BREAKING THE MOUND: THE BIRTH AND RISE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
It's an interesting start - a more prominent role for Dickson Mabon means he may well win Renfrew West & Inverclyde in 1983.
Jenkins thought it was getting tougher for the SDP even by the time of his win in Hillhead in January 1982. I was a Liberal activist in London at the time and I remember canvassing in early March for the local elections and going down a road which had always been 75% Conservative. I had no idea how soft the Conservative vote had become with the arrival of the SDP - the returns after suggested the Conservative vote had disintegrated to the SDP.
I've little doubt had the Falklands Conflict not intervened, the 1982 London local elections would have been disastrous for the Conservatives and Labour. In OTL, the vote share was CON 42, LAB 30, Alliance 25. It's entirely possible the Alliance would have outpolled the other two parties and perhaps gained 500 Council seats rather than 100 putting it in a strong position to challenge in seats like Sutton & Cheam in a future GE.
Jenkins thought it was getting tougher for the SDP even by the time of his win in Hillhead in January 1982. I was a Liberal activist in London at the time and I remember canvassing in early March for the local elections and going down a road which had always been 75% Conservative. I had no idea how soft the Conservative vote had become with the arrival of the SDP - the returns after suggested the Conservative vote had disintegrated to the SDP.
I've little doubt had the Falklands Conflict not intervened, the 1982 London local elections would have been disastrous for the Conservatives and Labour. In OTL, the vote share was CON 42, LAB 30, Alliance 25. It's entirely possible the Alliance would have outpolled the other two parties and perhaps gained 500 Council seats rather than 100 putting it in a strong position to challenge in seats like Sutton & Cheam in a future GE.
Deleted member 157939
One could say they're already doing that at the present
Deleted member 157939
Hello everybody, thank you very much for your kind words and thoughts. In the next update, I intend to explore the MPs response to Benn's election as leader. However I am at an impasse on what exact direction to take. Therefore I've made a poll as a source of inspiration. Thank you once again!
Deleted member 157939
Ann Carlton, an advisor to Silkin, recounts in a New Statesman article on how after Eric Heffer withdrew his name, Neil Kinnock was suggested as a candidate. The proposal fizzled down, with Kinnock leaving the meeting, as senior left-wingers argued he would not attract enough votes to be credible. Silkin would later reluctantly agree to contest the race.
ATL Kinnock is eventually agreed upon, despite fierce arguments against his candidacy. He fails to attract as many MPs as Silkin did OTL, serving as one of the factors that allowed Benn to clench a narrow victory.
here is the article in case you are interested. https://www.newstatesman.com/politi...enn-s-deputy-leadership-campaign-was-defeated
Going for the jugular I see. Some fine and ugly choices to make here, and in Brighton. Not all the MPs will do the same thing. Some moderates may well get in their cars and drive home and plot from there, either leaving the party and retiring or defecting. Some will look to the big beasts to form a group and begin a plan to fight back with the creation of a Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party. And most will be lost at sea. Peter Shore, Roy Hattersley, young(ish) John Smith and two dozen others were already discussing a UDI of sorts as a last-ditch plan prior to the vote, murmuring how far to take it (proclaim loyalty to Foot as the Leader but make their own Deputy Leader, or go even further and elect their own Leader and Deputy Leader and only recognize Foot and Benn in relation to their roles within the NEC). Now they have more ammunition. It'll be a very busy night at the Old Ship bar at Brighton. How far is Kinnock prepared to go, and when is he prepared to do it? How much of a civil war will occur within Tribune Group and who will take what side? What will happen to the something like 60 moderate and soft-left MPs who went on record as voting against Benn while their own constituencies backed him? And, what of the NEC elections?
Deleted member 157939
Thank you very much for your feedback! I plan to address all these points in the next update 😁
Good luck, and stay safe. Looking forward to the return of this timeline.
Before the Shit hits the Fan
Deleted member 157939
The aftermath of the Brighton conference would confirm the Gang of Four's foreboding warning as Labour faced the gravest crisis of its history. For six miserable months, the party found itself trapped in a deeply rancorous contest for the deputy leadership. To the horror of right-wingers and the emerging "soft" inside left, Tony Benn would clench a wafer-thin victory over incumbent Denis Healey. In yet another triumphant display, the outside left secured a tide of left-wing initiatives while asserting control of the leadership. The ramifications of Benn's victory would decimate any semblance of internal cohesion within Labour. At a meeting of Consensus affiliated MPs immediately after the conference, a proposal suggesting the publication of a statement affirming loyalty to Labour was notably met with an uncomfortable silence.
Over the course of the next four months, the party would suffer a haemorrhage of defections. A total of twenty three Labour MPs would resign the whip, with the spectacle of a steady progression of Labourites settling into the SDP ranks serving to bolster the momentum of the burgeoning party. By February 1982, the SDP parliamentary group had grown from seventeen to forty-five. The defectors did not abandon Labour solely due to the events of the Brighton conference, however it was invariably a major factor. Many had come to the same conclusion as the founders of the SDP: the position of the Labour right was feeble and that a fightback had become virtually impossible. Exhaustion with the internal state of the party, coupled with the frightening prospect of the detested Benn (whose challenge was considered a forerunner to an inevitable leadership contest) being in such close proximity to the leadership, had rendered Labour intolerable for many social democrats. However the mass exodus that Labour endured did not entirely settle in the SDP, a significant number of disillusioned MPs, trade-unionists, members, activists and councillors, opted to retire from politics, reasoning that a further breakaway would only serve to the benefit of the Conservatives or end up strengthening the Labour left.
On the second October, twenty eight MPs would convene at Westminster Hall. Spearheaded by Consensus chairmen Peter Shore and Roy Hattersley, the meeting had been called to discuss the prospect of a "UDI" within the PLP, in which MPs would 'secede" from the Conference and elect their own Deputy Leader. Initially having been proposed as a final resort prior to the election, the rapid developments of the annual conference had once again completely transformed the situation within Labour. Brighton had seen motions carried calling for a variety of unacceptable left wing policies to right-wingers. Most alarmingly the Conference's commitment to the future "democratisation" of NEC and Parliamentary Committee/Shadow Cabinet elections was presumed to entail reforming the elections to be voted on by the conference/the rank and file membership. This proposal would almost certainly produce an ostensibly left-wing Shadow Cabinet and NEC, while diluting the sovereignty of the PLP. Furthermore as a majority of the PLP had voted against Benn, his victory was perceived as an imposition on MP's contrary to their own preference. Right-wingers would argue this set a dangerous precedent, vindicating their previous reservations against the electoral college.
The participants, later dubbed the "Secessionists," at the meeting would come to the agreement that the only way to counter the outside left's consolidation of power and to prevent the further dilution of the PLP's authority was to take radical action. Calls existed for a "hard" secession, advocates of such favoured a total breakaway of the PLP, in which MPs would elect their own Leader and Deputy, while recognising Benn and Foot solely in their capacity as members of the NEC. Others would propose a "soft" secession, in which the PLP would proclaim loyalty to Foot yet would elect its own Deputy leader. It was recognised however that any sort of attempt to contest the results of the college would be extremely ill-received by the rank and file membership and the Labour left as whole. Without left-wing support, the proposed PLP election could be perceived as a right-wing coup therefore diminishing its legitimacy. As a result the softer approach would be favoured in an attempt to attract a broader group of support, seeking to appeal to inside left MPs with like-minded views on parliamentary sovereignty. With an emergency session of the PLP scheduled for the fifth of October, rapid preparations would begin in drafting an open letter/statement to submit to Foot, the NEC and the national press.
Over the course of the next four months, the party would suffer a haemorrhage of defections. A total of twenty three Labour MPs would resign the whip, with the spectacle of a steady progression of Labourites settling into the SDP ranks serving to bolster the momentum of the burgeoning party. By February 1982, the SDP parliamentary group had grown from seventeen to forty-five. The defectors did not abandon Labour solely due to the events of the Brighton conference, however it was invariably a major factor. Many had come to the same conclusion as the founders of the SDP: the position of the Labour right was feeble and that a fightback had become virtually impossible. Exhaustion with the internal state of the party, coupled with the frightening prospect of the detested Benn (whose challenge was considered a forerunner to an inevitable leadership contest) being in such close proximity to the leadership, had rendered Labour intolerable for many social democrats. However the mass exodus that Labour endured did not entirely settle in the SDP, a significant number of disillusioned MPs, trade-unionists, members, activists and councillors, opted to retire from politics, reasoning that a further breakaway would only serve to the benefit of the Conservatives or end up strengthening the Labour left.
On the second October, twenty eight MPs would convene at Westminster Hall. Spearheaded by Consensus chairmen Peter Shore and Roy Hattersley, the meeting had been called to discuss the prospect of a "UDI" within the PLP, in which MPs would 'secede" from the Conference and elect their own Deputy Leader. Initially having been proposed as a final resort prior to the election, the rapid developments of the annual conference had once again completely transformed the situation within Labour. Brighton had seen motions carried calling for a variety of unacceptable left wing policies to right-wingers. Most alarmingly the Conference's commitment to the future "democratisation" of NEC and Parliamentary Committee/Shadow Cabinet elections was presumed to entail reforming the elections to be voted on by the conference/the rank and file membership. This proposal would almost certainly produce an ostensibly left-wing Shadow Cabinet and NEC, while diluting the sovereignty of the PLP. Furthermore as a majority of the PLP had voted against Benn, his victory was perceived as an imposition on MP's contrary to their own preference. Right-wingers would argue this set a dangerous precedent, vindicating their previous reservations against the electoral college.
The participants, later dubbed the "Secessionists," at the meeting would come to the agreement that the only way to counter the outside left's consolidation of power and to prevent the further dilution of the PLP's authority was to take radical action. Calls existed for a "hard" secession, advocates of such favoured a total breakaway of the PLP, in which MPs would elect their own Leader and Deputy, while recognising Benn and Foot solely in their capacity as members of the NEC. Others would propose a "soft" secession, in which the PLP would proclaim loyalty to Foot yet would elect its own Deputy leader. It was recognised however that any sort of attempt to contest the results of the college would be extremely ill-received by the rank and file membership and the Labour left as whole. Without left-wing support, the proposed PLP election could be perceived as a right-wing coup therefore diminishing its legitimacy. As a result the softer approach would be favoured in an attempt to attract a broader group of support, seeking to appeal to inside left MPs with like-minded views on parliamentary sovereignty. With an emergency session of the PLP scheduled for the fifth of October, rapid preparations would begin in drafting an open letter/statement to submit to Foot, the NEC and the national press.
Last edited by a moderator:
First, it's great to see this timeline return - it's started very strongly and I'm looking forward to seeing where it goes.
Two observations - first, don't forget up to three quarters of the SDP's original members hadn't been in any party. It's easy to see the fate and future of the SDP through the prism of the impact on Labour but it did and would impact the other parties. The new recruits were enthusiastic but completely politically naive - the new party couldn't really make best use of the groundswell of support and interest which would fade with the coming of winter and later the Falklands conflict.
Second, an SDP of 45 MPs has consequences for the Liberals - Cyril Smith famously wanted the SDP to "be strangled at birth" and for those Liberal activists who had fought Labour in the north and midlands, having to ally with some of the former enemy was always going to be difficult.
That was less of an issue for those Liberals who faced the Conservatives and these welcomed the new influx of helpers and activists and money. Relations between the Liberals and SDP were therefore mixed and patchy - in some areas, the two parties worked together well from the start, in others there was an intense and often personal rivalry.
Steel and Jenkins got along very well and most Liberals admired Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers. Owen was always the problem - he never took to the Liberals and the Liberals never took to him. To be fair, I did hear Owen speak very fondly of Jo Grimond which won him a lot of respect.
Two observations - first, don't forget up to three quarters of the SDP's original members hadn't been in any party. It's easy to see the fate and future of the SDP through the prism of the impact on Labour but it did and would impact the other parties. The new recruits were enthusiastic but completely politically naive - the new party couldn't really make best use of the groundswell of support and interest which would fade with the coming of winter and later the Falklands conflict.
Second, an SDP of 45 MPs has consequences for the Liberals - Cyril Smith famously wanted the SDP to "be strangled at birth" and for those Liberal activists who had fought Labour in the north and midlands, having to ally with some of the former enemy was always going to be difficult.
That was less of an issue for those Liberals who faced the Conservatives and these welcomed the new influx of helpers and activists and money. Relations between the Liberals and SDP were therefore mixed and patchy - in some areas, the two parties worked together well from the start, in others there was an intense and often personal rivalry.
Steel and Jenkins got along very well and most Liberals admired Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers. Owen was always the problem - he never took to the Liberals and the Liberals never took to him. To be fair, I did hear Owen speak very fondly of Jo Grimond which won him a lot of respect.
Deleted member 157939
Thank you very much for the feedback!
The next few updates will focus primarily on the crisis within the two mainstream parties. I do intend to adress the dynamics and relationship between the Liberals and SDP.
I agree with Stodge that a greater contingent of Labour defectors will certainly have an impact on the SDP's relationship with the Liberals. It will depend on which seats the defectors belong to (Lib-Lab contests or Lib-Con contests) and some of those relationships will definitely be tricky to manage. It's going to be interesting how the differing opinions within the Gang of Five and the wider SDP play out in this TL, towards not only co-operation with the Liberals but also which other party to support in a hung parliament, defence and a host of other issues.
Could the larger number of sitting MPs lead to a greater level of professionalism in the SDP campaigns and therefore a more successful ground game etc?
Then again, if the Falklands War still happens and then proceeds to go badly for Thatcher's government, that might be enough to paper over the cracks and the SDP rides in thanks to everyone else being so unpopular...
Keep it up!!!
Could the larger number of sitting MPs lead to a greater level of professionalism in the SDP campaigns and therefore a more successful ground game etc?
Then again, if the Falklands War still happens and then proceeds to go badly for Thatcher's government, that might be enough to paper over the cracks and the SDP rides in thanks to everyone else being so unpopular...
Keep it up!!!