Good Intentions on the Road to Hell
The Washington Treaty of 1921 stated that a ‘light battleship’ of under 23,000 tons Standard Displacement would only use up 14,000 tons of a nations’ capital ship tonnage allocation. The clause was created to massage the figures in favour of the Royal Navy, by allowing them to keep larger numbers of ships, while having tonnage parity with the US Navy.
The classification also helped to keep the French in the Treaty, as it allowed them to have seven battleships for the same Treaty tonnage as Italy’s six (all existing French ships fell under the ‘light battleship’ classification, while Italy’s 30,500-ton
Caracciolo did not).
The clause was hastily added and was used as a negotiating tool, changing several times before reaching its final form. In 1921, it never occurred to negotiators that anyone would want to build new 23,000-ton ships. British, American and Japanese concepts had been heading for 50,000 tons, and designers had devoted their efforts towards what could be built on ‘as little as’ 36,000 tons.
However, following the end of the war, old rivalries and new realities began to surface. Italy and France still needed to secure the sea lanes links to their African Empires, while even a limited force in the Mediterranean gave them influence with the British. The French felt the need to deter any possible Italian adventurism in North Africa. The Italians weren’t going to be pushed around by the French, and they also had near-neighbours in Serbia, Greece and the Ottoman Empire who possessed capital ships.
Neither nation was likely to be in a position to challenge the major powers, and both faced financial constraints. Against that, their fleets only had to be capable of fighting their likely enemies – the older, smaller ships of the various Mediterranean nations. Italy had a single 15” fast battleship, and Greece had a lone 14” vessel, but everything else in the region had either 12” or 13.5” guns. With a treaty allocation of just 12,000 tons/year, each power could only complete one new 16” super-dreadnought every three years.
In 1922, the Italian government had tried to arrange an exchange of territory; in return for parts of Slovenia, the Serb government would give Italy a series of islands in the Adriatic, securing access to the port of Fiume. The issue was muddied by Slovenes who sought full independence and who delayed the matter through attempting to arrange a plebiscite organised by the League of Nations. Afraid of angering other powers and scuppering the deal, Italian forces backed off from confronting these Slovenian dissidents on several occasions that summer. The matter was eventually resolved between Italy and Serbia directly, but it left the Italian government looking weak.
Meanwhile, a series of inconclusive skirmishes between Greek and Ottoman forces on the mainland had been defused by the League, leaving the Greek government looking equally ineffective. To try to regain the initiative and boost their own popularity, the Greek government then demanded the return of the Dodecanese islands from Italy, and sent the Greek Navy to exercise near the islands, in what were nominally Italian waters.
The Regia Marina responded by despatching a fleet, including the battleships
Cavour and
Duilio, to reinforce the islands. Wary of igniting a conflict, the Italians secured the harbours and patrolled the sea lanes, but out at sea the Greeks proved more agile. The battleship
Salamis repeatedly intercepted and evaded the Italian squadron in both national and international waters, seemingly trying to goad the Italians into firing first. Neither the
Cavour or the
Duilio could keep up with the fast Greek ship, and the Italian Admiral requested reinforcements of torpedo boats.
These were on their way when a Royal Navy squadron arrived in the Aegean, and the Greeks were persuaded the return to their home waters. The islands were secured, but within the Regia Marina, the inability to intercept the
Salamis was grave cause for concern. Their only fast battleship, the
Caracciolo, had been under refit, and seemed likely that the Navy would need more fast vessels in the future.
By the autumn of 1923, a new Italian government included members of the Fascist party, whose views reinforced the need to make a bold statement about the nation’s future power and prosperity. In addition to the military requirement, nothing said ‘power’ quite like a battleship.
A 36,000-ton vessel was out of the question financially, but Italian designers had a valuable trick available, if they were prepared to go for something smaller. In 1916, the battleship
Da Vinci had suffered an internal explosion in harbour and was deemed to be a total loss. However, the wreck had been salvaged, and four of her five turrets (two twins and two triples) and their 12” guns were in good condition and could be re-used.
What really sold the plan was the idea of using the ‘light battleship’ clause to permit the building of two new ships, each with eight 12” guns, for which only two new triple turrets and six guns would be needed. The Italian Navy had already begun a cruiser programme, and high-powered machinery could be adapted from that.
This pair of fast ships could be used to put the slow French fleet off-balance if needs be, while each would be capable of taking on the Serbian, Greek or Turkish vessels.
Outline of the Vesuvio class.
LOA: 667’, Beam: 90’
22,500 tons designed Standard Displacement; 27,350 tons Full Load.
8-12” guns (3-2-3), 8-5.3” guns (4x2), 4-3.9” guns (HA).
12” (actually 300mm) Belt, 3” (75mm) Main Deck, 10” Barbettes, 12”-4” Turrets, 10” Conning Tower, 1.5” Torpedo Bulkhead.
Rated power: 120,000shp for 32 knots
Vesuvio on trials: 138,200shp for 33.32 knots at 22,780 tons, real sea speed about 31 knots.