Aufmarsch II Ost

Having read most of this long and fascinating thread, I am interested in a more disciplined discussion of how things might've panned out in a scenario where German leadership, either due to the Emperor or some other agent(s) decides to strike Russia first.

To be clear: the premise is that the decision is made, and orders are given.

In the OTL, Germany declared war on Russia and France rather early. No doubt these promiscous declarations of war helped to underscore the international impression of German leadership as hyper-aggressive and blood-thirsty.

In the absence of an offensive westwards, no declaration of war against France is necessary. Let us assume the Germany does declare war on Russia as a reaction to Russia's mobilization.

The Russian warplan was flexible up till the 9th day after the general mobilization order was given. Given the the flurry of activity in the direction of East Prussia, Russian intelligence would surmise their main effort would be in the East, in which case they opt go with Plan 19+G, weakening their Galician front.

The Austro-Hungarian drive into Poland was originally predicated on the knowledge that Germany would focus on France initially. Aware that the Germans are massing the East, would this encourage the Austrians to more closely coordinate with the Germans? They do speak the same language, after all. And in so doing, would the knowledge that additional German forces were deploying encourage the Austrians to leave the 2nd Army and all of its 8 divisions to face the Serbs (perhaps significantly changing the outcome of the fighting there during December 1914)?

In any case, the strong German deployment to the East definitely weakens Ivanov's front. Given the actual historical performance of Russian forces, any German offensive will cause massive casualties and reveal the Russian army's many weaknesses. It is conceivable that the Germans and Austrians agree on a combined offensive launched mid-August with the goal of rendezvouzing near Brest-Litovsk.

In this scenario, the Central Powers probably make excellent headway before bogging down during September. Savage Russian counteroffensives using Russian reserves prevent the pincers joining, but Stavka determines holding the salient is too costly and conduct an orderly strategic withdrawl throughout the winter of 1914-1915. Over a million Russians are killed or wounded, and over 80,000 are taken prisoner by the Central Powers.

In Serbia, with the full benefit of 3 armies, the Austrians hold on to Belgrade during the winter of 1914-1915, but likewise here both sides are exhausted.

In the West, massive and successive French offensives make little headway, but as with Soviets on the Eastern Front during WW2, even flinging masses of infantry against well-prepared positions will eventually take its toll, drawing away German reserves, which prevents them from fully exploiting victories in the East.

The last straw for the British comes when the Ottomans launch an unprovoked attack on the Russians in the Black Sea on 29 October 1914. The raid leads to a Russian ultimatum demanding the Ottomans expel the German military mission there. The Ottomans refuse, and war is declared. Shortly thereafter, all trade through the Dardanelles is suspended. Ships that attempt to force the straits are fired upon. The British respond with an ultimatum to the Ottomans, which the Ottomans are unable to comply with. Great Britain subsequently declares war on the Ottoman Empire in early November 1914. A second ultimatum is sent to Berlin, whereby the British demand the evacuation of the German military mission. The Germans refuse, whereby Britain declares war and a total blockade. Three weeks later, Japan also declares war on Germany.

With the slaughter underway in Alsace-Lorraine, the British goverment, decides to use the BEF to seize the Dardanelles first, with the Gallipoli debacle starring British Tommys rather than ANZAC troops.

In OTL, Italy signed the Treaty of London after the fall of Przemysl, expecting Austria-Hungary's imminent collapse. In this scenario, the Russians have been driven from Poland, and the Serbs are on their last feet. British entry into the war guarantees their neutrality, however.

During the spring of 1915, Central Power diplomacy wins over Bulgaria, spelling the end of Serbia, while the Central Powers mass forces for a major drive into Russia. The Russian army is in a perilous state due to the exertions of the first six months of the war, and STAVKA determines that the Russian army will withdraw in the face of any major Central Power offensive, all the while official state propaganda invokes the "spirit of 1812".

Summary of crucial points thus far:
So my basic assumption is that a focus in the East enables the Austrians to divert more forces (at least four additional divisions and countless additional replacements), to fight the Serbs. This prevents the Serbs from humiliating the Austrians to same extent as OTL, and to a Serb defeat some six months earlier than OTL. At the same time, the focus on Russian prevents Russian victory in the Battle of Galicia, deterring Italy's entry in the war. Britain still joins the war, but throw their small army against the Turks at Gallipoli. A massive expansion of the British army begins, but these troops will not be ready for action before late-1915, at the earliest. The French spend the first six months of the war hammering the Germans, inflicting and sustaining horrible losses, however, by spring of 1915, the French army has lost nearly a million men killed, wounded and missing, and requires a respite.

During the summer of 1915, a major Central Power offensive against Russia is carried out, and after pressure and threats of invasion by the Central Powers, Rumania agrees to join the Central Powers in exchange for Bessarabia. The Russians offer spirited resistance in selected sectors, but serious material shortages compels them to conduct strategic withdrawals. To the extent possible, military aid begins to arrive via non-blockaded ports. The German advance is steady and relentless, reaching the Dniepr river by August (and Lake Pskov in the Baltics). German forces establish bridgeheads and continue their advance until September 1915, when a major Anglo-French offensive through neutral Belgium is launched. Kitcheners New Army, which had been assembling forces in France and Britain under the guise of rotating these into the front line in Lorraine, instead carries out a lightning advance into Belgium along the pourous Belgian frontier. British merchantmen secretely carrying Royal Marines sieze ports in Antwerp, Ostend and elsewhere. Only the fortresses at Namur and Liege avoid surprise capture, insteading delaying the French advance as substantial French forces are required to reduce them. Nonetheless, the scale of the flanking maneuver draws substantial German forces away from other fronts, including reserves from the Alsace-Lorraine front. At precisely this moment, the French initiate an independent gigantic offensive along this front.

Most of Belgium is overrun, but the Germans successfully manage to stabilize the front after ferocious counter-attacks. Total German losses are over 650,000, vs. 420,000 French and nearly 200,000 British.

Starved of reinforcements in the East, the Central Powers are vulnerable, and precisely at this moment the Great Russian Counteroffensive is launched, primarily directed against the weaker Austrians in the South. The offensive shatters the Austrian army and the threat of a being flanked compels the Germans back across the Dniepr. As winter sets in, the Germans attempt to shore up their line by eliminating Russian bridgeheads in the Austrian sector. Shortages prevent the Russians from fully exploiting gains but repulsing the invasion is a major boost to Russian morale even as the casualties reach astronomical proportions.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The Russian warplan was flexible up till the 9th day after the general mobilization order was given. Given the the flurry of activity in the direction of East Prussia, Russian intelligence would surmise their main effort would be in the East, in which case they opt go with Plan 19+G, weakening their Galician front.
The original Russian plan contemplated up to 3 German armies heading East, which was the capacity of the German rail infrastructure. The 'East First' strategy was more of an even split, i.e four German armies deploying east and four German armies deploying west. It is extremely doubtful Russian intelligence would see anything untoward in the first couple of weeks of mobilization, so a sudden massive change of plans would be a bit random.

The Austro-Hungarian drive into Poland was originally predicated on the knowledge that Germany would focus on France initially. Aware that the Germans are massing the East, would this encourage the Austrians to more closely coordinate with the Germans? They do speak the same language, after all. And in so doing, would the knowledge that additional German forces were deploying encourage the Austrians to leave the 2nd Army and all of its 8 divisions to face the Serbs (perhaps significantly changing the outcome of the fighting there during December 1914)?
I would expect A-H to still focus its efforts on the Russians, since Russia is the key threat. Co-ordination between A-H and Germany is likely to remain suboptimal if Conrad's ego remains intact...

In the West, massive and successive French offensives make little headway, but as with Soviets on the Eastern Front during WW2, even flinging masses of infantry against well-prepared positions will eventually take its toll, drawing away German reserves, which prevents them from fully exploiting victories in the East.
With the losses inflicted on the Russians, the only thing preventing the CP powers fully exploiting their victories would be logistics. They would have an embarrassment of riches in terms of qualitative and qualitative advantages over the Russians at that point.

The last straw for the British comes when the Ottomans launch an unprovoked attack on the Russians in the Black Sea on 29 October 1914. The raid leads to a Russian ultimatum demanding the Ottomans expel the German military mission there. The Ottomans refuse, and war is declared. Shortly thereafter, all trade through the Dardanelles is suspended. Ships that attempt to force the straits are fired upon. The British respond with an ultimatum to the Ottomans, which the Ottomans are unable to comply with. Great Britain subsequently declares war on the Ottoman Empire in early November 1914. A second ultimatum is sent to Berlin, whereby the British demand the evacuation of the German military mission. The Germans refuse, whereby Britain declares war and a total blockade. Three weeks later, Japan also declares war on Germany.
The notion of Britain entering the war to defend Russia is novel, as is an unprovoked blockade of Germany/continental Europe.

During the spring of 1915, Central Power diplomacy wins over Bulgaria, spelling the end of Serbia, while the Central Powers mass forces for a major drive into Russia. The Russian army is in a perilous state due to the exertions of the first six months of the war, and STAVKA determines that the Russian army will withdraw in the face of any major Central Power offensive, all the while official state propaganda invokes the "spirit of 1812".
An added complication for Russia is the early loss of territory, equipment, munitions is very difficult to replace - OTL it spent the first couple of years building up its industry to a point where it could effectively support the war effort. In this scenario, the Russians will have to endure those serious equipment shortfalls for the foreseeable future...

...until September 1915, when a major Anglo-French offensive through neutral Belgium is launched. Kitcheners New Army, which had been assembling forces in France and Britain under the guise of rotating these into the front line in Lorraine, instead carries out a lightning advance into Belgium along the pourous Belgian frontier. British merchantmen secretely carrying Royal Marines sieze ports in Antwerp, Ostend and elsewhere. Only the fortresses at Namur and Liege avoid surprise capture, insteading delaying the French advance as substantial French forces are required to reduce them. Nonetheless, the scale of the flanking maneuver draws substantial German forces away from other fronts, including reserves from the Alsace-Lorraine front. At precisely this moment, the French initiate an independent gigantic offensive along this front.
I think this is where you have attempted to jump a shark...
 
Having read most of this long and fascinating thread, I am interested in a more disciplined discussion of how things might've panned out in a scenario where German leadership, either due to the Emperor or some other agent(s) decides to strike Russia first.

To be clear: the premise is that the decision is made, and orders are given.

In the OTL, Germany declared war on Russia and France rather early. No doubt these promiscous declarations of war helped to underscore the international impression of German leadership as hyper-aggressive and blood-thirsty.

In the absence of an offensive westwards, no declaration of war against France is necessary. Let us assume the Germany does declare war on Russia as a reaction to Russia's mobilization.
So, I assume you think of Willy II. decision to "just turn all of our forces to the East" during the discussion about the order of mobilization on 1st August 1914 after the famous/imfamous Lichnowsky-telegram leading to the "misunderstanding" of british as well as french neutrality.
Only, that Willy II sticks to his decision, after "Georgie" claimed the mentioned as ... a "misunderstanding".
-> no ultimatum to Belgium on the 3rd August
--> no ultimatum of Britain to Germany
-> no entering Belgium on the 4th August
--> no DoW of Britain against Germany
and, btw, no DoW of France against Germany ... yet.

The Russian warplan was flexible up till the 9th day after the general mobilization order was given. Given the the flurry of activity in the direction of East Prussia, Russian intelligence would surmise their main effort would be in the East, in which case they opt go with Plan 19+G, weakening their Galician front.
"Flexible" until 9th day ... In the thread you linked this was more kind of an assumption - in favour for the russians.
IOTL the russians decided on 6th/7th August to create their 9th Army at Warsaw and resp. after that 10th Army south of it (fortress Ivangorod at the Vistula) after getting intel, that german II., V. and VI. Corps, at least first parts of their troops, were heading westwards from their entraining stations, what started at the 4th and 5th August. At this point 2 Corps of the russian 4th Army were already on their way to northern Galicia (area of Lublin).
Dunno if it would have been possible to change that in any reasonable way for the russian deployment "abilities" that late as the 9th August to create a 3rd Army facing East-Prussia, as for Plan 19+G.

ITTL, the russians might see german II.Corps, or near-border parts of it, go east maybe already from the 2nd/3rd August, ... but any further troop transports wouldn't start until 6th/7th August, giving the railways-staff of the germans at least a couple of days for re-planning.
Giving the IOTL railway timtable, this would mean "flurry" in East-Prussia would start around ... : 9th August.

... narrow time margin for changing the war plans for the russians from offense against A-H/limited offense against Germany to defense against Germany and A-H (or only limited offense here).

The Austro-Hungarian drive into Poland was originally predicated on the knowledge that Germany would focus on France initially. Aware that the Germans are massing the East, would this encourage the Austrians to more closely coordinate with the Germans? They do speak the same language, after all. And in so doing, would the knowledge that additional German forces were deploying encourage the Austrians to leave the 2nd Army and all of its 8 divisions to face the Serbs (perhaps significantly changing the outcome of the fighting there during December 1914)?
Unlikely.
At first :
"Coordination" between the germans and the austrians was ... minimal at best IOTL.
Conrad told Moltke on 31.July, that he intends to "crush" Serbia first, but starts to mobilize the "rest" of his forces in Galizian from 4th of August onwards.
Moltke "answered" on 2nd August about the forces he deploys in East-Prussia (IOTL 8th Army-Prittwitz) with only a very vague offer of eventual attack on favourable conditions without any special focus. And ofc the strong demand for an austrian focussing on Russia. Conrad answered, received in Berlin at 3rd August IIRC, that he would be ready for attack - the russian - at 20th August. ... And that they would, for molilization reasons, declared war against Russian only at the 6th August.
And that's it. There was, however some communication between the german Landwehr Corps Woyrsch and the "Landwehr" Army-group Kummer of the austrians in Poland west of the Vistula.
At : second :
Austrian deployment plans hadn't changed much, since the Redl-affair, ... as well as the austrian railway-plannings for deployment. The "re-deployment" of the austrian 2.Army on 1st August finally agreed by Conrad and the responsible austrian railways-staff-chief, already almost caused the latter to fit.
But ... with Russia becomming the main focus (ITTL as well as IOTL), this redeployment was essential to produce anything at least remembering a sensible defense in eastern Galicia. Therefore (IMHO) this "redeployment" would not be changed. Any redeployment of austrian 1st or 4th Army towards eastern Galicia would have been even more problematic for the austrian railway-deployment.

Only possible/reasonable "change" I could see, is the redeployment of Army-Group Kummer towards Serbia, "replacing" austrian 2.Army, brought there in the trains intended to move 2.Army towards Galicia.

In any case, the strong German deployment to the East definitely weakens Ivanov's front. Given the actual historical performance of Russian forces, any German offensive will cause massive casualties and reveal the Russian army's many weaknesses. It is conceivable that the Germans and Austrians agree on a combined offensive launched mid-August with the goal of rendezvouzing near Brest-Litovsk.
The high-lightened happen IOTL : russian 4th Army only with 3 Corps instead of 4.

However, let me "propose" something here :
Lets assume the russian - for whatever reason - decide to focus on Germany in this situation, best option IMO :
- russian Guards Corps "stays within Rennekampfs 1.Army
- russian I.Corps goes to Samsonovs 2.Army (as IOTL)
- russian 3.Army is "redirected" towards the lower/middle Vistula (Ivangorod fortress) to attack/defend/fight towards Silesia
Meanwhile the germans deploy to their railway capacity 3 armies in East-Prussia (about 12-14 Corps). With their (also IOTL) intensivly used air-reconnaisence "spot" the redeployment of russian 3.Army, which let them deploy the 4. army intended for the east, initially after the first advances of the other 3, having the railways cleared of them them, in Silesia : east of Kattowice, north of Cracow, where they were IOTL already at around 10th August.
Meanwhile austrian deployment goes on as IOTL (for the above mentioned reasons). Given the "info" Conrad gave IOTL the germans and austrians agree upon attack date 20th August, maybe a couple of days earlier for the germans, AND upon the "pincer" to meet somehwere east of Warsaw (though IOTL, this was only proposed by Conrad and never confirmed by Moltke, not even in their talks from 1912 onwards). However, this time the southern part of the "pincer" also contains a strong german "tooth".

But (maybe) more on this later. :) ... after returning sometime from work.


The last straw for the British comes when the Ottomans launch an unprovoked attack on the Russians in the Black Sea on 29 October 1914. The raid leads to a Russian ultimatum demanding the Ottomans expel the German military mission there. The Ottomans refuse, and war is declared. Shortly thereafter, all trade through the Dardanelles is suspended.
Just a little ... "correction" before I have to leave : the ottomans closed the street for all trade already in September.

However : respectable proposal of you :)
 
The original Russian plan contemplated up to 3 German armies heading East, which was the capacity of the German rail infrastructure. The 'East First' strategy was more of an even split, i.e four German armies deploying east and four German armies deploying west. It is extremely doubtful Russian intelligence would see anything untoward in the first couple of weeks of mobilization, so a sudden massive change of plans would be a bit random.

Is it truly inconceivable? After 9 days, with no attack forthcoming in the West, and the obvious intensity of railtraffic in Pomerania and East Prussia, that the Germans were deploying substantial forces here?

I would expect A-H to still focus its efforts on the Russians, since Russia is the key threat. Co-ordination between A-H and Germany is likely to remain suboptimal if Conrad's ego remains intact...

Sound strategy seems to suggest that it's most efficient to eliminate the weaker threat first, i.e. Serbia. What can you say about Austrian deliberations as to when and how to fight a two-front war?

With the losses inflicted on the Russians, the only thing preventing the CP powers fully exploiting their victories would be logistics. They would have an embarrassment of riches in terms of qualitative and qualitative advantages over the Russians at that point. The notion of Britain entering the war to defend Russia is novel, as is an unprovoked blockade of Germany/continental Europe.

The first point I recognize. This is why I'd think, even advancing from Vilna, it would take the Germans a while, perhaps 3 months to reach Smolensk and the Dniepr. Also, given the disparity in strength, the obvious Russian move, for which there seems excellent historical precedent, is for the Russians to fall-back steadily in good order (which I understand they did rather well) while harrassing the enemy advance, slowing it considerably. The meer fact of German invasion at this early stage, I surmise, before the regime's complete delegitimization, would make it easier to invoke the "spirit of 1812".

As for British intervention, would the British be content to let Germany conquer Russia? What imperial designs to Britain and France have on Turkey? If Turkey instigates war against the Franco-Russian alliance, they certainly provide a tempting and exposed target for the British. The question I suppose is whether the Brits feel now's as good a time as any to finish them off.

An added complication for Russia is the early loss of territory, equipment, munitions is very difficult to replace - OTL it spent the first couple of years building up its industry to a point where it could effectively support the war effort. In this scenario, the Russians will have to endure those serious equipment shortfalls for the foreseeable future...

Given a slow Central Power advance, does this increase the likelihood of the evacuation of key industries and workers?

I think this is where you have attempted to jump a shark...

I am jumping a shark many places, but Ferguson's argument is that the British were definitely contemplating invading Belgium in support of France. Now that the Russians are being pummeled in the East, the pressure is on to attack before the Germans vanquish them. Attacking through Alsace-Lorraine would mean more of the slaughter of the first six months of the war, so I imagine the commanders would surmise an attack through Belgium. Is this preposterous?
 
Unlikely.
At first :
"Coordination" between the germans and the austrians was ... minimal at best IOTL.
Conrad told Moltke on 31.July, that he intends to "crush" Serbia first, but starts to mobilize the "rest" of his forces in Galizian from 4th of August onwards.
Moltke "answered" on 2nd August about the forces he deploys in East-Prussia (IOTL 8th Army-Prittwitz) with only a very vague offer of eventual attack on favourable conditions without any special focus. And ofc the strong demand for an austrian focussing on Russia. Conrad answered, received in Berlin at 3rd August IIRC, that he would be ready for attack - the russian - at 20th August. ... And that they would, for molilization reasons, declared war against Russian only at the 6th August.
And that's it. There was, however some communication between the german Landwehr Corps Woyrsch and the "Landwehr" Army-group Kummer of the austrians in Poland west of the Vistula.
At : second :
Austrian deployment plans hadn't changed much, since the Redl-affair, ... as well as the austrian railway-plannings for deployment. The "re-deployment" of the austrian 2.Army on 1st August finally agreed by Conrad and the responsible austrian railways-staff-chief, already almost caused the latter to fit.
But ... with Russia becomming the main focus (ITTL as well as IOTL), this redeployment was essential to produce anything at least remembering a sensible defense in eastern Galicia. Therefore (IMHO) this "redeployment" would not be changed. Any redeployment of austrian 1st or 4th Army towards eastern Galicia would have been even more problematic for the austrian railway-deployment.

Only possible/reasonable "change" I could see, is the redeployment of Army-Group Kummer towards Serbia, "replacing" austrian 2.Army, brought there in the trains intended to move 2.Army towards Galicia.

The high-lightened happen IOTL : russian 4th Army only with 3 Corps instead of 4.

However, let me "propose" something here :
Lets assume the russian - for whatever reason - decide to focus on Germany in this situation, best option IMO :
- russian Guards Corps "stays within Rennekampfs 1.Army
- russian I.Corps goes to Samsonovs 2.Army (as IOTL)
- russian 3.Army is "redirected" towards the lower/middle Vistula (Ivangorod fortress) to attack/defend/fight towards Silesia
Meanwhile the germans deploy to their railway capacity 3 armies in East-Prussia (about 12-14 Corps). With their (also IOTL) intensivly used air-reconnaisence "spot" the redeployment of russian 3.Army, which let them deploy the 4. army intended for the east, initially after the first advances of the other 3, having the railways cleared of them them, in Silesia : east of Kattowice, north of Cracow, where they were IOTL already at around 10th August.
Meanwhile austrian deployment goes on as IOTL (for the above mentioned reasons). Given the "info" Conrad gave IOTL the germans and austrians agree upon attack date 20th August, maybe a couple of days earlier for the germans, AND upon the "pincer" to meet somehwere east of Warsaw (though IOTL, this was only proposed by Conrad and never confirmed by Moltke, not even in their talks from 1912 onwards). However, this time the southern part of the "pincer" also contains a strong german "tooth".

But (maybe) more on this later. :) ... after returning sometime from work.


Just a little ... "correction" before I have to leave : the ottomans closed the street for all trade already in September.

Very good. More!
 

Riain

Banned
Is it truly inconceivable? After 9 days, with no attack forthcoming in the West, and the obvious intensity of railtraffic in Pomerania and East Prussia, that the Germans were deploying substantial forces here?

IIRC the Russians expected Germany to have 15-25 divisions in the East, and the last iteration of Germany's eastern plan in 1913 there would be: one army raised locally, one army bought directly into EP by rail, one army delivered west of the Vistula to march into EP on foot and one army delivered into EP after all that had happened. The first wave would be about 32 divisions.

Russia had dropped the G version of plan 19 by 1914, so not only did they have little flexibility but would most likely not have recognised a major eastern offensive until after it had exceeded the expected 25 divisions quite late in the game.
 

Aphrodite

Banned
The big problem with this, as in all Germany goes East threads, is that its not based on any real German plans. A lot of the difficulties are omitted or solved using our powers of 20/20 hindsight

The German war game is based on French neutrality. Hence it omits any planning for defending the Western frontier or what is going on there. It's easy for us to come up with a plan for the Germans in the West- we know exactly what the French are doing, where they are deploying and what their capabilities are. Moltke does not. When you start to develop a Western strategy from Moltke's viewpoint, it is obvious why the German military reject it.

The Germans are terrified of the French. This can be seen in the Kaiser's diplomacy. The ultimatum to France demands not a declaration of neutrality but that France turn over Toul and Verdun. A Germany confident of its Western defenses would insist upon simply a declaration of neutrality. The Kaiser agrees to Grey's proposal because the offer isn't for British neutrality but British and French neutrality. He adds that Britain would have to guarantee French neutrality with all of Britain's land and sea forces. Britain means nothing to him because the Germans have long calculated that going West is better than going East even if it means war with Britain and Belgium. This gives a great idea of how bad the Germans think going East really is.

There are a lot of reasons for this. When we draw up plans for Germany in the West, we assume that Moltke knows exactly what the French can and will do. He doesn't. A defense in the West is nearly impossible to devise from Moltke's viewpoint:

First, there is no margin of error. The Rhineland lacks any depth and the defeat of any German army can cause the rapid collapse of the front. The other German armies risk being pinned against the Rhine and destroyed. That the Rhineland itself can't be loss is obvious given the huge resources Germany has there.

Second, Moltke doesn't know the French deployments. He has to plan on a defense where the French may choose one of several options. He will plan for the worst case on each option because the results of being wrong are the defeat of the German reich. Do the French go through Belgium? Maybe, maybe not. Do the Belgians fight or not? Moltke must assume that the French might and the Belgians don't resist. That means strengthening the Northern flank.

Do the French instead send the Fifth army south of the Fortress line? Maybe- that means strengthening the Southern forces. What about the French Army of the Ardennes and the French forces in the Alps? Do they get sent to the offensive and where does Joffre put them? Moltke doesn't know and has to plan for them

Do the British join the war anyway? Moltke has to assume they do and find forces to defend against these 6 divisions as well.

Finally, Moltke has no way of knowing how the French and German armies will perform.

All this means is that Molke is going to be hard pressed to come up with a plan with even five armies and he's likely to want to put six there. In either case, he might as well strike West because he's doesn't have much more to throw at the Russians

Edited to add: The British are likely to declare war a lot faster than you have them- probably at the same time as the French. We know that there are enough votes for war based on a Tory-Liberal interventionists coalition even before the invasion of Belgium and that the Tories are going to vote to defend Russia. The liberal interventionists will as well
 
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Romania is not joining the CPs with such a late PoD, certainly not after King Carol I is already dead.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Germans are terrified of the French. This can be seen in the Kaiser's diplomacy. The ultimatum to France demands not a declaration of neutrality but that France turn over Toul and Verdun. A Germany confident of its Western defenses would insist upon simply a declaration of neutrality. The Kaiser agrees to Grey's proposal because the offer isn't for British neutrality but British and French neutrality. He adds that Britain would have to guarantee French neutrality with all of Britain's land and sea forces. Britain means nothing to him because the Germans have long calculated that going West is better than going East even if it means war with Britain and Belgium. This gives a great idea of how bad the Germans think going East really is.
Not really. The Germans were terrified of the Russian steamroller and two front war. They knew the French were beatable because of 1870 AND their military strategy was predicated on being able to beat the French in 6 weeks, but that the Russians could not be invaded and beaten rapidly enough to avoid the two front war, plus they had unlimited strategic depth that swallowed Napoleon, which means no quick knockout. Paris on the other hand, plus the Nord Region, were the centers of French industry, along with much of their iron and coal being right near the German border (Germany captured 90% of it IOTL) so it was very easy to seize and neuter France's war making ability (in theory). Germany's military planning was entirely predicated on the ease of French defeat.
The diplomatic maneuvers to get France to stay neutral by turning over border forts was a political gambit to give justification to Germany to invade France if they didn't agree, while securing the border and Saar coal if they did. It had nothing to do with fear of France, it was a maneuver to give France an out and ensure that they didn't backstab Germany when they turned on Russia instead or give them international political justification for saying they had to invade France because France clearly was going to attack them anyway, as they didn't neutralize themselves when given the chance.

Historically the Germans had more than good reasons not to trust the British or any Franco-British promises of neutrality on their word of honor alone, European history demonstrates that is folly accepting that.
 

Aphrodite

Banned
Not really. The Germans were terrified of the Russian steamroller and two front war. They knew the French were beatable because of 1870 AND their military strategy was predicated on being able to beat the French in 6 weeks, but that the Russians could not be invaded and beaten rapidly enough to avoid the two front war, plus they had unlimited strategic depth that swallowed Napoleon, which means no quick knockout. Paris on the other hand, plus the Nord Region, were the centers of French industry, along with much of their iron and coal being right near the German border (Germany captured 90% of it IOTL) so it was very easy to seize and neuter France's war making ability (in theory). Germany's military planning was entirely predicated on the ease of French defeat.
The diplomatic maneuvers to get France to stay neutral by turning over border forts was a political gambit to give justification to Germany to invade France if they didn't agree, while securing the border and Saar coal if they did. It had nothing to do with fear of France, it was a maneuver to give France an out and ensure that they didn't backstab Germany when they turned on Russia instead or give them international political justification for saying they had to invade France because France clearly was going to attack them anyway, as they didn't neutralize themselves when given the chance.

Historically the Germans had more than good reasons not to trust the British or any Franco-British promises of neutrality on their word of honor alone, European history demonstrates that is folly accepting that.

First, if the Germans aren't afraid of the Western frontier, they would seriously consider an East first strategy especially if they thought they could easily hold in the West. Instead, no one in the German general staff even seriously suggested it

Second, the offer to France might be considered an offer we want rejected but the offer to the British can't be put in that category. Its not "If you agree to be neutral, we won't attack France" Its "If you guarantee French neutrality, we won't attack France and Belgium". The Germans simply do not want the French pressing into the Rhineland Germany can lose East Prussia but once the Rhineland is gone, then the war is over

Third, if they are so sure of their Western defenses, then crippling France at first doesn't matter. Just let them batter against Germany while we take care of Russia. It works just as well as the knockout blow to France especially if it means British neutrality. They won't even consider that offer. The reason is clear: if the Germans go East, they are afraid that the Russians will simply retreat and that while they are chasing the Russians, the French breakthrough. If they didn't think that would happen, then chasing the Russians back is the right strategy. Push the Russians back, give us security in depth and then we hit the French with a knockout blow.

The Germans are clear on this: All forces must be concentrated on the most dangerous opponent- and that is France and that is the phrasing they use
 

Deleted member 1487

First, if the Germans aren't afraid of the Western frontier, they would seriously consider an East first strategy especially if they thought they could easily hold in the West. Instead, no one in the German general staff even seriously suggested it

Second, the offer to France might be considered an offer we want rejected but the offer to the British can't be put in that category. Its not "If you agree to be neutral, we won't attack France" Its "If you guarantee French neutrality, we won't attack France and Belgium". The Germans simply do not want the French pressing into the Rhineland Germany can lose East Prussia but once the Rhineland is gone, then the war is over

Third, if they are so sure of their Western defenses, then crippling France at first doesn't matter. Just let them batter against Germany while we take care of Russia. It works just as well as the knockout blow to France especially if it means British neutrality. They won't even consider that offer. The reason is clear: if the Germans go East, they are afraid that the Russians will simply retreat and that while they are chasing the Russians, the French breakthrough. If they didn't think that would happen, then chasing the Russians back is the right strategy. Push the Russians back, give us security in depth and then we hit the French with a knockout blow.

The Germans are clear on this: All forces must be concentrated on the most dangerous opponent- and that is France and that is the phrasing they use
You're missing the point; the Germans were afraid of a two front war, which a western front would be part of. So France needs to be dealt with one way or another to prevent it from becoming a threat. They did not think it was achievable politically, nor would Britain have any interest in enforcing it given their association with the Entente, so a military solution was the only way for them to neutralize France as a factor in the war and then enable a 1 front conflict against Russia. It isn't an issue of being so sure of defenses, they don't have to have to keep half their army fighting in the West for a long, drawn out war against an attacking France while they advance into the endless Russian depths. The fear isn't necessarily that the French would breakthrough, it is that they'd go through Belgium and overload German defenses to the point that they cannot advance into Russia at all, they'd have to leave a disproportionate part of their army guarding the border and fight with a minority of it against Russia, while letting france develop their strength in peace. That is the entire point of the Schlieffen/Moltke plan: quickly knock France out to ensure they aren't a threat, seize their resources for the war effort, don't give Britain a place to even try and put an army on the continent, and then the 1 front war against Russia can commence. It is still to try and get a buffer against Russia first and then turn on the French after they've already mobilized and have properly guarded the Belgian border with their reserves.

Britain had not power to stop France from declaring war, I don't know why you think they do. Then on top of that what is to prevent Britain from reneging on their offer, especially if the threat is if they don't comply then Germany is going to attack? Plus why would Britain just allow Germany to fight Russia 1-on-1? They were terrified of German domination of the continent, hence their association with the Entente Cordiale. Britain has no power to or interest in neutralizing France.
 

Riain

Banned
I'd add that I don't think Germany's aim in 6 weeks was to take Paris and get an armistice with France. Rather, like the Franco-Prussian War they hoped to win some major victories on the frontiers in that 6 weeks and take a French field-army or three off the board, that way they could pursue a broken army and conduct sieges etc while sending several armies east.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'd add that I don't think Germany's aim in 6 weeks was to take Paris and get an armistice with France. Rather, like the Franco-Prussian War they hoped to win some major victories on the frontiers in that 6 weeks and take a French field-army or three off the board, that way they could pursue a broken army and conduct sieges etc while sending several armies east.
IIRC they planned to crush France's army within 6 weeks, so they wouldn't need to take Paris, just redeploy East, defeat the attacking Russian armies, then play things by ear and negotiate.
 
As it's late for me, only commenting on some of prooved ... differences :
The big problem with this, as in all Germany goes East threads, is that its not based on any real German plans. A lot of the difficulties are omitted or solved using our powers of 20/20 hindsight
There were very real plans for an "Aufmarsch Ost" to focus upon the russians first every year. Moltke the elder already started them, Waldersee as well as Schlieffen, though the latter put more emphasis on the wesst ... in his later years, continued to renew them every year, as well as Moltke the younger, until 1913.
These plans were fully completed with marching and railways table and whatever. In 1913/1914 there was still even a study about, though no full "plan".

The German war game is based on French neutrality. Hence it omits any planning for defending the Western frontier or what is going on there.
In the first years of Moltke the elder and Waldersee ... yes, as France was still rendered the "looser" it was 1870/1871. But that changed then. Hence ALL "east first" plans devided the whole of the german forces in two almost equal halfes, sometime a few coprs more in the west, sometimes in the east.

It's easy for us to come up with a plan for the Germans in the West- we know exactly what the French are doing, where they are deploying and what their capabilities are. Moltke does not. When you start to develop a Western strategy from Moltke's viewpoint, it is obvious why the German military reject it.
It's easy to see for the germans, where the french might attack : only two options, as Britain has shown in 1870 with the Gladstone treaties, that it would NOT acceps ANYBODY to get control over Belgium and esp. the belgian coast.
Option one :
Through the Belfort gap ... very narrow, very easy to defend, the Rhine here a well defendable barrier. Not a very good option.
Option two :
Into Lorraine towards the german part of the Moselle to "cut off" the fortress zone of Metz/Thionville. Still not the "best" region for attack, but from the Saar-region it would give some more further options to the french forces leader.

And both options were adressed in the "western part" of "East First" war gamwes and plans, ... as well as the possibility of a french advance through at least southern Belgium and Luxemburg.

Sry, but you're simply wrong, that the germans had no ideas of what to do in the west, while being more "busy" in the east.
Actually in the years before Moltke the youngers decision to concentrate on the west alone, they knew much better, what to do for defending against France while attacking Russia, than they knew, what to do with Russia after (mostly) defeating France.


The Kaiser agrees to Grey's proposal because the offer isn't for British neutrality but British and French neutrality.
Wrong. Willy II ordered the eastern turn on 1st August 1914 after the FIRST Lichnowsky telegram, only telling about Britains (possoble) neutrality.
The second Lichnowsky Telegram, telling of Britain ALSO guaranteeing or offering french neutrality came AFTER Willy had his fight with Moltke. This was only the "icing" on the cake Britain seemingly offered Willy.
He adds that Britain would have to guarantee French neutrality with all of Britain's land and sea forces.
Putting this into the letter he wrote to "Georgie" was, in Willys view, only clarifiying, what he renderd already offerd.
Britain means nothing to him because the Germans have long calculated that going West is better than going East even if it means war with Britain and Belgium.
Britain meant almost everything to Willy, in good as well as bad.
Though you're right about the german, Schlieffen and Moltke-the-younger trained officers corps thought different.


Due to shortness of time, on last issue :
Edited to add: The British are likely to declare war a lot faster than you have them- probably at the same time as the French.
Due to what "casus belli", please ?

... or are you of these, that think the "mighty" british empire doesn't have to care for such ... negligibles, due to being the "mighty" british empire, that doesn't have to care for .........
 

Riain

Banned
IIRC they planned to crush France's army within 6 weeks, so they wouldn't need to take Paris, just redeploy East, defeat the attacking Russian armies, then play things by ear and negotiate.

How would you define 'crush'?
 

Riain

Banned
Defeat to the point that the majority of the Western Front armies could be sent East to fight the Russians and defeat their invasion.

Were the Germans ever going to send the majority of their armies to the east? I have only ever seen in the 40+% range, never 50% or more. That was what the bigger eastern plans up to 1913 had and what ober ost peaked at during the war.
 

Deleted member 1487

Were the Germans ever going to send the majority of their armies to the east? I have only ever seen in the 40+% range, never 50% or more. That was what the bigger eastern plans up to 1913 had and what ober ost peaked at during the war.
Had they destroyed the majority of the French pre-war army, then perhaps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlieffen_Plan#Prelude
Rather than pursue the retreating French armies over the border, 25 percent of the German force in the west (20 percent of the German army) would be transferred to the east, for a counter-offensive against the Russian army
 
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