Carthage and the lost Libyan War

[CountofDooku]

Of Hannibal’s Carthage, Part 8:

Invented by the Greek engineer Polyidus of Thessaly, the Helepolis or 'city-taker' was the biggest siege engine ever constructed. King Demetrius I of Macedon commissioned the architect Epimachus of Athens to build the biggest recorded Helepolis, which he used in the failed siege of Rhodes in 305 BC. This huge construction was said to be nearly forty meters tall, split into nine storeys, with catapults at its base and two stairways giving access to its multiple levels. Built entirely of wood, it was covered with iron plates to protect it from fire. During the siege the Rhodians managed to dislodge some of these plates, prompting Demetrius to withdraw the weapon for fear of its destruction. Hannibal himself hired Greek engineers for his Second Roman War and later the Third Roman War. When on campaign, the armies of the ancient world expected to live off the land by purchasing food and pillaging enemy territory. This made them especially vulnerable to scorched earth tactics, where defenders would purposely destroy crops to starve invaders. While naval vessels were able to deliver supplies, their use limited armies to coastal expeditions and it was not until the development of new, land-based supply methods that warfare changed significantly. These methods increased the efficiency and self-sufficiency of armies and provided a significant advantage over enemies, as evidenced by the success of the reformed Carthaginian Armies. The military reforms of Hannibal in Carthage in the Second Roman War marked a significant change in pay for Carthaginian soldiers. Falcatesair did now consider the new annual salary of 100 denarii, complimented by payment in land or cash up to 2,000 denarii, suitable payment for 24 years hard service. Hannibal was quick to identify the role that the dissatisfied troops had played in the years of strife. He set up the Military Treasury, a pot of money initiated by his own funds and topped up by regular citizen tax payments; it provided soldiers with a pension equivalent to 16 years' pay.

The science of measurement, metrology, was invented by the Egyptians during the Bronze Age. Its creation was inspired by a lust for money as Pharaoh Sesostris wanted to measure and tax his subjects' arable land. Units of measurement were typically based on parts of the human body or a man’s capacity: the digit, palm, foot and pace for example. Not surprisingly there were many local variations, but as trade between cities and states increased there were attempts to introduce standard quantities of everything. The Greek king Pheidon is widely recognized as the creator of the first set of agreed common weights and measures. Hannibal did the same for Carthage and provided a fixed system that would benefit the trade in his whole Republic and their trade partners. Throughout the ancient period there was a drive to find new exploitable land, either through clearing forests or, more frequently, draining lakes, marshes and flooded plains. The Greeks set their sights on draining Lake Copais, a swampland north of Athens that was flooding fertile land around it as the natural flow of water was blocked due to regular earthquakes. In 325BC an engineer, Crates, sought to solve the problem by supplementing the natural drainage in the area with a long tunnel. The work was halted by the military ambitions of Alexander the Great but resumed centuries later. In 1890 the lake was finally drained and the area is now used for farming. Hannibal's had similar goals in Libya as he cultivated and watered more and more land for use by the new colonists. Additional there was a simple principle of seed selection, sowing the best quality seeds provided the best quality crop. The strength of a crop was affected by the seed from which it was grown and through seed selection a farmer could develop a crop free of disease that offered a more profitable yield. The farmer had to take the time to select only seeds from the most healthy and strong plants in a crop, removing the small, withered, discolored or inferior seeds. Selecting the seed was usually simple: the best seed was the heaviest, and would therefore be found settled on the very bottom of the grain on the threshing floor.

There is some debate as to the exact origins of the first coins, although it is widely accepted that some of the Mediterranean’s earliest coinage came from Lydia in Asia Minor. The first Greek coinage was produced on the island of Aegina, some 24 km south of Athens. Aegina was a trading nation that minted a coin known as the 'turtle', named for the sea-turtle design punched into it. Pebble-like in appearance, these early coins were made from electrum, an alloy of gold and silver. The Barcas family of Hannibal under their separate Empire of Nova Carthago had begun to make their own coinage and Hannibal later did so too for all of Carthage. In 420BC the Greeks made their first attempt to introduce a standardised currency. The Carthaginians under Hannibal soon realized the need for a system of fixed coinage and minted their coins to be worth the weight of their gold and silver 'bullion' content. This, unfortunately, lent itself to a gradual debasement as the more corrupt states began to mint their own - alloying the metals in the coins to maintain weight while using the spare gold and silver to make more debased ones. As ever-increasing populations demanded more goods it became necessary to explore the principles of mass-production. This led to the development of piecework: the construction of component parts that could be produced quickly and in large quantities. Teams of workers would then assemble these parts into goods. Punic philosopher and writer, Melkharbal the Elder, tells of shops dedicated to the production of individual chandelier parts. There is also evidence to suggest that factory-like production was used in urban areas for the manufacture of pots, building parts and military items like near the harbor of Carthage.

The Romans inherited their knowledge of brickmaking from the Etruscans. Distrustful of a foreign technique, early Roman fired bricks were made from roof tiles which had already proved durable. By the Republican era fired bricks were widely used due to the perfection of a baking process whereby the mortar was absorbed. Roman bricks were standardized and came in four sizes, ranging from the 'bassalis' which was eight Roman inches square or around twenty centimeters, right up to the 'bipedailis' which was two Roman feet square, around sixty centimeters. Brickmakers often stamped their wares with their names and dated them by adding the names of the Consuls in office at the time. After his Second Roman War in Italy, Hannibal adapted the Etruscn technique and traded bricks and technologies with them for his own building projects. Hannibal also imported modern sewers as an engineering achievement more stupendous than any. The system grew into a complex network of sewers that expanded with the cities of Carthage and collected the excrement to later use them as fertilizer.

During the Second and Third Roman War, Hannibal introduced radical reforms which changed how the Carthaginian army was recruited and structured, and therefore how it fought in battle. Regular soldiers instead of Mercenaries were trained. The Falcaten (Carthaginian Legion) organization was scrapped with the group becoming the basic unit. Hannibal also reformed the weaponry and fighting methods of the Carthaginian army. Not every man was equipped identically, but the most common used types of weapons and armor became standardized and groups with such units were educated in Punic commands. Many groups from areas all over the Carthaginian territories in one army did not understand each others tongue, but they had learned basic Punic and followed their Carthaginian Commanders loyal. Traditionally, the citizen armies of the ancient world were supplied by a combination of mercenaries, levies and volunteer troops. Often farmers and landowners, these men ultimately looked to return to their plots and families, comforted by the spoils of war. The professional solider was a different beast entirely. He gave his life to the army, never wavering to think on what awaited him back home. However, when a state discharged these men without suitable reward, they often turned to their generals. If successful in finding the spoils to offer his men, a general could exert huge influence and power. Hannibal used such troops in the last years of his life in exile away from Carthage, but this tactics and army type traveled back to Carthage with his body after his death, well preserved in his written texts about state and military art.

Wooden ships routinely sprang leaks and the accumulation of water within a large hull had to be bailed out by hand, a slow and sometimes dangerous task. It was a job made easier by the invention of the screwpump. The Greek inventor,Archimedes of Syracuse invented the Archimedean screw or screwpump. With this device bigger and better trade ans warships would be build in the Greek states and Carthage. All states built their navies to safeguard their merchants' vital trade across the Mediterranean. The Carthaginians were the most daring seafarers of the ancient world, preferring to hire mercenaries for their land wars whilst concentrating on the construction of a huge fleet of ever-larger ships. As Carthaginian trade and the need to transport troops increased, so did the importance of sea control. They built vast war galleys manned by citizen rowers. Alongside Greek-style triremes, quinqueremes ('fives') and septiremes ('sevens'), reinforced for ramming, were constructed. Even so, the largest ship of the ancient world was the Syracusia, designed by Archimedes and built in 240 BC by King Hiero II. It used some sixty times the resources needed for an average trireme and took 300 skilled workmen over a year to build. The palace ship later used to travel the body of the dead Hannibal from Quart Hnba'albrq (Quart Hannibal Barkas) back to Carthage had a similar design.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 71: Mago's Masaesyli War (218 - 212 BC):

Mago's fight in Libya against Masaesyli was not going like planned, because the enemy despite his good strategies (like the Monopáti and the Astrapí) still retreaded and used new tactics to avoid open fights. Because of that Mago relied on a new strategy, he marched his army along the new Libyan Shophet-road and secured the coastal towns and cities of Hippo Regius, Rusidae, Chullu, Igilgili, Salade, Rusuccuru, Rusguniae, Tipsas, Iol and Cartenna. He build fortified wall and fort sections along the coast he intended to protect and left string Garrisons behind. He ten turned towards Portus Magnus and Siga, conquering both places with his strong forces. With that the Shophet-road finally linked all of Carthaginian north Libya and denied the Masaesyli a direct link to the sea and the trade coming from there. The Masaesyli in the meantime had learned the tactic and strategy used by Mago and tried to counter it with murder, bribery, treachery, and assassination. It should be another six years before Mago finally beat the Masaesyli and pacified their former part of northern Libya. The attacks from the Masaesyli were growing since a few weeks, not decreasing like before and Mago thought this was because the enemy was finally getting so week that he had to take huge risks. But Mago was wrong the enemy wanted to tempt him for a more risky, direct battle tactic were he would advance to deep into Masaesyli lands. The attack on Massyliis capital city of Cirta, now part of Carthage as a federate tribe forced Mago to counterattack and at the same time the Massylii were outraged the Carthaginians were unable to defend them, while their brothers from Masaesyli earned most of their hate. Mago managed to surround the enemy army but they surrendered before a true battle occurred. Mago let them go like many tribes before as they gave up their loot and weapons for a chance of peace. But as soon as the Masaesyli were in safety they rearmed and the raids started again. Mago send one of his armies after the enemy, but his troops were defeated together with his Punic Commander. At the same time Mago was able to defeat a Masaesyli together with the Massylii at the Great Plains near Hippo. Still this victory just stopped the enemy from further attacking the allied Massyli and even retook Cirta soon after that was slowly rebuild by Carthaginian and allied Numidians. The next year of the war, in 217 BC Mago successful managed to destroy most of Masaesyli's supply lines by own raids (much like Hanno the Great had did before with his partly successful campaign against Numidia), but could not actually defeat him. Still Hannibal and the Senate were pleased that he managed to secure the coast and the Carthaginian heartland from the enemy. Together with Mauretani, Massylii and Hesperian supporting troops, Mago managed to further advance into his enemies land. Mago now aggressively advanced along the rivers and builds fortified cities, castles and garrisons along the way. He managed to beat the Numidians in the Battle if Igilgili, Tipesa and between Rusadir and Siga. Later Mago adapted the same tactic for Oasis and springs, trying to cut of the nomads from enough water supplies. With this strategy and after years of guerrilla-war, Mago managed to conquer and hold the cities of Sitifis and Auzia, finally breaking the Masaesyli once and for all even before Hannibal's Second Roman War was half over. This last battles were the hardest because the Romans had send some instructors that trained the Masaesylian armies well and Mago hat many causalities in the whole war. Syphax the king of Masaesyli was brought to Carthage, where he was thrown in a pit in 212 BC. The once strong, ambitious and feared numidian leader of Masaesyli, a free nomad as Syphax called himself, would never see the wide mountains of his homeland, or even the sun ever again and die in Carthaginian prison some years later. His lands would later be resettled by the mixed colonies of the Punics, the Massylii, Mauretani and Hesperian, while that part of his tribe that didn't surrender and obey the Carthaginians would emigrate south trough deadly and dry desert, until they reached a rich land with many rivers, seas and great forests. There they came in contact with some of the tribes that Hanno the Navigator had traded with as he traveled down the western coast of Libya and contacted them from the coast south of the new lands of the Masaesyli.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 72: Battle of the Rhone Crossing:

Massilia managed to convince the Volcae an aggressive local Gallic tribe to stop Hannibal from crossing the Rhone long enough, until the Romans could arrive to finish him. Before crossing the Pyrenees, Hannibal left Hanno with 11,000 soldiers to guard the newly conquered area, along with all the heavy baggage, and released 10,000 reluctant soldiers from the invasion. Hannibal had used diplomacy to pacify the Gallic tribes beyond the Pyrenees, and his march was not contested until they reached the territory of the Volcae on the banks of the Rhone by late September. By then, his army had shrunk to 38,000 foot and 8,000 horsemen. After reaching the west bank of the river, Hannibal decided to rest for three days. Hannibal took advantage of the pre-existing hatred the Celts had for the Romans on the right (west) bank, and persuaded them to aid him in his crossing of this formidable obstacle. He secured from them a number of boats that were capable of making trips at sea, and a numerous collection of canoes of all sorts that must have been employed by the natives of that country. In addition to purchasing these,he was able to acquire their aid in building still other boats. This process of preparing to cross the Rhone took two days. The Carthaginians collected boats and built rafts as they prepared to cross the river. Hannibal's strategy was to send his nephew Hanno with a detachment of troops north. He was to cross the river upstream and surprise the Volcae. Although the Volcae inhabited both banks of the river, they had retreated to the eastern where they encamped and awaited the Carthaginian crossing attempt. Hannibal bought up all the local boats, canoes and anything that would get his huge army and baggage train across the fast flowing river. The Rhone at this time was a very wild river. Crossing it was a dangerous obstacle and Hannibal seemed to be very diligent in his preparations, since this was his first major problem on his way to Italy. Awaiting the Carthaginian army on the left bank of the Rhone was a tribe of Gauls called the Cavares. This tribe had fortified a camp on the far side of the river, and was awaiting Hannibal's army to cross, so as to attack them as they crossed.Hannibal knew of Alexander the Great's crossing of the Hydaspes river in India and copied that movement. Hannibal formulated his plan according to this model ordered one of his lieutenants, Hanno the Son of Bomilcar to make a northern circuit, to cross the Rhone at a location that he deemed to be suitable for the purpose, and then by forced marches, march south and to take the Barbarian army in flank while he was crossing the river. Hanno, son of Bomilcar, now in charge of a mobile column made up of infantry and cavalry on the third night, and sent this force upriver under cover of darkness to find another suitable crossing place. The day and the night after all of the boats had been built and gathered, Hanno was ordered up the bank and guided by native Gauls, until they reached an island that divided the Rhone into two small streams. Led by local guides, Hanno located a crossing about 25 miles (40 km) to the north of the Carthaginian camp near an "island", and crossed the river undetected with the aid of hastily built rafts from materials that were at hand. The Carthaginian detachment chopped down trees, lashing the logs together with reliable ropes they had brought with them from the army's stores. By this means, Hanno's corps crossed the river and immediately proceeded south to the barbarian location. Some Iberians crossed the river using inflated animal skins. This detachment then rested for a day. They moved south on the following night (the second night after leaving the main army) and arrived behind the Volcae camp at dawn. Hanno signalled Hannibal by lighting a beacon and using smoke.During this time, Hannibal had been completing his preparations to cross the Rhone. At this, the Carthaginian preparations had been particularly obvious and loud, Hannibal had ordered the preparations to be made without concern for secrecy, knowing full well that Hanno's corps was marching down the left (eastern) bank of the Rhone to attack the Cavares. His preparations were designed to draw their attention away from their northern flank and focus their attention on his own preparations. Three days after setting out, Hanno arrived behind a tributary of the Rhone and gave the previously agreed upon signal to let Hannibal know that his force had arrived. Hannibal immediately ordered the boats to cross. The small corps was observing the principal army closely, and on seeing it start its crossing, prepared to descend on the Cavares while the army was crossing. Once Hanno had sent a smoke signal to notify his uncle he was in position, Hannibal embarked with his main force and the Punic army started to cross the 1000 yard wide river. The rafts carrying Numidian cavalry were furthest upstream, while boats carrying dismounted cavalry crossed below them, with three or four horses in tow, tied to their boats. These took the brunt of the river's current and the mobile infantry in canoes were placed below them. Some soldiers may have crossed the river by swimming. The crossing itself was carefully designed to be as smooth as possible. Every detail was well thought out. The heavy horsemen were put across furthest upstream, and in the largest boats, so that the boats that Hannibal had less confidence in could be rowed to the left (eastern) bank in the lee of the larger and more sturdy craft. As for the horses themselves, most of them were swum across the river at the side and stern of each boat. However, some were put on boats fully saddled and ready for immediate use, so that, once they debouched from the river, they could cover the infantry and the rest of the army while it formed up to attack the barbarians. Hannibal himself was among the first to cross, and the rest of the Carthaginian army assembled on the western bank to cheer their comrades while they waited their turn to cross.Seeing that the Carthaginians were finally crossing, the Cavares rose from their entrenchments and prepared their army on the shore near the Carthaginian landing point. The armies started to shout and jeer at each other while the Carthaginian army was in the midst of crossing. These sort of exchanges consisted primarily of encouraging their own men and challenging the other army to battle. Often in antiquity, to intimidate their enemy, armies would be ordered to pound their shields with their weapons and raise loud cries at exactly the same moment to create the greatest amount of noise. When he landed on the opposite bank Hanno sprung his ambush. Battle was soon joined on the eastern shore but the Carthaginians managed to establish a foothold. It was at precisely this moment, while the Carthiginian army was in the middle of the stream jeering at the enemy from the boats and the Cavares were challenging them to come on from the left bank, that Hanno's corp revealed itself and charged down on the rear and flanks of the Cavares. A small detachment of Hanno's force was assigned to set the Cavares camp on fire, but the majority of this force reeled in on the stunned Cavares. Some of the Cavares rushed to the defense of their camp,but the majority remained at the location where they had been awaiting the arrival of what they had thought was all of Hannibal's army. They were divided; and Hannibal, who was on one of the first boats, landed his men on the left bank of the Rhone amidst the dazed and confused Cavares and with a will led his men in upon them. There was barely even a semblance of resistance, surrounded as they were, pandemonium took control of their ranks, and each man looked to his own safety as they retreated pell-mell away from the carefully arrayed Carthaginian phalanx. Once Hannibal had set up his beachhead on the east bank of the Rhone he began the extensive operation of getting the rest of his troops across the river. Smaller boats crossed in the lee of larger vessels so they didn't bear the full brunt of the current. The cavalry swam with their rides but the elephants needed more persuasion. For this Hannibal built rafts, covered them with soil and urged a female elephant onto these floating islands and the rest of the herd followed. However, once the rafts were detached from the bank, the elephants panicked and were forced to make their own way across to the other side, they simple walked across the bottom of the river using their trunks as snorkels. Some of the elephant driver were tossed in the river by this and some even died, while some elephant driver swum desperately fast to the other side of the river. Once Hannibal's army was across the Rhone he sent three hundred of his Numidian cavalry to scout the surrounding areas.While the actual conflict only took a matter of minutes, Hannibal had spent five days preparing this dangerous and risky operation from every angle, ensuring that it was ready at all points and as little as possible was left to chance. The Roman Commander who had just landed in Massilia sent some of his scouts north to locate Hannibal's army. He originally was at the mouth of the Rhone and on his way to Spain to intercept Hannibal. It was a surprise to both cavalry forces when they met in a fierce but brief engagement. This was the first direct clash between only Rome and Carthage in the Second Roman War and the Romans had the better of the skirmish, losing less troops and forcing the Numidians to flee back to camp. Once Hannibal learned of the proximity of the Roman army he had a decision to make, stay and fight or speed on to Italy. With so much to gain from making war in Italy, he chose the latter and headed north away from the Romans and towards the Alps. Hannibal needed to reach the Alps quickly in order to beat the onset of winter. He knew that if he waited until springtime on the far side of the mountains, the Romans would have time to raise another army. He had intelligence that the consular army was camped at the mouth of the Rhone. He sent 500 Numidian cavalry down the eastern bank of the river to acquire better information concerning the forces massed to oppose him. This force encountered 300 mounted Romans who had been sent up the river for the same purpose. The Numidians were defeated with 240 of their number killed in this exchange between scouting parties; in addition to 140 Roman losses. The Numidians were followed back to the Carthaginian camp, which was almost assembled excepting the elephants, which required more time getting across. Upon seeing Hannibal had not crossed with the whole of his force, the scouts raced back to the coast to alert the consul. Upon receiving this information, the consul dispatched his army up the river in boats, but arrived too late. The Roman Commander, after the cavalry skirmish aware of the locate the Carthaginian camp as well, but was still unable to cut him off. Despite outnumbering the Romans at this point, Hannibal decided to push towards the Alps and started marching north following the eastern bank of the Rhone. The Romans, loaded their heavy baggage onto the ships and marched north with his army to confront Hannibal. But they only arrived at the deserted Carthaginian camp, and finding that the Carthaginians were three days' march away, returned to Massalia. There the Romans put their army under the command a veteran of the previous Iberian Campaign and ordered him to sail for Iberia. The Roman Commander himself returned to Italy to organize the defenses against Hannibal's anticipated invasion and prepared for war on Roman soil.

(Hannibals next possible routes to Italy)

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 73: From the Rhone to the Alps

(marching to the Alps)

Hannibal needed to reach the Alps quickly in order to beat the onset of winter. He knew that if he waited until springtime on the far side of the mountains, the Romans would have time to raise another army. He had intelligence that the consular army was camped at the mouth of the Rhone. He sent 500 Numidian cavalry down the eastern bank of the river to acquire better information concerning the forces massed to oppose him. This force encountered 300 mounted Romans who had been sent up the river for the same purpose. The Numidians were defeated with 240 of their number killed in this exchange between scouting parties; in addition to 140 Roman losses. The Numidians were followed back to the Carthaginian camp, which was almost assembled excepting the elephants, which required more time getting across. Upon seeing Hannibal had not crossed with the whole of his force, the scouts raced back to the coast to alert the consul. Upon receiving this information, the consul dispatched his army up the river in boats, but arrived too late. In the face of winter and hostile tribes, the consul decided to return to Italy and await the arrival of Hannibal as he descended from the Alps. However, in accordance with the Senate's orders, the consul ordered one Roman army to Iberia. The Romans proposed attacking Hannibal's over-extended and vulnerable lines of communications and supply. Despite their established tactical system, the Romans were used to fighting by marching their troops to their enemies' army, forming their army up and attacking. They did not know how to force an enemy to battle by cutting off their communications, they were not aware of which flank was the strategic flank of an enemy in a battle. In addition, they were negligent about their order of march, and early Roman history is littered with massacres of consular armies by other nations because of their lack of proper precaution against these evils. On getting the whole of his army on the left bank of the Rhone, Hannibal introduced his army to Magilus, and some other less notable Gallic chiefs of the Po valley. Hannibal's purpose was to inspire his men with confidence in the planned expedition by showing them Padane Gallic chieftains who offered them their aid. Speaking through an interpreter, Magilus spoke of the support that the recently conquered Padane Gauls had for the Carthaginians and their mission of destroying Rome. Hannibal then addressed the officers himself. The troops' enthusiasm was uplifted by Hannibal's inspiring address. Upon crossing the river, Hannibal ordered his infantry to start their march the day after the assembly, followed by the supply train. Not knowing that the Romans were eventually going to set out for Italy, when his cavalry had crossed the river he ordered them to curtain his march on his southern flank, towards the sea. His cavalry would have formed a screen which would have been employed to protect him from the Romans were they to advance upon him from that direction. The cavalry would skirmish with the Roman scouts, while giving the rest of the army time to form up. This contingency did not occur. Hannibal was in the rearguard with the elephants. This was the direction that he assumed that the Romans would be most likely to advance from (that is from the west) as he had some idea that they were behind him. The rearguard was well manned to ensure that it could skirmish with the Roman army while the main body of his infantry and cavalry could form up for battle against the Romans if they should attack from that quarter. This contingency, however, also did not occur. While assuming this order of march, Hannibal marched towards the Insula. He had ordered his infantry to get a head start, and it marched to the Isere in six days, marching 12.5 miles per day. The cavalry and rear guard only took four days, a march of 19 miles per day. In this period, the body as a whole had marched 75 miles. When Hannibal's army made contact with the Insula, he arrived in a Gallic chiefdom that was in the midst of a civil conflict. For whatever reason, Hannibal chose the cause of the elder of the two combatants, Brancus. After putting away the cause of the younger and less popularly supported one, he formed an alliance with Brancus. From this tribe he received supplies that were required for the expedition across the Alps. In addition, he received Brancus' diplomatic protection. Up until the Alps proper, he did not have to fend off any tribes.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 74: Corsican Problems:

On Corsica, the Roman Commander Gaius Samnion Pulcher was facing problems, as his northern and southern armies had reached Mariana, Mantinum, Portus Favonii, Syracusanus Port, Palla and Marianum. Until then there were roads supporting his movements, but now they had to reach the western part of the island over trail or by sea. Ficaria, Titianus Portus, Pauca, Aiacium and Ureinium were hard to reach by this strategy and the current defeat of his army part in the mountains by Mahar the Skilled made Gaius aware that the enemy was not simple retreading, but had prepared a well thought strategy against him. Gaius ordered some of his troops back, to defend Aleria against any possible counter attack of Mahar, because he was sure the Punic Commander would try to retake the City once again.

Sardinian opposition:

(map of the war at the moment)

In Sardinia it at first didn't look to good for Quintus Mucius Scaevola and his Roman armies and their supporting troops, since Hampsicora and Hasdrubal the Bald had managed to ally themself with the Balari, Ilienses and Ciculensii mountain tribes by offering them money, weapons and a outonomy of their way of living after the Carthaginian victory alongside Carthage without forcing thei Punic way of living on them like the Romans did with their Romanization. This alliance helped Hasdrubal to get the mountain cities of Caput Tyrsi, Aquae Lisitanae and Sorabile to his side and together they conquered the city of Forum Trraiani, cutting off the northern Roman part of the Island from the southern Roman part and securing Othoca by doing so. The Romans immediately send their armies out to counter attack this new rebellions and enemy presence in the central Island, while Hasdrubal was undecided. Weather or not he should take the northern route to Macopsisa, Molaria and Hafa to secure Turris Libisanis against the second Roman army in Olbia and the northeast, or focus his remaining power in weakening the southern Roman army with another attack over Valentia, Biora and Aquae Neapolitanae to conquer Carales and push them out of the southern part of the island. That Hasdrubals tribal mountain warriors were helping his before shrinking numbers thanks to his defeat in the Battle of Othoca were true, but unlike Quintus, Hasdrubal didn't realize that his new alliance had stretched his lines of supply and the territory to secure even further, thereby weakening his position instead of strengthening it.

Carthage's new Sicilian Army:

On Sicily things were looking better for Carthage, because of Hannibal's overal tactic, Africa and Hesperia seamed secure from direct attacks at the moment. This allowed Hesperian troops to travel to Libya were they helped Mago against the native nomad tribes, while Libyan troops could finally be send to support the Sicilian campaign in the North. They landed in Lilybaeum and travelled over the northern route from Drepanum to Segesta and to Panormus. They came just in time to reinforce the city, because the northern Roman army had already retaken Thermae and Soloeis (before the walls could finally be repared from the last battle). Now they were advancing towards Panormus. While the Carthaginian mountain raid of Proxiancos had helped to cut of their western route to the north at the moment, the Romans knew that the Carthaginian did not control all of it now and because of that would not easily be able to attack their army from behind any time soon with the southern Roman army in Agrigentum (Acragas). Hanno the Short planned on supporting the northern defense of Panormus, by putting pressure on the southern Roman flank, marching from Heraclea to attack the Roman army in Agrigentum even if he had neither the man, nor the equipment to be sure of a victory against the strong roman army and newly build defenses that protected the city now.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 75: Sicilian stagnancy?! - The Battle of Panormus and Soloeis, as well as the almost Battle of Agrigentum (also called the Sham Battle of Agrigentum):

In northern Sicily things were getting ready for battle, since the Romans had retaken Soloeis and were ready to march on Panormus. The Roman Commander ordered to march forward, believing that after the fall of Soloeis the Carthaginian had either retreated further back to their original landing and supply harbors in the west of the island, or simple had no northern army left. So he marched to Panormus to take the city. At the same time the Carthaginian Commander was ready to take back the previous lost Soloeis from the Romans and maybe even conquer Himera after defensing them. The two armies met between both cities and soon the battle of Panormus and Soloeis, or Soloeis and Panormus took place. The Carthaginians had kind of a L formation, or a spearhead formation, pointing at the Romans and hoping to defeat them. The smaller right Carthaginian flank was positioned up a hill and the Punic Commander thought it would be the most secure position, as the Roman center attacked his spearhead formation directly. Luckily for the Romans, the Punic defenders did not see their great turn around the hill flank and were quiet surprised as a massive amount of Roman troops stormed over the hill to attack their weakest flank, while the main Roman and Carthaginian line were deadlocked into close combat with each other. The right Carthaginian flank on the hill was soon crushed and Roman troops managed to break trough a hole in the enemies lines. Sadly the Roman troops smelled victory already and instead of regrouping and managing to adapt their overall attack to the new positioning and chances, they missed their opportunity. These Roman Legionaries that had broken trough the Carthaginian lines simple tried to attack the enemy center from behind, hoping to surround the right enemy flank and break the Punic troops into two. But the Carthaginian Commander did not lose his head and was able to regroup the reserves and the right flank so that the roman breakthrough could be stopped by these troops. The remaining Romans on the Punic left flank and the center of the battle were now separated by the troops on the hill and these that had been breaking the enemy lines. They were to widely spread out and unconnected to make this battle the perfect Punic Cannae by completely surrounding the Carthaginian forces and missed their chance to quickly turn the war in Sicily in a Roman favor. Pretty exhausted and nearly breaking the battle was a stalemate for both factions and remained undecided as the Romans retreaded their exhausted troops slowly from the enemy and the Carthaginian already nearly breaking themselves and without any fresh reserves left could also not fight on any longer. Both sides hat taken thousand of losses and many wounded so they simple retreated to the cities that they had stayed in previously.

In the south of Sicily Hanno the Short had tried to make a feint attack with his army from Heraclea to Agrigentum (Acragas), simple to prevent the Romans from sending troops from their southern army north. But Agrigentum was to good fortified with such a big Roman Army and Hanno had not quiet yet build or brought all his siege equipment to Heraclea. So his army simple marched in seeing range of Agrigentum, showing the Roman Commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus that he was ready and eager to fight. Tiberius on the other hand also marched part of his troops up for a open field battle, but in reality just wished to convince the Punic troops not to turn north and join their army against the Roman army there. A few skirmishes were fought between both army scouting troops, but neither side wanted to start a real battle in the south at the moment. Hanno wanted to wait till all of his siege equipment's were ready and the northern flank a little more secured thanks to a Punic victory, Tiberius didn't want to endanger the Roman position in the greatly important city of Agrigentum by maybe losing a battle against Hanno and then having to few troops left to defend the city while the outcome of the northern Roman advance was still unclear. Nothing was decided by this fights in Sicily and the Island would continue to tie down Roman and Carthaginian armies and navies.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chaper 76: Hannibal's crossing of the Alps:

Hannibal marched in the direction of a mountain pass towards the village of Aquste and from there to Chevelu to the pass the Alps. There he found that the passes were fortified by the Allobroges. He sent out spies to ascertain if there was any weakness in their disposition. These spies found that the barbarians only maintained their position at the camp during the day, and left their fortified position at night. In order to make the Allobroges believe that he did not deem a night assault prudent, he ordered that as many camp-fires be lit as possible, in order to induce them into believing that he was settling down before their encampment along the mountains. However, once they left their fortifications, he led his best troops up to their fortifications and seized control of the pass. Hiding his men in the mountain brush on a cliff that arose immediately above and to the right off Hannibal's route of march, about 100 feet or so above the path, Hannibal stationed his slingers and archers there. This overhang was an excellent place from which to attack an enemy while it was marching in column through the pass. The descent from this pass was steep, and the Carthaginians were having a hard time marching down this side of the pass, especially the baggage animals. The Barbarians, seeing this, attacked anyway, in spite of their disadvantageous position. More baggage animals were lost in the confusion of the Barbarian attack, and they rolled off of the precipices to their deaths. This put Hannibal in a difficult situation. However, Hannibal, at the head of the same elite corps that he led to take the overhang, led them against these determined barbarians. Virtually all of these barbarians died in the ensuing combat, as they were fighting with their backs to a steep precipice, trying to throw their arrows and darts uphill at the advancing Carthaginians. After this contest of arms, the baggage was held together in good order and the Carthaginian army followed the road down to the plain.

This plain was 4 to 6 miles wide at most places, and was almost entirely stripped of defenders since they were all stationed at the pass. Hannibal marched his army down the road and took their city easily, stripping it of all its horses, captives, beasts of burden and corn. In addition, there were enough supplies for three days' rations for the army. This must have been welcome considering that no small portion of their supplies had been lost when the pack animals had fallen over the precipice in the course of the previous action. He then ordered this town to be destroyed, in order to demonstrate to the Barbarians of this country what would happen if they opposed him in the same fashion as this tribe had. Hannibal encamped there to give his men time to rest after their exhausting work, and to collect further rations. Hannibal then addressed his army, and we are informed that they were made to appreciate the extent of the effort they were about to undergo and were raised to good spirits in spite of the difficult nature of their undertaking. The Carthaginians continued their march and encountered the Centrones, who brought gifts and cattle for the troops. In addition, they brought hostages in order to convince Hannibal of their commitment to his cause. Hannibal was concerned and suspicious of the Centrones, though he hid this from them and the Centrones guided his army for two days. As they marched through the pass near a village, the pass narrowed and the Centrones turned against the Carthaginians.

The Centrones waited to attack, first allowing half of the army to move through the pass. This was meant to divide Hannibal's troops and supplies and make it difficult for his army to organize a counterattack, but Hannibal, having anticipated deceit by the Centrones, had arranged his army with elephants, cavalry and baggage in front, while his Hoplites and Falcatesair followed in the rear. Centrone forces had positioned themselves on the slopes parallel to Hannibal's army used this higher ground to roll boulders and rain rocks down at the Carthaginian army, killing many more pack animals. Confusion reigned in the ranks caught in the pass. However, Hannibal's heavily armed rearguard held back from entering the pass, forcing the Barbarians to descend to fight. The rearguard was thus able to hold off the attackers, before Hannibal and the half of his army not separated from him were forced to spend the night near a large white rock, that afforded them protection and as a military position, its occupation secures the defence of the pass. By morning, the Centrones were no longer in the area. The army rested here for two days. It was the end of October and snowy weather, the length of the campaign, ferocity of the fighting, and the loss of animals sapped morale in the army's ranks. From their outset in Iberia, the Hannibal's troops had been marching for over five months and the army had greatly reduced in size. The majority of Hannibal's fighters were unaccustomed to extreme cold of the high alps, being mostly from Libya and Hesperia. Hannibal assembled his men, declared to them that the end of their campaign was drawing near; that soon they would be in the Po Valley. In this account he is said to have gestured to the view Italy, showing his soldiers the Po Valley and the plains near it, and to have reminded them of Magilus, who had assured him of Gallic friendship and aid. He then gestured in the direction of Rome, raising spirits in the ranks. After the two days of rest, Hannibal ordered the descent from the Alps to begin.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 77: Hannibal arrives in Italy:

The snow on the Southern side of the Alps melts and thaws to a greater or lesser extent during the course of the day, and then refreezes at night. In addition, the Italian side of the Alps is much steeper, many men lost their footing down this side of the Alps and died. At an early point in their descent, the army came upon a section of the path that had been blocked by a landslide. This section of the path was broken for about 300 yards. Hannibal attempted to detour, by marching through a place where there was a great deal of snow – the Alps are so high at this point that the snow from previous years does not even melt. They made some headway, at the cost of no small portion of the baggage animals that were left, before Hannibal came to appreciate that this route was impossible for an army. Hannibal marched his men back to the point in their path prior to their detour, near the broken stretch of the path and set up camp. From here, Hannibal ordered his men to set about fixing the mule path. Working in relays, the army set about this labour-intensive task under the eyes of Hannibal, who was constantly encouraging them. Both the sick and the healthy were put to this. The next day the road was in sufficient condition to permit the cavalry and pack animals to cross the broken stretch of road, Hannibal ordered that these should instantly race down below the foliage line (2 miles below the summit of the Alps) and should be allowed access to the pastures there. However, Hannibal's remaining elephants, which were completely famished, were still unable to proceed along the path. Hannibal's Numidian cavalry carried on working on the road, taking three more days to fix it sufficiently to allow the elephants to cross. Getting these creatures across this stretch of road, Hannibal raced ahead of the rearguard to the part of the army that was below the pasture line. It took the army three days to march from this place into the plains which are near the Po. Hannibal then focused on the best means of reviving the spirits of his troops and restoring the men and horses to their former vigor and condition and ordered his men to encamp. Hannibal arrived with at least 28,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 30 elephants in Italy and hoped that many Gauls of the Po Valley would ally with him against Rome. In the meantime, the Roman army from Massilia had marched over land to Iberia, where they hoped to liberate Rhodae and Emporiae as well as convince some of the subjected tribes of the former Iberian League to revolt against Carthaginian rule and ally again with the Romans to start a new theatre of war in Hesperia.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 78: The Gallic uprising:

The Romans simultaneously received news of Hannibal's crossing into the Iberian League and of an uprising in northern Italy of the Gallic tribes Boii and Insubres. Tese had established diplomatic contact with the Carthaginians and joined them as allies against their common enemy, Rome. The first objective of the insurgents were the new Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona (both founded shortly before in the beginning of 218 BC), causing the Romans to flee to Mutina, which the Gauls then besieged. In response, Praetor Lucius Manlius Vulso Longus marched with two legions and allies, for a total of 1,600 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, to Cisalpine Gaul, the territory of the Po Valley that Rome had recently claimed as a new province of the Roman Republic. This army was ambushed twice on the way from Aiminium, losing 1,200 men as they marched trough the Po Valley. Although the siege of Mutina was raised, the army itself fell under a loose siege a few kilometers from Mutina. This event prompted the Roman Senate to send one of the Western Mediterranean (Gaul and Iberia) legions and 5,000 allied troops to aid Vulso. The Romans even had to raise fresh troops to replace these and thus the armies meant for Iberia were stopped, while the Gallic uprising was giving Hannibal time to march from the Ebro to the Rhone. After evading a pitched battle at the Rhone, Hannibal came to the aid of his Gallic allies, who were hard pressed by the Roman reinforcements. He crossed the Alps, surmounting the difficulties of climate and terrain, and the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes. His exact route is disputed. Hannibal arrived with at least 28,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 30 elephants in the territory of the Taurini in northern Italy. While this crossing was expected by the Romans, they had not anticipated such an early arrival and their forces were still in their winter quarters. Hannibal's crossing of the alps, soon was considered one of the greatest achievements in military logistics, as he did so through hostile territory in late autumn with no supply line. His surprise entry into the Italian peninsula led to the termination of Rome's main intended thrusts, an invasion of Iberia and the support of the own troops in Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily. A direct invasion of Africa was planned after securing the Islands between Italy and Libya, but Hannibal once again crossed their plans.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 79: Thrace and Hellas:

(Philip V's ambitions in Thrace were aiming for the same territory that Philip II of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great had ruled there before)

In the year after the Hegemony War, Philip V of Macedon concentrated his ambitions on Thrace, because the Romans were worried about Carthage and Hannibal in what they later called the Second Punic War. Because of that they had very little interest in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean at the moment. The southern part of Thrace was already ruled by Philip V and Thrace itself had been a Macedon vassal state since the Odrysian kingdom under generals such as Lysimachus. In 279 BC, Celtic Gauls advanced into Macedonia, southern Greece and Thrace. They were soon forced out of Macedonia and southern Greece, but they remained in Thrace until the end of the third century BC. From Thrace, three Celtic tribes advanced into Anatolia and formed a new kingdom called Galatia. In parts of Moesia the Celtic Scordisci and Thracians lived beside each other, evident in the archaeological findings of pits and treasures, spanning from the third century BC to the first century BC. The Tribal authority was rising again for a short time period when the Romans attacked Macedon in the (First) Macedonian War, that the Macedon called the Roman War, or Macedon Roman War. While he formally governed Thracia (with the Exception of Byzantion) , Philip V wanted more, he wished to finally integrate the land into his state (like Philip II had done) and directly control it. Thanks to trade and a few boarder colonies, he soon tightened Macedonian rule in Thracia, but he had little troops and colonists to spare, since his main focus was still on southern Hellas (where part of the Hellas League were still looking for ways out of his Hegemony) as well as on Illyria (where the Romans continued to influence local tribes against Macedon and establish their own rule there). Because Thracia was already a vassal state and he was sure to hold it against the native tribes surrounding it's territory, Philip V concentrated his plans and ambitions against Rome and these Greeks that still refused to obey him on the long run.

(Philip V)

Despite their War with the Punic Carthage, Rome also had an eye on Philip V and Macedon as well as the Hellas League. Because of his recent victories and his ambitions, Rome feared that he would someday attack their colonies, territories and allies in the eastern Mare Adriaticum and Mare Ionicum. To buy themselves time and to secure the own regions and ambitions there without directly sending a army and troops, Rome desired to prevent Philip from aiding Carthage or the former free Greek cities in Magna Greecia in Italy and elsewhere. So Rome sought out land allies in Greece. They soon begun exploring the possibility of an alliance with the formerly beaten Aetolian League, as early as 212 BC. The Aetolians, war weary, had before made peace with Philip after he had beaten them and were absorbed in the Hellas League. However five years later the pendulum had swung in the other direction, the war faction was on the ascendancy, and the Aetolians were once again ready to consider taking up arms against their traditional enemy of Macedon. Soon the Aetolian assembly was convened for discussions with Rome. Because of Romes recent capture of Capua and Syracuse in the war against Carthage as evidence of Rome's rising fortunes, and offered to ally with them against the Macedonians. A treaty was signed. The Aetolians would conduct operations on land, the Romans at sea. Rome would keep any slaves and other booty taken and Aetolia would receive control of any territory acquired. Another provision of the treaty allowed for the inclusion of certain allies of the Aetolian League; Elis, Sparta, Messenia and Pergamin, as well as two Roman clients, the Illyrians Pleurates and Scerdilaidas.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 80: The Seleucid Empire and the Ptolemaic Kingdom:

Thanks to his alliance with Macedon and Bithynia against Pergamon, Antiochus III the Great could use the troops that were now free in Anatolia thanks to the Hellas League under Macedon Rule and concentrate on other fronts. While he tried to stop the eastern satraps from rebelling and gaining independence, Antiochus used his troops from Anatolia to conquer the Ptolemaic provinces of Kilikia (Cilicia) and Lykia, but was unable to invade Cyprus or break the Ptolemaic naval hegemony over the eastern Mediterranean. The ten year alliance with the Kingdom of Bithynia that was related to Macedon by marriage had given the Seleucid Empire a buffer against the former satrap and now independent Kingdom of Pergamum. But since Antiochus feared the Ptolemaic Kingdom as the greater threat for his ambitions and imperial goals, he tolerated the dynasties of now allied Bithynia, the rivalry Pergamon and Cappadocia for now in central Asia Minor even if he still intendet to conquer and rule them someday just like Rodos and the rest of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and other former territories of Alexander the Great in Libya and Asia. But for now Antiochus focused his forces on the revolts in the east, the northern boarder to Armenia and most important, the Ptolemaic Kingdom as his greatest competitor in the eastern Mediterranean. He ordered some of his troops east to secure the loyal Satraps against these that rebelled against him, but focused the bulk of his army in Syria against Ptolemy IV. With the clear goal to take Syria, the Lebanon and even to conquer all of Egypt, Antiochus opened a offensive war Syria that would later lead to the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC.The first part of his Syrian campaign was a success and Antiochus Seleucia Pieria as well as cities in Phoenisia, amongst them Tyre. Rather than promptly invading Egypt, Antiochus waited in Phoenicia for over a year, consolidating his new territories, fortifying them with garrisons and listening to diplomatic proposals from the Ptolemaic kingdom. Meanwhile, Ptolemy's minister Sosibius began recruiting and training an army. He recruited not only from the local Greek population, as Hellenistic armies generally were, but also from the native Egyptians, enrolling at least thirty thousand natives as phalangites. This innovation paid off partly, but it would eventually have dire consequences for Ptolemaic stability. In the summer of 217 BC, Ptolemy engaged Antiochus in the Battle of Raphia.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chaper 81: Battle of Ticinus:

Hannibal's vision of military affairs was derived partly from the teaching of his Greek tutors and partly from experience gained alongside his father, and it stretched over most of the Hellenistic World of his time. Indeed, the breadth of his vision gave rise to his grand strategy of conquering Rome by opening a northern front and subduing allied city-states on the peninsula, rather than by attacking Rome directly. Historical events which led to the defeat of Carthage during the First Punic War when his father commanded the Carthaginian Army also led Hannibal to plan the invasion of Italy by land across the Alps. After a 15-day crossing, Hannibal finally arrived in northern Italy with 12,000 African infantry, 8,000 Iberian infantry and 6,000 cavalry. Many of the elephants had survived. The survivors were emaciated, exhausted, and without supplies, having lost most of them in the mountains. Obtaining supplies wherever he could, Hannibal rested his men. The Gauls of the lower Po Valley, Hannibal's allies, were still far away. Hannibal was first obliged to fight with his currently reduced force to reach them and incite the rest of Gallia Cisalpina to revolt. Hannibals first action was to take the chief city of the hostile Taurini. Afterwards, the Carthaginians were intercepted by a newly raised Roman force under the Roman Commander that was coming from Messilia. Hannibal had evaded earlier him in the Rhone Valley. The northern Gallic tribes, being bound to Rome by treaty, knew that sooner or later they would be required to answer to Rome for their behavior regarding the hostility of the Boii and the Insubres. Intending to march on Rome, Hannibal knew that he had to secure his rear. He had entered Italy between the Insubres and a Ligurian tribe called the Taurini. The two tribes were at war; however, momentarily Hannibal's army was in no position to intervene.

The Taurini were not friendly to Carthage. After the army's recovery, Hannibal offered them peace by formal alliance. When it was refused, he surrounded their chief settlement, leveled it and executed all his opponents as an object lesson to the other tribes in the north. This act of terror was effective for the time being in securing a nominal alliance with the other Gauls, but it caused the immediate announcement of his presence throughout Italy, rendering further surprise impossible. Hannibal looked for a victory of any sort to secure the confidence of his new found allies. In the battle the ranks of the Carthaginians were expanded by contingents of Ligurians and Gauls to reach 80,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Receiving news of the massacre, the Roman Commander was incredulous that Hannibal should have crossed the Alps and be in Italy so soon. Decamping, he crossed the Po and marched upstream on the left bank looking for him. Receiving intelligence of his enemies impending arrival, Hannibal was equally incredulous that he should have made the difficult voyage from Massilia and now be at hand with an army. The most astounded of all at the news that both Hannibal and the Romans were in Italy, when they were believed to be in Iberia, were the Roman Senate and People. They sent orders posthaste to the second consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who was conducting leisurely operations in Sicily, that he was to abandon his current project and proceed to the assistance of the Romans in the Po Valley. Sending his fleet in advance, Tiberius determined that individuals could travel more swiftly than armies. He released his men from service, having exacted an oath that they would present themselves at Arminium south of the mouth of the Po on a certain day. Parts or the Roman forces were taken out of Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily to face Hannibal in Italy. However, despite these measures, events moved too swiftly for Tiberius to be of any assistance to Publius in the coming battle.

On the day before the battle, the Romans were encamped in the base (castra) at Piacenza, where the colonists had planned to build. This settlement being in a loop on the right bank of the Po river, they had to construct a bridge to access it from the left bank, there were two bridges, one from the right to the left bank of the Po at Piacenza and one from the left to the right bank of the Ticinus, but the best crossing is at Ticinum, which was founded by Roman colonists at the site of the fortifications Publius threw up to protect his new bridge. The ground on the right bank of the Ticinus north of there was swampy, no place for an army to become bogged down. After building the bridge over the Ticinus and crossing it, the Romans entered the level plain and camped five miles from Victumulae, in the country of the Insubres. The Roman consul superseded the praetors Manlius and Atilius. He therefore had commanded three legions, about 12,000 infantry and several thousand allies, possibly around 20,000 men. The regular cavalry of three legions amounted to 900. In addition, there were some 2,000 Gallic cavalry, which fought in the battle but later defected, and 1,000 allied cavalry attached to Manlius at Rome, a total of about 4,000 cavalry. At the same time as the Romans were making camp, Hannibal was camping upstream along the Po. The two were unknown to each other but making the discovery through scouts the next day both commanders decided on the same tactic: a reconnaissance in force to discover and test the strength of the enemy. Hannibal probably took the majority of the 6,000 cavalry that remained after crossing the Alps, while the Roman Commander took all of his cavalry and a small number of velites (light infantery with javelins). This last decision was not in keeping with a fast-moving reconnaissance and was to cost the Roman Commande the battle and nearly his life.

Finally coming within observation distance of each other, the two armies stopped to form ranks. Hannibal offered his strongest motivations to the troops if they would fight to win: tax-free land in Italy, Spain or Africa, Carthaginian citizenship to allies and freedom to all slaves. He then placed his heavy, or "bridled", cavalry in the center and the light and swift-moving Numidian and Hesperian cavalry on the wings, a classic formation in which the wings would break off to ride around and attack the enemy rear. Scipio's less effective technique used the cavalry more like the infantry in a fixed line. The Gallic cavalry would be out front screening a line of javelin-throwers, who would cast volleys into the front of the advancing enemy and then retreat through the ranks to the rear. Hannibal, seeing the infantry beginning to form, ordered an immediate, all-out charge, which rode down on the javelin-throwers before they could cast a single volley and sent them running for their lives through the ranks behind them. The main cavalry ranks then fought until the Numidian and Hesperian cavalry performed their planned envelopment and attacked the rear. Unable to maneuver because of the infantry milling about them, the Roman cavalry broke into small groups, some dismounting and fighting as infantry. The Roman Commander was wounded and soon found himself surrounded, with only a few to defend him. When the troop failed to respond to the order, fearing the large number of enemies around the consul, the Roman Commander drove his horse into the enemy. The others were forced to charge and opened a path through the frightened enemy to the consul. They escorted him off the field, which would have been to the fort.

Hannibal scattered the Roman forces, but he did not press his victory that day, perhaps because his forces were far outnumbered by the Roman infantry still in the fort. He left the field and Romes Legionaries gradually returned to base. The Roman Commander had discovered the intelligence he wanted to know. He knew Hannibal would be back the next day with his whole army, would interpose himself between the Roman fort and the bridge and all his men would be trapped, a set-up for another massacre. He therefore broke camp in the night, hastened to get over the bridge before dawn and was in Piacenza before Hannibal knew he had left camp. Finding the camp empty the next morning, Hannibal followed the Roman trail to the river, capturing the 600-man guard over a torn-up bridge. He decided not to force a subsequent crossing of the Po under hostile fire at Piacenza, but turned, went up its left bank, found a convenient crossing and descended the right bank to camp before Piacenza two days later.

After Hannibal's arrival in the early morning, before first light, some 2,200 Gallic allies in the Roman camp attacked the Romans closest to them sleeping in their tents, took the heads of the slain and crossed to the Carthaginian camp, where they were well received. Hannibal subsequently sent them as emissaries to raise all the Celts in Italy. Meanwhile, the Roman Commander again anticipating the consequences, immediately broke camp before dawn on that same night and slipping up the right bank of the Po to the west in the same direction from which Hannibal had come crossed the Trebia River, a right-bank tributary of the Po. Then he headed south along its left bank to the hills from which it flows, keeping the river between him and Hannibal. The Numidian and Hesperian cavalry sent in pursuit made the mistake of burning the camp first, giving all but Rome's rear guard time to cross the river. A day's march to the south, the Roman's reached the hills, fortified the slope of one of them and settled down to rest and wait for the arrival of the second consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus. The locality was called ripa alta (high bank), by the Romans. South of Rivalta, the mountains offer no opportunity for cavalry to deploy or armies to march or fight in the open. Hannibal camped at a distance in the plain below, enthusiastically supplied by the Gallic population. The Roman Commander had lost 2,300 soldiers and was severely injured in the battle, so he retreated across the River Trebia with his heavy infantry still intact, and encamped at the town of Placentia to await reinforcements. As a result of Rome's defeat at the Ticinus, all the Gauls except the Cenomani were induced to join the Carthaginian cause.

Soon, the entire north of Italy was unofficially insurgent, with both Gallic and Ligurian troops bolstering Hannibal's army to at least 40,000 men. This meant a great relief for Hannibal, who was cut of from direct supplies from Hesperia and Libya at the moment and had himself lost some minor casualties in the Battle of Ticinus. The situation for the Romans looked bad and the Senate was in disorder. The troops that had been called of from Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily were combined with freshly trained ones to form new Legions. This left the Roman Position on all tree Island weakened and gave the Carthaginian a chance to advance further if they realized what was going on. Hannibal himself ordered them in letters to constantly test the Romans strength and to challenge them as much as they could. Unknown to Hannibal the Romans did send some of the fresh trained troops towards the Islands as reinforcements and also didn't cancel their invasion of Iberia or their fight over Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica in total, because they wanted to tie down the Punic troops there and together with their fleet prevent the Carthaginian to send supplies and fresh man, or even new armies to Hannibal in Italy.

(the Gallic uprising in the Po Valley that sides with Hannibal shown in green)

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 82: Casus belli and propaganda:

During and after the Second Roman/Punic War there had been a discussion in Carthage, Rome and the rest of the Mediterranean about which side was right and which side started the war. Most Latin authors were pro-Roman and even some Greek authors supposed the idea, that Carthage was at fault for the war by declaring war on the Iberian League and their invasion of Roman territory. Most Punic, Greek and even some Latin authors had a different view and argued that the war could have been limited to Hesperia only if Rome hadn't interfered so much in the Carthaginian politics and alliances there, clearly outside of their direct homeland and sphere of interest in Italy. Some authors that were mostly neutral sided with Hannibal out of their own interest, they saw the punic Shophet and his actions as a necessary bulwark against the growing power of Rome that interfered in neighbor states and spheres of interests like in Hellas, Illyria, Spain, or even Gaul. Both sides used political, military and even religious initiatives to demonize the enemy and his actions and to justify their own war goal and the war itself.

The Romans, Messilia and their allies saw the Casus Belli in Hannibals war over Iberia and his war against the allied Iberian League and these Numidians that were allied with Rome. In their point of view Rome was just aiding an ally against an unjust aggressor. Carthage had accepted not to attack the allies of Rome In the peace after the First Roman War and Hannibal and the Barcads had accepted the Iberian League and their zone of influence in a treaty that had split Iberia/Hesperia before the war. The Carthaginians and their allies like Macedon and the Hellas League on the other hand argued, that the Iberian League as well as some Numidian tribes constantly attacked and raided Carthaginian land and that the war started with these raids and would be limited to Hesperia and against the Iberian League hadn't Rome and Messilia declared war on Carthage for defending it's territory. They also declared that the treaty between Rome and the Iberian League was a fides and that their main purpose was to be friends instead of enemies, but not a direct alliance. They also claimed that the Romans had strongly interfered into the internal politics of the Iberian League by aiding a pro-Roman against a pro-Carthaginian faction. The fact that Rome had chosen to ignore her Iberian friends for months before deciding it was their moral obligation to help and direct step into the war against Carthage didn't help their cause. Many argued even if no Roman army was in Iberia at that time, the declaration of War could have happened sooner, if the war was really aiming to help the Iberian League. That the Romans did intervene in a similar matter against raids on their territory from Illyria and Cisalpine Gaul, the territory of the Po Valley was also not a good justification that would help their cause.

Hannibal on the other hand accused the Romans and Messilia of killing the leaders of the anti-Roman, anti-Messilian and pro-Carthaginian faction in the Iberian League and their supporters to gain more influence in Hesperia, a fact that was backed by the internal struggle of the Iberian League as well as the withdraw of Messilia with parts of the Leagues territories after what most would call a coup. Rome and Messilia on the other side argued that the pro-Cathaginian party was only helping Hannibal's cause, because it was fostered and financed by him for this politics. They argued that the Iberian League was under the protection of Rome because they had once appealed to the Romans and were allies. Others say that Hannibal's final move against the Iberian League was started after the Roman declaration of war and was to prevent his nation from fighting a war in the central Mediterranean, Hesperia and Libya at the same time for long. Hannibal's pro-Latin authors and even some Roman Senator factions like the Claudian ans Fabian Group (that were against a new Punic-Roman War in general) argued that Hannibal himself at the height of the war said and showed “I have come not to make war on the Italians, but to aid the Italians against Rome.” even as he seemed victorious after Cannae and that his treaty with Philip V of Macedon showed no interest in destroying Rome and it's power in Italy completely. Other Roman Senator factions like the Scipionic and Aemilian group were for a direct policy of war against Carthage. In Carthage itself the situation was quiet similar, some Senator factions like the Barcids and Hesperians were aiding Hannibal to secure their gains in Hesperia and to demand justice for the Roman theft of Corsica and Sardinia after the final peace treaty with Carthage after the First Roman War. Other factions like the Hannoids, Libyans and some trader factions were against a new costly war in general and hoped that Rome would simply accept their gains and territories in Libya and Hesperia (and their need to defend this territories against neighbors that raided it). The war itself was heavily discussed by both Senates and in the end a majority (but not a big majority) was in favor of declaring war on the other side.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 83: Sicily:

(some of the fortifications along the Eleutherus river)

In Sicily the southern Roman and Carthaginian Armies remained in their positions, awaiting the next move of their enemy and waiting for own reinforcements. Hanno the Short was building his siege equipment to soon attack and take Agrigentum (Acragas) the most important city outside of the independent, Greek Syracusae from the Romans, while the Roman Commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus made his own plans on attacking Heraclea that had been fortified by Hanno and his troops over the last mounts. In the north of Sicily the Romans had managed to build a fortification with a dam, walls and watchtowers along the Eleutherus river, to prepare for the next Punic attack and to be prepared to stop it before it would reach Solus. To do so he placed a third of his army as garrison along this wall and it's towers as well as in camps nearby for support, while the rest of the Roman army remained in Solus. The Carthaginians under the Greek Mercenary Proxiancos, after their former Commander died from a infected wound were well aware of this Roman plans and took their own preparations by secretly sending a few troops up the Eleutherus river.

Sardinia:
In Sardinia Hasdrubal the Bald had gained new allies, but his troops were to wide spread across the western coast and the central island for a new counter attack at the moment. Because of that, he waited for the Romans under Quintus Mucius Scaevola to make the next move. Since he was well aware that the Romans wanted to retake Forum Traiani to directly united both parts of their island again and to shut him off from his allies in the mountains, Hasdrubal prepared for a ambush along the roads to the city so he could defeat the Romans enough to allow him a new offensive after the planned battle.

Corsica:
On Corsica, the Roman Commander Gaius Samnion Pulcher had stopped his advances as he legitimately feared that Mahar the Skilled would simply cut his Garrions in the newly liberated towns and cities and attacked his with his majority of troops and retreaded back to the inside of the island before Gaius could respond. Surely he could supply some coastal towns by sea but that would leave his fleet open for Punic attacks and so Samnion decided that it was best to adopt a new strategy. Gaius began to train his troop in small skirmisher troops that should shout the island for the camps and supplies of Mahar and his allies. Should they be attacked or ambushed again he intended to send his cavalry force as fast support troops and also use them as fast scouts to be more aware of Mahars movements and troop positioning.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 84: Battle of the Trebia:

Unknown to the Roman Senate now, the Roman Commancer had been wounded during the Battle of Ticinus and had been driven into the hills south of Placentia, a contemporary colony of the Romans. Now the Gauls had turned against Rome now in favor of Hannibal over this very issue of colonization. The Roman Commander had no choice but to hold himself where he was, until he could be reinforced by Sempronius. At this time, Hannibal was camped in the plain below the Roman camp near Placentia. The exact place where Hannibal camped is unclear, but it is thought to have been southeast of Placentia, on the Nura. Hannibal apparently had two objectives in mind: to accept the friendly overtures of the Gallic tribes who dwelt in the northern foothills of the Apennines and to prevent the two consuls from coming to the aid of the other. With regards to the second objective, Hannibal, astride the direct road from Ariminum, was in a centrally occupied position to potentially prevent Sempronius from joining his forces with the second Roman army. As a result, this maneuver as one of the earliest and best instances of the taking up a central position between two armies of the enemy and showed Hannibal's strategic understanding. Finding himself blocked from reinforcement, the Roman wounded Commander became distressed. Moreover, he was troubled by a defection among the Gauls in his own camp, who killed a number of the Roman men on guard. This defection, the Roman Commander feared, was the signal of a more general insurrection, and he wished to keep his hold on the Ananes nearby, which was one of the few tribes in the vicinity which had remained loyal to Rome. This he thought he could do by camping in their midst. Leaving a small number of troops in camp to conceal his movement, the Roman Commander decided to move the bulk of his forces across the Trebia, wading through the chilled winter waters of the stream amid snow and rain. The Romans were discovered by a detachment of Carthaginian cavalry who sought to interrupt their march. The Romans, it is said, could scarcely lift their arms to defend themselves. Yet, while harassing the Romans, the Carthaginian cavalrymen turned aside to pillage the Roman's abandoned camp. This allowed the Roman Commander to move his forces across the Trebia, where he took up and fortified a camp on the left bank.

After receiving the orders of the Senate in Sicily, Sempronius had dismissed his men after taking their oaths to reassemble at Ariminum south of the Po river. From there, he probably marched along the route of the Via Aemilia straight into Placentia. Sempronius' two legions assembled probably in early December, and Hannibal had ascertained at an early date that Sempronius was ordered to northern Italy. Being interposed between the two consuls, he could have sought a general engagement with the wounded Commanders army before Sempronius arrived with his forces. Yet it appears that Hannibal did not wish to defeat his opponents in detail, and as shown by subsequent events, Sempronius was allowed to link up with the second Roman army. With regard to the problem of how Sempronius coming from Ariminum could have effected the union with the Second Roman army on the Trebbia's left bank if Hannibal was on the right bank. Sempronius came through Liguria and it was not long before Tiberius and his legions arrived and marched through the city. They did not stop there, probably because Hannibal's Hesperian and Numidian cavalry had burned the Roman fort, but camped outside it to the south, at or near Hannibal's previous camp, some 40 days after they had left Sicily. Apparently Hannibal had crossed the Trebbia in his pursuit of the second Roman army and their wounded Commander and was camped on its left bank.

Despite Gallic willingness to supply Hannibal, he found that the size of his army was becoming a burden on the local communities resulting in a daily increasing scarcity. The Romans had a grain storage depot at Clastidium, which he was planning to attack. He must have bypassed it previously on his way to Placentia. Instead of attacking, he found that he could bribe the commander, Dasius Brundisius, whose name indicates he was not Roman but was from Brindusium, with 400 gold coins. The garrison was subsequently treated with kindness, which suggests that good treatment was part of the deal, but none of the sources describe it in detail. Clastidium was located on the right bank of the Po upstream from the Trebbia. That Hannibal could operate there without hindrance indicates that he was in fact camped on the left bank of the Trebbia and subsequent operations against the Gauls prove it further.

For reasons unstated by later authors, the Carthaginians suspected treachery from the Gauls located between the Trebbia and the Po; that is, on the left bank of the Trebbia, where his subsequent activity shows that Hannibal was certainly located. The authors make it clear that the Gauls hoped to stay on the good side of both commanders, but they do not give the details. Hannibal was incensed enough to dispatch 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to devastate their country, district by district to warn them not to chose the Roman side. This action decided whose side they were to take, they appealed to the Romans. Tiberius sent an unspecified number of cavalry across the river with 1,000 infantry. They caught the Carthaginians pillaging there and drove them into Hannibal's camp (clearly on the left bank). The Carthaginians acquired reinforcements and sallied out to push the Romans back across the river, where the Romans sent for reinforcements from their camp (proving a right-bank location). Hannibal stopped the Carthaginian attack because this was not the time and place of his choosing, but was happening spontaneously. Tiberius, however, concluded he had won a victory with the very arm in which the wounded Roman Commander had been beaten, the cavalry. Hannibal now knew that he could provoke Tiberius and made plans to entice him across the river, where his troops could be slaughtered without assistance from the camp. The cavalry action of the preceding day had inspired the Romans with confidence. Sempronius resolved to seek a decisive battle as soon as possible. The Senate had sent him to assist the first Roman army in the north, but the latter was unable to be assisted, leaving Sempronius in an ambiguous situation. According to Polybius, Sempronius felt free to act on his own: "He was, it is true, at liberty to act as he thought best owing to the illness of the wounded Commancer of the northern army." The wounded Roman Commancer advised "that their legions would be all the better for a winter's drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians... he advised Sempronius to let matters remain as they were." Sempronius decided to ignore him and go ahead with the attack, he didn't even kept the second Roman army informed.

In northern Italy, the Romans had two legions plus 10,000 allied infantry and 1,000 cavalry (less losses inflicted by the Boii, at least 1,300), and Gaius Atilius, reacquiring the legion that had been taken from him by the Senate plus 5,000 allies. Since the Roman Republic was using 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry as the standard complement of a legion, the Roman army should have had 12,000 Roman infantry and 900 Roman cavalry plus at most 13,700 allied infantry and 1,000 cavalry. After losses suffered at Ticinus, there should have had at most 27,000 men. Sempronius had been given two legions: 8,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, but he also had several thousand allies, about 16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry. The wounded Roman Commander had the greater army and would have been senior in command if active. Neither consul, however, could supersede the other without a decree from the Senate. The actual number of Roman troops before the battle to have been 18,000 men, to which were added 20,000 Italic allies. Other authors set the number at 16,000 and 20,000 allies, this being the strength of their complete army for decisive operations, when the consuls chance to be united. He does not say that they were united, only that, if they were, these would be their numbers; that is, 4 Roman legions and 4 allied alae. All authors subsequently tack on 4,000 cavalry, evidently not part of the 36,000 or 38,000, from which it may be inferred that the latter were infantry (a circumstance not stated by the authors). The numbers stated to have fought the battle are problematic: a combined Roman army should have had 5 legions of 20,000 men and all 30,000 allies authorized by the Senate and yet, if the armies were not combined, Sempronius should have had only two legions of 8,000 men. One answer is that the wounded Roman Commander gave up two legions and kept one and 20,000 auxiliaries in his own camp as a reserve. Some seems to think that his wound gave the entire authority to Sempronius, but immediately after the battle he commanded an army marching from his camp to Placentia. If he could command after the battle then he was not so incapacitated as to be removed from command before it. Both authors agreed that the two consuls had sharp differences of opinion and that Sempronius acted on his own. It is possible that the authors doubled the number of Roman legions fighting the battle and that Sempronius had only 8,000 or 9,000 Roman infantry. The authors both relate, however, that a mass of 10,000 men broke out of the Carthaginian encirclement and fell back on Placentia. Tiberius apparently did have more than two legions. Scipio argues in the story that Sempronius' men needed the winter to train, suggesting that on the way to north Italy Sempronius may have raised two more legions of recruits, throwing them into battle under difficult physical circumstances against expert advice without training. There is no mention of any such events, however. Yet another hypothesis for reconciling the numbers cited by Livy for combined strength of the two consular armies and the actual number of participants in the battle of the Trebia would be that Sempronius detached part of his allied contingents for garrison duty on Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and for naval service with Marcus Aemilius and Sextus Pomponius. Some allowance should also be made for non-combat losses. The strength of this hypothesis lies in the maximum use of ancient evidence. The 10,000 veteran troops who did not break and run were the major survivors. The authors make it clear that not many of the others made it to Piacenza, but some did. The casualties therefore were a maximum of 32,000 men, a rate of 76%. The rate was not at maximum, but the number who escaped is not known. If it was half the number who fell back in good order, the rate would have been 64%, in either case a Roman disaster, but perhaps not quite the one depicted by the authors if Scipio's army was not involved. The Carthaginians did not cross the river to take Sempronius' camp. They might have been physically exhausted or concerned about the 10,000 or they could have been deterred by the army in the second camp on their flank. Although Hannibal departed Spain with 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry his long march to Italy had clearly cost his army dearly. He had, however, been largely able to make up for his losses with new recruits from among the Cisalpine Gauls. Both sources agree that he fought the battle with 40,000 men: 20,000 Celtic, Spanish and African heavy-armed infantry, 10,000 cavalry plus another 1,000 in ambush, 8,000 Balearic slingers and spearmen plus another 1,000 in ambush. While the casualties were not stated, the square of 10,000 Roman infantry that broke the Carthaginian center caused a "great slaughter" of African and Celtic troops.

The December of 219 BC was cold and snowy. The Roman Commander was still recovering from his wounds but Sempronius was "impetuous and headstrong". Eager to come to blows with Hannibal before the other Commander could recover and assume command– and especially as the time for the election of new consuls was drawing near–Sempronius took measures looking for a general engagement, disregarding the other Commander's caution not to attack with untrained men. Unfortunately for Sempronius, Hannibal was aware of this, and prepared a plan to take advantage of Sempronius' impetuosity. Hannibal's force was camped across the cold and flooded Trebbia River. Hannibal had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks, densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy. Hannibal was relying on a network of Gallic spies to keep informed of enemy activity. When they told him that the Romans were ready to do battle, he sent for 100 each of the best infantrymen and cavalrymen and had them select 10 each for a special mission. This detachment of 1,100 infantry and 1,100 cavalry under the command of Hannibal's younger brother, Mago, were instructed to conceal themselves in the underbrush of the above-mentioned water-course under the cover of night, and prepare an ambush for the Romans. On the following morning, Hannibal sent the rest of the Numidian and Hesperian cavalry beyond the Trebbia to harass the nearby Roman camp and retreat, so as to lure the Romans into a position from which Mago's hidden detachment could strike at the opportune moment. They rode up to the gates and discharged missiles at the men on duty. In response, Sempronius sent out the Roman cavalry to drive them off, and shortly afterwards sent out 6,000 javelin-throwers, the light-armed infantry, to cover the formation of the main line of battle behind them. These were the 12,000 Roman heavy-armed infantry and 20,000 Italian allies, apparently heavy-armed also, as they were never used as light-armed infantry. The day was raw; snow was falling; the troops had not yet eaten their morning meal; yet, though they had been under arms for several hours, he pushed them across the fords of the Trebia, with the water breast-high and icy-cold. Arrived on the farther side, the Roman soldiers were so chilled that they could scarcely hold their weapons. Hannibal was ready to receive them. His men had eaten, rubbed themselves with oil before their camp-fires, and prepared their weapons. He might have attacked the Roman army when half of it was across, with even greater chances of success. But when he saw his ruse succeeding, he bethought him that he could produce a vastly greater moral effect on the new Gallic allies, as well as win a more decisive victory, by engaging the whole army on his own terms.

Hannibal now put forward his 8,000 light infantry – javelin-throwers and Balearic slingers – as a covering skirmishing line, and behind them, he formed the main battle line of 20,000 infantry of Libyan, Hesperians and Celts, with 10,000 cavalry and an unspecified number of elephants split between the two flanks. The Hesperian and Numidian cavalry wheeled suddenly and attacked the Roman cavalry, strung out in pursuit. Sempronius withdrew them to the flanks. The Numidians then harassed the Roman light infantry screen, or velites, causing them to expend all their missiles. As the armies approached they were unable to be much of an impediment to the Carthaginians due to lack of ammunition and hypothermia, so Sempronius ordered them to fall back through the heavy infantry. Similarly, when the Balearic slingers and javelin-throwers began to encounter Roman heavy infantry, Hannibal withdrew them and placed them on the wings. After the light-armed infantry (velites) retreated through the Roman line, the Roman infantry (Hastati, Principes, Triarii) closed with the Carthaginian infantry. Concurrently the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants attacked the Roman and Italian cavalry, sweeping them from the field, and leaving the infantry, whom they intended to protect, exposed. Samuels suggests that in describing the Roman cavalry as being a withdrawal he is being tactful and a rout better describes what happened. Seeing that the Roman rear had passed their position, Mago's hidden force emerged from the ambush and fell on the rear of the hard-pressed Roman infantry. With their morale already sapped by cold, hunger and fatigue, the Romans on the sides and in the rear broke formation under this fresh onslaught and ran for the river. As the disorganized men were milling about the river, Hannibal used the opportunity to effect a massacre. The great majority of the casualties fell here or drowned in the river. The Roman cavalry escaped on horseback. As the Roman soldiers remained with Sempronius in the center and majority of the force were the 20,000 Italics, the men who died were probably not the core of the army but were on the whole the Italic allies, who were as yet untrained and untested in battle. These Italics allied to Rome that were captured were later set free to go home without a ransom, but the Roman prisioners were all enslaved or killed.

It is clear from the odds and from subsequent events that Tiberius intended a main attack on the center of the Carthaginian line. As he was not killed on the flanks or in the rear, he must have been commanding the center in person. It would have included his most experienced and effective infantry. In fact, they behaved as professional soldiers, some of them quickly wheeling to fill in the sides and rear, forming a hollow square. In this standard Roman infantry formation, all sides faced outward leaving the center necessarily hollow, where the command post was and where the wounded were placed. This square soon deflected all Carthaginian attacks against it. The Carthaginians concentrated on the men by the river instead. A light-infantry detachment was sent out to stop the elephants. These they dealt with by volleying darts and jabbing under the tail. The elephants became wild, attacking both sides, until Hannibal ordered them driven off to the left to attack the Gauls fighting for Rome. These must have been the Cenomani tribesmen, the only Gauls in that category. Although he had made some unfortunate strategic decisions, Tiberius proved himself a better battlefield general, ordering his men forward against the Carthaginian center. The enemy there took great losses, although the authors do not say what they were. Of the two ethnic groups, Africans and Celts, the latter are said to have lost the most men. The square soon found itself at the Carthaginian rear and looking back could see the Carthaginian army effecting a slaughter of allied troops. Tiberius did not return to their assistance – the sources offer his excuses of the river and the heavy rain – but marched his men into Piacenza, probably over a bridge that must have stood there.

The next night, the camp garrison and the other survivors, mainly wounded men, crossed the Trebia on rafts. The wounded Roman Commander was in command. He "marched his army in perfect quiet to Placentia, whence he crossed the Po to Cremona, that a single colony might be spared the burden of two armies in winter quarters". In the single-camp interpretation of this passage, he must have crossed to the enemy side regardless of whether the camp was on the left or right bank. However, the narrative goes on to say that Hannibal did not cross the river to pursue them; thus, as previously, he was placing the river between him and Hannibal. Following the thread of the previous narrative, Scipio must still have been in his camp at Ripa Alta. Some survivors managed to make their way upriver on the same side as the battle to Roman's camp. The wounded Roman Commander broke camp at night, crossed the river and reached Placentia on the right bank, past Sempronius' now abandoned camp, or perhaps picking up the garrison left there along with additional survivors. He still had an army of such magnitude that it could not seek supplies in the same city as Sempronius'. For a time, the Romans were spared attacks by the Carthaginians, as the latter were now suffering from exposure. A cold snap had set in and the precipitation had turned from rain to snow and ice. All the elephants but one died along with "many men and horses". When the news arrived at Rome that both consuls had been defeated at Ticinus and Trebbia, the population panicked, expecting to see Hannibal at the gates.

By now, the Carthaginians had recovered. Their cavalry isolated both cities, but these were easily supplied by boat up the Po. Sempronius evaded the enemy cavalry to return to Rome and conduct consular elections. The two new consuls elected were Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Haius Flaminus Nepos, the latter of whom would lead the Roman army during the debacle at Lake Trasimene. Meanwhile, they were not scheduled to assume command until 15 March, the first day of the Roman year in 217 BC. Sempronius returned immediately to his command. The new consul-elects recruited more legions of Romans and allies, reinforced Cardinia, Sicily and Corsica, placed garrisons at Tarentum and other places, built a fleet of 60 quinqueremes and established supply depots at Ariminum and Arretium in Etruria in preparation for marching north. They asked for military assistance from Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, and received 1,500 men, because the Romans still hold all territories near Syracusae. Flaminius marched into winter camp at Arretium and Servilius at Ariminum. The Romans had constructed a fortified outpost near Placentia, Emporium ("trading center"). Hannibal decided to test it by attacking at night with cavalry and light infantry, but the sentries were alert. They raised the camp, which shouted so loudly that it could be heard in Placentia. At dawn the next morning, Sempronius' cavalry fell upon the Carthaginians, driving them off and wounding Hannibal slightly. A few days later, Hannibal marched on a supply depot at Victumviae. Its population had been enhanced by anti-Carthaginian refugees from all the Gallic tribes. Untrained, they went out to meet Hannibal as a mob of 35,000 and were shortly driven back into Victumviae, which arranged a formal surrender. As soon as the garrison had turned over its weapons, Hannibal's men on signal took over the town.

For a time the "cold was intolerable" but as spring began to come on Hannibal resolved to attack Etruria following the Trebbia southward. In the Apennines, the army was struck by a thunderstorm of such intensity that they could not pitch camp and when rain turned to hail and snow they put the tents flat and crawled under them. The storm was followed by a cold snap. All the elephants except one, and many of the horses died. After two days Hannibal returned to the Placentia region and camped. Sempronius, in the last of his term as consul, determined to do battle, left Placentia and camped three miles from Hannibal. Hannibal was down to 12,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, perhaps not from casualties, more likely because his army, relying on Gallic allies, was seasonal. Marching the next morning to Tiberius' camp, he was met by the Romans, who drove him back on his camp and then attacked it. Putting the bulk of his men in the center, Hannibal waited for the Roman to break in, but they never managed to do so. When they began to leave at the end of the day Hannibal sallied out in force to attack the Roman rear, hoping to effect a massacre. The fall of night prevented that event. Casualties were equal on both sides. This was the last military engagement of the consular year in Italy, a year of defeats, but perhaps not disastrous, as the next year would be.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 85: Battle of Cissa/Kissa:

The Battle of Cissa in the fall of 219 BC, near the Greek town of Tarraco in north-eastern Iberia took place after the Roman and Massilian armies had arrived over land, supplied from Narbo and Agathe. They easily managed to retake Rhodae and Emporiae and defeat the Garrison troops there, thanks to the help of the pro-Roman, pro-massilian and pro-iberian league factions in the city. While most of the Carthaginian troop under Hasdrubal were far away from the coast to subdue rebellious Hesperian tribes or further south to protect Carthago Nova, as well as the coastal towns on the eastern coast of Hesperia, were a small army under Hanno guarded the region, that Hannibal had conquered last in Iberia. The Romans originally had planned more troops for the Iberian invasion and for an invasion in Libya, but the Punic invasions in Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily as well as Hannibal's march to Italy and the attack of the Gallic Boii and Insubre tribes in northern Italy had prevented their offensive. Part of the great roman fleet was used to raid the supplies for the islands that the Punic had invaded, attack their trade fleets or to simple protect the own coast and fleets against the Carthaginians. Never the less a Roman army of 4,000 Roman and 6,000 allied infantry and 600 Roman and 1,400 allied horse as well as a Massilian army of 8,000 Hoplites and 14,000 allied infantry was escorted to Iberia, escorted by nearly 60 ships along the coast. However, the had attacked Roman colonies, causing part of Romans force to deploy there and fresh legions were raised to replace them, delaying his departure. While Hannibal was marching through Gaul, the Roman Commander had landed with his army at the allied Greek city of Massilia. He then sent a cavalry patrol north, up the eastern bank of the Rhone river, which clashed with a similar force of Hesperian and Numidian light cavalry and, after a hard fought skirmish, drove off the Carthaginians. After that the Romans marched north from their base, while Hannibal marched east towards the Alps. Arriving at the deserted Carthaginian camp, the Roman Commander learned that Hannibal was three day's march away and decided to send part of his his forces to Iberia, while he himself returned to northern Italy to organize the defenses against Hannibal.

Hasdrubal Barca, the younger brother of Hannibal, had two whole armies elephants to guard the Carthaginian possessions south of the Ebro in Hesperia. Hannibal had left a certain Hanno with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to garrison the newly conquered territory north of the Ebro. This Hanno has been identified by various authors as Hannibal’s nephew (the son of Hasdrubal the Fair). The Romans with a total of 20,000 infantry (one Roman and one allied army) 2,200 cavalry and 60 quinqueremes, marched west from Emporiae after passing the Pyrenees mountains and liberating the former Massilian territories there. The Greek cities of Emporiae and Tarraco welcomed the Romans, and the Roman Commander began to win over the Iberian tribes north of the Ebro. Hasdrubal Barca, after being warned of the Roman expedition, marched north with an army to join Hanno. Hanno had been completely surprised by the Roman arrival in Iberia. Seeing the grip of the Carthaginians on the newly conquered Iberian tribes (except the allied Illergetes) loosening because of the activities of Romans, he decided to offer battle, before Hasdrubals supporting army arrived. Hanno marched and attacked the Romans just north of Tarraco, near a place called Cissa or Kissa. There were no brilliant maneuvers or ambushes, the armies formed up and faced off. Being outnumbered two to one, Hanno was defeated relatively easily, losing 6,000 soldiers in battle. Furthermore, the Romans managed to capture the Carthaginian camp, along with 2,000 more soldiers and Hanno himself. The camp contained some the baggage left by Hannibal in his conquest of the region. The prisoners also included Indibilis, an influential Iberian chieftain who would cause severe trouble for the Romans later. The Romans also stormed the town of Cissa, though to the frustration of the Romans it did not contain any valuable booty.

With this battle, the Romans became master of Iberia north of the Ebro, even with some tribes still revolting against their rule. Hasdrubal, arriving too late to aid Hanno and -thanks to other insurgences in Hesperia that he had send armies to- not being strong enough to attack the Romans, still crossed the river and sent a flying column of light cavalry and infantry on a raid. This force caught some Roman sailors foraging and inflicted such casualties that the effectiveness of the Roman/Massilian fleet in Iberia was reduced from 60 to 35 ships. The Roman fleet, however still tried to raid the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia. Roman prestige was re-established in Iberia, while the Carthaginians had suffered a significant blow. After punishing the officers in charge of the naval contingent for their lax discipline, the Roman army wintered at Tarraco, now headquartor of supplies and command in the Iberian Theatre of War. Hasdrubal retired to Carthago Nova after strengthening the garrisons in allied towns south of the Ebro and planned how to push the Romans out of Hesperia after the upcoming winter.

If Hanno somehow had won the battle, it might have been possible for Hannibal to get reinforcements from Carthaginian Hesperia as early as 218 BC. This battle brought the same results for the Romans in Iberia as the Battle of the Trebia brought for Hannibal in Italy: securing a base of operation, and winning over some of the native tribes as a source of provisions and recruits, also cutting off the overland communication of Hannibal from his base in Hesperia. Unlike Hannibal, the Roman Commander in Iberia did not immediately launch a major campaign on enemy territory south of the river. Nor would he cut loose from his base like Hannibal did in the near future. Instead the Romans took time to consolidate their new holdings, subjugate or befriend Iberian tribes and raid Carthaginian territory.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 86: Hannibal crosses the Apennines:

Hannibal's war was not against Italy, but against Rome he declared the released Italian prisoners that their hometowns and homeland would be restored to their ancient independence and their ancient boundaries. His former Italian prisoners thereby deliverer his message against Rome with their own release, filled with revenge against the city of Rome. As the winter of 219 BC ended Hannibal searched for a route through the difficult defiles of the Apennines. The Roman Army in Etruscia, near Arretium (Arezzo), intended to move from there to Lucca, to protect the vale of the Arnus (Arno) as well as the passes of the Apennines, but Hannibal anticipated that move. The passing of the Apennines would prove to be difficult and under much suffering mostly the allied Gallic infantry that marched in the middle of Hannibal's army, would undoubtedly have dispersed, but the Carthaginian cavalry under Mago at the rear prevented that. Many horses would dye on this difficult passage and Hannibal himself would later lose an eye in consequence of ophthalmia.

After the Battle of the Trebia, Hannibal wanted to attack the remaining Roman forces, but they had left and he was too late. The main Roman army was already gone but a detachment of a few hundred men was left behind to guard the bridge until the rest of their army had passed and then had to destroy it so Hannibal couldn't use it anymore. They managed to do so in time but had no chance to get across the river themselves, so Hannibal took them all prisoners. The ideas and plans of Hannibal and Roman had changed drastically. Many tribes and cities former loyal to Rome in Gallia Cisalpina that had been subjects or allies of the Romans, now turned to Hannibal's side. They all sent embassies into his camp, offering him their friendship and alliance after his recent victories. Hannibal received them, but he was too sagacious to admit such a treacherous horde into his army. He treated them with great consideration and kindness, and dismissed them with presents, that they might all go to their respective homes, charging them to exert their influence in his favor among the tribes to which they severally belonged. Hannibal's soldiers, too, were very much encouraged by the commencement they had made. The army made immediate preparations for crossing the river. Some of the soldiers built rafts, others went up the stream in search of places to ford. Some swam across. They could adopt these or any other modes in safety, for the Romans made no stand on the opposite bank to oppose them, but moved rapidly on, as fast as the wounded Romans could be carried.

It was now December, too late for Hannibal to attempt to advance much further that season, and yet the way before him was open to the Apennines, by the defeat of the Roman army, for neither of their armies could now hope to make another stand against him till they should receive new re-enforcements from Rome. During the winter months Hannibal had various battles and adventures, sometimes with portions and detachments of the Roman army, and sometimes with the native tribes. He was sometimes in great difficulty for want of food for his army, until at length he bribed the governor of a castle, where a Roman granary was kept, to deliver it up to him, and after that he was well supplied. The natives of the country were, however, not at all well disposed toward him, and in the course of the winter they attempted to impede his operations, and to harass his army by every means in their power. Finding his situation uncomfortable, he moved on toward the south, and at length determined that, inclement as the season was, he would cross the Apennines. By looking at the map of Italy, it will be seen that the great valley of the Po extends across the whole north of Italy. The valley of the Arno and of the Umbro lies south of it, separated from it by a part of the Apennine chain. This southern valley was Etruria. Hannibal decided to attempt to pass over the mountains into Etruria. He thought he should find there a warmer climate, and inhabitants more well-disposed toward him, besides being so much nearer Rome. Hannibal planned on coordinating a land and sea attack. With his army coming from the north and a Carthaginian fleet from Libya, Corsica, Sardinia or anywhere else from the Mare Tyrrhenum and the Mare Ligusticus. With this combined attack, Hannibal hoped he could gain the support of the Etruscans in Etruria, former a independent federation of cities and as much trade partners of Carthage as their rivals before the rise of the City of Rome in central Italy. With the support of some of the Etrurian cities to his cause, Hannibal would be able to rise and support a even stronger army with a base of operations near Rome he hoped. The Romans on the other hand hold one of their armies near Arretium, marching over Florentia to Lucca to guard the western and southern pass of the Apennines near the Mare Tyrrhenum coast an into Etruria. On the other coast at the Mare Adriaticum another Roman army was waiting for Hannibal in Ariminum to block his patch east of the Apennines. After the last losses against Hannibal in Iberia and northern Italy the Romans feared that Hannibal's destructive path against Rome would continue and he would march directly onto Rome. To prevent this from happening the Romans hoped to stop him from entering central Italy, but to do so they had to raise fresh troops or order some of these in Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Iberia to return home to Italy.

But, though Hannibal conquered the Alps, the Apennines conquered him. A very violent storm arose just as he reached the most exposed place among the mountains. It was intensely cold, and the wind blew the hail and snow directly into the faces of the troops, so that it was impossible for them to proceed. They halted and turned their backs to the storm, but the wind increased more and more, and was attended with terrific thunder and lightning, which filled the soldiers with alarm, as they were at such an altitude as to be themselves enveloped in the clouds from which the peals and flashes were emitted. Unwilling to retreat, Hannibal ordered the army to encamp on the spot, in the best shelter they could find. They attempted, accordingly, to pitch their tents, but it was impossible to secure them. The wind increased to a hurricane. The tent poles were unmanageable, and the canvas was carried away from its fastenings, and sometimes split or blown into rags by its flapping in the wind. The poor elephants, that is, all that were left of them from previous battles and exposures, sunk down under this intense cold and died. One only remained alive. Hannibal ordered a retreat, and the army went back into the valley of the Po. But Hannibal was ill at ease here. The natives of the country were very weary of his presence. His army consumed their food, ravaged their country, and destroyed all their peace and happiness. Hannibal suspected them of a design to poison him or assassinate him in some other way. He was continually watching and taking precautions against these attempts. He had a great many different dresses made to be used as disguises, and false hair of different colors and fashion, so that he could alter his appearance at pleasure. This was to prevent any spy or assassin who might come into his camp from identifying him by any description of his dress and appearance. Still, notwithstanding these precautions, he was ill at ease, and at the very earliest practicable period in the spring he made a new attempt to cross the mountains, and was now successful.

On descending the southern declivities of the Apennines he learned that a new Roman army, under a new consul, was advancing toward him from the south. He was eager to meet this force, and was preparing to press forward at once by the nearest way. He found, however, that this would lead him across the lower part of the valley of the Arno, which was here very broad, and, though usually passable, was now overflowed in consequence of the swelling of the waters of the river by the melting of the snows upon the mountains. The whole country was now, in fact, a vast expanse of marshes and fens. Still, Hannibal concluded to cross it, and, in the attempt, he involved his army in difficulties and dangers as great, almost, as he had encountered upon the Alps. The waters were rising continually; they filled all the channels and spread over extended plains. They were so turbid, too, that every thing beneath the surface was concealed, and the soldiers wading in them were continually sinking into deep and sudden channels and into bogs of mire, where many were lost. They were all exhausted and worn out by the wet and cold, and the long continuance of their exposure to it. They were four days and three nights in this situation, as their progress was, of course, extremely slow. The men, during all this time, had scarcely any sleep, and in some places the only way by which they could get any repose was to lay their arms and their baggage in the standing water, so as to build, by this means, a sort of couch or platform on which they could lie. Hannibal himself was sick too. He was attacked with a violent inflammation of the eyes, and the sight of one of them was in the end destroyed. He was not, however, so much exposed as the other officers; for there was one elephant left of all those that had commenced the march in Spain, and Hannibal rode this elephant during the four days' march through the water. There were guides and attendants to precede him, for the purpose of finding a safe and practicable road, and by their aid, with the help of the animal's sagacity, he got safely through.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 87: The Siege of Akragas/Agrigentum:

(first the map of Akragas/Agrigentum, second the Punic siege camps around the city, third the battle of the Battle of the Grass Plains and last the Roman counter camps to relief the city)

The siege of Akragas took place when the Roman held and rebuild city of Akragas (Agrigentum) was besieged by the army of Hanno the Short who had completed his siege equipment during the winter of 219 BC and was now attacking in the beginning of Spring in 218 BC. Knowing that the supplies of the city of Akragas would be short after supporting their entire population of 200,000 people, their guard of 10,000 – 20,000 citizens and some mercenaries or freed slaves as well as the additional former 10,000 Legionaries and 600 cavalry within the city walls. The walls and defenses themselves had been rebuild like the city and improved under the command of Tiberius Sempronius Longus who fortified the city with additional ditches, Cervi (Branches projecting horizontal from the wooden wall), Cippi (Tree branches partly buried in trenches) as well as Lilia (sharp stacks in a small pit) and Stimuli (barbed hooks in the ground). Hanno's elephants helped his army to move the heavy siege equipment from Heraclea to Akragas, while Hanno's army swelled up to 31,400 infantry and 7,250 cavalry thanks to reinforces from Carthage, new soldiers and mercenaries from cities that had until now sided with Carthage on Sicily as well as from mercenaries from outside of Sicily (mostly from Greece and the Hellenic world, but also many from Hesperia, Libya and Gaul). Hanno the Short hoped that the greater Roman army and the garrison of Akragas could be enclosed inside the city and starved out to weaken them before the direct attack. The city of Syracuse send a few thousand Hoplites and mercenaries to help their Roman allies in Sicily against Carthage, but kept their main army and fleet to defend the east coast with their own territory and their capital itself. At the same time they expanded their army with new recruits and expended their fleet with new build ships to support Rome and to stand against the Punic fleet in Sicily on their own if needed.

Rome and Syracuse had helped with strengthening the defenses of Akragas as the major southern city of Sicily and one of the biggest and most important cities in the whole island right after the Carthaginians had taken Lilybaeum. They even appealed to other cities in Hellas and Magna Graecia and many mercenaries from all over the Hellenic world. Thanks to that the war of Rome and Syracuse against Carthage in Sicily became also another war amount Greeks, now even more than ever before. Over 2,300 Hoplites joined the combined Roman/Syracusean army that marched towards Akragas to help defending the city. Hanno the Short in the meantime ordered a fleet of triremes to block the southern river and any possibility to supply the city by sea. Hanno set up tree camp sides, that encircled the city and cut it of from supplies before they could harvest the fields and live without their gathered supply after the winter. The Carthaginians hoped that they could starve out the city or take it by siege before the Roman/Syracusian support army could arrive. Some of the reinforcements were arriving fast by ships coming from sea over the Akragas river. In the first Battle of Akragas between the Sicilian Greeks and the Carthaginians had an army of 60,000 and a fleet of 120 triremes together with 1,000 transports and only faced Syracusae and the Greeks allied to the city. Hanno the Short had a much smaller army and a much smaller fleet and was not only facing Syracusae this time but the mighty Roman Republic that had all of Italian peninsula for supplies. Much like Hannibal, Hanno realized that he had to be faster, more tricky and much smarter than his enemies to defend their overwhelming number and succeed in taking Sicily. Once the Island would be his he could directly threaten the rest of Magna Graecia from Sicily. But before he could do so he had to take the great city of Akragas and the even bigger and better defended city of Syracusae with the main army and fleet of Syracuse there. Hanno's army had spears, shields, lances, javelin, stones and other weapons. Even if part of his army was made up by mercenaries, most of them were professional soldiers, more disciplined, well trained and with a stronger cavalry than their Syracusean and even Roman counterparts. Hanno the Short even had some war chariots in his army but he relied more on his heavy siege equipment.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 88: The Battles of the Eleutherus River:

Along the Eleutherus river the Romans had crated a fortification, some kind of limes to stop any further Punic advance in the north of Scily. The Greek Mercenary Proxiancos, now Commander of the Carthaginian forces in northern Sicily, had prepared a attack on this fortified position along the river, by secretly building a dam to retain the river. Then as masses of water had secretly swelled behind the am, Proxiancos led his soldiers destroy it and thereby flooding the Eleutherus river down to the sea. The flood washed away parts of the Roman fortifications and killed many Romans stationed there and in the nearby camps at the evening. The Romans panicked and were weakened, in the beginning of he night when they tried to repair he damage or a natural disaster as they live the flood to be, Proxiancos attacked. His soldiers stormed the damaged roman walls that were jet not fully repaired and pushed into the enemy defense. As the Romans started a counterattack from their camps, Proxiancos managed to encircle them with his cavalry and parts of his infantry. Thanks to he Greek Mercenaries Command and his Hesperian and Libyan cavalry, he managed to hold the majority of the Roman support troops back long enough to finish of the Roman troops directly at the wall. Proxiancos hard and forward attack costed him all but tree elephants and many of his cavalry, but he managed to kill nearly most Romans at the wall and nearly all Romans from the camps that tried to support them. This victory opened the way to Soloeis for the Carthaginian army, but it was a Pyrrhic victory because Proxiancos lost so many elephants and most of his cavalry as well as half of his infantry. When the main Roman army marched from Soloeis to confront the now weakened Punic troops, Proxiancos was sure that he could use the remains of the former roman fortification to his own defense in the battle and defeat the second Roman army too. He positioned the Hoplites and the smaller spear infantry to hold he gaps in the defense and held his other troops as reserves. They tried to hold the Romans off and Proxiancos remaining cavalry managed to crush part of the Romans cavalry and even encircle some of their forces that were spread out to surround the Punic army completely. After defeating many Romans, Proxiancos Punic forces were overwhelmed by the superior Roman numbers and had to retread under heavy causalities, but the Romans lost many troops to the Carthaginians too.

 

[CountofDooku]

Chapter 89: Hannibal in Etruria:

Hannibals campaign in Etruria was about to face serious Roman resistance and a Roman army much greater than his own forces. Hannibal's plan thereby relied on the people of Etruria, former settlers from Greek and later invaders from Gaul. They established the Etruscan Confederacy and were a great power and rival of Carthage before Rome became a strong power in Italy. But after crossing the Apennines thinks didn't go as planned, as Hannibal's army looted the area but he didn't manage to bring any major Etruscan city to aid his side or to ally with him, as he had managed with the Gallic tribes in the Po Valley. This outcome and the Etruscan loyalty to Rome throughout the war would greatly influence Hannibal later in the peace talks with Rome and would be one of the reasons he would be called a traitor and expelled from Carthage later. Some Carthaginian Senators and the second Shophet later wanted to weaken the imperialistic Roman Republic as much as possible and give independence to all provinces and tribes outside of Latinum, while Hannibal wanted the more loyal Roman lands like Latium, Picenum, Umbria and Etruria to stay a part of Rome, so that they could serve as a opposition to the Samnite League ambitions in central Italy and the ambitions of the Hellenic Polis (as well as the Hellenic League) in southern Italy after the war, so no new hegemony in Italy would arise any time soon.

Since Hannibal could not hope on any supplies from the Etruscans as he had hoped, he had to rely on support from Carthage by fleet only. A Carthaginian fleet under Hamilbal the Fast with 60 triremes and 400 transports had the order to take the western route from Carthage trought the Mare Sardoum. This fleet had orders to support the Carthaginian armies in Sardinia and Corsica over their western coasts with new supplies and thousands of fresh troops, but the main goal was to land a whole army of fresh and well trained Hesperian and Libyan troops for Hannibal's Italian campaign in Etruria to join with his main forces there. After that the fleet had orders to raid the Etrurian coast and sail back to Carthage, but this plan wasn't going as planned just like Hannibal's other Etrurian plan. Instead of weakening the Roman position in Etruria from land and sea and maybe even getting some of the cities to side with his cause Hannibal saw himself in a very bad position as the Romans managed to intercept the Force of Hamilbal the fast before his transports arrived in Etruria. While some the warships in Hamilbals fleet still managed to raid parts pf the Etrurian coast before the Romans engaged them in a devastating battle, the main goal to land reinforcements for Hannibal was prevented. Hannibal himself was thereby forced to raid Etruria to support his troops with supplies, a method not helping him win any Etruscan hearts. While the Romans feared that Hannibal would march on Rome itself, the Punic Commander feared, that the Roman armies would now encircle and defeat him in Etruria with their superior numbers. Cut off from supplies, Hannibal was now forced to march thought the Plestine marches that would offer him the shortest way to Rome. The Roman army of 30,000 men guarding the interior of Italy with, learning of the rapidity of Hannibal's movement, changed their own position hastily, giving Hannibal's army no chance to rest. They caught up with Hannibal near Lake Trasimene where the spotted Hannibal camping with his army and decided to attack him immediately before he could escape again.