Could you plausibly claim that the US provoked Japan before Pearl Harbor

Yamamoto was the one that was at least most common sense then the ones in charge he protested against bombing Pearl Harbor before it was bombarded by bombers
 
Yamamoto was the one that was at least most common sense then the ones in charge he protested against bombing Pearl Harbor before it was bombarded by bombers
He was the mastermind behind the whole Pearl Harbor attack ......

He might not have wanted the war with the US, but to say he protested the bombing of Pearl is just wrong.
 
He was the mastermind behind the whole Pearl Harbor attack ......

He might not have wanted the war with the US, but to say he protested the bombing of Pearl is just wrong.
Hell he's the one who planned it and then pushed it to his superiors then used the threat of resigning to force it through
 
If you effectively embargo a modern nation from oil, they'll either capitulate to your demands or find an excuse to go to war with you. This is especially true if you're taking steps to ensure that OTHER countries don't sell oil to the embargo target either.
I don't think Roosevelt had any illusions that the embargo would result in the 1st outcome. One perversity of most Western populations is that they will often support things like this while opposing an 'honest' declaration of war for the reasons that motivate such embargoes. It's kind of like the old Civilization games when in a democracy or republic---you can't up and declare war but you can take steps to provoke a 'sneak attack' on your country and wave the bloody shirt.
 
If you effectively embargo a modern nation from oil, they'll either capitulate to your demands or find an excuse to go to war with you. This is especially true if you're taking steps to ensure that OTHER countries don't sell oil to the embargo target either.
I don't think Roosevelt had any illusions that the embargo would result in the 1st outcome. One perversity of most Western populations is that they will often support things like this while opposing an 'honest' declaration of war for the reasons that motivate such embargoes. It's kind of like the old Civilization games when in a democracy or republic---you can't up and declare war but you can take steps to provoke a 'sneak attack' on your country and wave the bloody shirt.

I agree with almost everything you said, while I disagree with just one thing that you said there. It's not perversity. It's a feature, of nearly all sophisticated civilizations, and one that worked very well, so why abandon it?
Being in principle committed to peace and non-aggression while in reality being sneaky git of a warmonger is an excellent social technology, it allows you start wars at your convenience like an aggressor while enjoying all the benefits of self-defense. Among of those benefits being effective silencing of domestic opposition to war, and third parties being more likely to have at least friendly neutral attitude toward you.
 
From the Japanese point of view.

  • Made it's international reputation by defeating Russia in 1905. Treats captives well.
  • Emulated European style colonisation on the Asian mainland.
  • Participates in WW1. Treats captives well.
  • Is rebuffed for the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the 1919 ToV
  • Participated in the 9 Power (Pacific Security) and 5 Power (Naval disarmament) treaties at Washington in 1921. This was a security pact underpinned by the power of the US Dollar.
  • 1924 Immigration Act excludes Japanese from USA.
  • Architect of Washington Treaties Charles Evans Hughes says that this Act undid the good work done at Washington in 1921.
  • 1926-27 Kuomintang Northern Expedition re unites China from the south. Threatens to takeover Japanese concessions. Japan appeals for help from Washington Treaty parties but no support forthcoming.
  • 1929 US Stockmarket crash capped off 10 years of domestic economic instability in Japan. The Showa Depression 1930-31 was triggered by external events.
  • 1930 Japan Signs London Naval Treaty to further limit naval arms.
  • 1931-32 Yen devalued 60% against USD and 44% against GBP.
  • 1931 Herbert Yardley publishes The American Black Chamber. Japan learns that the US was reading its mail at Washington in 1921. Never signs an arms limitation treaty again.
  • 1931-32 Kwantung Army goes rogue and siezes Manchuria. Domestically this is seen as an economic lifeline against the effects of the Great Depression. Western media reports on the events with accounts of atrocities such as bombing civilians or firing upon shell-shocked survivors. It aroused considerable antipathy to Japan, which lasted until the end of World War II.
  • 1932 League of Nations Lytton report critical of Japan, Japan withdraws from League.
  • 1937 Second Sino-Japanese war starts. Japanese military's behavior is abhorrent.

When non interventionists demanded that the President acknowledge a war existed [1937] and that US goods not fuel the conflict, FDR weathered the storm. Nevertheless, his first public response to the 1937 conflict was merely a pious statement by Hull that condemned the use of force an neglected to mention Japan. The administration was divided. One faction, led by Hornbeck and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morganthau wanted to protect US interests in China through a military and economic build up that, they assumed, would force Japan to back down. Hornbeck and Morgenthau did not believe that the Japanese had the wherewithal, or the nerve, to confront the United States. Opposed were Hull and Ambassador Grew in Tokyo who warned that sanctions could lead to war and at the least, undercut relative moderates such as Konoe and Saionji who were trying to rein in the militarists.
From "The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History" by Walter LaFeber p184-185

Moving to 1941, at US Cabinet level, it was decided to put pressure on Japan by limiting oil shipments. At this meeting it was acknowledged that cutting oil would cause war. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acherson creatively interpreted the instructions to cut the oil shipments. When it was realised that supplies to Japan had been cut it was felt that opening them up again would send the wrong message as a back down. Now on the conveyor belt to war, when the Japanese invasion fleets were on their way south on 6th December, Roosevelt was going to ask Congress to declare Armed Neutrality from Monday Dec 8th, similar to what was active in the Atlantic. That Japan was about to attack was obvious but the US leadership expected attacks on US ships only in China, not as far away as Hawaii. USN planning in Hawaii was on how to bait the IJN to come to the central Pacific so the USN could fight it, not wholly-crap we are the first hit! None of the various Rainbow plans envisaged the fall of Singapore or the Malay/NEI barrier. Japanese success on this scale was not anticipated. Not even the Japanese anticipated it.
 
I watch the movie Midway in the beginning of the movie yammoto said don’t back japan into a corner or it will do something drastic leave it to the reasonable ones to counter the fanatics and what the USA did... they cornered japan and it bite back with the bite of a scared corner animal so yes we provoked japan by letting the fanatics get their way with the oil

The problem with that is it allows countries who do unreasonable or aggressive things to justify any behavior. It is a bit like a terrorist who shoots a dozen hostages claiming "look what the Police made them do" by not giving them everything they demanded.
 
1931 Herbert Yardley publishes The American Black Chamber. Japan learns that the US was reading its mail at Washington in 1921. Never signs an arms limitation treaty again.

I don't think any country would expect countries to NOT try to read their mail in similar circumstances, it has been part and parcel of international relations since the dawn of civilisation. Spies have long been regarded as the second profession after all.

If your diplomats think this is not happening all the time, particularly in the course of Treaty negotiations you need to give your diplomats a good solid kick in the pants.
 
I don't think any country would expect countries to NOT try to read their mail in similar circumstances, it has been part and parcel of international relations since the dawn of civilisation. Spies have long been regarded as the second profession after all.

If your diplomats think this is not happening all the time, particularly in the course of Treaty negotiations you need to give your diplomats a good solid kick in the pants.
They were negotiating a disarmament treaty, something that requires a partnership which you can't have without trust. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson shut down the Black Chamber and years later in his memoirs made the oft-quoted comment: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Stimson had ethical reservations about cryptanalysis targeting diplomats, not on spying in general.
 
They were negotiating a disarmament treaty, something that requires a partnership which you can't have without trust. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson shut down the Black Chamber and years later in his memoirs made the oft-quoted comment: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Stimson had ethical reservations about cryptanalysis targeting diplomats, not on spying in general.

Still a naive viewpoint. Everyone taking part in the Washington treaty negotiations was looking to game the outcome. Peaking over the other guys shoulder can give you a edge, if you know what he wants you might be able to give him something close enough to get something you need. If Stimson really believed that I suspect he got played a lot by diplomats who played a more pragmatic game.
 
From the Japanese point of view.
  • 1926-27 Kuomintang Northern Expedition re unites China from the south. Threatens to takeover Japanese concessions. Japan appeals for help from Washington Treaty parties but no support forthcoming.

I feel this point is debatable. If anything was Japan who rejected appeals from the Washington Treaty parties, particularly the 1927 British suggestion of an international armed intervention against the Nationalist-occupied Nanjing.

This rejection was one of the black marks that tarred the Japanese diplomacy and caused quite a stir within the Japanese public, but it was directed against their own civilian government, not the Western governments.
 
Did America provoke Japan? Well Japan's leaders felt provoked. So I guess one could argue that, backwards as it may seem given that Pearl Harbour was a massively disproportionate response to trade sanctions.

"Did America intend to provoke Japan?" Seems a much more worthwhile question. I've always been a bit curious as to how much the Roosevelt administration understood of how insane and politically dominant Japan's officer corps was.
 
"Did America intend to provoke Japan?" Seems a much more worthwhile question. I've always been a bit curious as to how much the Roosevelt administration understood of how insane and politically dominant Japan's officer corps was.
Logically if the US had intended to provoke Japan they'd have waited until their naval building program had started to bare fruit before imposing sanctions.
 
The reality is that the fanatics had been in charge of Japan since the 20s at least.
The army had, Japan's parliament however was pretty intent on reigning the army in during the 1920s. Parliament really only became the complacent rubber stamp for the army after the May 15 Incident (which was in 1932).
 
Well, the war in East Asian and it's causes is a difficult topic, and one which dozens of books have been written about, but I'll try to keep it short. It mainly was a conflict of interests between two of the worlds major imperialist powers.

The american ruling class had quite some economic interest in China, South East Asia and the Pacific Region, and Japans aggressive expansionism heavily threatened the USA's influence in East Asia as a whole. So an embargo on oil and scrape metal was enacted, which "forced" (forced in the sense of, if it wanted to continue it's aggressive war in China) Japan to attack the european colonies in South East Asia (especially the Dutch East Indies, a major source of oil which Japan badly needed).

However the Japanese government knew that, if it directly attacked and conquered these territories (thereby aggressively violating american interests), the US would declear war. So a plan was drawn up to launch a "pre-emptive" strike against the bulk of the US Pacific Fleet, stationed in Pearl Harbour. The rest is history.

The problem with the question of who was the aggressor and who was the defender is that both, the japanese and american ruling class, wanted to enforce their objective interests. Tensions between Japan and the US over influence in the Pacific region had existed since the 1910s.

However, when it comes to who sparked the flame, the answer is obviously and undeniably Japan with it's aggressive expansion into China and South East Asia. But in the end, the war was a great "chance" for the american ruling class to extend it's influence in Asia, aswell (which it did). It was a game of great powers, ruling classes and economic interests. Both sides told stories about "liberation" and "well beeing", most of them were only half-true at best. The real loosers were the peoples of Asia.

However it has to be noted that, despite all the crimes the US and it's pupet regimes commited (South Korea and the Philippines are notable examples in the immediate post war period), and despite the major role the american involvement in the war played in the restoration of British, French and Dutch colonial rule over South East Asia, the peoples of Asia were still a lot better of than they would have been under the occupation of fascist Japan (you can clearly see that in the territories that actually were under japanese control during the war). For the common man in Asia, it was a choice between bad and worse.
 
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I feel this point is debatable. If anything was Japan who rejected appeals from the Washington Treaty parties, particularly the 1927 British suggestion of an international armed intervention against the Nationalist-occupied Nanjing.

This rejection was one of the black marks that tarred the Japanese diplomacy and caused quite a stir within the Japanese public, but it was directed against their own civilian government, not the Western governments.

By that point the IJA pretty much considered China their back yard and personal preserve. There was no way they were going to allow any Western powers (particularly the British) any more influence on Chinese affairs than they already had.

It would be an interesting POD though, if the British Army and RAF performed badly enough it might have had all sorts of unforeseen consequences.
 
Basing your claims off of a terrible Roland Emmerich movie completely ridiculous. The reality is that the fanatics had been in charge of Japan since the 20s at least. There were no reasonable men in charge in Japan. And frankly that includes Yamamoto.
Movies are gospal though.
Everything I needed to know about ancient history I learned from Mel brooks :)

On a serious topic...
Inadvertantly, yes the US and other powers who were happily carving China up for themselves into blocks for themselves dine the 1800s did want Japan in on the deal.

Did the embargo force Japan to choices. Embargoes usually do. Japan made a bad choice for Japan.
 
The problem with that is it allows countries who do unreasonable or aggressive things to justify any behavior. It is a bit like a terrorist who shoots a dozen hostages claiming "look what the Police made them do" by not giving them everything they demanded.
Everything is perspective and point of view and history is almost always written to assure the winner looks good. Not saying that the Japanese were not wrong or aggressors etc..

Just reality
 
Still a naive viewpoint.
21st Century cynicism applied to 20th Century optimism
Everyone taking part in the Washington treaty negotiations was looking to game the outcome.
No. It was more than 5:5:3.
The diplomatic corps had attended the burial of the US Unknown Soldier the day before the Washington talks opened. Kinda hard to be driven by 'gaming' a result when you are there to negotiate arms limitations and when everyone had known someone killed or lost sons themselves there was a genuine spirit to reach a deal. No one wanted it to fail and no one wanted to be the reason it failed.
Peaking over the other guys shoulder can give you a edge, if you know what he wants you might be able to give him something close enough to get something you need. If Stimson really believed that I suspect he got played a lot by diplomats who played a more pragmatic game.
Do you enjoy competition when you find out later it was rigged? Do you participate in it again, I'd expect not? This is not Sparta, there were certain things that were respected, still are, in diplomacy like you don't go dipping through Diplomatic Bags. If you are going to do it, sure as hell you don't want to get caught! Perhaps the naivety was American at the time. The American consulate in Berlin took the coded Zimmerman Telegram to transmit over American channels trusting Germany and not knowing that a quarter of the US was to be promised to Mexico in the event of the US entering the war against Germany. No wonder why they lost their shit when the Brits showed them what was in it.
 
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