2 + 1 > 3 + 4 ?
2 + 1 > 3 + 4 ?
In September 1921, delegates reconvened with a new set of ideas, to look at the size of the fleets as they would be at the end of 1921 (with several ships now building in Japan and the USA ‘assumed’ as being complete by that time).
For reasons of both prestige and national survival, the British still wanted to maintain the largest fleet in the world, although by now they accepted that it may only be a ‘Second power, plus one’ standard; with the equivalent of one more ship than the US Navy. Thoughts of conflict with the USA had been steadily drifting out of British political and military thinking for decades, and in naval terms, Admiral Fisher’s 1905 decision to strip the North American station of virtually all its ships had been the culmination of that process.
By 1921, for cultural, political, historic, but most importantly financial and industrial reasons, America was officially ‘not a threat’.
The British therefore wanted to ensure a ‘Third plus Forth’ power standard, under which the Royal Navy would be superior to the largest two Navies after that of the USA.
The Americans had discretely pointed out that the British had not included the 17,800-ton ‘large cruiser’ Courageous in the capital ship total, and so she had been added. Although not immediately helpful, the change later paved the way for progress in an agreement over cruisers.
Subject to a treaty being ratified, the British agreed to scrap their old 12” dreadnoughts and I-class battlecruisers, which would bring RN tonnage down to 840,000.
For political and nationalistic reasons, the US government could not accept a total less than that of Britain, however there was also a desire to limit the US Navy to no more than 700,000 tons, as that would allow the delay or cancellation of most of the ships that had already been authorised, thereby saving money.
By now, there was a grudging acceptance among the American leadership that one or two ‘South Dakotas’ or ‘Lexingtons’ would have to be completed. If nothing else, the US Navy should have a few ships as large as the latest British vessels. The South Dakota, Indiana, Lexington and Constellation were well advanced in their construction, and the most advanced, USS Indiana, was afloat with her armour mounted, her engines fitted and her secondary guns in place. She could be ready in the spring of 1922, and in terms of construction, most of the money had already been spent.
The next idea to close the gap between what the Americans wanted and what the British already had, was to allocate a nominal ‘Treaty Tonnage’ to some of the older, smaller ships, rather than using their true displacement. As these were most numerous in the Royal Navy, it would offset British concerns over the relative worth of their smaller ships, while shrinking their Treaty Tonnage by more than anyone else’s.
After a deal of haggling over the exact terms, this idea paved the way for an agreement between parties. A ‘light battleship’ would be one that displaced less than 23,000 tons Standard, but would benefit from an exemption that used only a fixed 14,000 tons of a nation’s allocated capital ship tonnage. With this rule applied, the RN total fell to 775,000 tons.
A further political fudge would bring this total down even further, suiting American interests and providing a sweetener for the British, who wanted the RN's role in protecting the sea lanes to far-flung outposts of Empire to be recognised. Although they would not be regarded as a separate party to the Treaty, the Australians would be allowed a token tonnage limit to allow them to retain their flagship, the Lion-class battlecruiser HMAS Australia. However, unlike for instance the Ottoman Empire or Brazil, the RAN would still be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Any lingering American and Japanese concerns over this ‘additional British fleet’ were offset by the relatively small allocation of tonnage; the RAN would only be permitted one ship of 28,000 tons, a limit that was clearly insufficient for the most modern and powerful capital ships.
In a rather tongue-in-cheek move, the British delegation attempted to push their Imperial exemptions further with HMS New Zealand and HMS Canada, but this was firmly vetoed. It was worth a try, but the British didn’t press the matter, as unlike HMAS Australia, neither ship had ever been commissioned into a Dominion Navy.
Overall, the political compromises allowed a win for everyone. With the ‘Australian exemption’ and the ‘Light Battleship exemption’, the British total stood at 749,000 tons, meaning a Treaty Limit of 750,000 tons was possible. The Americans could accept the same number, as it still meant that many of the costly 1916 ships would have to be either cancelled or deferred, and there was no question of a 1920 Programme being necessary.
With Australia’s additional 28,000 tons, the British Empire could still have the largest fleet, but American politicians could report to their constituents that the USA would have tonnage parity with ‘Great Britain’.
Negotiators for the two major powers now knew that they were close enough for a deal to be worth doing, and that meant pressing everyone else to accept it. Allowing for the ‘light battleship’ rule, the third largest fleet was that of Japan, with 315,000 treaty tons.
Following a recalculation based on the rules of the US-defined ‘Standard Displacement’, all of France’s dreadnoughts benefitted from the Light Battleship exemption, which brought her Treaty Tonnage down to 168,000 (although part of this was in the form of five Danton-class ‘semi Dreadnoughts’). The Italian total, including the new Caracciolo and four old pre-dreadnoughts, was 157,000 tons, while the Dutch were on 109,000 tons with their four relatively modern ex-German ships.
The first problem was that the Japanese would not accept a limit that was half that of the British or Americans; they demanded 75%, although codebreaking by US Navy Intelligence had told the US government that they would settle for anything over 60% if concessions were made elsewhere. To secure their backing for the Anglo-American deal (and the Australian exemption), they were ultimately given 465,000 tons, or 62%, but the Americans insisted that this would also be subject to the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922.
Having refused to be part of any treaty that involved Germany, the French now used the German fleet to argue for more tonnage for themselves. The Deutsche Volksflotte had eleven capital ships (most of them in various states of disrepair), but if considered under the proposed Treaty rules, these ships would amount to 165,000 tons.
If the French accepted their current level of tonnage, it meant mere equality or perhaps even inferiority to their defeated enemy. Such an idea was unthinkable in Paris, and their initial demand was for an allocation of double Germany’s total; 330,000 tons.
Even though the likelihood of the French building a 330,000-ton navy was extremely low due to the nation’s financially constrained position, such a limit would violate Britain’s red line of a ‘Third plus Fourth’ power standard.
After a certain amount of arm-twisting, and it being pointed out that four of the German ships were ‘Nassau’ class, and that the Moltke had not left harbour since 1917, the French finally agreed to a lower limit. This would be enough to allow them to build a large modern ship, or three if they scrapped the obsolete ‘Dantons’.
However, they still wanted a greater tonnage allowance than the Italians, but with no ships under construction and a large ‘semi-dreadnought’ fleet that could be replaced first, they were not in a strong negotiating position. Ultimately, the threat of financial consequences by both the British and Americans changed their mind, and the French mood was pacified by the realisation that all seven of their dreadnoughts benefitted from the ‘light battleship’ rule, whereas the Italian Caracciolo did not. France could therefore keep her seven most modern ships for slightly less Treaty Tonnage than the Italians’ six.
The Italians were ready to accept a 210,000-ton limit, which was significantly larger than their current fleet. With some encouragement from the British, the Dutch were content with 180,000 tons, and this reduced total was a factor in securing French agreement for their total to match Italy’s.
In September 1921, delegates reconvened with a new set of ideas, to look at the size of the fleets as they would be at the end of 1921 (with several ships now building in Japan and the USA ‘assumed’ as being complete by that time).
For reasons of both prestige and national survival, the British still wanted to maintain the largest fleet in the world, although by now they accepted that it may only be a ‘Second power, plus one’ standard; with the equivalent of one more ship than the US Navy. Thoughts of conflict with the USA had been steadily drifting out of British political and military thinking for decades, and in naval terms, Admiral Fisher’s 1905 decision to strip the North American station of virtually all its ships had been the culmination of that process.
By 1921, for cultural, political, historic, but most importantly financial and industrial reasons, America was officially ‘not a threat’.
The British therefore wanted to ensure a ‘Third plus Forth’ power standard, under which the Royal Navy would be superior to the largest two Navies after that of the USA.
The Americans had discretely pointed out that the British had not included the 17,800-ton ‘large cruiser’ Courageous in the capital ship total, and so she had been added. Although not immediately helpful, the change later paved the way for progress in an agreement over cruisers.
Subject to a treaty being ratified, the British agreed to scrap their old 12” dreadnoughts and I-class battlecruisers, which would bring RN tonnage down to 840,000.
For political and nationalistic reasons, the US government could not accept a total less than that of Britain, however there was also a desire to limit the US Navy to no more than 700,000 tons, as that would allow the delay or cancellation of most of the ships that had already been authorised, thereby saving money.
By now, there was a grudging acceptance among the American leadership that one or two ‘South Dakotas’ or ‘Lexingtons’ would have to be completed. If nothing else, the US Navy should have a few ships as large as the latest British vessels. The South Dakota, Indiana, Lexington and Constellation were well advanced in their construction, and the most advanced, USS Indiana, was afloat with her armour mounted, her engines fitted and her secondary guns in place. She could be ready in the spring of 1922, and in terms of construction, most of the money had already been spent.
The next idea to close the gap between what the Americans wanted and what the British already had, was to allocate a nominal ‘Treaty Tonnage’ to some of the older, smaller ships, rather than using their true displacement. As these were most numerous in the Royal Navy, it would offset British concerns over the relative worth of their smaller ships, while shrinking their Treaty Tonnage by more than anyone else’s.
After a deal of haggling over the exact terms, this idea paved the way for an agreement between parties. A ‘light battleship’ would be one that displaced less than 23,000 tons Standard, but would benefit from an exemption that used only a fixed 14,000 tons of a nation’s allocated capital ship tonnage. With this rule applied, the RN total fell to 775,000 tons.
A further political fudge would bring this total down even further, suiting American interests and providing a sweetener for the British, who wanted the RN's role in protecting the sea lanes to far-flung outposts of Empire to be recognised. Although they would not be regarded as a separate party to the Treaty, the Australians would be allowed a token tonnage limit to allow them to retain their flagship, the Lion-class battlecruiser HMAS Australia. However, unlike for instance the Ottoman Empire or Brazil, the RAN would still be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Any lingering American and Japanese concerns over this ‘additional British fleet’ were offset by the relatively small allocation of tonnage; the RAN would only be permitted one ship of 28,000 tons, a limit that was clearly insufficient for the most modern and powerful capital ships.
In a rather tongue-in-cheek move, the British delegation attempted to push their Imperial exemptions further with HMS New Zealand and HMS Canada, but this was firmly vetoed. It was worth a try, but the British didn’t press the matter, as unlike HMAS Australia, neither ship had ever been commissioned into a Dominion Navy.
Overall, the political compromises allowed a win for everyone. With the ‘Australian exemption’ and the ‘Light Battleship exemption’, the British total stood at 749,000 tons, meaning a Treaty Limit of 750,000 tons was possible. The Americans could accept the same number, as it still meant that many of the costly 1916 ships would have to be either cancelled or deferred, and there was no question of a 1920 Programme being necessary.
With Australia’s additional 28,000 tons, the British Empire could still have the largest fleet, but American politicians could report to their constituents that the USA would have tonnage parity with ‘Great Britain’.
Negotiators for the two major powers now knew that they were close enough for a deal to be worth doing, and that meant pressing everyone else to accept it. Allowing for the ‘light battleship’ rule, the third largest fleet was that of Japan, with 315,000 treaty tons.
Following a recalculation based on the rules of the US-defined ‘Standard Displacement’, all of France’s dreadnoughts benefitted from the Light Battleship exemption, which brought her Treaty Tonnage down to 168,000 (although part of this was in the form of five Danton-class ‘semi Dreadnoughts’). The Italian total, including the new Caracciolo and four old pre-dreadnoughts, was 157,000 tons, while the Dutch were on 109,000 tons with their four relatively modern ex-German ships.
The first problem was that the Japanese would not accept a limit that was half that of the British or Americans; they demanded 75%, although codebreaking by US Navy Intelligence had told the US government that they would settle for anything over 60% if concessions were made elsewhere. To secure their backing for the Anglo-American deal (and the Australian exemption), they were ultimately given 465,000 tons, or 62%, but the Americans insisted that this would also be subject to the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922.
Having refused to be part of any treaty that involved Germany, the French now used the German fleet to argue for more tonnage for themselves. The Deutsche Volksflotte had eleven capital ships (most of them in various states of disrepair), but if considered under the proposed Treaty rules, these ships would amount to 165,000 tons.
If the French accepted their current level of tonnage, it meant mere equality or perhaps even inferiority to their defeated enemy. Such an idea was unthinkable in Paris, and their initial demand was for an allocation of double Germany’s total; 330,000 tons.
Even though the likelihood of the French building a 330,000-ton navy was extremely low due to the nation’s financially constrained position, such a limit would violate Britain’s red line of a ‘Third plus Fourth’ power standard.
After a certain amount of arm-twisting, and it being pointed out that four of the German ships were ‘Nassau’ class, and that the Moltke had not left harbour since 1917, the French finally agreed to a lower limit. This would be enough to allow them to build a large modern ship, or three if they scrapped the obsolete ‘Dantons’.
However, they still wanted a greater tonnage allowance than the Italians, but with no ships under construction and a large ‘semi-dreadnought’ fleet that could be replaced first, they were not in a strong negotiating position. Ultimately, the threat of financial consequences by both the British and Americans changed their mind, and the French mood was pacified by the realisation that all seven of their dreadnoughts benefitted from the ‘light battleship’ rule, whereas the Italian Caracciolo did not. France could therefore keep her seven most modern ships for slightly less Treaty Tonnage than the Italians’ six.
The Italians were ready to accept a 210,000-ton limit, which was significantly larger than their current fleet. With some encouragement from the British, the Dutch were content with 180,000 tons, and this reduced total was a factor in securing French agreement for their total to match Italy’s.
