar, Papua and Solomon Island native ethnicities, the remaining native ethnic groups constitute nearly 28% of the population. These smaller groups, although did not dominate federal politics, had contributed to their play on the balance of regimes throughout Indonesian independence.

The division of remaining ethnic tribes may be divided into two simple categories, those who promoted Islam and those who advocate for Pancasila as the centre of politics. Ethnicities with a majority Islam (Aceh, Madura, Buginese, Minangkabau, Bantenese, Banjares, etc) supported pro-Islam policies and Bumiputera. While non-Islam or diverse religious ethnicities (Batak, Minahasan, Balinese, Flores, Ambon, etc) supported civic nationalism and Pancasila ideology.

Melting Pot or Salad Bowl?

Despite Indonesia’s diverse ethnicities, the question of unity remains a significant ordeal to the future of the Federal Republic. Each ethnicity, despite heterogeneous thought, had a common denominator that the ethnicity’s politicians have reverberated for all the group. This, is fundamentally, rooted in the main idea of what Indonesia should be. Differences in minor details may differ from one identity to another, but the big picture remains two contrasting views, a multiculturalist (salad bowl) or assimilationist (melting pot) group.

The multiculturalist, currently holding dominance since the early days of Indonesia, holds dear that Indonesia has always been a nation of diversity, with people with nothing in common sharing one divine goal invented by the same ideal: a prosperous and just society. This was a direct response to centuries of colonialism; abuse and atrocities conducted by people deemed as superior. The result was an attempt to erase that superiority, claiming that all ethnicities have an equal status in Indonesia, no higher no lower. People should have an equal chance of opportunity, and that is self-evident for the natural good of the world.

Salad Bowl supporters, surprisingly, have no definite ideology (left or right wing) that can cling to. It is because the communist, liberal, and nationalist groups have pushed multiculturalism as their main policy, which made the question of multiculturalism more religious than political. The nationalist sentiment had advocated for civic nationalism (putting the Indonesian nation as the unifying rally). The communists and liberals had put multiculturalism due to their ideology’s blindness to race, colour, and ethnicity (for all the different reasons). This pan-coalition, as fragile as it may seem, had put Bumiputera policy under significant backlash; nothing had been passed even with the deep divisions each group has among each other.

The supporter of multiculturalism had no apparent location, rather than it is more from the government’s popularity. In Indonesia’s most thriving places, the inhabitants would have a more tolerant position of other races, in contrast to those that have “envy issues” or have less prosperity than the neighbour surrounding it. However, multiculturalism has a stronger presence in non-Islam populations.

Assimilationists only became rather dominant when Malaya’s Kesejahteraan Rakyat wing soared from the Labour Law 1986 victory against the Federal government. But the idea had a history before PPP’s ascension. Early Parindra days had significant proposals to make Indonesia a super-Malayan nation. PNI-R's early days had pan-Malayan sentiment, the reason why Indonesia annexed Madagaskar. However, the assimilationist did not progress further because the group itself shifted from ethnic nationalism to ethnic and religious nationalism. Instead of just pan-Malay nationalism, melting pot supporters put Islam too as their common religion, which put more ethnicities against it. The apparent changes were seen during the PNI-R’s gradual chasm with the PUI wing (at that time still PNI-R). Nasution which did not accept assimilationists to include Islam, has moved its way into multiculturalism (showing with higher acceptance of foreign immigrants to Indonesia).

Melting pot has become stagnant when the general sentiment of it has not become unifying Austronesian nation, but unifying Indonesia as one Islamic identity. It alienated regions with minority religions (Maluku, Batak, Bali, Flores, Dayak, and Papua), putting those coincidentally isolated regions at higher risk of regional insurgency. However, assimilationist has grown in Indonesia, even with hard-Islam identity, as Mahathir and his faction had created breakthroughs in making this idea mainstream from Bumiputera policy.

The supporter of the melting pot theory, without a doubt, had cores in pro-Islam communities, specifically reformist ones like Salafism or modernist Islam. It also has significant inroads within Malay and Sundanese populations, with smaller ethnicities (Bugis, Gorontalo, Lombok, Madura, Banten, Cirebon and Bengkulu). Some of them (Minang and Acehnese) had a stronger emphasis on Islam, but still adhere to the melting pot enthusiasts.
​

---

[1] As of 1988, the Council of Rulers is a ceremonial body as well as a political message to the Federal Government of Indonesia for their existence, possibly aiming for the reclamation of their rightful territories.

Wow, I just talked about three ethnicities only. As you can see, I deliberately miss very prominent minority groups and regional areas, which will be the subsequent chapter (immigration and particular regions).

iirc that OTL Surakarta has a openly Catholic mayor for 2 periods (getting re-elected) from 2012-2021.

 

[SkylineDreamer]

iirc that OTL Surakarta has a openly Catholic mayor for 2 periods (getting re-elected) from 2012-2021.

Yes, you're right. It's this guy. He was vice-mayor of Jokowi before Jokowi was elected as Governor of Jakarta.

 

[SkylineDreamer]

Is Indonesia a Nation State or a Colonial Empire? Joochem Boodt*, 2023​

---

The Final Frontier Chapter
New Guinea
​

Merauke, 1983​

The 20th century has seen colonialism and imperialism eroded with self-governance, public awareness of democratic ideas, as well as the decline of European dominance on the world stage. The struggles of a colony had slowly faded as a memory of the past, although not with vengeance. By the late century, Africa’s colonial holdings have slowly been granted independence or sufficient self-governance from its colonizers. Asia had no significant protectorate remaining, and the clusters of the Pacific had slow independence stage provided by the United States. Little places of colonial holdings, yet even colonial settlements, may have existed. That is if you assume so.

All the cornerstones of the globe have been navigated, but the island of New Guinea was relatively untouched throughout the millennia. The reasons were simple: malaria and heat. However, the island was not isolated from international trade, it was claimed Majapahit had tributaries; sultans of Tidore claim sovereignty of the Western tip of New Guinea and many more colonial contacts before it became a Dutch, British and German colony. It had no motive to properly colonize the region with its intense heat and diseases.

New Guinea is essentially an island of mountains and valleys covered in dense tropical rainforest, which holds tribal societies with vastly unintelligible languages. Societies were loosely organized, with little political cognizance, mere councils of elders for peace-making and dispute settlement. Much of the higher forms of civilization created by the colonizers, European or Indonesian, made inroads into coastal New Guinean tribes that slowly grow. Technology was primitive, dated as early as the stone era. Agriculture remained in the nomad state of slash-and-burn, and people had no civil attitudes, sometimes fully violent.

In the 1870s, a small colonial economic activity sparked in the region. The first was the former German New Guinea which established plantations in Madang. Boundaries between colonised plantations and the tribes have been settled to reduce threats of plantation burns made by the natives. In 1888, the Dutch settled in Papua and have a serious check on the Tugeri tribe. Hostilities with powerful primitive clans between colonizers and natives continued until the present, with several foreign communities still may be under threat. However, with economic opportunity, the colonizers remained on those plantations, even expanding to minerals and foreign resources. Somewhat soon, gold was found in British New Guinea. Other forms of minerals (copper, nickel, silver, and cobalt) had been discovered at the latter stages of colonization.

During World War II, the Japanese army invaded northern New Guinea for a while before being defeated by the Allies. After WW2, Australia returned the possessions of the Eastern portion of New Guinea, while the West was returned to the Dutch. Australian officials wanted a return to the prewar order, while some had empowered the local population for their sacrifices in the war. Cacao was slowly growing as New Guinea’s main economy. The Dutch portion, meanwhile, had a different history.

Ecstatic with the joy of independence from the country Indonesia, Western Papua had the hopes of joining their Jakarta brothers should the situation be. Instantly, Indonesia’s appeal to the United Nations, despite rigorous resistance from the Netherlands, had given an ear to Papua’s referendum for the future of the region, which had voted overwhelmingly for joining. Still, this declaration of rejoining with Indonesia remained highly disputable, with diplomatic cables having cited Indonesia had rigged and tampered with the referendum process, threatening electors should they not vote for Indonesia. Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat, or Act of Free Choice, was the decision that admitted western New Guinea into Indonesia.
​

Pepera Meeting, 1950​

The rapid annexation of Western Papua to Indonesia had alarmed Australia [1], much of it because they had little awareness of how Indonesia’s diplomatic apparatus successfully made the United Nations agree to this undemocratic proposal. Even so, the growing movement of Parindra, the ultra-nationalist party with Pan-Austronesia, had made Australia’s New Guinea under threat with separatist threats funded by Indonesia. The rumours of Indonesia attempting to unite New Guinea from this method had made Australia anxious. With significant diplomatic blunders and Australia’s continued underestimation of Indonesia’s strength, Australia proceeded with aggression on Indonesian soil. By 1960, Australia had thought the country will starve Indonesia into submission, releasing the Western portion of Papua, and a total dismemberment of the growing threat. Instead, what happened was Kennedy’s sudden visit to Indonesia, renouncing Australia’s growing brutalism on Indonesia’s civilian population, and the complete reversal of the Australia Aggression. Not only would Australia lose all New Guinea holdings, but the Solomon Islands had also been given to Indonesia as well.

By 1966, united New Guinea was officially an integral Indonesian land. Uniting the East and West had reconciled separated tribes (which was rare from the island’s sparse population), but it had the intended effect of uniting New Guinea as the broader Pan-Austronesia movement of the Parindra. Under Nasution’s administration, New Guinea’s attention was third to Java-centrism and Sumatra. Gaining the island on the fold was a significant victory for Indonesia. In 1972, Nasution reorganized Papua as a State Republic, like a state within a federation. The defacto leadership, meanwhile, had nothing of the sort.

The Indonesian Model

The 1970s was the implementation of Indonesia’s rule within New Guinea to the remaining portion of the island. Eastern New Guinea was relatively new, but Western New Guinea received Indonesia treatment as early as the 50s before the Australians occupied the island for a while during the Australian Aggression. Unlike the Australian non-interference method, allowing the free reign of the tribes while keeping the economic benefits (i.e., plantations and mines) without the threat to these natives. Policymakers in Indonesia, as well as societal implementers, had a holistic approach to New Guinea. That is, the total revamp of New Guinean civilization, forming the Austronesian model for the world, equalising the development from Sumatra to New Guinea (Papua for Indonesian).

The Indonesian model of government in New Guinea for the next 20 years had a simple approach. Jakarta had believed New Guinea’s deposits to be plentiful; that extracting them will be the fastest method of development for New Guinea. The end goal was to create New Guinea as the industrial powerhouse of the Indonesian world, claiming the new nation’s status as the next Asian Tiger, the Asian economic powerhouse, or even the empire of the equator. Plans from the interim Wilopo Administration had put New Guinea on the priority list of the government’s organization plan. However, Sukarno Administration had promised the tribes in New Guinea Highlands that they be granted autonomy and self-rule without interference. That’s the promise that made East New Guinea appeal to separatism against Australia, with the “anti-White” sentiment that depicted Australians as ruthless lords. At first, Nasution had planned to continue Sukarno’s no interference policy (which unexpectedly was adopted in Madagascar), much to the disappointment of Parindra. That changed when Suharto [3] visited the island.

Before the reorganization of the State Republic of Papua, then-General Suharto was the interim commander of the island. He has visited the island, surprisingly remained untouched by the Australians. He was attracted to the significant gold and copper deposits on the island and had given reports that these minerals alone might revive the Indonesian war-torn economy as quickly as possible. Suharto has seen the abundance of mineral deposits in New Guinea, as his soldiers when patrolled on the small town of Merauke, have accidentally discovered gold in the streams of drinking water. This story echoed the military personnel of Indonesia, which hurriedly created the unofficial Gold Rush in Indonesia in the early 70s.
​

Freeport Company mining site, 1969​

President Kennedy, in the early 60s, has a significant interest in New Guinea. As Indonesia’s solid presence as the United States’s ally in the Pacific (with Japan), the Kennedy Administration appealed to Sukarno. There had been significant 100-year-long agreements regarding lands granted from Indonesia to the United States government, most of whom were the gift and guarantee of American friendliness towards Indonesia. The real reason, for Kennedy, was the growing demand for ores for the rising electronic industry, in which cobalt, and nickel, had been high American interests. The Liberty Space Centre in New Guinea, near Jayapura, was not intended as important as it used to be. Nixon’s drama with NASA during the 70s made this location unexpectedly the launch site of the first Moon launch in the world. That renowned legacy made Liberty Space Center’s town, Tropicana, a significant population boost in the 70s, then growing too large before the NASA administration moves back to the US with this growth. [2]

Nasution’s growing concern was he agreed with Suharto’s proposal of developing the island but attempts to do it by educating the natives had been futile, much because of the people’s willingness to violence that ravaged immigrants with skilled expertise that could educate them. Efforts to compromise between giving the locals autonomy and pushing forward the industrialization had ended with Nasution’s presidency advocating for the latter’s proposal, eventually relenting immigration restrictions as early as 1972 from Indonesia. Suharto’s influence continued in Papua from Governor Frans Kaisepo’s approved attitude towards him. Frans [3] was a staunch Indonesian nationalist, many of his contributions were to aid Papuan sentiments in Australian New Guinea, much to the creation of modern Papua history. Frans accepted Suharto’s modernization proposal, as he wished for ethnic Papuans to be equally developed as the remaining Indonesian brothers. Appointed as the governor of the Papua State Republic from 1973 until his death, Frans devoted his life to the rapid development of Indonesia.
​

Kaisepo, 1980​

As early as 1967, three locations (Manokwari, Jayapura, and Merauke) had been the target of highly skilled labour to settle. This was Suharto’s initial proposal to educate Papuan tribes with adequate skills such as crafting, farming, or mining. However, these faced significant resistance with Papuan tribes endorsing this encroachment as the “newest form of imperialism and new method of life” which gained much annoyance to the federal government. Because of this, Nasution’s immigration policy of education has slowly shifted towards full-front colonialism. To make up for the skilled labour demands of the growing industry and mines of New Guinea, forming the true sense of colonialism in the modern world. Efforts of immigration to New Guinea, shockingly, were easy. Not only do Indonesians have successfully attracted their citizens to move here, but foreigners were enticed by the island. This was made by Nasution’s special regulation regarding the Papua State Republic, but much of this should be credited towards Suharto.

In 1975, not long after the reorganization of the territory as the Papua State Republic, Frans Kaisepo announced the infamous Papuan Constitution of 1975. It was the state republic’s constitution drafted by New Guinean pro-Indonesian nationalists, and Suharto-faction militarists. These proposals have cited the importance of New Guinea for the abundance of minerals. Suharto’s intentions on the island, regardless of moralistic point-of-view, can be explained rather simply: money. Since his commando during the liberation of New Guinea with Air Marshall Suryadarma, he has bought significant swaths of land for three main industries: plantation, mining, and manufacturing. Cocoa has been New Guinea’s most profitable plantation crop, along with oil palm and coconut. The land was free since Nasution’s post-peace treaty granted military personnel that contribute to Indonesia’s victory lands that the government had acquired with the native treaties that had been going on since before the war. Those compensations were nothing profitable for the lower rankings (for the land was not big enough for profitable plantation, industry or mine). Thus, these lower-ranking military personnel joined together with their land contributions, forming what became the core foundation of Partai Rakyat Demokratik’s funding mechanism of Suharto-ism. Frans, and probably Suharto, advocated the method of rapid Westernization on the island, as a means to provide a profitable venture of his savings, as well as his ambitious pledge to succeed Nasution as his successor. This came as a success with Suharto’s growing business empire, from energy, and plantation to the retail sector, which much of his wealth came from New Guinea’s exploitation.
​

Suharto looking at the profits of PT Humpuss, an energy sector company, 1979
​

​

Didik Budiharto, or Didik Suharto, inherit the Energy sector of Suharto's company, in 1985. [4]​

However, his ambition might contribute to New Guinea’s advancement, because his growing empire enticed all the corporations entering New Guinea for potential success, thus exploding the island’s economic value. Freeport, the United States mining company leased by Sukarno during the early US-Indo friendship talks, have started to attract more migrants to escalate mining in Tembaga Pura, just because Suharto’s corporation and private Indonesian locals have encroached on the city with competing gains. As companies flooded the island with locals unwilling to cooperate as workers, the natural result was unrestricted, unprecedented, and wild immigration towards the island. From the early immigration entries dated from 1967, these towns have evolved into bustling cities. The place had been transformed into a new colony, competing with Indonesians with foreigners on the island. Fortunately, as New Guinea’s native population concentrated in the mountainous regions, the effects of culture shock had little impact than they should have been.

The difference between Suharto and Nasution's approaches to developing New Guinea differentiated who should have been the actors involved. Nasution approved that the fastest method to build New Guinea was to attract as many skilled labours as possible without limits. Pouring all the necessary manpower will advance New Guinea much faster. He has stated that “a rising tide lifts all boats”. He had no qualms about Javanese migrants coming to New Guinea for the opportunity, nor the foreigners who strangely saw the place attractive. Suharto, on the other hand, prefer the restrictive approach of transforming New Guinea as “New Java”, since he felt the skilled labours in Indonesia proper is enough for New Guinea’s growth. Another personal reason was foreigners’ entry into New Guinea gave Suharto’s business empire more competition, stifling the monopoly he was trying to achieve on the island.

The foreigner’s entry into New Guinea, how bizarre it was, had been a good number of lucky factors that ignite the constant flow of the white population to New Guinea. Firstly, the white population had been characters with skills in complicated labours such as machine maintenance, industrial planning, and especially senior consultants. Freeport, Copra Coconut and Barrick Gold, all US-Canada conglomerates, have invited thousand of skilled labours with their families to stay for their mines’ maintenance. NASA’s research scientists also contributed to the growth, with Tropicana as the immediate result of it.

In the 80s, the LKY premiership has given New Guinea a new federal government, but nothing transformed the progress New Guinea has had. Instead, LKY advocated for the improvement of efficiency on the island, thus bringing up Suharto’s initial plan to the extreme. Not only do LKY continue immigration policies to the Papua State Republic, but LKY also boosted Nasution’s PITP (Program Infrastruktur Trans Papua), by accommodating all the necessary connections to help the island grow. It’s an impressive feature that after Indonesia had finished the construction of the Trans-Java toll network, LKY’s further initiative was to create the first toll road in New Guinea; a small stretch of line connecting Jayapura to the city of Tropicana.
​

Tropicana Suburb, 1988​

LKY adopted a stern measure to subsidize local development more than foreign exploitation, since both immigrants from Java and the West had alienated native tribes from receiving the economic benefit besides infrastructure, LKY has commenced a conciliary method which, like Nasution’s early plan, again entire the locals to adopt the modern life rather than the traditional customs. Different from than response during the Nasution administration, with the changing island visible to every native New Guinean, locals have looked in awe of this progress, thus advocating a moderate position on industrialization. This contributes to the island’s growing participation in bureaucracy, politics, and social changes (which mostly immigrants or coastal Papuans with nationalist views have dominated throughout the years). LKY also involve natives on working hard labour, such as navigators, bricklayer, etc.

LKY’s focus is the same as the government that preceded him. Noticing the abundance of ore resources and arable land, LKY had all attention to extracting the potential deposits New Guinea had for Indonesia’s growth. More gold, silver and cobalt deposits have been found in several locations on the island, many of whom became LKY’s immediate focus to establish a mine that may provide an economic boost to Indonesia’s booming export. He still tried to restrict foreign companies, and for his premiership attempted to reduce foreign exploitation for Indonesia’s core policy, similar to the nationalization programs LKY had done on oil and forestry companies. Nevertheless, the exponential rate of discovered deposits made foreign companies inevitably enter the business competition with LKY’s nationalization attempts, much so that these attempts only neutralize the arrival of private (and mostly foreign) mining firms to extract resources. LKY did not try to restrict these enterprises with regulation, though, because he believed it may inhibit New Guinea from this rapid advancement, which was what made Indonesia’s economy boom as high as 15% at one time.

LKY’s premiership also saw a different flow of foreign immigration entering New Guinea. These newcomers mainly were ideologues with certain beliefs for a utopia that exists in a tropical paradise, along with the Cold War tension remaining high across Europe. This form of immigrants, disparaged by Indonesians as “white hippies” became a trend for these people to vacate themselves and settle in New Guinea for two things: belief and fear. Concerned with the growing tension across Europe, inhabitants of the remaining pro-West countries in the Germano-sphere have remained sceptical of their government’s inability to form a cohesive peace assurance for their people. These people, mostly left-leaning, have been estranged from the government’s anti-USSR and anti-French tendency on policy. The trigger for this immigration, however, was entirely unintentional, from a German band. In 1970, the German band Trio announced a hit song Paradies [5], which was a criticism of the fear of war in Europe that claimed there was a paradise. Incidentally, the heaven mentioned was New Guinea, where the band sang of “lush green paradise”, “endless beach” and “ecstatic happiness of the people” within. With the song becoming a hit, the trend of “moving to New Guinea” became a hit on young afraid European that saw war as inevitable, thus flocking there with hopes of creating a “utopia”. These numbers of foreign expatriates were nowhere near the number of Javanese immigrants to the island, but it gained significant influence as the “elite” class of the island’s population. In 1988, the number of white New Guineas has risen to a humble 350 thousand people, which was nothing for the Indonesian migrants of a total of 3 million, as well as the native Papua of barely 9 million people. Many of these immigrants lived on the Western (Dutch New Guinea) portion of the island, while the Eastern side had been much more native.
​

German Band, Trio​

Frans Kaisepo, the first state president of Papua, remained a popular figure and Father of Papua until he died in 1987. The president’s policy of open economics has put the advancement of the New Guinean society, but the benefits to the native core population remained mixed. Some argued that the advancement of New Guinea had no benefit for the natives, and some argued the “trickle-down” effect it has, especially regarding the infrastructure it has built. Under LKY’s premiership, Kaisepo continued his liberal governance by allowing more companies to enter New Guinea.​

---

Madagascar
The African Model [6]
​

Antananarivo, 1988​

The events unfold in the continent of Africa, with French’s new communist approach and consolidation from the Nixon Administration, the bargain of Malagasy Island as a sovereign territory of Indonesia had been most controversial to the Western world, the USSR and probably the continent of Africa itself. The insatiable thirst of previous Pan-Nusantara Parindra that may have gone out of control, along with the seemingly “imperialist” attitude during the early republic of Indonesia, may contribute to this bargain. The Malagasy annexation was a French attempt to put Indonesia a good trading partner, which proved useful from the United States’ deteriorating relation with France in the Kennedy, Nixon, Shafer, Carter, and Glenn administrations (Nixon had tried to normalize but u-turn to appease his conservative voter base). However, this annexation has harnessed the UN protest, but it went nowhere fortunately for the organization’s focus on Indochina, Central Africa, and just the Middle East which was rampaging with the rising UASR. With Africa's instability for the last 20 years, international attention cannot argue which Malagasy (eventually Madagaskar) has the most growth of all African nations in history because of its part as the Federal Republic of Indonesia.

The island was a French colony for centuries, which remained untouched even during the War. However, the changes in Paris, with significant disdain for overseas territories, made the French more willing to just let independence rather than retain overseas possession, except French West Africa. This made Malagasy, even though French governments have made modernization to make Malagasy a profitable colony, soon to be ignored and partially omitted from French policies. The Madagascar island, eventually, was given to France for other reasons, but it made the locals realise France doesn't value the island more than it had been.

When Malagasy people heard Indonesia ruled the nation, the reaction was partly indifferent. Many ruling classes (mostly Merina) have hoped for independence, but the common man of Malagasy has an indifferent attitude toward the new occupants. However, the main contributor to Madagascar’s integration into Indonesia is the first State President of Madagascar, Philibert Tsiranana. Tsiranana was a pro-French sympathizer that wished to join as part of the Franco-African Community. But the growing chasm between Thorez and Tsiranana made the latter slowly disinterested in making Madagascar a French autonomy. Instead, he became more advocate of independence with moderate nationalism. Arriving in 1967, the native Malagasy tribes had heard of the victory across the Indian Ocean, felt envigorated with a sense of anti-imperialism, and pressed Tsiranana for independence. Domestic regions in Malagasy were stormy, ethnic Merina had been the less enthusiastic about joining Indonesia, but the poorest regions of Western and Southern Madagascar had a good impression of the Indonesian people because they despised the Merina people more than they prefer others to dominate the government than the Merina. When French talks of giving Madagascar to Indonesia began, the Western and Southern tribes, despite their illiteracy and remoteness to international events, may have celebrated Indonesia’s entry into the region.
​

Tsimiroro Heavy Oil Site, one of the largest oil fields in Madagascar, opened thousands of jobs, courtesy of Subandrio and LKY's industrialization program in 1981​

President Nasution, upon arriving in Madagascar, noted the island’s decent number of natural resources and wished to implement his Papuan approach into Madagascar. This was opposed by Tsiranana, who advocated for improving the livelihoods of Madagascar first. Nasution, but that time gave Tsiranana why Papua had been modelled as such and reassured the initial plan of the island’s development method. Tsiranana who heard about this, was very elated and eventually became the new proponent of the pro-Indonesia movement. The Madagascar Consitution of 1973, formed after the changes made in 1972 Federal Consitution that deliberately appease Madagascar and New Guinea, put forth Tsiranana and Madagascar island as a federal part of Indonesia.

The true Papuan model envisioned by Nasution and Sukarno was adopted in Madagascar. The series of rapid industrialization by coopting the natives to adopt Westernization have received accommodating attitudes from the people in Madagascar who supported it. With blatant colonialism not necessary, Nasution announced vocational programs in Madagascar to teach basic modern skills: craftsmen, engineers, or hard-skilled labour, which may be fruitful for industries to arrive in Madagascar. Nasution’s attitude after the annexation was not as attentive as before, but his ignorance of Madagascar may benefit Tsiranana during his presidency on the island.

Tsiranana advocated moderate economic and social policies, which was influenced by his stay in France which saw the advanced Westernize society. Indonesia’s demand for goods and closer connectivity to East Asia made Madagascar another potential to ease the demand with its resources. Agriculture in Madagascar such as rice and cassava, as cash crops such as vanilla or coffee, became highly demanded exports that Tsiranana needed for his reforms. Much so that in his death in 1978, Tsiranana quoted his utmost gratitude to Indonesia.
​

“The hunger of Indonesia made us rich, prosper and advance. I have no regrets about giving up independence for Indonesia. I think the majority of Madagascar understands it.”
-State President Tsiranana​

Indonesia’s entry on the island has improved the poor citizens of South and West Madagascar, which amend relations with the inner Merina people. For the region's good abundance of oil and ore resources, Indonesia’s federal government (especially under LKY) had put priority on the island’s industrialization. Those mines, with skilled labour from the Merina people, became a good synergy for the advancement of livelihood. Madagascar is claimed to have the most prosperous people in the entire African continent.

Positive Feedback Loop

Tsiranana tried to establish prosperity from his Malagasy Socialism, it was a government program to advocate basic human rights and improve the standard living conditions of Madagascar. This humanitarian and pragmatic solution came to increase access to water and electricity, improve agricultural production and improve the private sector. This approach came from the diversification of Madagascar's economy, increase private investment, and constitute a national welfare program to push more prosperity to the people of Malagasy.

In contrast with Frans’ more Federal-aligned approach to governance, Tsiranana has his ambitions to govern Madagascar. He encouraged the development of cooperatives, instead of conglomerates, as means of economic participation. A mixed economy, instead of a liberal economy, was commanded on the island. Instead of receiving experienced skilled immigrants for factories and agriculture, Tsiranana invited teachers and trainers from Indonesia-proper and abroad, which taught local Malagasy people the necessary knowledge and skills for advancing the economy. Slow advancement in agriculture, upland cotton plantation, and petrol refinery have been constructed to increase revenue.

Tsiranana’s opposition argued his Malagasy Socialism idea may have been too slow for Malagasy people. However, the critics were shut for the outstanding results of it. Unemployment in Madagascar had nearly dropped to zero, while living conditions have raised to increase lifespan for nearly 10 years in the last decade. Malagasy’s revenue skyrocketed when private investments flooded the agriculture and energy sector of Madagascar’s industry. The populace has felt the positive changes in the nation’s rapid development of electrical and water networks in villages.

The Merina elite, who wanted independence in the first place, and acclaimed their status suppressed by Tsiranana, had little to argue against the popular president. Although Tsiranana’s success was not his, it was proper Indonesia’s demand, which backfire the Merina elite’s main narrative. Cries of independence, or regional separatism, dwindled for the disappointment of opposition. Bahasa Indonesia became widely accepted as Malagasy’s official language, accepting Indonesia’s dominance. There has been an issue of economic dependence, but the rapid improvement of all Malagasy made these concerns washed away. Unlike the island of New Guinea, Madagascar has less influx of Indonesian immigrants because of Tsiranana’s domestic program. Yet, the Malagasy locals have begun assimilation into the Indonesian culture for its support by economic progress.
​

“Let’s start building this, and this, and this too. Build it all.”

-The famous quote from Premier LKY in Madagascar electrified pro-Indonesian sentiment in Madagascar, as well as the popularity of the Indonesian government on the people.​

Tsiranana's socialist programs have mimicked the Israeli socialism model of his leniency and sympathy for the Jewish community. His interest was satisfied when out of all Jewish exodus locations, many Jewish left-leaning figures had migrated to Madagascar for refuge, which the Indonesian government partially approved, for the harsh repressions of Jews under Arabian UASR. Staying in the Northern part of Malagasy, Tsiranana eventually copy several of the Israeli's agricultural methods, education and thinking, which was more forward than most Malagasy and tried to implement with the Malagasy model. This was the only unrestricted immigration to Malagasy, which policies have been criticised by Indonesian-proper (Javanese and others) that had quotas to enter the island.

---

* The name came from this Youtuber of a video that I watched. It was quite a different perspective, but a welcome one for me.

[1] My efforts to smooth the TL by giving off more reasons why Australia decided to invade Indonesia at that time. This was pretty realistic considering Australia's OTL support to East Timor during their independence efforts.
[2] More smoothing to make NASA-related events realistic to ITTL, which I made as part of NASA feud with Nixon, and part of luck made Papua good publicity for the Moon Landing.
[3] This is a prologue for Suharto's wealth ITTL, as well as how PRD remain a good force in politics.
[4] Didik Budiharto is ITTL Tommy Suharto
[5] Attempt to make the reason why foreigners seem to keep moving to Papua, of course, because of this human rights issues in Papua (like West Papua ITTL) have been mostly reduced, and became somewhat ironic as ITTL it would be the foreigners as also accomplice of "crackdown of violence" in event of "native aggression".
[6] Another smoothing to make Madagascar more realistic on joining Indonesia.​

These chapters have focused more on the bigger picture, such as culture, islands or government policies. Next up I want to micro a little bit, coming off to the people of Indonesia in this era.

 

[Yourbaee]

Did ITTL Indonesia doesn't use the term limit ?

 

[SkylineDreamer]

Did ITTL Indonesia doesn't use the term limit ?

Currently, no. IOTL New Order also doesn't have term limits. There's also no incentive to do so (Sukarno had a war time era, and resigned before peacetime. Nasution lost popularity on 1978 which was only 14 years, Subandrio declined for a 3rd term).

 

[Dude...]

What is the Police System for Indonesia in the AU, since it’s a Federal state, does the State Republics have their own Police like in the US? And do the Federal Government has a national level law enforcement agency akin to FBI or the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)? And does the Federal District Police Force under the control of District Gov or the FedGov?

 

[SkylineDreamer]

What is the Police System for Indonesia in the AU, since it’s a Federal state, does the State Republics have their own Police like in the US? And do the Federal Government has a national level law enforcement agency akin to FBI or the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)? And does the Federal District Police Force under the control of District Gov or the FedGov?

Currently, ABRI is still the most influential force (both policing and defence) in ITTL Indonesia. But, there have been attempts to strengthen Local Guards, or Federal District Police Forces, criticised by the domineering pro-military PNI-R and PRD. In organization, the Polisi is both Indonesia's FBI and Federal Police. Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN) is equivalent to CIA.

The Federal District Police Force, or essentially all forces, remained subservient to the President, thus FedGov. Defacto, most of the president's power was "relegated" to the Ministry of Defense, which sometimes may act in accordance, or against, the wishes of the President.

 

[SkylineDreamer]

2nd August 1988
Penang, Malaya Province, State Republic of Indonesia
​

The rings of alarm filled Basyir’s ears. It’s closing time for the gates.

A young-adult hopeful watches the closing of the factory. Gaze at the doors which unveil the enormity, he saw what he had always seen for years. The echoes of the prompter so the labour leaves the premises and the guards gracefully usher workers out of the workplace. Although he has done this so many times, he always shivers at the late breeze of the Malacca’s wind on his back; which is radiated with the impeccable sunset before being obstructed by the island before.

Basyir holds the youngest sales position ever sat in the Walini semiconductor industry in the Federal District of Penang. Unlike the industries surrounding Penang’s Industrial Zone, Walini is the only one which adheres to the minimum wage of the Nusantara State Republic, in a district which doesn’t constrain any industrial to do so. Penang Federal District, following Federal law, has the lowest minimum wage in comparison to most State Republics. Because of this, conglomerates have insisted on staying in Federal Districts, while leaving State Republics. However, before the election, Mahathir made a deal with conglomerates that prevent this exodus, but remarkably reversing them much to the worker’s glee. Now, the zone remains as busy as usual, harnessing the power of Indonesian workers.

As a salesman, Basyir noticed the reason that Walini Semiconductor can afford the minimum wage, is because of the industry’s sheer profitability in constructing the materials it produces semiconductors. Returns of semiconductor has been high for Walini Electronics in recent years, because of the extraordinarily high demand from the world. Much to the worker’s disbelief, Indonesia’s Rp 5000 minimum wage is far lower than the workers in Korea, Japan, or Taiwan. Moreover, Indonesia has a strategic location which attracts foreign investors, and no hostile or complicated government like the Philippines or Thailand (which for everyone working here, responded with disbelief).

Basyir enjoys his fulfilled dream, as most young adults have strived for in Indonesia. Born during the peak of Australian Aggression, Basyir’s childhood was filled with the nation’s growth out of devastation. Born to a family of seven whose house was destroyed by Australian bombings; his parents found an opportunity in the manufacturing heart; has worked from the bottom to the top. The ‘Indonesian Dream’, as much of Basyir’s real-life experience, came real with his parents emerged from owning no home to a decent family with a considerable sized income. He was reminded of times when their parents could only afford tempe and tahu with nasi putih, then they could afford ikan asin, then ayam. For the rest of his life, he can see the Indonesian Dream in his family, now capable of eating steik in the most luxurious Western of Menteng, Jakarta. On the entertainment demand, his family can afford to enjoy a vacation in Bali or Bintan, two places that his parents would shock to believe if he had asked them twenty years prior.

The salesman realized that he, along with tens of millions of youths in this nation, have experienced the greatest comeback of a generation in Indonesian history. Benefiting from trade, alliance, and economic growth, Indonesia’s strength emerges from the generations that see what the leadership has led them to. That is why the recent demonstrations in Indonesia were not because of the criticism of decline or stagnation, it was of fear of “privilege” and “unfairness” that saw many occupants feel they don’t receive the “progress” they should have had, a sentiment that echoed the farmers especially. For the workers, however, Basyir noted that most of the pro-labour movement has been political-motivated, not fully in the interest of labours. The Labour Law of 1986 did not alter the lives of farmers and workers as significantly as it should. Basyir, however, commented that it only strengthens Mahathir’s bloc in PPP, thus overthrowing Musa after the death of LKY. His notions came to this conclusion because of his recent conversations with his father, a worker, that felt the unrest before the election didn’t reverberate to most of his peers.

“Basyir, what’s with the gaze?”

He did not realize the middle-aged man that has been waiting for him as all the other workers have left. Andi was the factory’s worker’s chief in the refining manufacturing section – the zone in which semiconductors are checked, refined, or discarded by quality. For Basyir, Andi was his most friendly coworker in this factory, many of whom saw Basyir as too young to have such a rise in career. Envy is a strong emotion.

“Nothing, Pak. Just enjoying the smoke,”

Basyir’s sarcastic remark chuckled Andi. The salesman’s thoughts remained on the company he had worked with. He sees that Walini Electronics, like him, is growing exponentially in the market. He felt that his sales had contributed to Walini’s growth as a prominent semiconductor producer. Still, he felt an unease in his future, because when someone has risen so high, they will start to forget the risk.

Andi pats the young’s shoulder with eyes fixating on the company’s name. “You know, when I first worked here, everywhere is just plain grasslands, no one was here. Yet here we are. In the middle of a smoke farm for the tiniest piece of magic. Semiconductors? I called that electric wizardry.”

A grinning Basyir agrees with Andi’s comment. He wasn’t particularly sure how these semiconductors work, but he knows that these tiny components contribute much to the electric tools he and Andi uses. Telephones, refrigerators, and radios, he understood that these components bring new technological advancements that he couldn’t fathom to comprehend. Moreover, these components that have decent penetration into the Indonesian market, had nowhere close to the insatiable hunger for the same products in the American market, which made Basyir wonder what kind of advanced products the Americans have been inventing.

He had known Andi’s story in Penang, arriving as a soldier of the Indonesian Armed Forces who liberated British Malaya, Andi’s youth came mature with meeting gadis desa of the village a few miles North of Penang. With a twist of romantic stories between the couple, Andi decided to stay in Penang, live with his lover, and grow a family of five. Andi saw the changes in Penang, from a decent trading post, now a bustling growing metropolis with limitless industrial construction. Penang’s full district had no empty lands, either fully purposed for industrial or residential demands. Andi never realized that the same Penang that he had lived in became the government’s top priority of the most advanced industrial zones (electronics and chemicals) in the nation, competing with the capital of Indonesia as the provider of Indonesia’s cheap futuristic technology for the new millennium.

However, Andi’s Penang story was an understatement for the region because the place had been a bustling city well before Andi’s birth. Basyir had known of Penang’s history as the birthplace of well-known Asian intellectuals, a great city full of Overseas-Chinese, and a hub of growing youths that is pro-American. It was the Seberang Perai that he had romanticised about. Unlike the metropolis on the island that started to spread towards Butterworth, the factory rested near Sungai Muda, the border between Kedah and Penang, which saw the biggest contrast of landscape that mirrors almost all of Indonesia. The swaths of farmlands and lush trees conflicted with the iron sheets of the industrial roofs, divided with the small rivers that split between rural and industrial, before arriving at Penang’s closer suburb of red ceramic housings. Basyir noted, should one have seen Penang from the aeroplanes, one would see the greatest painting created by men, the shades of colours dignifying the synergy of agriculture, industrial and residential, all within the same region less than 20 km in diameter.

Basyir rested on the commuter bus that brought him to the factory in the morning, to bring him to his neighbourhood to rest. The lively neighbourhood in Kepala Batas, north of Butterworth, will be the resting place of many workers of Walini Electronics. Basyir rented this place for corporate visitation. He works in Jakarta after all, but the salesman had business to deal with the factory administrator before going back to his sales office. Moreover, he was glad to be sent here, because of the chaotic Jakarta has become. Surrounded by competitors, Walini Electronics has difficult times with electronic enterprises with far greater influences undercut the corporation. Semiconductor, unlike the energy or textile industry, is a sector that is still new for Indonesia but boomed in East Asia. Naturally, as Taiwan, Korea and Japan had received the economic miracle of the semiconductor industry, nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand emerged to contest the existing powers. This, fortunately, was a victory for Indonesia, because the efficiency developed by the LKY premiership had made Indonesia a much cheaper, more practical, and better exporter of semiconductor energy than the other two which could replace the established ones in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The United States, with the technology it has, demanded more semiconductors than its industry could produce, thus demanding imports from cheap counterparts to fill the vacancy.

Basyir is reminded of his first sales pitch to a US semiconductor representative of Motorola. He heard from the higher-ups which Walini Electronics had agreed to a production agreement, which buys cheap semiconductors from Indonesia for United States consumers. Basyir, along with his senior, gets a good agreement of selling revenue of nearly 1 million USD, a first deal he celebrated with his first owned television. Basyir was an excellent salesman, dashing and welcoming, who capture the gaze of foreign investors. In a few months after acquiring his sales job, his career spiked as one of the best salesmen in the company.

Basyir’s minds were interrupted with the commuter bus’s poster which depicts the campaign slogan of Guntur Sukarnoputra. The resemblance of him with his father is uncanny, the features and passion he ignited were electrical. In Penang, a growing number of labours do support the leaning-communist party of Indonesia, Partai Pekerja Indonesia. Although they have campaigned for more alignment with the United States, the grassroots of the party remained loyal to the Soviet cause, especially apparent when the Soviet Union has been developing its domestic matters, in contrast to the United States' increasing foreign involvement everywhere. Most people who opposed the United States oppose how bossy the superpower has been on subsidiary countries, which looks like an insult to developing countries’ populace. Basyir, still, understood that despite the United States having a mixed response in Indonesia, many of whom are grateful for the superpower’s contribution to Indonesia’s rapid economic growth.

The poster which presents Guntur also reminded him of his sales pitch two years ago. Basyir received a contact from Pravetz Computers, their demands of buying semiconductors for Indonesia caught a curiosity in Basyir’s mind. It was because of two things: the size and the nation. Pravetz Computers is a computer enterprise in Bulgaria, one of the COMECON nations that is within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Walini’s sales group has been aware of the organization’s rising demand for semiconductors, competing with the United States' demands, which pique the company with great interest. What were the Soviets trying to do? Why do they need our semiconductors? These questions dwell inside Basyir’s thoughts, but he never said them out loud, nor comments about them, because the deal made him what he is today. The deal of nearly $5 million cemented Basyir’s position in the company as the best salesman of the year.

As the salesman’s mind cleared a little, he now listens to the hit music Antara Aku, Kamu dan Bekas Pacarmu from Iwan Fals. The guitar strums seem to have a beat on young commuters, who have shown little movements following the rhythm. Then, he watched the sunset of Penang, a little too late, as the lamp lights on the streets turned on, giving a glimpse of shine towards the peaceful countryside of Penang, illuminating the quiet marshes, little homes and trees surrounding it.​

---

Jalan Cendana 6-8, Menteng, Distrik Federal Jakarta

Ibu Tien caresses her forehead. Without her husband’s presence, the family has cracked more and more, as each child bicker on their ambitions, money, or power, which put the previously calm household. After the car accident in 1980, Cendana Group – before not organized into a conglomerate group – had years of struggle on who should be the successor of all her husband’s companies. Naturally, daughter Mbak Tutut has been the first-in-line of the group, but her political ambition that create Partai Rakyat Demokratik insinuated other children to assume the eldest child to shift into a political focus, not a business one. Therefore, Bambang and Didik all aimed for that position. Eventually, the climate of the group was almost partitioned, and Ibu Tien intervened and assumed the leader of the Cendana Group until her children mature.

“PT Citra Auto Nusantara has had the license for Mercedez Benz and Ford Motor Company for decades, you will not take that away from me.”

The thunder of Bambang Trihatmodjo on the front porch can be heard by Ibu Tien who has been sitting in the living room.

“How brave considering PT Humpuss’s license on Tol Laut has been broken by your own doing.” Didik retorted.
​

Ibu Tien and Mbak Tutut, 1982​

As early as Didik’s inheritance to the energy company, her youngest son has received the most profitable sector of the group for almost three years. Didik Budiharto, after his Angola military campaign ended up by discharge of disobedience, made Ibu Tien sympathy to give him PT Humpuss, once the only company Ibu Tien has hold of during the messy inheritance fight. At that time, PT Humpuss hasn’t had the growth Didik’s reforms had made, possible because many thought Suharto’s venture in Papua had been too ambitious, despite promising reports. Didik, however, had been a staunch believer of his father’s dreams, giving up all his luck on the industrial potential Papua has. Ibu Tien was ecstatic that her son did get through with all its returns, many of his siblings don’t like the changes.

The balance of the group rests within Ibu Tien’s insistence to split between sectors of the Cendana Group. Mbak Tutut has controlled the media and retail sector of the group. The media is suitable for Tutut’s political career, while the retail sector retains the profitability and fame of Mbak Tutut itself. The most famous retail of them all, Taman Anggrek Mall in Jakarta, received a good response for the expansion of commerce in the Grogol Subdistrict. Mbak Tutut also involves herself in supermarkets, cooperating with Carrefour in the Indonesian market. Mbak Tutut’s business venture was not as great as her other brothers, probably because she is also the chairman of Partai Rakyat Demokratik, a political journey which is complicated with an uncertain political future.​

Titiek Suharto, 1988​

Titiek Suharto, Ibu Tien’s other daughter, owned the entertainment and agriculture sector of Cendana Group, which sometimes coincided with Mbak Tutut’s retail ventures. Owner of Taman Mekarsari, Titiek focuses on expanding profitability in fruit production (like zalacca, jackfruit, oranges, rambutan, starfruit, melons, jackfruit, pineapple, and many more). Titiek’s most profitable sector is Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, constructed south of Halim Airport, which made the greatest domestic entertainment world in Indonesia.

For Bambang and Didik, the divide should be between Bambang in the property sector and Didik in the energy sector. Bambang owned PT Asriland, which contributes greatly to the rapid suburban development of Bintaro Jaya, where Bambang has been said to be “Kebayoran Baru of Tangerang”. Bambang also developed many in Malaya and other stuff, joined with old Suharto friends constructing the great suburbia of Indonesian residential expansion. Didik, on the other hand, owns the energy sector, such as mining or extraction, which bases mostly in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua. However, the sector which put these brothers into a fight is the automotive industry.
​

Bambang Trihatmodjo, 1984

Didik Budiharto, 1988​

Since the early 1970s, the automobile industry in Indonesia had earned the boom sensation with Astra's first Toyota Kijang that made cars mainstream in Indonesia. Since then, efforts to dominate Indonesia’s automotive industry remained heated, with companies such as Nissan, Daihatsu and Honda attempting to topple Toyota’s growing dominance. There are also Western auto companies to consider, such as Ford, Chevrolet or BMW and Mercedes-Benz.

The early struggles of Bambang started after his idea to accept luxurious supercars as his main venture. Mercedes-Benz, Ferarri, and Lamborghini he attempted to appeal to them, promising a good market in Indonesia. However, since Indonesians haven’t reached the profitability to buy these sorts of cars, made Bambang control himself and pushed for automobiles such as Ford, or Daihatsu. The only successive break was the introduction of Mercedes-Benz to Indonesia, which made the company the “high-class car” of Indonesia. However, Bambang soon reached a deadlock when Daihatsu had already been courted by Didik’s new automobile company, which also noticed the growing potential of the automotive market. Didik’s focus, unlike his brother, is more nationalistic as his dream is to create the first domestic car, completely designed by Indonesians, to be launched as a pure Indonesian car. This, however, proved to be a difficult job for the young entrepreneur, thus he resorted to the most effective step to achieve his goal. He invited Daihatsu, Isuzu, Kia, and Hyundai to his business venture, appeasing them for the Indonesian market.

The tension between the brothers began after Daihatsu successfully bolted to Bambang as their main Indonesian distributor. The younger brother had been furious about this deal and Didik eventually started to form his brand, Timor, based on the stolen designs of Daihatsu. Moreover, Didik eventually began his counterattack against Bambang’s greed when Didik purposefully blocked Bambang’s property sector to Papua and let another property developer encroach on the new suburbia of Sukarnopura. In retaliation, Bambang messed with PT Humpuss’ Tol Laut license, which made the distribution of Humpuss mineral exports much harder.

Unlike Suharto, Ibu Tien had little corporate experience in her life, but she had great experience in dealing with her children. As the witness to her children’s lives, Ibu Tien had carry the torch after Suharto’s death, carrying the legacy to continue the Cendana family intact.

“Stop it.” Ibu Tien’s soft voice dominated against the growing tension in the other room. Ibu Tien had little problem silencing the bickering children, she had used this authority frequently, especially after her as the leader of the household.

“You two must sort it out. I don’t want to hear it for the rest of my life. What would Dad say if he sees both of you ruining his legacy?”

The next sentence ended the brother’s brawl. Suharto had been the greatest icon of the Cendana family. Remembered as a general, politician, leader and influential, the old man still owns an influence on Indonesian politics, even more so in the military.

Ibu Tien proceeded with a discussion of the Cendana Group. Their future is quite uncertain as, although very influential in the political business, the Cendana family still overshadows Lippo and Salim, the regional government cliques of Singapore, Johor, Kedah, and Brunei, with also the threat of Trihandoko’s BUMN. She reminded me that in times of competition, the Cendana family should stay strong, united, and fully committed to a common goal.​

---

Tanah Abang, Federal District of Jakarta, Indonesia

Director Tedjo Budianto gazed upon the little land between the rails and highways of Tanah Abang, as the future headquarters of Jasa Marga.

He reminded the times when he was appointed contractor for the Jakarta-Bogor-Ciawi (Jagorawi) Toll Road that stretched 46 km as the first. Not long after the construction, Nasution inaugurated PT Jasa Marga, also the first toll-road company in Indonesia. As part of Nasution’s Program Infrastruktur, many of the toll roads have been given to PT Jasa Marga for construction. The government program to connect Java and Papua with highways gave Jasa Marga the opportunity the monopoly of the road construction business. After Jagorawi, PT Jasamarga has been given more opportunities for toll construction. Currently, he has memorized all operating toll roads under his watch.

After the construction of Jagorawi, the Nasution government announced that every toll road Indonesia has, it should accommodate car travel to the main transportation points of each metropolis. That meant airports, ports, residential complexes towards office centres, or ring roads around the busiest section of the city. This, as stated in Nasution’s programs, had become the blueprint of Indonesia’s construction, as many of the 70s engineers envisioned potential connections for the year 2000. As a result, the federal government have tried to maintain the lands for these sorts of developments, to avoid needing needless alteration for lack of planning. Because of PT Jasa Marga's monopoly in Java toll road construction, the company has been in all toll construction until 1977. These toll roads, he memorized, had all been under Jasa Marga’s operation.
​

No	Name	Nickname	Length	Date of Operation
1​	Jalan Tol Jakarta-Bogor-Ciawi​	Jagorawi​	46 km​	April 1971​
2​	Jalan Tol Dalam Kota I Seksi W1 (Tomang- Tanah Abang-Manggarai)​	Lingkar Dalam Kota​	9.1 km​	May 1973​
3​	Jalan Tol Semarang​	Semarang ABC​	24.75 km​	August 1974​
4​	Jalan Tol Jakarta-Tangerang​	Janger​	29 km​	March 1975​
5​	Jalan Tol Bandara​	Tol Bandara​	18.9 km​	June 1975​
6​	Jalan Tol Jakarta-Kebayoran Lama​	Jakeb​	6.2 km​	July 1975​
7​	Jalan Tol Surabaya-Gempol​	Surgem​	45 km​	August 1976​
8​	Jalan Tol Dalam Kota I Seksi W2 (Manggarai-Jatinegara)​	Lingkar Dalam Kota​	2.8 km​	December 1976​
9​	Jalan Tol Jakarta-Cikampek​	Japek​	73 km​	October 1977​
10​	Jalan Tol Belawan-Medan-Tj. Morawa​	Belmera​	34 km​	October 1977​
11​	Jalan Tol Padalarang-CIleunyi​	Padaleunyi​	33 km​	February 1978​
12​	Jalan Tol Tangerang-Merak​	Tamer​	72,45 km​	July 1978​
13​	Jalan Tol Dalam Kota I Seksi E (Matraman-Pulomas)​	Lingkar Dalam Kota​	7.1 km​	July 1978​
14​	Jalan Tol Surabaya-Gresik​	Surgres​	20.7 km​	March 1979​
15​	Jalan Tol Surabaya-Mojokerto​	Sumo​	36.27 km​	April 1981​
16​	Jalan Tol Dalam Kota I Seksi N (Tomang-Kemayoran-Pulomas)​	Lingkar Dalam Kota​	9.5 km​	May 1982​
17​	Jalan Tol Dalam Kota II Seksi E (Tanjung Priok-Cawang)​	Lingkar Dalam Kota 2​	13.5 km​	July 1983​
18​	Jalan Tol Dalam Kota II Seksi W2 (Tanjung Duren-Cawang)​	Lingkar Dalam Kota 2​	13.4 km​	September 1983​
19​	Jalan Tol Palimanan-Kanci​	Palikanci​	26 km​	October 1984​
20​	Jalan Tol Kebayoran Lama-Ulujami​	Kebajami​	2.5 km​	March 1984​
21​	Jalan Tol Tanjung Duren-Kapuk​	Lingkar Dalam Kota 2​	9.1 km​	April 1985​
22​	Jalan Tol Palembang-Indralaya​	Palindra​	21.69 km​	September 1985​
23​	Jalan Tol Kertosono-Mojokerto​	Kemo​	40.5 km​	October 1986​
24​	Jalan Tol Cikopo Palimanan​	Cipali​	116 km​	May 1986​
25​	Jalan Tol Semarang-Batang​	Batarang​	75 km​	August 1987​
26​	Jalan Tol Semarang-Solo​	Somar​	72.64 km​	October 1988​

However, arriving in 1977, the Subandrio Premiership opened toll-road construction to the private sector and other non-federal government companies, which slowly reduces Jasa Marga's monopoly on toll-road construction. Also, of Trihandoko’s feud with the former Jasa Marga chairman, the federal government gave more opportunities to a new construction company, PT Citra Marga Nusaphana Persada (CMNP). This new company, in the greatest irony, was part of Cendana’s conglomerate family. Currently, the dominance of Jasa Marga has been contested by PT Waskita Karya, PT Hutama Karya, PT Temasek Construction, and PT Rekayasa Malaya.

Although Jasa Marga’s monopoly has diminished, the company remained the most significant toll road company in Indonesia. With a total of almost 900km of road constructed in the last 15 years, PT Jasa Marga has been awarded as the fastest-growing company in Indonesia, and its recognition gained interest outside of Indonesia. Still, PT Jasa Marga found problems, especially with future road constructions in the Federal District of Jakarta.

Jalan Tol Pelaburan Pluit-Tanjung Priok, or Harbour Toll Road, is the planned construction that linked Tanjung Priok and Pluit to ease the congestion in Tol Dalam Kota. With the increase in traffic volume of trucks and residential vehicles, Lingkar Dalam Kota has occurred regular traffic jams on rush hour megapolitan. Moreover, with more emphasis on rail construction, the LKY premiership had requested railway construction to be prioritized. In early 1983, Jasa Marga had agreed with Subandrio on finishing Lingkar Dalam Kota 2. However, the northern section of that ring road (which is Harbour Toll Road) received intense criticism from District Secretary Hendarto for the destruction it will cost on Kota Tua, the place where Indonesia is trying to receive the UNESCO World Heritage.

Jasa Marga’s regular method of toll construction was either building the on-ground toll road section or constructing an elevated section for multi-level crossing. As evident from nearly the interchanges made during the early 80s (Tomang Interchange, Tanah Abang Interchange, Kemayoran Interchange as examples) many of them involved two (rarely three) levels of crossing. The Kota Tua section to be crossed by the Harbour Toll Road will be cutting Museum Fatahillah with Pelabuhan Sunda Kelapa. Also, with Hendarto’s insistence on rebuilding Kota Tua as a fully colonial architecture, the district secretary remains ardently opposed to bulldozing the zone for toll construction. Other concerns, such as flooding, tunnel collapse, ventilation system, and other concerns have been Jasa Marga’s greatest challenges.

Hendarto’s solution to this ordeal, quite simply, was to dig a tunnel on the entire stretch of Kota Tua. That had shaken the company a little, since for all its history, the company never planned for tunnel construction. Most of this has been the railway companies, which still received many issues on the Gambir tunnel which is hot, crowded, and cracking all the time. Early attempts at tunnel toll road construction were PT CMNP’s Jalan Tol Luar Kota Jakarta Seksi S2 of TMII-Pondok Indah. They had made underpasses for many of the toll’s construction, but never on full-length tunnel construction, especially to accommodate high volumes of truck vehicles.

PT Jasa Marga also suffered significant setbacks for Harbour Toll Road for their land in Kota Tua, Ancol and the stretch towards Tanjung Priok has been used as freight railway access for industries in Kapuk and Cengkareng. With Hendarto’s plans to change focus to train connections, the District Secretary has made persuasive comments to LKY and Musa Hitam that highway construction isn’t feasible for highly dense cities that Jakarta must be. Therefore, for the last decade, Jakarta has constructed more railway tracks than toll roads. From the MRT Expansion, Freight Connection, Halim Railway Access, and Bandara Suryadarma Railway Access, Hendarto’s district planning was full of railway construction. Director Tedjo, although irritated with Hendarto’s alteration, still commend him for the amazing transformation of the city of Jakarta. It is for the District Secretary that the metropolis’ inner city had better pedestrian access, public transportation, and especially hygienic service competing with European states.

Jasa Marga’s disadvantage over other competitors is due to its dominance in the road construction sector, the company has become idle in innovation. Many of the newer construction companies advocated more innovation, such as the longest elevated toll road in Indonesia, both Jalan Tol Bekasi-Kampung Melayu and Jalan Tol Tangerang-Angke. Then the first planned underground toll road that connects Kebayoran Baru with Pondok Indah, also with the fastest construction toll road connecting Pekanbaru and Dumai. As more companies presented themselves to be more sophisticated than Jasa Marga, the company started to lose government projects. Not to mention regional monopolies have begun taking place, as LKY’s acceleration method gave Singapore and Malaya construction companies a monopoly on the region’s toll construction, barring Jasa Marga from entering the fold. It is also worsened with those companies having more efficient, better results and better operating systems than Jasa Marga.

Director Tedjo, the new face after Mahathir personally appointed him as the new face of Jasa Marga, has plans to reverse the trend. Mahathir’s appointment has been his method to reduce PT Temasek Construction (Singapore’s company) into intruding too much on Malaya, and all of Indonesia’s urban construction. Tedjo is the bravest director to fully immerse in the challenges of Harbour Toll Road.

Hendarto’s initial tunnel plan was 2.5 km that will bypass Kota Tua, and eventually surface up ad both Pluit and Kampung Bandan on both sides. Still, concerns about the connectivity of Ancol (currently revitalizing the area as an urban beach) and Kemayoran (for the region’s separation by railway) have been many of the challenges of the Harbour Toll Road connectivity. Eventually, PT Jasa Marga did the most insane proposal ever given to Hendarto. Instead of the 2.5 km underground access, PT Jasa Marga planned for a whopping 5 km underground connection, which the Harbor Toll Road remained under from the early determined Pluit, but extended towards Kemayoran, where the railway access from Senen joined with the ones from Kota. If completed, it will become the longest underground toll road in Indonesia. The construction cost spiked a little from Tedjo’s construction, but it gained praise from the federal government for its innovation in highway construction. However, the Nasution’s general plan for Jakarta noted that if Jakarta did not construct a toll road north in the sea, the Harbour Toll Road will subject to double-decker access as planners have predicted increasing traffic between vital access of Suryadarma Airport and Priok Harbour, with more density in neighbourhoods of Pademangan, Pluit, Kapuk and Warakas.

Tedjo was shocked by the sound of metal clanging from the site floor. The workers there had bumped into another metal pole, giving the metals a low hum. Then, Tedjo finally remembered his reason for arriving here.

“Dudi, how’s the construction of the new headquarters?” he gestured at the young employee.

“Current on time, director. As we have the permission to construct our building, we have been advancing on the foundation of the headquarters, as well as reminding the construction that the highway is still active, thus reducing accidents that might impede the flow. In terms of schedule, we will start construction of the upper platform possibly next September.”

This new headquarters of Jasa Marga, Tedjo envisioned, will be the cornerstone of Jasa Marga’s dominance in the highway industry. As becoming the first and most influential company in Indonesia, Jasa Marga should have the most iconic headquarters. The 1.45 hectares of unused plot between the railways of Tanah Abang and Tanah Abang Highway Interchange, Tedjo noted, will be the best location for Jasa Marga’s new headquarters. It is still inside of the 3100 ha Ring 1 of Jakarta, located strategically on the busiest toll road of Jakarta, along with the connectivity of the commuter line.

Tedjo’s plan for the headquarters is even crazier, he intended to have the building stand precisely on the Tanah Abang off-ramp of the interchange. That way, he would present Jasa Marga as the innovation of building, with emphasis on the toll road they have constructed also referred. The government, with intense criticism, ultimately allow such an ambitious proposal, but Tedjo need to prove to himself that his vision remains the best for the company, or the Federal government sack him like the previous one.​

---

Three stories, the common man, the conglomerate and the company that construct Indonesia. Kinda explains how fast Indonesia accelerate from all those destructions. The first kinda implies more on foreign events, but more on that later. The second story pretty much defines that Cendana Post-Suharto is more successful as a businessman rather than a political dynasty ITTL, more on the family in future updates. For the third story, can't help it from a construction geek like myself.

ITTL Tol Dalam Kota is almost like OTL 6 ruas Tol Dalam Kota Jakarta, while OTL Jakarta Inner Ring Road is ITTL Tol Dalam Kota 2, with slight exceptions. Completely new toll roads here include Tol Bekasi-Kampung Melayu which passes Banjir Kanal Timur instead of Kali Malang. Also, Tol Cipali is 29 years early, and Tol Surabaya Mojokerto is 36 years early, very eager to see what 2020 ITTL Indonesia will look like. For regions in Malaya and Singapore, due to LKY's liberalization and acceleration program, many of these toll constructions have been constructed by local companies, instead of federal ones like Jasa Marga.​

 

[SkylineDreamer]

I kinda wonder the situation of the Military. I mean the TL Indonesia is bigger from IRL. Seeing the map and the situation of the country I have a suggestion. Follow US system of geographical Unified Combatant Command and unify all armed services between 3 Combatant Commands. Which are:
A. Central Command with area of responsibility in - Nusantara State Republic
- Cocos Keeling Island
- Christmas Island
- Mainland South East Asia
- South China Sea
- Philippines
- Eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean.
B. Pacific Command with area of responsibility in
- Papua State Republic
- Melanesia State Republics
- Arafura, Solomon, Coral Sea (basically most of the Southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean)
- Philippine Sea (and most of the West Pacific)
C. Indian Ocean Command
- Madagascar State Republic
- Chagas Archipelago
- Gulf of Aden and Red Sea (basically covering till the Suez Canal)
- Arabian Sea
- Middle East
- East Africa and South Africa (basically main command for handling operations in Africa)
- basically anything in Southeast, east, north east, and central Indian Ocean

We'll cover more of the military, but I can tell something.

I think the military's focus will also patrol trade rather than merely defending the cornerstones of Indonesia. By this argument, I think dividing into just three would not be enough.

The three combating commands you mentioned are a good division, but I reckon there will be a Fourth Fleet located to patrol Bali Strait, Sulawesi Strait, or simply the Central region of Indonesia (Sulawesi, Maluku, East Kalimantan) to alleviate the stress of the Central Command and Indian Ocean Command, as they focus on both defence and patrols (Malacca trade and defence on the South China Sea for Central Command, Pacific trade with the US and defence towards Australia [a good measure] for Pacific Command). I do see Indian Ocean Command will be the most stretched out of the command and probably will relegate sea regions to Central Command in case the fleet doesn't have the capacity, thus increasing the necessity of a strong Central Command.

Overall, what I do see happening is an Indian Ocean Command, Malacca Command, Molucca Command, and Pacific Ocean Command.

Between the 3, Central Command will be the most heavily armed because of China, Indian Ocean Command will be the one that has the most expeditionary capability (and probably action knowing that region of the world is messy), and Pacific Command will be heavy on Navy (simply the one who deploy the most around West Pacific)

I agree. It depends on the global condition, but I mostly agree that even though Indonesia had a war with Australia, the Pacific Command will have the least experience combat situation (probably more of a rescue mission in case a mountain explodes on a Pacific island, etc {foreshadowing?}). However, it's hard to say if Central or Indian Ocean Command will have the most armed fleet because Indian Ocean Command will contribute the global trade as another party of anti-piracy, which in the Western Indian Ocean has been ripe of. In Central Command, the US and Japan will also assist in any China aggression.

 

[Yourbaee]

So Cendana not interested to politics after suharto died kinda weird if compare to otl haha

 

[SkylineDreamer]

17th August 1987
DPR Building, Jakarta, Indonesia

The ceremonial of the 42nd anniversary of Indonesian independence has been over for quite some time, but Premier Musa Hitam remained distraught about the occurrences that had happened throughout the past year. The man reclined in his office, contemplating what had passed from all the chaos that ensues, especially after his dear predecessor was assassinated so abruptly. A year and two days ago, Premier Lee Kuan Yew was killed in an explosion received after a suicide bomber attacked Sarinah during a visit with various controversial figures. Immediately after, Musa Hitam was inaugurated as the new Premier, attempting to continue the legacy of LKY without getting slaughtered in the process, both by the same terrorist acts or the Parliament itself. This August had been less ideal for Premier Musa also, being the government that allow Kudatuli to happen, the struggle between Barisan Progresif and Kesejahteraan Rakyat had never been so evident towards the general election of 1988.

For all of Musa’s respect for the dead, the Indonesian decade of 1980 should have been monumentalized as the Lee Decade. The contributions it had towards the domestic front of Indonesia have been extremely positive, no other party except Mahathir Mohammad’s faction ever gave their criticism without the admiration of the former Premier. After the assassination, it was almost a unifying factor of the Parliament, because PNI-R, PPI, and PUI had little resistance to Musa’s LKY-esque programs. Although Musa admitted his policies have been less radical than LKY had given throughout the decade, his smooth-sailing premiership was only obstructed by the factions of his party, not the opposition.

For all things considered, Musa had a little concession to appease the PNI-R, PPI, and PUI for any matter because of the deceased Premier. His education proposal garnered a positive response to PUI, PNI-R. The PPI also gave little opposition to the revision of the Labour Law, despite the noise Guntur has made to appease the public. But, if a clear-headed outsider looking at the perspective of post-LKY assassination, the only parties trying to undermine Musa’s premiership was the insistence on Kesejahteraan Rakyat on making Mahathir Mohammad the leader of the party.

The Premier noticed the song on his playing radio had tuned on the unmistakable violins of Mengheningkan Cipta, eerily suitable for his trail of thoughts.

Dengan seluruh angkasa raya memuji

In one year, LKY had pivoted from a contentious figure of Indonesia, into a universally hailed martyr for Indonesia. His untimely death has cemented his icon for Indonesia’s progress into the next millennium, in addition to greatly undermining the cause of LKY’s opposition. The tragic event also shaped Indonesia’s perception of Kesejahteraan Rakyat, while they think of the faction as the evolved reaction of LKY’s liberal policies, now Indonesians perceived them as a little reactionary to the cause. This, because of the brazenness of Kesejahteraan Rakyat, gave the people of Indonesia a more appealing direction towards Guntur Sukarnoputra, and a predicted decline of PPP seats in an Indonesia with a booming economy, growing prosperity, and better standings. Musa Hitam had attempted to bridge the gap between Emil Salim and Mahathir Mohammad. One thinks the other made LKY die, while the other thinks as LKY die a new faction must lead the PPP. However, it seems that all of Musa Hitam's proposals only make opposition parties more favourable to him than his own party’s unity, the purpose Musa is trying to achieve.

LKY is also applauded in the international stage. The United States has applauded LKY for the increasing liberalization of the Federal Republic, giving an ideological win for the ongoing Cold War. The Soviet Union, despite viewing Indonesia as rather hostile for its seemingly close interaction with the United States, has given a good admiration for LKY. In Andropov’s words, “Although we do not agree with the capitalist system of Indonesia, LKY’s programs have a positive effect on the total prosperity of the Indonesian workers, which was one that the Soviet Union can support.” Relations in Europe have never been greater, with the increasing demand for imports from Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian developed industries gaining increasing relations with the rapidly developing Indonesia which Musa is governing. France’s President Mitterand, despite the Unites States’ hostility, arrived in Indonesia for the funeral of LKY, which he stated as “The solemn day for the world, for its leader that brings a nation out of destitution has left so suddenly.” It seems that with LKY’s death, virtually the entire world became a little less violent.

Pahlawan negara

President Subandrio, under the National Heroes Act, has given LKY the status of a national hero in December 1986. He was reminded that even though LKY had been a divided leader, his contributions to the nation were not insignificant. The argument was endorsed by almost all majorities of the parties, except Kesejahteraan Rakyat who thought it was too immature and sudden. However, Musa Hitam has a personal hunch, that with all the tension Subandrio and LKY have had in the last days, the friendship between them was never severed.

The ascension of LKY as the Premier of Indonesia, contrary to popular belief, succeeded not because of LKY’s outstanding success in Singapore that the Parliament was impressed at, but because of the political manoeuvre Subandrio has made to make a Chinese-descendant appealing to lead the nation. Also, a face of change from the old administration, Subandrio leaned heavily on the emphasis of reform and rebranding. His main purpose was to make PPP the next dominant party in Indonesia, a coalition of centre-to-centre-left factions that believe in increasing social programs, improving livelihoods and a new face against the adage of nationalism equals unity. He believed that while nationalism is the old ideology that binds the nation together, prosperity and wellness are the modern glue that will unite all Indonesians for one purpose: to continue the same prosperity and wellness it has had. Because of this, he believed Premier LKY, the man that still transformed Singapore with little help from the Indonesian government, can imitate his success on the federal scale. President Subandrio’s choice eventually was right. LKY did advance Indonesia in metrics that the former administration wasn’t capable to achieve, even with the spending it has on the federal level.

Nan gugur remaja di ribaan bendera

Premier Musa’s thoughts continue towards the weird adventurism of Indonesia’s military in helping the United States on wars in Angola and Mozambique. President Subandrio had thought that the stability of Mozambique is vital towards the stability of Madagascar. Thus, he approved the military intervention with the United States, hoping for a democratic institution with a friendly attitude. However, as the interventions only make both struggles antagonistic to the United States, and Indonesia as a whole, the military attaché was stopped by Subandrio. In turn, with Mozambique now firmly on an anti-US government, President Subandrio was so frightened of the increasing separatism of Madagascar that he changed course and revisit Sukarno’s Non-Aligned Conference. This, with the United States direct involvement in other national affairs, made the administration have a mixed attitude on continuing the policies under the American sphere or adopting a new democratic way of life.

American foreign policy, especially under Glenn, has fluctuated between strengthening ties on Asia-Pacific and strengthening ties on the European heartland. Washington has announced that although China and India are immediate threats to the spheres in the Asia Pacific, Europe is more vital for American interests. While Asia-Pacific has a sea barrier that can contain communist influence, the situation in Europe was unstable, and sometimes reactive. With Kennedy’s intention on confusing the Soviet Union by making France the third power (Kennedy argued France’s future in the 60s was either communist of De Gaulle, either way, a third power), the back-and-forth foreign relations between France did complicate the American foreign policy, until Washington has announced its intentions to Europe focus, to make France not a neutral, but pro-US nation.

The French dance on international politics, swaying between neutral-US and US-hostile, but always the Soviet Union hostile, draws an interesting perspective towards LKY and Subandrio. Both figures have seen that threading on both superpowers was beneficial to the survival of France, and somewhat brand a new ideology. PPI’s Guntur Manifesto have striking similarities to French communism, if you ignore the noises the left has argued otherwise.

Both politicians agreed that France succeeded in keeping the Soviet Union and the US in balance, possibly reducing the tension. But they differ on what should Indonesia adopt in the unique characteristic. Subandrio, affected by the United States' growing involvement in national affairs, was fearful of domestic intrusion. He adopted the balance in relations, pushing towards a more independent Indonesia as Sukarno had previously envisioned. Premier LKY, on the other hand, prefers that Indonesia maintain a friendly ally of the American sphere, but slowly accommodate trade and cultural ties with opposing powers. This movement was initiated by the agreement with the French Republic back during the Nasution Administration’s annexation of Madagascar, LKY merely advancing those to include the Soviet Union. This difference, culminated in their disagreement with the intervention, handling of the Toba Crisis, and eventually the growing split in early 1986.

Bela Nusa bangsa

Premier Musa came as LKY’s confidante after the attempts to bridge between the former Hatta Faction and the growing Malaya Faction, which was later split into two (the famous Barisan Progresif and Kesejahteraan Rakyat) after Mahathir Mohammad had enough power. Premier Musa, believed in the economics of LKY, but maintain a healthy degree of decentralization in the regional government, which Hatta had envisioned (unlike LKY which prefers an autocratic commandeering approach to the administration). Hatta’s faction fell into obscurity, as their principles were co-opted by Habibie’s PNI-R, thus giving the slow transition of turning PPP into a sole coalition between Malaya, Madagascar, and the liberal faction. Currently, Musa’s compromise applies between Mahathir and Emil, both trying to win over Musa with their policies enacted, with Musa also trying to stay in power from balancing.

Still, Musa’s criticism of moderate compromise became his ultimate strain for future electability. The liberal wing accuses Musa’s race upbringing to be so sympathetic to Mahathir Mohammad, while Mahathir scored scathing remarks of Musa following the “elite” footsteps of LKY’s policies. Even though Musa’s favourability in the opposition party increased, his favourability in his party stagnated, sometimes decreasing, as either faction radicalized to the point of breakup.

In Musa’s mind, he had attempted various ways to alleviate the stress of the party, but the Kudatuli riots gave him the resolve of a radical solution, not just the conventional compromise. He knows that if Mahathir continues to assume power, PPP’s Barisan Progresif will split, and it will happen otherwise should Emil Salim assume power. Other significant figures that aim to unify the party had been little that reached the national level. Anwar Ibrahim, the foreign minister, can be a great candidate if not for his youth. Sabam Sirait, the leader of Hatta’s Reformasi Faction, has little popularity in PPP’s core territories of Malaya. That left Musa the only viable candidate for compromise.

Kau kukenang wahai bunga putra bangsa

The desk on which Musa Hitam sat currently, has a little memo from LKY that Musa has hidden. It was a reminder for himself, for his late 2nd term programs that he intended to pass through the Parliament. There are three points that intrigue Musa for its novel suggestion. The first suggestion, was the end of monarchism in Indonesia, agreeing with the PNI-R’s youth wing that monarchism is just hampering the progress of democracy in Indonesia, incentivising cronyism that had plagued Indonesia since the colonial times. LKY’s plans to enact those include dissolving the exclusive rights of kingdoms and forcing them to hold an election, with emphasis on claiming that if the royalty has popularity, the people will vote for them anyway. The second suggestion lies in LKY’s proposal to form a democratic sphere with Japan and Korea, by urging Subandrio for continuing this instead of reviving the Non-Aligned Movement. This proposal was a shock for Musa Hitam, which had known LKY for being strongly pro-US for his premiership. His policies, albeit authoritarian for many of the cabinet, have noticed parallels with the New Deal government. Aligning with Japan and Korea, also, Musa predicted, will be difficult since they too have strained relations from the colonial past. Finally, the most controversial of them all was the legalization of all Indonesian regardless of sex, race, and gender. At first, Musa had no attention to the proposal, until LKY scribbled an erased word “homosexuals” in the memo, which made the Premier gasp in shock at what the connotations were. These types of proposals might only be passed for years, or decades even for any debate to happen. However, Musa Hitam also can't help but thought of the unavoidable when these types of debates became mainstream supposing the progress of Indonesian society continues.

Harga jasa kau cahya pelita

Upon hearing the growing orchestra involving the lyrics, Musa can’t help but shed a tear for the deceased Premier. A great man, non-negotiable, yet very inspiring to the youths of PPP, Lee Kuan Yew changed the perception of Indonesians. Modern neo-Javanism (adopted by the PPP youth wing of Barisan Progresif) has declared that even if Chinese descendants can become great leaders, race should not be a factor in elections. In other parties, PNI-R and PPI acclaimed the late Premier as a new face of all experts has agreed to be the golden age of Indonesia. PUI and Kesejahteraan Rakyat, whether they agree or disagree, do support the argument that LKY has been a consequential premier. It shed new light on future politicians, especially minorities, to stand up and become their icons.

Bagi Indonesia Merdeka.

Musa’s sob eventually cracks the silence of the office he presides. He was always in awe of Indonesia’s revolutionary songs, overwhelmed with emotion. But, with all those orchestra accompaniments, there is the theme of hope, of freedom, that generally exists in all these songs, reminding all Indonesians that our end goal of us is that: freedom.
​

---

Blok M Mall, Jakarta, Indonesia​

A young aspirant Joko arrived with haste at the exhibition of Blok M Mall. For the independence day celebration, Blok M Mall has opened a grand exhibition for local crafts, and Joko established a furniture stall that shows significant wooden art. His company, CV Roda Jati, has a decent profit in the furniture business, but still can’t afford the expenses of the awaiting son. Acquiring a degree in Universitas Gajah Mada for silviculture, Joko tried working on state forestry but felt rather slow in career growth, thus the new exhibition shop. Throughout the week of the exhibition, a few customers bought Joko’s intricate cupboard. Still, it was quite underwhelming considering his neighbouring shops or crafts have more customers.

Joko entered his furniture stall with his pregnant wife already waiting for him. “Mas, where have you been?”

“I forgot a few boxes from our car,” Joko answered as he is holding a box full of little sculptures. As part of Joko’s furniture, these sculptures were a model of how he should carve the furniture. It has been a model of inspiration, for Joko’s behalf, which made a few cool carvings.

“Okay, Mas. I need to go to the toilet.” Joko’s wife stood up from the only chair in the stall and then left for the restroom which was at the end of the exhibit hall. Joko was scared of any accidents happening, but he knew if he follows his wife, who will guard the stall?

He nodded to his wife, already busy unpacking the boxes to be presented on the table. For Joko, this furniture business has been a passion and work for his family. Inheriting the carpentry skills from his uncle (who also has his own furniture business), Joko tried to be courageous and expand his furniture market more than in his hometown, Solo. Initially, he thought Semarang would be beneficial, of its proximity while a big city. However, Joko’s ambition knows that if there is the best shot, it would be Jakarta. This exhibit became Joko’s first attempt to appeal to the Jakarta market, which showed good but not enough for his liking.

When Joko’s hand accidentally hit one of his sculptures that he had unpacked, he just realized that a young boy has paid attention to him. A cute Chinese-Indonesian boy, with a plain T-shirt and an unnoticeable rosary on his neck. He has fixated towards the sculptures he has unpacked.

“Oh, hello, Dek. Lihat-lihat opo?” "Hello, Dek. What are you looking?"

The boy did not answer Joko but looked at the fallen sculpture that has hit the floor. “Ini Pak, tadi jatuh.” "Here, Sir. It fell just now."

“Ahh, Terima kasih, Dek.” "Ahh, thank you, Dek."

Joko, albeit living in a multicultural neighbourhood back home, has little experience to converse with a Chinese-Indonesian, let alone a boy without his parents. “Endi wong tuwamu?” "Where are your parents?"

“Wonten mrika.” The young boy spoke Javanese, although with difficulty. He pointed towards the end of the clothes stall, with his mom and another young girl looking at the clothes. "There."

“Adek bisa basa Jawa?” Joko asked. "You can speak Javanese?"

“Dikit-dikit, Pak. Ga bisa banyak2.” The young boy returned speaking Indonesian. "A little, Sir. Can't speak too much."

The young boy’s impressive first impression made Joko energetic to show all his furniture collection, although he knows the boy wouldn’t buy anything without his parents. Joko showed the furniture he sculpted with delicacy. However, as Joko presents his furniture to the young boy, he sees the little man showing less attention to the furniture, than to the sculptures.

“Pak, mau tanya.” The little boy told Joko. "Sir, if I may ask."

“Iya, kenapa Dek?” Joko answered. "Yes?"

“Bapak bikin patung2 ini, kenapa ga buat action figure aja?” Joko was perplexed by the little boy’s question. He doesn’t understand what an action figure is, thus giving the boy a confused look. The boy understood Joko’s confusion, and proceed to pull out a figure from his pocket. "You've made these sculptures, why not make an action figure?"

“Gini Pak, action figure. Bapak bisa buat dari kayu.” Joko saw a strange white robotic figure with a sword and a shield on both arms. The robot has a sturdy body with quite an armour. Still, looking at the designs, he immediately concluded it was Japanese-made. "Here, Sir. Action figure. You can make it with wood."

The young boy gave Joko his action figure, Joko keep looking all around the action figure. The action figure can move each part of the body with joints, giving the freedom of pose that Joko wanted. The material is so plastic, but Joko felt that this can be managed from the wood he has sculpted.

He kept looking at the action figure when a teenage boy with a resemblance to the young spoke. “Ah, ternyata kau disini. Ayo ikut Koko.” "Ahh, here you are. Come with brother."

The teenage boy hold Max’s hands and tried to leave Joko’s stall. However, Joko abrupts their departure.
“Dek, ini barangnya.” Joko said as he holds the action figure. "Dek, your stuff"

“Buat Bapak aja, Adek liat Bapak lebih perlu dari Adek.” "For you Sir, you need it more than I do."

Joko was stunned by the young boy’s words. “Dek, namamu siapa?” "What's your name, Dek?"

“Max, Pak. Max Hendarto. Ini kakak Andreas” Max said pointing at his brother. "Max, Sir. Max Hendarto. This is my brother Andreas."

“Kenalan, aku Joko. Joko Widodo.” Joko shook the little boy’s hands as he eventually left with his brother. "I'm Joko. Joko Widodo."​

---

Dek or Adek or Adik is the common Indonesian term for little brother or young boy.
Koko came from the Chinese character 哥哥 (gē gē) meaning big brother.
Translations for Indonesian texts are given in smaller inline spoilers. I'm experimenting with whether dialogue should be in English, or Indonesian with the translations, you could help me decide.

PS: I have significant revisions regarding the Space Race ITTL, shown in the quote here:

August 17, 2023

The idea that Kennedy pushed for the Space Race to Indonesia by launching Apollo 13 was somewhat unrealistic after hours of rereading the TL. I admit that the initial idea was to make the United States somewhat murky towards NASA after a series of unfortunate events, pushing Nixon's fiscal responsibility characteristics to strongly oppose NASA's incompetence (maybe ending the Space Program), but these problems were not stated on the posts here. Instead of rewriting the whole TL regarding it. I instead found a common ground that at least I can see the sense of it happening realistically.

You can see the edit in the posts already linked, with difference shades of black.

Again, part of cleaning the TL with better realism.

Happy Independence Day, Indonesia!

 

[SkylineDreamer]

So Cendana not interested to politics after suharto died kinda weird if compare to otl haha

Not really, they still involved in politics. It's just without Suharto the Cendana Family need someone to take his mantle, and his children have no power as he had. The business actually helps them like how Hary Tanoe did IOTL, but with a larger scale.

 

[Yourbaee]

So jokowi will make gundam eh....

 

[XiaoJuice]

Jokowi? More like Jokoweeb.