The Impossible Ship
In the autumn of 1924, the Admiralty became aware that the Americans were working on a new class of fast capital ship. Unofficial sources said that the US ships would make use of the ‘light battleship’ definition, and that designs with eight or nine guns of 14” calibre were under study.
By the New Year, more than a half-dozen outline British designs had been prepared, and the matter was moving in the direction of which should taken forward for construction.
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Charles Coles, the Deputy Director of Naval Construction Sat at the head of the table. The meeting was about the Royal Navy's next class of capital ship, a light battlecruiser. It was up to him and the others to navigate their way through the minefield of possible options and produce a recommendation at the end.
A few days earlier, the Engineer-in-Chief had confirmed that in a battleship-type environment, it would be possible to deliver 120,000shp from machinery that weighed no more than 2,800 tons. Coles knew there were early indications that figure could be improved on by using superheated steam, but this was not the moment to complicate matters.
‘I favour B3’, said Sir Malcolm Strang as he flicked through a series of blueprints.
‘I think many of us do’, observed Coles, ‘but it would be heavy weather taking it through the Admiralty.’
There were a few faint smiles; nautical phrases were so embedded in the language that it was impossible to avoid them altogether.
The sketch in front of Strang showed design ‘1924-B/3’; a handsome three-funnelled ship which would carry eight 15” guns in twin turrets. It had highly forced, fast running machinery based on that of the E-class cruisers, although it would be reinforced to cope with the shock of firing the heavy guns. In other ways it was relatively conventional; the hull form was modelled after
Hood, with an external belt inclined with the hull, a built-in bulge and a break in foc’sle aft of Q-turret.
Coles knew that it had numerous problems, but that they could all be summed up in one way; the design was too conventional. Nevertheless, that was the reason it was popular, as it used safe, well-understood ideas that could be built without great expenditure on new, unproven concepts.
1924-B/3
Superficially a
Hood on 23,000 tons, but with an 8" belt she stood no chance in 1925.
‘You know the problem’, continued Coles, ‘protection is only adequate against 14” fire over magazines, with 12” elsewhere. The Admirals will say she’s another Queen Mary waiting to happen – she’s too lightly protected.’
‘That they will’, said Captain Arbuthnot, the Service’s official representative at the meeting. Following post-war trials, it was now widely accepted that the explosion of the battlecruiser
Queen Mary at Stavanger had been triggered by a German shell penetrating her belt and exploding in or near the magazine.
‘I’m sure we can squeeze a little more armour in, particularly with what we’ve learned from C2’, suggested Strang, whom Coles had noted particularly favoured B3, perhaps because it was powerful and yet the most traditionally battlecruiser-like of the various designs before them. Strang had served on cruisers and then on
Renown during the war, and although he had since left the Service to find a new home in the DNC’s office, he was a plodding old-fashioned sailor at heart. It was a pity he was here at all.
Coles glanced up at the portrait at the other end of the room, at the firm, but nonetheless slightly cheeky face of Admiral Fisher. The old Admiral wouldn’t have put up with Strang for more than about a minute, but Coles had neither Fisher’s level of influence nor his mercurial personality. Diplomacy was the order of the day. Strang was a well-connected Baronet, who hunted with the First Sea Lord. He might be rather stupid, but he was a potentially useful ally.
Today was a day for persuasion, and he turned towards Strang.
‘How would you deal with the armour problem?’, he asked.
‘I don’t see it as a problem,’ replied Strang, ‘we can thicken the belt amidships to provide protection against 14” fire.’
‘Yes…’, mused Coles, while thinking no, ‘but what happens when they have to face ships with 16” guns?’
‘They don’t’, replied Strang confidently, ‘they’re to counter cruisers and other light battleships.’
‘Couldn’t we reduce length by using triple turrets?’, asked Reginald Tyrrell, the newest member of the group, a youngish man who had only joined two weeks earlier. Coles could see he had a bright future, but he was still a bit wet behind the ears at present.
There were murmurs of agreement and several people moved to speak, but Coles got in first.
‘No Mr Tyrrell’, he said firmly, ‘We looked at that with B4, and it was worse; the hull was over stressed by the weight of the turrets, and could be armoured against nothing more than 12” fire, if I recall… it would also be a brand-new turret, with all the Treasury problems that would entail.’
Cost was a significant factor, but Coles also knew that hull stresses were the reason for the A-B-Q-Y arrangement of B3, rather than a more modern A-B-X-Y. It was just too old-fashioned a design, he thought once again.
As this thought passed, there were a few nods from around the room, and Coles resumed.
‘I remain unconvinced by B3. Now, Mr Tyrrell has just mentioned B4, and although that design did not meet our requirements, in my view we should develop it further, using more modern ideas about the layout of armour.’
The Navy’s newest ‘Nelson’ class battleships used armour that was mounted inside the hull, rather than outside as in
Hood or the B-series. The scheme had its detractors, who argued that it would make damage more difficult to repair, and that the thin skin of the hull could be riddled by light fire. However, Coles and most of the DNC’s office knew that it was the one of few realistic ways to reduce weight while preserving protection. Internal armour could be sloped sharply inwards towards the bottom of the ship, so that descending shells would strike it at a steep angle, thereby increasing its resistive power.
Young Tyrrell looked encouraged, but it was Strang who spoke first.
‘Rather than start again, what about improving B3? If we took the lessons from C2 and applied them to B3, we could have it all.’
Coles had to resist the temptation to sigh; it was clearly going to be a long day.
‘C2’ was another unsatisfactory attempt to shoehorn nine 15” guns into a workable design, by relying on thick sloped edges to the main deck instead of a traditional armour belt. It saved weight, but it wasn’t very good at protecting the waterline, and would tend to throw shell fragments up into the body of the ship. However, the C-series had an advantage that Coles knew had promise; they used a deep flush-decked hull to reduce stresses and keep weight down.
He and nearly half of his design staff had just finished with the London-class cruisers, which used just such a hull, built using longitudinal framing, which saved a little more weight by cutting down the number of heavy transverse frames inside the hull.
The private yards were still complaining about this ‘new method’, even though it was actually more than 15 years old. Still, he thought, the
Londons would have blazed the trail by the time these ships were built.
‘C2 has its merits’, he said, lying cheerfully, ‘but I know we can do better. All the designs in front of us today are adequate to deal with ten or twelve-thousand-ton cruisers, but none of them are good enough to risk in a fleet action.’
There were mumbles of surprise, and agreement from around the room.
‘As Sir Malcolm says, a combination of B3 and C2 would be a start, but I believe we need to incorporate an internal belt, and be far more ruthless about what is and what is not armoured. We are not building a battleship, but we are using battleship tonnage, so this new ship must be safe to engage anything it may encounter, even if it does not do so for long, or does so with the assistance of heavier forces.’
Handing out a plain manilla folder, he continued, ‘Gentlemen, I have here a proposal from Vickers regarding a new hoist layout for gun turrets, which they claim would save considerable weight and improve flash-protection. Bearing this in mind, and given the history of turrets being put out of action, even when they are not wrecked, I believe we must ask ourselves whether using thousands of tons of turret armour is an essential part of a light warship…’