Bicentennial Man: Ford '76 and Beyond

Exit the ARENA

Like many Latin American countries in the 1960s and early 1970s, Brazil had been no stranger to a populist, ostensibly left-wing government coming to power and then being ousted in a coup by a conservative military, a common story whose Lusophone chapter was written in 1964 when Joao Goulart was overthrown in a putsch organized in part with quiet American acquiescence. The Brazilian military junta had operated somewhat differently from many of its peers, however, in forming its "National Renewal Alliance," or ARENA, as a governing body, legalizing a mainstream (albeit conservative) opposition, and by the standards of thugs like Pinochet, Videla and Stroessner it was fairly moderate, even as ARENA exiled and arbitrarily tortured dissidents and killed somewhere in the vicinity of four hundred opposition members extrajudicially. Part of the reason it was able to operate this way was the remarkable "Brazilian Miracle" of the 1970s in which Brazil enjoyed Latin America's highest growth rates and strongest economy, and despite strict censorship and coziness of media outfits such as TV Globo with the state, a thriving civil society based in the expanding middle class emerged by the late 1970s to allow the outwardly moderate Joao Figuerido to become President of Brazil in 1979 and continue the slow re-democratization process begun under his immediate predecessor and mentor Ernesto Geisel over the previous six years, including a moderate response to massive labor strikes.

The oil shocks of 1978 and 1979 badly damaged Brazil's economy, however, much more so than the 1973 oil crisis that had shaken confidence in Latin America. The Decada Perdida may not have been as severe or long-lasting in Brazil, but it struck nonetheless, and even as Figuerido attempted to transition the country gradually under the new umbrella party "PDS" - Democratic Social Party, effectively a rebranded ARENA - the steady economic growth and rising standards of living on which the Brazilian dictatorship had made the backbone of its credibility with the public ended. By late 1981, Brazil's economy was not just sagging but collapsing, and it was overshadowed only by true basket cases like neighboring Argentina and Chile or Mexico, which had entered sovereign default in the summer of 1980 and seemed to be tripling down on its disastrous economic policies [1]. As of the spring of 1982, Brazil was the world's largest debtor, with soaring inflation that the government was forced to combat with extremely harsh austerity measures that drove many of the millions lifted out of poverty during the Brazilian Miracle back into destitution.

The timing for this economic conflagration was poor, as it coincided nearly exactly with the 1982 Congressional and state elections that the newly-legalized opposition intended to directly contest. While labor strikes were still led by the fiery young leftist Lula da Silva, more institutional opposition had consolidated around the figure of Leonel Brizola, who had returned from exile to take back control of the Labor Party of Brazil, or PTB, [2] and presenting an updated and democratized version of Getulio Vargas' program of trabalhismo, a democratic socialist but non-communist left-wing agenda centered in a Brazilian, Christian and populist context - exactly the kind of thinking popular with devoutly Catholic Brazil, in which Vargas' Estado Novo and its remarkable progress still was hugely popular. The other component of the opposition was the more traditionally liberal "big tent" progressive democratic outfit Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB, headed up by Tancredo Neves and Ulysses Guimaraes. These men were more intellectual, lawyerly, establishmentarian figures nonetheless firmly opposed to the furtherance of the PDS-led regime, which was widely expected to transition to civilian rule once Figuerido's term ended in 1985.

The stakes in 1982 were thus very high. It remained to be seen who, exactly, would lead the opposition into this bold new era for Brazil as democratization loomed on the horizon by largely peaceful means (in contrast to Argentina, where civil war between the opposition and junta had been narrowly avoided in 1979). An opposition victory could lead to direct elections for the Presidency, and perhaps a new constitution; an opposition victory was also likely necessary to correct some of the economic malaise that was rapidly compounding. Neves and Guimaraes thus cut a deal that the former would be the formal party leader but the latter would head up the bloc in Congress should it be successful; they were given a huge boost when Brizola announced he would not run candidates in constituencies in which PMDB was likely to carry, in order to prevent splitting the vote.

PDS made a bevy of mistakes as well; first and foremost, they anointed as their standard-bearer the cartoonishly corrupt Paulo Maluf, a Lebanese-Brazilian apparatchik from Sao Paulo who had served as both mayor and governor and ran on a brasher, more populist brand of conservatism meant to appeal to middle class appetites and show what PDS was capable of without being an explicitly military party. Maluf's candidature, despite remarkably favorable media coverage from the military-aligned news stations, became a lightning rod for the opposition.

The elections of 1982 thus ended with the PMDB on 245 seats, enough to form a majority on their own, and PDS under 200; Brizola's PTB took 34 seats in the Congress, thus making it a plainly junior partner to Guimaraes, who was made Speaker, but a partner nonetheless that could lock PDS out. What really effected the vote results, though, were the mass defeats of PDS governors in several states, thus ensuring the opposition a coalition of 13 Senators to the government's 11. Brazilians, by the millions, rejoiced in the streets; the democratic transition had seemingly arrived years earlier than thought possible, and Figuerido pointedly resisted calls to send tanks into the streets to contest the results, in part thanks to crucial pressure and support from Washington for the continued transition.

Democracy, eighteen years later, was returning to Brazil - and the elections of 1985, when Congress would theoretically elect a new President unless the law was changed, loomed large...

[1] More on this later
[2] The butterfly here is he actually gets the old party back rather than seeing Ivete Vargas in charge
Ooooooo.....Brazil seems to be in a different....but familiar path.....
Hmmm...no idea what to comment actually....

BTW, yeah Carey presidency could be in tatters if the relationship problem is as IOTL....
 
Relationship drama aside, what I find interesting is that we see the next big global period of economic instability won't occur until there's a Republican back in the White House. While the Democrats are going to attrition pretty hard in the back half of their 12 years of Presidential control (I think 1982 will go well for them and let Carey finish out his first term strong), they may be back in the majorty before the new millenium. Republican control of Congress, especially the House will probably end at the 6 year itch in 98' for Mr. GOP 1992.
Indeed. 97 will be a lot worse than 94, too, for whatever it’s worth

My father-in-law is Irish Catholic and one of sixteen! My wife has something like sixty five first cousins lol. So yeah, can confirm.
Holy shit hahaha
Ooooooo.....Brazil seems to be in a different....but familiar path.....
Hmmm...no idea what to comment actually....

BTW, yeah Carey presidency could be in tatters if the relationship problem is as IOTL....
A great TL
 
I wonder what the GOP's general path will be after 1988. I guess that there are several key factors of the TL to be decided before we can even talk about how TTL GOP will be compared to the OTL GOP, nevertheless, I do think that a more Tory-like GOP is possible, perhaps they go down a path similar to that of David Cameron's compassionate conservatism?
 
I wonder what the GOP's general path will be after 1988. I guess that there are several key factors of the TL to be decided before we can even talk about how TTL GOP will be compared to the OTL GOP, nevertheless, I do think that a more Tory-like GOP is possible, perhaps they go down a path similar to that of David Cameron's compassionate conservatism?
@KingSweden24 can correct me if I am wrong, but I seem to recall that the plan was for the GOP to lurch further to the right and return to the White House in 1993.
 
I do think that a more Tory-like GOP is possible, perhaps they go down a path similar to that of David Cameron's compassionate conservatism?
I tend to see it trending to be tory-like too and taking on a more of a chris christie-like type of conservatism which is similar to Ford’s where instead of saying “We can’t give people too much government because they’ll get fat and lazy, welfare queen blah blah blah” , it will be more like “Look at the deficit democrats are running with their huge spending programs we won’t afford it we need to “tinker” with these programs for our government to last in the long haul”.
 
I tend to see it trending to be tory-like too and taking on a more of a chris christie-like type of conservatism which is similar to Ford’s where instead of saying “We can’t give people too much government because they’ll get fat and lazy, welfare queen blah blah blah” , it will be more like “Look at the deficit democrats are running with their huge spending programs we won’t afford it we need to “tinker” with these programs for our government to last in the long haul”.
This is exactly what I was thinking about. Honestly, depending on how the upcoming elections in the TL turnout, I think that there are some possible exciting candidates such as John Heinz, Arlen Specter, Christine Todd-Whitman, John Warner, and Charles Percy. I'll admit that some of them are "too boring," but I'd argue that others could fit the TL pretty well. Although, they at least make for good running-mate options for a moderate, "Nixonian" Republican
 
Personally, I feel that Lamar Alexander is a potential contender to be the GOP President from 1993-2001. His strand of conservatism seems to mesh well with the environment that KingSweden24 has established. A conservative southerner, but not an ideologically zealous one.
 
I wonder what the GOP's general path will be after 1988. I guess that there are several key factors of the TL to be decided before we can even talk about how TTL GOP will be compared to the OTL GOP, nevertheless, I do think that a more Tory-like GOP is possible, perhaps they go down a path similar to that of David Cameron's compassionate conservatism?
I tend to see it trending to be tory-like too and taking on a more of a chris christie-like type of conservatism which is similar to Ford’s where instead of saying “We can’t give people too much government because they’ll get fat and lazy, welfare queen blah blah blah” , it will be more like “Look at the deficit democrats are running with their huge spending programs we won’t afford it we need to “tinker” with these programs for our government to last in the long haul”.
This is exactly what I was thinking about. Honestly, depending on how the upcoming elections in the TL turnout, I think that there are some possible exciting candidates such as John Heinz, Arlen Specter, Christine Todd-Whitman, John Warner, and Charles Percy. I'll admit that some of them are "too boring," but I'd argue that others could fit the TL pretty well. Although, they at least make for good running-mate options for a moderate, "Nixonian" Republican
You’re both barking up the right tree generally, though many of these names are way too moderate even for TTL’s GOP
Either way the 1990 midterms is going to be an all-time bloodbath for whatever Dems are left in Congress. This timeline's version of OTL 1994 for sure.
It’s going to be really bad - 1994 a worthy comparison
Personally, I feel that Lamar Alexander is a potential contender to be the GOP President from 1993-2001. His strand of conservatism seems to mesh well with the environment that KingSweden24 has established. A conservative southerner, but not an ideologically zealous one.
A good guess. He was certainly used well in “Exocet” which im hoping comes back from hiatus soon
 
You’re both barking up the right tree generally, though many of these names are way too moderate even for TTL’s GOP
That's surprising. I mean, while the hard right of the Republican Party has always been a pretty dominant force there, they are not invincible. Their policies haven't really changed in the last few decades. Over in OTL, it was thanks to Reagan that they even remained relevant. After all, in a 1980s dominated by Democrats (especially those more on the lefty side), the hard right would be left in a lurch.

Baby boomers would be coming of age in the 1980s and in the same way how Reagan held a prominent influence fo them, Carey ITTL or whoever ran in a Dem 1980s will hold it fo them. The economic prosperity will put them in high regards and any reforms that aid the common folk (especially healthcare), will become more accepted as the norm. Something that the hard right will be unable to deal with. As such, by the early 1990s, what do they have to offer? Being the "other" choice can only get you so far, especially if you do something to PO other folk. Plus, there's the standard with having actual popularity and appeal.
 
That's surprising. I mean, while the hard right of the Republican Party has always been a pretty dominant force there, they are not invincible. Their policies haven't really changed in the last few decades. Over in OTL, it was thanks to Reagan that they even remained relevant. After all, in a 1980s dominated by Democrats (especially those more on the lefty side), the hard right would be left in a lurch.

Baby boomers would be coming of age in the 1980s and in the same way how Reagan held a prominent influence fo them, Carey ITTL or whoever ran in a Dem 1980s will hold it fo them. The economic prosperity will put them in high regards and any reforms that aid the common folk (especially healthcare), will become more accepted as the norm. Something that the hard right will be unable to deal with. As such, by the early 1990s, what do they have to offer? Being the "other" choice can only get you so far, especially if you do something to PO other folk. Plus, there's the standard with having actual popularity and appeal.
I’m referring more to John Heinz and Christie Whitman specifically. There’s plenty of names right of them but well left of the Gingrich GOP of the 90s
 
That's surprising. I mean, while the hard right of the Republican Party has always been a pretty dominant force there, they are not invincible. Their policies haven't really changed in the last few decades. Over in OTL, it was thanks to Reagan that they even remained relevant. After all, in a 1980s dominated by Democrats (especially those more on the lefty side), the hard right would be left in a lurch.

Baby boomers would be coming of age in the 1980s and in the same way how Reagan held a prominent influence fo them, Carey ITTL or whoever ran in a Dem 1980s will hold it fo them. The economic prosperity will put them in high regards and any reforms that aid the common folk (especially healthcare), will become more accepted as the norm. Something that the hard right will be unable to deal with. As such, by the early 1990s, what do they have to offer? Being the "other" choice can only get you so far, especially if you do something to PO other folk. Plus, there's the standard with having actual popularity and appeal.
This is an interesting point of view, and in a way, it reminds me of the issues that the Conservative Party had with putting up an appealing face and voice that could counter Blair and New Labour (as for the Cons it was Cameron's compassionate conservatism). Ultimately, I think that if whatever healthcare reform Carey does ends up being as beloved as the NHS is in Britain then it'll become quite a challenge for the more conservative part of the GOP to stand in an election against the healthcare achievements of the Carey admin. Regardless, it'll be fascinating to read what OP comes up with as it pertains to the GOP's ideological shifts and how the American public responds to the Carey Admin's reforms
 
This is an interesting point of view, and in a way, it reminds me of the issues that the Conservative Party had with putting up an appealing face and voice that could counter Blair and New Labour (as for the Cons it was Cameron's compassionate conservatism). Ultimately, I think that if whatever healthcare reform Carey does ends up being as beloved as the NHS is in Britain then it'll become quite a challenge for the more conservative part of the GOP to stand in an election against the healthcare achievements of the Carey admin. Regardless, it'll be fascinating to read what OP comes up with as it pertains to the GOP's ideological shifts and how the American public responds to the Carey Admin's reforms
Healthcare is one of the main things, but it’s more than that. It’s putting the GOP in difficult positions in what they can support and how right-wing they can be without losing mainstream support. The overton window is shifting to the left after all, especially with how the economy will recover and so on under Carey.

Will also be a fatal blow to the GOP culture war, at least in terms of significance or how serious people will take it.
 
That's surprising. I mean, while the hard right of the Republican Party has always been a pretty dominant force there, they are not invincible. Their policies haven't really changed in the last few decades. Over in OTL, it was thanks to Reagan that they even remained relevant. After all, in a 1980s dominated by Democrats (especially those more on the lefty side), the hard right would be left in a lurch.

Baby boomers would be coming of age in the 1980s and in the same way how Reagan held a prominent influence fo them, Carey ITTL or whoever ran in a Dem 1980s will hold it fo them. The economic prosperity will put them in high regards and any reforms that aid the common folk (especially healthcare), will become more accepted as the norm. Something that the hard right will be unable to deal with. As such, by the early 1990s, what do they have to offer? Being the "other" choice can only get you so far, especially if you do something to PO other folk. Plus, there's the standard with having actual popularity and appeal.
I think, as you said, with economic reforms and government provided healthcare being more widely accepted, the GOP's hard right may not have much oxygen in the economic space.

That raises the possibility that the hard right faction may be more "european" like Europe's far right parties, focusing more on social conservatism.
 
I think, as you said, with economic reforms and government provided healthcare being more widely accepted, the GOP's hard right may not have much oxygen in the economic space.

That raises the possibility that the hard right faction may be more "european" like Europe's far right parties, focusing more on social conservatism.
I mean, the American hard right already do that and it’s their main thing since both OTL parties are neoliberal economically.

That said, without Reagan championing in that “religious rightwing” power, it’s gonna be notably different. OTL, he really was the icon for that and without that, gonna be hard for them.
 
A Most Thorough Review
A Most Thorough Review

The most lasting legacy of Hugh Carey's Presidency in foreign policy terms may have been its considerable efforts to pacify insurgencies across Latin America and stabilize the region in an effort to end the violence and restore some of democracy, but just as important as this all-encompassing post-1978 focus on the region was the ascendancy of a new brand of thinkers at the Pentagon - the so-called "neoconservatives," or their preferred nomenclature, the "muscular liberals." Carey's domestic policy was in many ways a reinvigoration of the old Truman/Kennedy "Cold War Liberal" thinking, rejecting the bourgeoise yuppy-leftism of Watergate Babies or the '68er radicalism of the New Left in favor of a robust, middle-class oriented industrial policy culminating in a re-consolidation of welfare programs under FAP, the introduction of his complex but revolutionary healthcare expansion act, and the pushing of Humphrey-Hawkins and the ESA to rapidly tackle unemployment with the gamble that inflation would, eventually, subside on its own. [1]

Where pre-1968 liberalism really flourished, however, was at Scoop Jackson's Pentagon. It was no secret that Jackson dropping out after Iowa and endorsing Carey had come with the price of a Cabinet appointment, and the "Senator from Boeing" was unlikely to wind up anywhere other than Defense. The man too hawkish for Democratic primary voters was definitely not too hawkish for the military brass, and there were more than a few conspiratorial-minded leftists who dismissed Jackson as a "shadow president." Nonetheless, his experience was invaluable for a young new administration, and his careful guidance during crises in Sweden in late 1981 and in the Middle East in 1982 and 1983 helped prevent all of them from ballooning into broader wars that could have threatened regional stability, global oil prices or the American economic recovery, and by the time of his death on September 1, 1983, he had made his mark on the Pentagon in his brief tenure both through that leadership and in the young generation of hard power, "guns and butter" conservative Democrats who followed him - most prominently Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, the so-called "Baby Scoops" who were regarded as his chief proteges and by early 1982 in official, Senate-approved positions at the Pentagon, men who would become critical cogs in the "DC Blob" over the next several years.

The philosophy behind Jackson's politics was that liberalism had survived the near-fatal challenges posed to it during World War II only by being outproducing and outfighting the fascist regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan, and that to defeat communism, America had to lead the West into doing the same. Jackson was a firm anti-communist and an ideologue, but not a zealot like many American conservatives who considered the battle against Soviet communism as carrying religious (and by the early 1980s, perhaps millenarian) undertones. Rather, he viewed the Soviet Union as a clear and present threat to the international liberal world order much in the same way Hitler's Germany had been one, and considered many in the West to be woefully naive about what exactly the Soviet project at the end of the day set out to do. Wolfowitz in particular was his hatchet man in such occasions, having been part of a controversial 1976 committee nicknamed "Team B" that suggested that the CIA, perhaps under political pressure after a decade and a half of scandal and increasing popularity, underestimated the threat of the Soviets in terms of conventional and nuclear forces. While this had caused stir and scandal in Gerald Ford's Washington, general Democratic contempt for the intelligence agencies, in particular the CIA, played into Wolfowitz's hands upon the return of the Democrats; the CIA were terrifying spooks who were generally thought to cause more problems than they solved, while the Pentagon saw to it that weapons were produced in American factories, ideally unionized ones.

Nonetheless, Jackson's Pentagon was not an island, and the 1982 Strategic Posture Review had to operate within a coalition of which Jackson and his acolytes were a part, rather than a whole. While Wolfowitz was a staunch opponent of arms control or reduction agreements, Jackson was open-minded and presented the continued purchase of Ohio-class submarines as a way to reduce the cost of the marine component of the nuclear triad while also complying with the contours of the recent SALT II agreement, which had gone into effect on January 1, 1982 after being ratified by both parties the previous year. This also led to Jackson finally approving the cancellation of the controversial MX missile, which besides the considerable backlash engendered to its basing plans by both NATO allies and Congress had the issue of totally locking up the nation's rail system were it to be deployed en masse. Being a Boeing man, however, Jackson was adamant that further orders of the B-1 not be reduced any more than they had been under Ford in 1979; efforts by both Congress and the Air Force to nudge orders down from 164 planes to 112 were rebuffed, repeatedly, and in the end the full complement was produced by the end of the decade.

This was in part an initiative that was very important to Jackson - the maintenance of American air superiority at all costs (thus a throwback to Truman-era thinking about air power that had been proven erroneous if not naive) but also technological advancements to support American troops in a theater of war and building a "tech edge" throughout the next decade. Jackson and senior Pentagon planners deduced, correctly, after the Swedish-Soviet War of 1981 that the USSR's capabilities had declined remarkably in the final years of the Brezhnev era and that Andropov's pivot to a more consumer-goods focused economy would by necessity require considerable military reforms; as such, the Conventional Force Orientation policy that reorganized America's armies and air force squadrons for a new post-Vietnam era took the view that NATO was likely a decade out from the earliest potential ground war in Europe and that the next ten years should thus be spent building as substantial a technological edge as possible via electronic warfare, superior planes, and cruise missiles. [2] The future of war, as Jackson saw it, would be fought with mass air and naval support of smaller, better-trained tactical brigades and battalions, and he predicted that it would likely be fought in Latin America or East Asia before it was fought in Europe, contravening decades of thinking amongst American defense analysts.

He wasn't entirely wrong, but he also wasn't entirely right - when he died of an aneurysm on September 1, 1983, the process of implementing his reorientation of the Pentagon towards guns and butter had only just begun, and his vision would be a legacy others would have to bestow upon him. [3]

[1] Which in many cases it does, though no Volcker means that inflation will remain higher and stickier through the 80s than OTL, but unemployment will be much lower, and much earlier. YMMV on which of those things helped Reagan more ahead of 1984, but my money is on the latter.
[2] Do note that SDI/"Star Wars" is not include in here
[3] Special thanks to @TimothyC for his comments earlier in this thread that informed my thinking around American defense reorientation in the early 1980s ITTL
 
I can imagine Scoop Jackson would not be happy with how bloated the current mlitary is (namely in failing audits for like 7 years in a row) or the various level of corruptions and the like there. Though I wonder what Jackson would think of the new troubles being in the Middle East and how it came about, partially through the US perhaps not supporting the right folk.
 
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