Does a western embargo of Japan automatically mean a Japanese grab for Southeast Asia?

[raharris1973]

Or, did Japan only strike south because in late 1941 it had reasons to hope its desperate gamble could work?


Put another way, which of the factors present in OTL 1941 would we have to take away for the Japanese to have zero hope in their desperate gamble, and thus not do it?

Discussion related to ensuing poll:


a) US mobilization, reinforcement and shipbuilding schedule is at the October 1942 OTL level by ATL October 1941


Explanatory background:


Basically what if there are earlier US preparedness moves dating from the 1930s, sort of like the idea in the Keynes Cruisers timeline. Something like this or an earlier or accelerated two-ocean navy act, results in the US being a year ahead of schedule in terms of armed strength, so that the US ends up at its June 1942 equipment, naval and air strength by June 1941, thus before any embargo is imposed on Japan.


b) Britain appears more formidable, Japanese never get automedon papers admitting weakness


Explanatory background:


The automedon was a British ship captured by a U-Boat, it contained a secret British assessment that British forces in the Far East were too weak to hold against Japanese aggression and/or little reinforcement could be spared for the region, which the Germans passed on to the Japanese.


If the Japanese do not have this information, do they anticipate Singapore will be too difficult to take?


c) USSR better defends against or counterstrikes against Barbarossa by fall 1941


Explanatory background: When the Japanese put themselves on a timeline for war in Aug or Sep 1941, it still looked plausible to outside observers that Germany could defeat the USSR in 1941, or be in a very good position to finish the USSR in 1942.


If instead the USSR is winning major battlefield victories in September-October 1941 and partially or wholly negating the German gains of the Barbarossa campaign, is Japan too worried about Soviet potential to strike from the north, to launch its own offensive to the south? Note: This presumes that Japan does not assume the April 1941 Japan-USSR Neutrality Pact will be reliable if Moscow can easily afford to break it.



d) Japan has a 1923 level natural disaster in autumn 1941


Explanatory background:

If in autumn 1941 Japan had some sort of domestic natural disaster as destructive as the 1923 Kanto earthquake was, does Japan rethink the feasibility of a wider Pacific War?


e) USSR unencumbered by German invasion when US embargo begins


Explanatory background:

If there simply is no Barbarossa and the USSR is not at war with any major powers in 1941, is Japan too worried about Soviet potential to strike from the north, to launch its own offensive to the south? Note: This presumes that Japan does not assume the April 1941 Japan-USSR Neutrality Pact will be reliable if Moscow can easily afford to break it.



f) No USSR-Japan Neutrality Pact when US embargo begins


Explanatory background:

If the USSR and Japan fail to reach a formal neutrality agreement in April or thereafter through the launch of Barbarossa and then the imposition of the US embargo in July 1941, will Japan worry that attacking Britain and the US in the south will automatically lead to war with their Soviet ally to the north? Note: This presumes that Japan does not assume that Barbarossa makes the Soviets incapable of striking Manchuria in any case.

g) Italy has remained neutral thru the time US embargo begins


Explanatory background:

Even with all else being equal, but Italy holding onto its neutrality, the Allied situation in the Mediterranean and Africa is vastly simplified, and the British can commit much more of their fleet to reinforcing Singapore. Is that alone enough to deter an attempt to grab Southeast Asia in the teeth of expected British and American opposition.


h) France is fighting on from Algeria


Explanatory background:

Even with all else being equal, but France formally fighting on from Algeria and thus a Fighting French/pro-British regime controlling the entire French empire worldwide, does Japan fear this leaves it facing too much potential allied naval power to do a strike south. Indeed, under these circumstances, would the Japanese have even occupied Indochina at all?



i) Mainland France has not fallen


Explanatory background:

With France holding on, France continuing to control its overseas empire and Germany looking likely to lose the European War in the long-term if not the short, does Japan fear this leaves it facing too much potential allied naval power to do a strike south. Indeed, under these circumstances, would the Japanese have even occupied Indochina at all?


j) Any two of the above factors in combination

k) Any three of the above factors in combination

l) Any four of the of the above factors in combination

m) Any five of the above factors in combination

n) Japan would still strike when cornered, even if nearly all factors a) through i) apply


Explanatory background:


Perhaps Japan would feel compelled to try to grab SEA resources if the US embargoed it no matter how impossible the odds, because the alternatives of not responding to the American insult or yielding to American demands are simply unacceptable in terms of domestic politics, assassination threats, etc.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'd recommend reading some serious literature on the subject. 'Japans Decision for War' might be one. The relevant chapters in Costellos 'The Pacific War' is another.

Perhaps Japan would feel compelled to try to grab SEA resources if the US embargoed it no matter how impossible the odds, because the alternatives of not responding to the American insult or yielding to American demands are simply unacceptable in terms of domestic politics, assassination threats, etc.

Its not a matter of "insult" or "domestic politics". The embargo was economically devastating and would have collapsed Japans economy in another half a year. Alternately, agreeing to US & British terms for lifting the embargoes would have killed any chance of economic independence & ensured Japans status as a US or Brit client state for decades. japan had invested the bulk of its national wealth & reduced its working classes to near poverty in a effort to acquire a self sustaining empire. The US policy directly forced Japan to throw away this entire investment & leave it economically dependent of foreign banks and governments. It was a desperate move, but the leaders saw no alternative.

 

[BBadolato]

It's a combo of a and d. Pearl Harbour from a strategic perspective relied on the U.S not having any real naval presence in the Pacific near Japan, so Japan could go south to take the resources they need. Without that, the Japanese are left with no feasible options at all, D is self-explanatory.

 

[raharris1973]

I'd recommend reading some serious literature on the subject. 'Japans Decision for War' might be one. The relevant chapters in Costellos 'The Pacific War' is another.



Its not a matter of "insult" or "domestic politics". The embargo was economically devastating and would have collapsed Japans economy in another half a year. Alternately, agreeing to US & British terms for lifting the embargoes would have killed any chance of economic independence & ensured Japans status as a US or Brit client state for decades. japan had invested the bulk of its national wealth & reduced its working classes to near poverty in a effort to acquire a self sustaining empire. The US policy directly forced Japan to throw away this entire investment & leave it economically dependent of foreign banks and governments. It was a desperate move, but the leaders saw no alternative.

that sounds like an evasion of the major question to make an unrelated point. Following your logic, it might mean your vote is "n) Japan would still strike when cornered, even if nearly all factors a) through i) apply", although nobody went ahead and voted for that yet.

 

[sloreck]

The US wanted the war in China to end, Japan keeping Manchukuo was OK but more than that was anathema for the USA. By the time the embargo became complete it had been being ramped up for several years including cutting Japan off from international credit (See "Bankrupting the Enemy"). Depending on the source Japan had perhaps 18 months of petroleum to run the military and the economy, after that everything, literally everything would stop - and remember petroleum is used as a chemical feedstock to make all sorts of things as well as burned for fuel. Japan had put itself in a hole, true, but if it stopped the war in China, accepted only having Manchukuo, the rest of the empire would have been intact and the embargo would have been lifted. The US actions, supported by the British and Dutch gave Japan the choice of conquer the oil and other raw materials and continue the war in China or end the war in China and resume more normal trade. The same cliques in the Japanese Army that started the war in China beyond Manchukuo would not see ending the war being "humiliated" by the west, they were convinced that Japanese spirit would prevail against the weak westerners/USA who would fold after a swift kick in the nuts.

One of the realities was that the Japanese did not have enough tankers, even before they started getting sunk by the USN, to move the quantities of oil they needed. Sure it would be better than nothing but reserves would still be run down. Also issues about refining capacity for certain grades of fuels and so forth. Sure there folks in the IJA and IJN who knew these facts, and probably presented them. However if they did not shut up after their superiors rejected their numbers, or said that Japanese spirit would prevail, then the folks describing the no clothes situation would be posted to some remote island to monitor birds, or be forced out, or perhaps end up assassinated.

IMHO while it would take time for Japan to work off its debt, with its Empire intact and without the huge losses of WWII they could have gotten themselves free of debt.

 

[mlp]

All of these factors dont change the fundamental Japanese mentality that they would need secure natural resources through coercive power, military or otherwise. All of these would merely push the timeframe of any SEA invasion.

 

[raharris1973]

The most popular deterrents to Japanese action in the poll seem to be bad natural disaster and advanced US preparedness (5 votes each at this time). There are somewhat surprisingly fewer votes for an Axis alliance doing less well in Europe and the Med creating a deterrent to Japan as a side effect.

I am also "shocked, shocked" that the Korean participant in poll sees Japanese aggression as inevitable.