Could an expansion-minded post-Civil War United States have been able to challenge the hegemony of the British Empire by 1900?

[von Adler]

Another factor to remember with the US growth is that a militaristic state aiming to challenge British hegemony will most likely be enforcing taxation and conscription on its population - which will probably reduce the attractiveness of the US for the extensive migration it received OTL. Traditionally, the more nationalist constituents of the US have often been against immigration of non-WASP groups. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 might look more like the 1924 legislation, which set a fixed number and maximum percentage based on existing groups as identified by the cencus.

A lot of the Italians, Irish, Hungarians, Slovenes, Poles, Austrian and South German catholics might want to go to Canada instead of the US due to these factors. The US population could very well be 10-20% smaller than OTL by 1910.

 

[Arkenfolm]

I don't quite understand why you're so focused on the European front. While it was the most important front in operational terms, it doesn't really demonstrate the strategic potential of the Empire very well. As I have shown, India was capable of supporting a large and effective colonial army which cannot be ignored in estimating the Empire's capacity for a Great Power War. Even a fraction of that number would still be a large factor in a war between the US and the Empire.

India is not capable of supporting a large army, because British India's domestic industry is small. All of that has to come from Britain itself, which adds to the amount of shipping involved to support a war on the other side of the world. And I don't know how effective you can really call the average Indian division effective in the Great War. Effective against the average Ottoman division, certainly, and some of them did well enough on the Western Front. But the Ottomans were not a well-equipped force.

I don't think this could become a World War. The US had no European allies that would support them if they invaded Canada in a war of agression. France needs Britain as a counter to Germany, and will at best be neutral. Germany enjoys good diplomatic relations with the Empire and still has very limited global power projection capacities. Russia opposes Britain but has no interests in the Americas, and could use the opening much better to expand her power in China and other "neutral" areas. Austria-Hungary has neither the inclination nor the capacity to get involved.

Britain would be paranoid to hell that any of these powers would take advantage, especially France (in Africa) or Russia (in Asia), which means leaving more garrisons such as those British Indian soldiers you mentioned. And they would, since France could negotiate better borders in Africa.

Sure, but that'd need to be a big army that you then can't use for the invasion of Canada, or defending the East Coast against a strike launched from Nova Scotia, or the Carribean against the Gulf of Mexico. Every one of these coastal fronts would have to receive enough troops to cover its entire length, due to the superior maneuverability of naval forces, and every single strongpoint would have to be able to defend against bombardement by potentially several dozen battleships for days if not weeks until reinforcements arrive.

Basically, the US would be in a similar strategic position to China in the Opium Wars, except with rough technological parity.

How are those ships receiving coal? How are they receiving ammunition? There is one Royal Navy base within thousands of miles of the West Coast--Esquimalt, which since BC in 1890 officially had 98K people (a reasonable number of which were American immigrants, Chinese, or Native Americans), can't support many operations like that. They could ship supplies from across the continent on the recently (late 1885) built Canadian Pacific Railway, but that can be cut by cavalry raids. Now granted, I imagine that with a serious threat such a railway would be built earlier, but it would have to be either vulnerable to American attacks or further north which means more expense due to disadvantageous terrain and longer transit time to Canada's industrial centers.

Supplying a naval invasion across tens of thousands of miles is guaranteed to result in Gallipoli-tier disaster. Even if it defeated the Pacific fleet of the US TTL--which is possible since a France-tier navy is defeatable, the result is a self-sustaining prison camp whose supplies are harassed endlessly by commerce raiders and whose Indian component makes for propaganda to recruit the average racist American of the 1890s century. All of the American West Coast ports are surrounded by mountains, and if the passes are blocked by fortifications and the rails are gone, it would be practically impossible to break out.

Comparison to China in the Opium Wars is ridiculous, unless you mean against the OTL late 19th century American military which this thread isn't about.

 

[von Adler]

How are those ships receiving coal? How are they receiving ammunition? There is one Royal Navy base within thousands of miles of the West Coast--Esquimalt, which since BC in 1890 officially had 98K people (a reasonable number of which were American immigrants, Chinese, or Native Americans), can't support many operations like that. They could ship supplies from across the continent on the recently (late 1885) built Canadian Pacific Railway, but that can be cut by cavalry raids. Now granted, I imagine that with a serious threat such a railway would be built earlier, but it would have to be either vulnerable to American attacks or further north which means more expense due to disadvantageous terrain and longer transit time to Canada's industrial centers.

Supplying a naval invasion across tens of thousands of miles is guaranteed to result in Gallipoli-tier disaster. Even if it defeated the Pacific fleet of the US TTL--which is possible since a France-tier navy is defeatable, the result is a self-sustaining prison camp whose supplies are harassed endlessly by commerce raiders and whose Indian component makes for propaganda to recruit the average racist American of the 1890s century. All of the American West Coast ports are surrounded by mountains, and if the passes are blocked by fortifications and the rails are gone, it would be practically impossible to break out.

If the US is acting like a geopolitical rival to the British, you can be sure that they will built up capacity ot operate in the eastern Pacific - this would include Hawaii, the Galapagos islands, Easter Island and building up a major naval base in western Canada, It would also include denying the US such bases - no US Wake island, no US Hawaii, no Phillipines, no US Midway and no US Phillipines.

In any case, the British operating in the Pacific would be aiming to tie down US troops and resources. Raiding, shelling ports and coastal shipping - railroads are good, but the capacity of a single steamer can be equal to 100 trains and denying coastal shipping will cause transportation problems for the US.

 

[Hearkener]

India is not capable of supporting a large army, because British India's domestic industry is small.

Demonstrably counterfactual, as I have shown. Colonial soldiers would be equipped mostly from the imperial core's industrial output.

All of that has to come from Britain itself, which adds to the amount of shipping involved to support a war on the other side of the world.

Imagine if Britain had invested centuries worth of labor into building a fleet specifically designed for that task... The RN's capability for global power projection is extremely well documented.

And I don't know how effective you can really call the average Indian division effective in the Great War. Effective against the average Ottoman division, certainly, and some of them did well enough on the Western Front. But the Ottomans were not a well-equipped force.

I don't know about WW1, but in the sequel there are records of Gurkha forces defeating equal and greater Wehrmacht forces in frontal engagements, so I see no reason to blanketly accuse them of incompetence. Decrying the "orientals'" cowardice was common in the era, and that was based on racist pseudoscience.

How are those ships receiving coal? How are they receiving ammunition? There is one Royal Navy base within thousands of miles of the West Coast--Esquimalt, which since BC in 1890 officially had 98K people (a reasonable number of which were American immigrants, Chinese, or Native Americans), can't support many operations like that. They could ship supplies from across the continent on the recently (late 1885) built Canadian Pacific Railway, but that can be cut by cavalry raids. Now granted, I imagine that with a serious threat such a railway would be built earlier, but it would have to be either vulnerable to American attacks or further north which means more expense due to disadvantageous terrain and longer transit time to Canada's industrial centers.

Commercial Transpacific shipping was viable from 1891 onwards, so the answer to both those questions is "from the Pacific Rim".

All of the American West Coast ports are surrounded by mountains, and if the passes are blocked by fortifications and the rails are gone, it would be practically impossible to break out.

Obviously it's not feazible to roll up the US from west to east. The point of such an invasion would be to draw American troops away from Canada, destroy as much infrastructure as possible and force the American government to choose between continuing the war in Canada or getting California back in one piece. And understand that the West is not the only place where such a strategy might be executed; the Gulf of Mexico would make for another such target.

 

[Malone]

Another factor to remember with the US growth is that a militaristic state aiming to challenge British hegemony will most likely be enforcing taxation and conscription on its population - which will probably reduce the attractiveness of the US for the extensive migration it received OTL. Traditionally, the more nationalist constituents of the US have often been against immigration of non-WASP groups. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 might look more like the 1924 legislation, which set a fixed number and maximum percentage based on existing groups as identified by the cencus.

A lot of the Italians, Irish, Hungarians, Slovenes, Poles, Austrian and South German catholics might want to go to Canada instead of the US due to these factors. The US population could very well be 10-20% smaller than OTL by 1910.

US militarism has never been that tied to a 'WASP identity.' There were several Union regiments of Irish Catholics in the Civil War. Additionally, the Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1924 Immigration Act were passed during times of a very weak federal military.

I think those Italians, Hungarians, and Poles who sign up for the US military will actually just speed run their integration into greater American society. The US may actively seek to increase immigration just to boost its military-aged population if it sees the British Empire as composed of several hundred million potential colonial recruits.

 

[Arkenfolm]

If the US is acting like a geopolitical rival to the British, you can be sure that they will built up capacity ot operate in the eastern Pacific - this would include Hawaii, the Galapagos islands, Easter Island and building up a major naval base in western Canada, It would also include denying the US such bases - no US Wake island, no US Hawaii, no Phillipines, no US Midway and no US Phillipines.

In any case, the British operating in the Pacific would be aiming to tie down US troops and resources. Raiding, shelling ports and coastal shipping - railroads are good, but the capacity of a single steamer can be equal to 100 trains and denying coastal shipping will cause transportation problems for the US.

All of which are still distant ports from the US West Coast. Said raids on coastal shipping would be risky given the sea currents and potential for small torpedo boat raids and armed trawlers/merchantmen.

Demonstrably counterfactual, as I have shown. Colonial soldiers would be equipped mostly from the imperial core's industrial output.

Exactly. India is not capable of supporting a large army because pretty much everything besides their food (when they have it, that is, since British India had several large famines) and the soldiers themselves comes from British industry.

Imagine if Britain had invested centuries worth of labor into building a fleet specifically designed for that task... The RN's capability for global power projection is extremely well documented.

The colonial conflicts which the Royal Navy won like the French and Indian War (or the American Revolution which they didn't) or the War of 1812 are nothing on the scale of sustaining an industrial war across an ocean, or two oceans as you propose. The Royal Navy can't be everywhere at once, and wouldn't want to given one bad diplomatic move and people will panic over the potential of French/German/Russian ships shelling English ports. They are the largest navy, but they can be wittled away at. Especially since this is the era before ships have radio, which makes tracking raiders much more difficult. Torpedo boats are also a very potent threat, and something which the US would probably have a lot of (or could easily build at inland shipyards and bring them to the coast). Yes, Britain did help pioneer the torpedo boat destroyer, but the point stands, especially given that British torpedo boat destroyers require more resupply than short-ranged torpedo boats.

I don't know about WW1, but in the sequel there are records of Gurkha forces defeating equal and greater Wehrmacht forces in frontal engagements, so I see no reason to blanketly accuse them of incompetence. Decrying the "orientals'" cowardice was common in the era, and that was based on racist pseudoscience.

I mean "average", as in "average Indian division" not an elite force like the Gurkhas were. I've seen studies rating the effectiveness of German divisions (the one I saw was based on how the Entente rated them), and I'm assuming a similar thing could be done for the British Army as a whole.

Commercial Transpacific shipping was viable from 1891 onwards, so the answer to both those questions is "from the Pacific Rim".

Which is an absolutely enormous distance, especially since the nearest port is about 3,700 km away in Hawaii. The logistical difficulties are absolutely enormous, especially in an era before radio. Ships could be caught in typhoons (or otherwise take days avoiding it/going very slow through it), sudden sea swells, or fall prey to raiders.

For that matter, there is also no trans-Pacific telegraph cable until the early 20th century, so any British forces on the West Coast have no means of rapid communication or coordination with other forces. The nearest telegraphs are in British Columbia, and those may themselves be cut and isolated by American cavalry which means the nearest telegraph station would be a neutral Latin American nation (who may well pass info to the US since they benefit through playing both sides).

Obviously it's not feazible to roll up the US from west to east. The point of such an invasion would be to draw American troops away from Canada, destroy as much infrastructure as possible and force the American government to choose between continuing the war in Canada or getting California back in one piece. And understand that the West is not the only place where such a strategy might be executed; the Gulf of Mexico would make for another such target.

It's a terrible strategy either way, since in the case of the Gulf Coast, its topography is riddled with barrier islands and thus dangerous for shipping even before a single coastal fort is built. It's also easy to access from the East and could be patrolled by a no-doubt substantial river fleet with good institutions behind it due to many Civil War veterans. It also has a very natural chokepoint (Cuba) which ships could be ambushed at by raiders. That means more shipping required to supply an army AND warships to escort it.

Worse, the area around the coast isn't even that important in the late 19th century (outside of New Orleans) since the Texas oil boom has only just started and the main cotton areas are further north.

 

[Hearkener]

They are the largest navy, but they can be wittled away at.

The RN had more than twice as many battleships as their closest rivals OTL in peacetime. Wittling away at that kind of discrepancy in numbers takes time, especially in an era where these monsters are basically invincible to anything that isn't also a battleship. So protecting the North Sea still leaves plenty of tonnage available to severely outnumber the US Navy.

French/German/Russian ships shelling English ports

France and Germany both have excellent relations with GB, and Germany doesn't yet have the naval capacity to be more than an annoyance at this point. Russia might be a threat, but also a weak economy dependent on British investors.

It's a terrible strategy either way, since in the case of the Gulf Coast, its topography is riddled with barrier islands and thus dangerous for shipping even before a single coastal fort is built. It's also easy to access from the East and could be patrolled by a no-doubt substantial river fleet with good institutions behind it due to many Civil War veterans. It also has a very natural chokepoint (Cuba) which ships could be ambushed at by raiders. That means more shipping required to supply an army AND warships to escort it.

Good luck to those river-boats facing open ocean battleships. Civil war veterans in their 50s sure will intimidate an 88mm cannon fired from a floating fortress with the firepower of an entire artillery brigade.

Cuba is unfortunately part of Spain (there's no way the Empire will allow an anti-British US to take it), and I doubt Madrid will look kindly upon American warships using its waters to ambush British naval forces without permission. That'd actually be a really good way to end up fighting the Spanish Empire as well.

 

[vizzer]

From the original OP I don't know where the idea that the US wasn't an expansionist power comes from it was just expanding against the natives of the interior which could basically be done on the cheap.

 

[TrickyApe]

Supplying a naval invasion across tens of thousands of miles is guaranteed to result in Gallipoli-tier disaster. Even if it defeated the Pacific fleet of the US TTL--which is possible since a France-tier navy is defeatable, the result is a self-sustaining prison camp whose supplies are harassed endlessly by commerce raiders and whose Indian component makes for propaganda to recruit the average racist American of the 1890s century. All of the American West Coast ports are surrounded by mountains, and if the passes are blocked by fortifications and the rails are gone, it would be practically impossible to break out.

Was there ever an amphibious-style invasion over a distance remotely resembling the trans-Pacific? Even in the 20th century, Gallipoli staged in Egypt, D-Day in Britain, Inchon in Japan, as ones that come to my mind. It sounds like fantasy.

 

[Arkenfolm]

The RN had more than twice as many battleships as their closest rivals OTL in peacetime. Wittling away at that kind of discrepancy in numbers takes time, especially in an era where these monsters are basically invincible to anything that isn't also a battleship. So protecting the North Sea still leaves plenty of tonnage available to severely outnumber the US Navy.

This isn't true since torpedo boats were developed at this time and a credible enough threat the Royal Navy invented the torpedo boat destroyer as a counter which other navies rapidly improved.

That metric of battleships is also potentially irrelevant by the fact that no other nation had both comparable economy AND will to challenge the Royal Navy in terms of battleships before Germany and the imbalanced 1890s-era US Navy. France was late to building battleships because of naval doctrine, Germany was late to expanding the navy because of her own strategic concerns, and no other nation had the economy to compete. But barring the US opting for a Jeune Ecole doctrine (which is possible), a 60-70% of the Royal Navy is reasonable using the American economic stats I quoted earlier which if equally divided leaves a fleet at least 1/4 of the Royal Navy's strength on either coast (in practice probably more/more modern ships in the Atlantic) and a sizable inland fleet in the Great Lakes/Mississippi River basin which some ships could move to the East Coast via the canals if needed.

France and Germany both have excellent relations with GB, and Germany doesn't yet have the naval capacity to be more than an annoyance at this point. Russia might be a threat, but also a weak economy dependent on British investors.

Not in the 1880s when there were occasional war scares over Africa with France that improved their own relations with Germany, and in the 1890s Anglo-German relations took a turn for the worse. Yes, there was investment and exchange of technology, but the same would be true with the UK and US for this whole era. So British ports being shelled by a European power would be a realistic threat to many politicians and military officials, let alone the general populace.

Good luck to those river-boats facing open ocean battleships. Civil war veterans in their 50s sure will intimidate an 88mm cannon fired from a floating fortress with the firepower of an entire artillery brigade.

Battleships can't manuever in confined waters (the Gulf is full of shoals) and at risk of running aground, nor can they go upstream on any of the rivers. For that matter, neither can most cruisers. See the incident in 1891 when Chilean torpedo boats sank an ironclad during a civil war. The Russo-Japanese War is also a good example of the damage torpedo-armed ships can do. Confined waters are dangerous for large ships because they're at risk from mines, torpedo boats, coastal fortifications/land artillery and the closer ranges make their protection less effective. Most ships in the Spanish-American War were lost because of fires on deck, hence the mid-caliber armament on battleships.

Not that it matters when my post was specifically about using those river boats to attack shipping and aid combat operations. Battleships can't be everywhere at once, and lighter escort is always deemed acceptable (see both World Wars, especially before they introduced better convoying).

Cuba is unfortunately part of Spain (there's no way the Empire will allow an anti-British US to take it), and I doubt Madrid will look kindly upon American warships using its waters to ambush British naval forces without permission. That'd actually be a really good way to end up fighting the Spanish Empire as well.

Cuba being Spanish has no bearing on it being a chokepoint. In the end, Spain would get its neutrality violated by both sides since international waters and American waters are too dangerous for shipping.

Was there ever an amphibious-style invasion over a distance remotely resembling the trans-Pacific? Even in the 20th century, Gallipoli staged in Egypt, D-Day in Britain, Inchon in Japan, as ones that come to my mind. It sounds like fantasy.

Technically Japan in WW2 invaded the Aleutians which is a trans-Pacific invasion, although they met no opposition on the ground because there were only a few dozen people on the islands they occupied. They also bombed Dutch Harbor. IIRC theoretically the Aleutian campaign could have been a useful diversion for the Japanese as it coincided with Midway and with a bigger Japanese force could have sank more American ships (which would've been a crapshoot due to the weather) and tied down a lot of American resource in retaking the area AND garrisoning it further.

For an actual example, I know a Japanese invasion of Hawaii in WW2 gets discussed every now and then and the concensus is that it's a fantastic way for Japan to lose the war on par with Germany throwing everything into Sealion. Much of Japan's shipping, tens of thousands of soldiers, and a huge chunk of the IJN would end up destroyed or captured for the benefit of temporarily occupying a few minor parts of Hawaii and maybe a decent slice of Oahu or the Big Island.

What is being suggested is closer to the first albeit with the resources expended of the second. Yes, it would tie down a lot of American ships and troops and maybe open more options elsewhere. But ultimately no one sent there is ever coming back except in a prisoner exchange and it would cost a lot of ships and coal for little gained but a few more months before Canada is overwhelmed.

 

[AsukaEMP]

This isn't true since torpedo boats were developed at this time and a credible enough threat the Royal Navy invented the torpedo boat destroyer as a counter which other navies rapidly improved.

For that matter, neither can most cruisers. See the incident in 1891 when Chilean torpedo boats sank an ironclad during a civil war. The Russo-Japanese War is also a good example of the damage torpedo-armed ships can do.

The Royal Navy developed the destroyer because 1. they had the means and 2. there was no point in taking risks. People thought that TBs were a credible threat, that's not evidence that they actually were. And if history has proven anything it is that those people were wrong. The only times that TBs have sunk large contemporary warships was when those ships were laying at anchor or had already been disabled by gunfire from larger ships.​

1. An ironclad from the early 1870s isn't a cruiser. A ship armed with muzzle-loading guns, and which could barely reach 12 knots, being sunk by brand new ships built almost 20 years later with what was then some of the most modern weaponry isn't proof of anything.
The only thing the Royal Navy would have to do to avoid that fate is not sending its scrap to the immediate vicinity of the US coast.
2. Torpedo boats played basically no role in the Russo-Japanese war, despite both navies having dozens of them. Their 5 seconds on fame was when they sneaked into Port Arthur right at the beginning of the war and torpedoed two ship laying at anchor. That was the only time in the entire war they ever did any noteworthy damage to a battleship, and even then both ships survived the attack and were repaired within a few months. The only ships actually sunk by torpedoes had already been knocked out by gunfire and were literally helpless before the order was given to go torpedo them.

Battleships can't manuever in confined waters (the Gulf is full of shoals) and at risk of running aground, nor can they go upstream on any of the rivers. For that matter, neither can most cruisers.

The Gulf Coast* is full of shoals.
And their point was that TBs and river boats are useless in the envirmonets you'd expect to see a battleship, the open seas. As you said battleships can't sail up a river (with exceptions), and would have diffulty manouvring in shallow coastal waters... So why would they be there? You don't need to sail a battleship into Mobile Bay in order to set up a blockade, you do it by intercepting ships out on sea.

Not that it matters when my post was specifically about using those river boats to attack shipping and aid combat operations. Battleships can't be everywhere at once, and lighter escort is always deemed acceptable (see both World Wars, especially before they introduced better convoying).

TBs and river boats aren't submarines, they're not seaworthy and not made for sorties beyond the immediate vicinity of the coast. And I mean that in the most literal sense. The Blakely class TB the USA began building in 1898 had a range of only 50 miles, they literally couldn't even reach Cuba without being refueled halfway between Key West and Havana. And those were considered large TBs that could carry 80 tons of coal on them. Earlier classes like the Talbot could barely carry 9 tons of coal on board.

(Edit: there were later ships formally classified as "torpedo boats" in other navies during the early 20th century that were actually capable of going large distances. But if you look at their specifications it becomes immediately obvious that these were for all intends and purposes actually early destroyers, and no longer the super cheap and tiny vessels you'd conventionally refer to as a torpedo boat)

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

Answering the OP's question as well as considering the current discussion, I would answer sorta of, people are talking like the US would go of it's way in agonizing Britain first and foremost and publicly decry loudly when they would've know already that is a recipe for bad times, of course even if they keep quiet about their ambitions, GB(as well as some other powers with interest in the Pacific) would've been weary of what they see as the growth of American power and are likely to increase their presence there even if they have other concerns but they wouldn't go to war for no reason, so as long as American manages to stay smart about it, they can quietly build up their armed forces in both the east and west coasts.


There's also another important factor people seem to be forgetting, which is that a US with a much more active military and navy would develop plans and war games in case of conflict with other powers, especially GB given they're top dog, so they'll not only do things like have better coastal defenses and naval bases, but also preparations in the case of land invasions and mining of waters as last case scenario, this also applies to things like the building up of synthetic nitrates like Germany during WW1 as well as research in stuff like torpedo boats as they'll need any edges in case they're fighting the royal navy and need to prepare for the worst.


As for foreign policy, expect them to be much more active in not only LATAM but also Liberia and especially the Pacific as they seek to have as many places as possible in order but they wouldn't be able to match the sheer amount of colonies GB can use for instance, so while in a fight the British and Americans go into stalemates with one another, power projection wise, Britain comes out on top if only because of the size of their empire.

 

[raharris1973]

Why is it assumed that a challenge to British hegemony means war, or a bitter battle of containment.

With (Russia, Wilhelmine Germany, 1890s France) or without (mid-century Prussia, Bismarckian Germany, the French 2nd Empire, the USA) hostile rivalry, other powers and empires "challenged" British hegemony by simply existing and growing, without it leading to wars. But the fact was, between the end of the Crimean War and WWI, Britain only actually fought wars with the "WOGs". So why couldn't the US imperially grow and spread in directions beyond historical, thus "challenging" British hegemony in that manner, without it being war or a bitterly hostile thing.

France managed to secure a second-place global-spanning colonial empire without it causing war, despite scares like the Fashoda incident.

For example, the rankings of colonial empires in terms of holding by size of population of colonial subjects in 1900 were ranked like this:

British Empire total = ~400,800,000
1. Minus homeland and “White Dominions” = 343,702,200 about 7x UK home population

Dutch Empire total = 47,980,100
2. Minus homeland = 42,876,000 - 90% of imperial total, more than any imperial/colonial population except British

French Empire total = 78,790,700
3. Minus homeland = 39,890,700 -- just over one-half the imperial total

German Empire total = 67,609,178
4. Minus homeland = 11,242,000. [bigger than American ruled Philippines by nearly 4 million]

Belgian Empire total = 15,426,500
5. Minus homeland = 8,733,000. – over half of imperial total

United States -
6. Minus homeland - Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, 7.5 million

Portuguese Empire total = 12,434,000
7. Minus homeland = 6,984,000. – over half of imperial total


Might a post-Civil War, expansionist United States have somehow increased its unincorporated colonial holdings and unincorporated subjected populations to raise its rank to something more like the level of the German, or even French or Dutch colonial empires, with the similar global distribution across all continents and hemispheres?