Could Operation Michael have succeeded?

[EnglishCanuck]

So in honor of the 100th anniversary of Operation Michael, part of the German Spring Offensive in 1918, I come to the board asking the obvious; was it possible for Operation Michael to have succeeded and Germany prevail?

Is there any way for this to end in negotiations or enough panic amongst the Entente powers to accept mediation?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

No. I cannot see it. The British Army of the day had been fighting Germany for over 3 years and the best lessons had been learned by the survivors and in 1918 the BEF was to all intents and purposes a Peer 'continental army' level opponent with the addition of having an embarrising advantage in supplies and ammunition over the Germans.

Further more it had better cavalry formations (read: mounted infantry and horse artillery - still the fastest method of gettign cross country in 1918) than the Germans with which to plug any gaps backed up by tanks a provide the time for the infantry and artillery to fill said gap

Gorden Corrigan slays some WW1 Cavalry myths in his book 'Mud Blood and Poppycock' and talks about the part British and Empire cavalry played in several battles not just the Spring Offensive

In addition during the Spring offensive while the technically superior Focker D.VII might have wrested control of the air from the RFC/RNAS (RAF from April) it was not delivered in time or in numbers and the LW never acheived this goal and generally the newly formed RAF maintained air superiority through a combination of superior numbers and the LWs increasing lack of aircraft, Pilots, equipment and even the necessary lubricants to keep what they had in the air.

So IMO the BEF was too powerful, was salty enough and had superior logistics making a sucessful Michael unlikely

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Yes, see Zabecki's study on the 1918 offensives:
https://www.amazon.com/German-1918-Offensives-Operational-Strategy/dp/0415558794

 

[The Red]

It could feasibly have ended in a decisive tactical victory for Germany but it wouldn't have been able to force France out of the war, which is what it really needed to do.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

It could feasibly have ended in a decisive tactical victory for Germany but it wouldn't have been able to force France out of the war, which is what it really needed to do.

By itself it wasn't designed to, it was setting up the preconditions for subsequent offensives to do so. If it works and separates the French and British armies, then it is possible for the rest of the 1918 offensives.

 

[The Red]

By itself it wasn't designed to, it was setting up the preconditions for subsequent offensives to do so. If it works and separates the French and British armies, then it is possible for the rest of the 1918 offensives.

According to Norman Stone a subsequent major offensive wouldn't have been possible for quite some time afterwards and as such the Germans wouldn't have been able to exploit their success. The German leadership arguably weren't aware of this at the time as when the army began to be plagued with logistical issues in May Ludendorff starting blaming poor morale instead, but with hindsight the Spring Offensive really did have to be the "Decisive Battle".

 

[Deleted member 1487]

According to Norman Stone a subsequent major offensive wouldn't have been possible for quite some time afterwards and as such the Germans wouldn't have been able to exploit their success. The German leadership arguably weren't aware of this at the time as when the army began to be plagued with logistical issues in May Ludendorff starting blaming poor morale instead, but with hindsight the Spring Offensive really did have to be the "Decisive Battle".

I'm not sure what sort of work Norman Stone has done on the 1918 offensives, but Col. David Zabecki found copies of the original German documents, thought destroyed in WW2 air raids, in US archives and determined that decisive victory was possible if a certain strategy was followed. OTL Michael was conducted very poorly, which led to the logistics issues faced by the German army during that offensive and subsequent ones, but it did not have to be so and in fact Allied army logistics were much more fragile and capable of being disrupted had Ludendorff not flailed around, wasting strength on less important objectives.

 

[The Red]

I'm not sure what sort of work Norman Stone has done on the 1918 offensives, but Col. David Zabecki found copies of the original German documents, thought destroyed in WW2 air raids, in US archives and determined that decisive victory was possible if a certain strategy was followed. OTL Michael was conducted very poorly, which led to the logistics issues faced by the German army during that offensive and subsequent ones, but it did not have to be so and in fact Allied army logistics were much more fragile and capable of being disrupted had Ludendorff not flailed around, wasting strength on less important objectives.

I wouldn't disagree with any of that, my point is more that ultimately it wouldn't have been enough to finish the war on its own. I know that that wasn't necessarily the intention of the offensive but with hindsight it really had to be, the Germans wouldn't have been able to follow up on their success anytime soon.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I wouldn't disagree with any of that, my point is more that ultimately it wouldn't have been enough to finish the war on its own. I know that that wasn't necessarily the intention of the offensive but with hindsight it really had to be, the Germans wouldn't have been able to follow up on their success anytime soon.

Operation Michael? It wasn't necessary to win the war with that one offensive, as it was the first of several planned and had it actually fulfilled it's goal of separating the French and cutting British logistics, it would have set up the conditions for subsequent planned offensives to win the war and defeat France before the US showed up in strength.

 

[Hood]

Operation Michael? It wasn't necessary to win the war with that one offensive, as it was the first of several planned and had it actually fulfilled it's goal of separating the French and cutting British logistics, it would have set up the conditions for subsequent planned offensives to win the war and defeat France before the US showed up in strength.

He's already pointe out Germany wouldn't be able to actually execute the subsequent plans for quite some time, dye to logistical reasons etc.
Therefore it had to be decisive.

 

[lukedalton]

Operation Michael? It wasn't necessary to win the war with that one offensive, as it was the first of several planned and had it actually fulfilled it's goal of separating the French and cutting British logistics, it would have set up the conditions for subsequent planned offensives to win the war and defeat France before the US showed up in strength.

The problem is two fold, from one part the Germans had low supply and morale was not great, even if Micheal was succesfull and the logistic better planned, continuing other offensive will be very hard (and can start a series of mutiny) and second once the Battle of Vittorio Veneto start and A-H is knocked out of the war, Germany is surrounded and her south open for an invasion.
So once all that become clear, Germany remaining options are negotiate from a stronger position while selling it's allies and throw them to the wolf to survive.

 

[Mikestone8]

The problem is two fold, from one part the Germans had low supply and morale was not great, even if Micheal was succesfull and the logistic better planned, continuing other offensive will be very hard (and can start a series of mutiny) and second once the Battle of Vittorio Veneto start and A-H is knocked out of the war, Germany is surrounded and her south open for an invasion.

Only failed offensives are likely to cause mutinies. So long as they think they are winning, the soldiers will put up with the hardship. Thus it was only from July/August, when the tide had clearly turned, that Germans started surrendering in large numbers.

 

[Karelian]

Not with the OTL leadership.
Ludendorff and his "rush B"-mentality at the helm doomed all attempts, no matter how tactically brilliant, to ultimate defeat.

Was the offensive capable of capturing Amiens and Hasbrouck? Yes. Would a serious diplomatic offer for peace combined with this led to a negotiated armistice? Unlikely, but not impossible.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

He's already pointe out Germany wouldn't be able to actually execute the subsequent plans for quite some time, dye to logistical reasons etc.
Therefore it had to be decisive.

He's stated it based off of a historian who did not have access to the original German documents; my position is based on the army officer who rediscovered copies of the documents in US archives and wrote a military analysis about the offensives. Stone is a good historian for the Eastern Front, but he is not a specialist on the German army in the west, nor did he have access to the general staff documents that Zabecki did.

The problem is two fold, from one part the Germans had low supply and morale was not great, even if Micheal was succesfull and the logistic better planned, continuing other offensive will be very hard (and can start a series of mutiny) and second once the Battle of Vittorio Veneto start and A-H is knocked out of the war, Germany is surrounded and her south open for an invasion.

Morale is at a peak prior to the offensives and the supply situation for the offensives is actually quite good, despite the home front situation. You do know that after Michael IOTL there were 3 more major offensives, right?
Their failure to knock out the Allies was due to Ludendorff botching the plans, not due to supply issues or lack of reserves. They were misaimed and frittered away their energy against pointless objectives. Micheal itself doesn't need to be continued, offensives elsewhere on the Western Front would follow on as per OTL.

The collapse of Austria wasn't until the end of the year and the Allies were in no position to launch an offensive via Austrian territory even in 1919 if solely due to the rail situation.

So once all that become clear, Germany remaining options are negotiate from a stronger position while selling it's allies and throw them to the wolf to survive.

There really isn't a need to sell out any allies (other than perhaps the Ottomans to a degree, which is simply acknowledging the reality on the ground in the middle east) if the Spring Offensives in France go well. France cutting a separate deal effectively ends the war and Italy won't be on Austrian territory by then, nor will the breakout from Salonika be possible by then either, especially with France out.

 

[lukedalton]

Only failed offensives are likely to cause mutinies. So long as they think they are winning, the soldiers will put up with the hardship. Thus it was only from July/August, when the tide had clearly turned, that Germans started surrendering in large numbers.

Only within certain limits...and by 1918 they have already approach it, the food situation for them and the civilian it's rapidly going to hell and in general they are tired of the war, a rapid series of offensive to outpace the arrival of the americans it's out of the question; the soldiers, as any man, can be broken winning or not. IRC many units stopped their action to loot the enemy for supply...not a good sign (and the Austrian are even in a worse place)

 

[Catspoke]

So I am presuming this successful Michael strives for taking Amiens from the get go and splitting the British and French (perhaps this offensive skips Arras and instead extends the attack frontage to the south.

Then its basically all in Blucher to drive toward Paris (skipping Georgette. perhaps an earlier Blucher or a more prepared Blucher). The goal is to force an armistice or at the very least put the Germans in a position to resist through the 1918-1919 Winter.

 

[The Red]

Operation Michael? It wasn't necessary to win the war with that one offensive, as it was the first of several planned and had it actually fulfilled it's goal of separating the French and cutting British logistics, it would have set up the conditions for subsequent planned offensives to win the war and defeat France before the US showed up in strength.

I think we’ve been talking past each other a little bit but that’s easily remedied, I was referring to the Spring Offensives in general, which indeed could have cut off the BEF at Amiens and subsequently encircled or captured Paris. After that however, you still have a situation where time is against Germany. The French government isn’t going to surrender and the British are likely to muddle on as well, both motivated by the influx of American men and material to replace their losses.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I'm not sure what sort of work Norman Stone has done on the 1918 offensives, but Col. David Zabecki found copies of the original German documents, thought destroyed in WW2 air raids, in US archives and determined that decisive victory was possible if a certain strategy was followed. OTL Michael was conducted very poorly, which led to the logistics issues faced by the German army during that offensive and subsequent ones, but it did not have to be so and in fact Allied army logistics were much more fragile and capable of being disrupted had Ludendorff not flailed around, wasting strength on less important objectives.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the offensive go off track once Ludendorff decided that capturing territory, as he had done in the East, was more important that strategic objectives that had been set by planners? I've read that explanation more than once (and saw it in the documentary The First World War) and it seems to make sense. I mean, there were also morale issues as the richness of the territory caused starved German soldiers to essentially stop in their tracks to loot.

If Amiens had fallen though, would they have had the time to carry out later offensives?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I'm not sure what sort of work Norman Stone has done on the 1918 offensives, but Col. David Zabecki found copies of the original German documents, thought destroyed in WW2 air raids, in US archives and determined that decisive victory was possible if a certain strategy was followed. OTL Michael was conducted very poorly, which led to the logistics issues faced by the German army during that offensive and subsequent ones, but it did not have to be so and in fact Allied army logistics were much more fragile and capable of being disrupted had Ludendorff not flailed around, wasting strength on less important objectives.

Does he address where the Germans were going to get the strength for the follow-up offensive? Making plans is all well and good but the culture of the German military tended to ignore or underestimate non-kinetic operational-strategic factors (which is why Michael was conducted rather poorly) and everything I’ve read indicates that Michael was the final bolt and once it was exhausted, as it pretty well was by the time they were reaching Amiens, the Germans had no offensive strength left.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I think we’ve been talking past each other a little bit but that’s easily remedied, I was referring to the Spring Offensives in general, which indeed could have cut off the BEF at Amiens and subsequently encircled or captured Paris. After that however, you still have a situation where time is against Germany. The French government isn’t going to surrender and the British are likely to muddle on as well, both motivated by the influx of American men and material to replace their losses.

I don't think it is necessary for the French to surrender unconditionally; instead, given the situation, they could easily cut a separate deal if they lost hope of being able to win in the foreseeable future. If Paris is surrounded and France northwest of it to the coast is lost, France has lost the majority of it's industry and remaining coal sources in-country, while Britain is probably going to pull it's forces back to defend the home country, as invasion panic is going to be going through the roof once the Channel Coast is lost.