Cryhavoc101
Donor
I managed to find a downloadable version of his work - now assuming it is the same piece of work (he Worked with the late Prof Richard Holmes!!!) from 2006 I noticed a couple of things (admittedly I skim read mainly the alternative bits and conclusions as I have been away much of the W/E)
Firstly the 'what Eric should have done' segments are based on the knowledge of modern operational art' ie what a modern professionally trained NATO General from the 90s/00s would have done in Ludendorff's place - I do not think that the work is suggesting that there was a way for the German army of the day to succeed
He then finishes the work explaining why the Germans did not do what a 'modern professionally trained NATO General from the 90s/00s would have done in Ludendorff's place' and also why the German Leaders could not have changed this without a large number of changes stretching back several decades
Now I will have to read the conclusions again but my take on what he is saying is that basically Michael was too big, too Grand - a masterpiece of planning and Op sec for sure (which alone is worthy of study) but the German army and its leadership of the day was incapable of achieving such a large operation in the face of its peer opponents ability to react to it.
Micheal should have been a series of much smaller 'sustainable' and 'complementary' operations - like the British would do several months later (as Zabecki suggests) - however in order for Eric to do this he needs something to Bridge the gap between the otherwise excellent Tactics with very poor Strategy (I've seen German Strategy of the day as Tactics Writ large) something they repeated in the equally desperate Ardennes campaign over Xmas 44/45 - where the German Army repeats nearly all of the mistakes it made in the Spring Offensive of 1918!
I will try to read it completely during the week and this may change my understanding of his conclusions and specifically his alternate actions, but right now my understanding of the work is basically :- what would said 'modern professionally trained NATO General (ie someone like Maj. Gen. Zabecki) from the 90s/00s would have done in Ludendorff's place'
But a great piece of work thanks for bringing it to our attention
Firstly the 'what Eric should have done' segments are based on the knowledge of modern operational art' ie what a modern professionally trained NATO General from the 90s/00s would have done in Ludendorff's place - I do not think that the work is suggesting that there was a way for the German army of the day to succeed
He then finishes the work explaining why the Germans did not do what a 'modern professionally trained NATO General from the 90s/00s would have done in Ludendorff's place' and also why the German Leaders could not have changed this without a large number of changes stretching back several decades
Now I will have to read the conclusions again but my take on what he is saying is that basically Michael was too big, too Grand - a masterpiece of planning and Op sec for sure (which alone is worthy of study) but the German army and its leadership of the day was incapable of achieving such a large operation in the face of its peer opponents ability to react to it.
Micheal should have been a series of much smaller 'sustainable' and 'complementary' operations - like the British would do several months later (as Zabecki suggests) - however in order for Eric to do this he needs something to Bridge the gap between the otherwise excellent Tactics with very poor Strategy (I've seen German Strategy of the day as Tactics Writ large) something they repeated in the equally desperate Ardennes campaign over Xmas 44/45 - where the German Army repeats nearly all of the mistakes it made in the Spring Offensive of 1918!
I will try to read it completely during the week and this may change my understanding of his conclusions and specifically his alternate actions, but right now my understanding of the work is basically :- what would said 'modern professionally trained NATO General (ie someone like Maj. Gen. Zabecki) from the 90s/00s would have done in Ludendorff's place'
But a great piece of work thanks for bringing it to our attention