Aufmarsch II Ost

BooNZ

Banned
It's on Wiki, so lets call it instinct. ;) Actually I've have seen it alluded to here and there, and certainly they didn't mobilise in good positions to hold off Germany, rather they kept their army intact. Keeping most of their army in Antwerp won't help if the French go through eastern Belgium.

I see your wiki and I raise you:

https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pre-war_military_planning_belgium
http://faculty.virginia.edu/setear/students/jcs/neutrality4.html

I have not found my previous readings on the subject...

As for the rest; no plan survives contact with the enemy, all the pronouncements before the war will be gone once the guns start firing. Despite all the prewar pronouncements about Belgium the French were at Dinant within days of the completion of the plan 17 mobilisation/concentration. It's a small leap from Britain guaranteeing Belgian integrity on the 4th of August to dozens of French and British divisions at Charleroi and Mons 16 days later.

That's a very safe bet, since the Entente purportedly had no formal plans to invade Belgium - OTL even the French reconnaissance units lacked maps of the Ardennes...

If France or Anglo-French forces invaded Belgium on an ad-hoc basis, it would be an act of despiration after all other measures had been exhausted (or explored thoroughly). Those circumstances would scarely inspire the Belgians to 'join the team'. Further, that is ample time for the Germans to crush the Russian 1st and 2nd armies, save the damsel/A-H and do - like - whatever.
 

BooNZ

Banned
WW1 armies could operate at about 150km from a railhead, beyond that troops couldn't be reliably supplied. Russian railways were a different gauge from German railways and could be converted at ~10km per day, so the culmination point slowly creeps forward during the advance. Other things to extend that 150km could be capturing supply dumps and enemy rolling stock, but that's a bonus that you can't plan on.

Looking at that map shows the depth that German armies can reach and in what timeframe, and the rear of the Russian Armies facing AH are a hell of a long way from the East Prussian border.

You previously mentioned six weeks - 420 km + 150 km is a decent distance...
 

BooNZ

Banned
How many 570km advances were made in WW1? Better yet, halve that; how many 285km advances were made in WW1?
In an earlier post [27] you suggested the Germans would do nothing for six weeks after crushing the Russian 1st and 2nd armies and the appearance of the Russian 9th and 10th armies against the Germans would be strictly optional. In that context, I extrapolated the likely distance the Germans could cover using your timeframe of six weeks and your rail rehabilitation guidance [post 60]. Ordinarily advances are restricted by logistics, opposing forces or bad weather. In the scenario, what could restrict the German advance in Autumn 1914 to the extent your guidance is no longer valid.

Bonus question: What exactly should the Russians do after the destruction of their 1st and 2nd armies?
 
In an earlier post [27] you suggested the Germans would do nothing for six weeks after crushing the Russian 1st and 2nd armies and the appearance of the Russian 9th and 10th armies against the Germans would be strictly optional. In that context, I extrapolated the likely distance the Germans could cover using your timeframe of six weeks and your rail rehabilitation guidance [post 60]. Ordinarily advances are restricted by logistics, opposing forces or bad weather. In the scenario, what could restrict the German advance in Autumn 1914 to the extent your guidance is no longer valid.

Bonus question: What exactly should the Russians do after the destruction of their 1st and 2nd armies?

I daid that after 3-4 German armies smashed 2 Russian armies and took some fortresses there would be no targets worthy of such a force and it would wander around Poland looking for something to do. I'm sure they would capture territory, but who cares about that when there are massive enemy forces out there beyond reach.

Re-gaguing Russian railways isn't a solution for a number of reasons, but it is a help. Firstly any work can't start until the attacking forces have captured a segment of line to convert, so work might not start for a week or two after the offensive begins. A starting railhead will have sidings, unloading infrastructure and all that sort of thing and the line itself will have crossing loops or be double track, good bridges etc and be capable of handling big trains at regular speeds. But any conversion will be a rush job on a single track, without unloading infrastructure, sidings, passing loops, signals, or the quality of an established line so cannot compare in terms of productivity. What it would be used for is the highest priority supplies, such as ammo but it will only push out the reach of the army to maybe double the 150km average limit rather than making it fully mobile.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I daid that after 3-4 German armies smashed 2 Russian armies and took some fortresses there would be no targets worthy of such a force and it would wander around Poland looking for something to do. I'm sure they would capture territory, but who cares about that when there are massive enemy forces out there beyond reach.
You have ignored the question(s) and the fact a back of an envelope calculation based on your assumptions gets the Germans well within reach of the Russian armies facing A-H within weeks.
 
You have ignored the question(s) and the fact a back of an envelope calculation based on your assumptions gets the Germans well within reach of the Russian armies facing A-H within weeks.

I pointed out that the back of the envelope calculations are based on invalid assumptions; namely that a regauged railway is as good as an established railhead and that some 420km of railway will be converted in 6 weeks giving the Germans the ability to cross Poland in one campaign.

As for the rest, I don't know where 4 German armies are going to go, presumably 150-250km from their starting points, also presumably one would go into the Baltics. I doubt the Russians will send the 9th army to Galicia, it or the 10th would go to the Baltics and the other probably to some blocking position in central Poland.

maps_27_easternfront_gtarnow_(1600).jpg


IOTL the 9th Army took from 13 July to 30 Sept, 11 weeks, to travel some 250ish miles following the Russian 'Great Retreat', but that didn't start with a major battle followed by sieges of fortresses.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I daid that after 3-4 German armies smashed 2 Russian armies and took some fortresses there would be no targets worthy of such a force and it would wander around Poland looking for something to do.
The underlined is something I somehow doubt. With russian 1st and 2nd Armies crushed, the fortresses of Lomza and Ostrolenka most likely taken (these weren't much prepared, more the opposite regarding GGS infos early August), Ossowiec maybe also, at least under heavy siege-gun fire, as this WAS properly armed and prepared by the russians), ... not sure about Grodno, but most likely not Nowo-Georgiesk (the BIG Warsaw fortress, the "pinnacle" and "germ" of russian fortresses in Poland) taken or under siege. With the space between the Wartha-river and the Vistula already almost completly emptied by the russians before any serious action starts (as IOTL) the germans would most likely also already occupy the western bank or at least approaches to of the Vistula.

The OHL would not let eventually "free" troops sit idle.
Beside securing the Njemen-Bobr-Narew line as well as the Vistula with some "leisurely" advances further, maybe up to Bialystock, probably taking Lodz as well now early on, as there are no defenders left (they, the remnants of russian 1st and 2nd Armies, able to somehow make their way through to it sit likking their wounds in Nowo-Georgieak), the "rest" will most likely reassigned and sent to other theatres, until sufficient supply lines would be constructed or "renailed" to this line.
Perhaps to Galicia, "finishing off", what the austrians left of russian4th and 5th Armies, trying to support recapturing Lemberg (which IMO would even ITTL be left to incompetent General Brudermann).
Perhaps to Lorrain for whatever action has and could happen there ( maybe an advance north of Verdun ? ... maybe an advance through the Trouée de Charms ? (depends on what strategy/plans the now german high command has developed by now).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Some thoughts on the early "Great Retreat" ITTL compared to OTL.

The russian didn't do that after Tannenberg, as well as not after 1st Masurian Lakes and the Battle for Lodz, which gives you a situation similar to what we have here already in ~ early Sepmtember.
Instead after each of these "happenings" , esp Tannenberg and 1st Masurian Lakes, they - the russians - pulled back to their BIG fortress (or rather fortress zone) of Nowo-Georgiesk, north-northwest of Warsaw and kept on reinforcing (with whatever few forces available) it. Thereby they created IOTL a loong flimsy salient reacing over Nowo-Georgiesk to Lodz (which IOTL the germans had at that moment just no forces to occupy).
Why ?
There were IIRC some though not very loud voices for retreat already then and leave Nowo-Georgiesk. But for ... political reasons STAVKA decided different.
Regarding Lodz it could be argued, that it was an important industrial centre, but the concentrated, as said, at Nowo-Georgiesk, despite the "experience" of Liege already at hands.
AFAIU for political reasons : Nowo-Georgiesk - beside being claimed to be superior to Liege - and with it Warsaw were THE VERY symbols, signs and means of russian rule over Poloand. Giving them up would mean giving up Poland altogether, militarily as well as political. What - at that moment - would look already as kind of a "surrender", accepting defeat and being prepared to eventually accept defeat also on a larger scale.

IMO the russians would try the same ITTL as well for the same political reasons, despite any (quite obvious to us) military wisdom ... and throw whatever they can scratch together at Warsaw, giving ... offering german forces a lot of (easy ?) work on a silver plate.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Ah, so you're saying there is a trade off between attacking and developing rail network? To what extent?

It's speculation on my part, but I doubt the dramatic expansion of the rail network would have been seen as the priority until the Germans had decisively dealt with the immediate Russian military threat. In the main, the developing of the rail network is a pre-requisite of attack on the Eastern Front, but I doubt the German railway division(s) would be prepared/resourced for a rapid eastward expansion of the railway in autumn 1914. I think the map provided by Riain illustrates the lower range of what is logistically achieveable across a broad front during reasonable weather conditions.

Probably not easy to develop rail-network in winter, but impossible? With the Russians in veritable hiding (and huge numbers of prisoners) they probably do it rather quickly, given the conditions. As far as Russian losses are concerned, you might be correct. Since the Russians overestimated German mobility, they might withdraw more quickly, thereby avoiding envelopment. Although I expect once the 1st and 2nd armies are obliterated by their German counterparts, they will throw all their reserves at the German advance (9th and 10th, and elements of the Southwestern Front), and these will also suffer dearly.

Whatever happens after the destruction of the Russian 1st and 2nd armies requires substantial speculation, but the above is consistent with my understanding/ expectation - although it represents the best case scenario as far as Russian decision making goes.

So my next question is: would the Austria and Germany be able to launch a substantial offensive during by February 1915, given they've probably overrun Poland, taken Vilna, Brest-Litovsk and perhaps even Rovno.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_27_easternfront_gtarnow_(1600).jpg

If they can, they will attack a Russian front that has had a three month respite. What does this mean in terms of Russia's ability to withstand an offensive?

Again I speculate, but I'm not sure the Germans would have the same sense of urgency to pursue the war 100% through the middle of the 1914/15 winter, unless there was a clearly defined objective at stake.
 
With the first and second armies shattered, the Russians have to shore up their Prussian front. They will have to gut every other sector to plug the gap, so the Russians probably never make it to Lemberg let alone Rawa-Ruska, and if they do make it to Lemberg the trap devised by Conrad would be sprung. If Vilna and Bialystok are lost the entire salient will have only two rail lines left to support the whole front, one of which a determined Austrian drive could sever.

The salient is lost by late September or early October at which point both sides are probably exhausted. Given the strategy is knock out Russia first, and given they IOTL launched a reasonably successful winter offensive, would they not do this?

There is No advantage to sitting Tight. The War is hideously expensive and the quicker you can end it the better. If Britain has joined the case to knock out the Russians is even more pressing. Perhaps making a 120
mile drive is unrealistic even for the Germans, and given the Russians held the Austrians back in the Carpathians during the winter 1914-1915 the Austrian drive towards Vinnitsa is repulsed. But a winter offensive weakens the Russians further.

A 1915 summer offensive will almost certainly get the Germans to Pskov from the Dvina (150 miles) by the end of summer. They can then spend the winter clearing Estonia.

The Austrians manage to take Kiev and the Germans make it halfway to Smolensk.

Russia was already under tremendous domestic strain after the Great Retreat. This more extensive defeat exacerbates it. What would it take for Nicky to throw in the towel? For both sides continuing the war encouraged even harsher demands from whichever side was in the assent. If the Russians are obstinate the Germans will become even more demanding. Also, the occupation of much of the Ukraine allievates much of the food situation in the CP.
 
Interesting thoughts so far, but Imo one should look back to the West for a while.

I am not sure how stable the French would be going into the second half of 15 without some success to shore up their internal situation. AFAIK the war will be rather unpopular and as you said it is costly in terms of money, material and human capital. Should the British have not entered yet, I could see France becoming more unstable as time goes on in 1915. Maybe even reaching the point where they are forced to tag out.
My resoning here is that France lacks the uniting and hardening factor of German agression and occupation. So the instability we have seen before in the political area could be exebarated.

And should Britian not be in and France get out, I think Russia could seek an accomodation at this point. But there is so much going on elsewhere as well, that the general picture could have so many facets that impact the decissions that it is had to predict.
 

BooNZ

Banned
As for the rest, I don't know where 4 German armies are going to go, presumably 150-250km from their starting points, also presumably one would go into the Baltics. I doubt the Russians will send the 9th army to Galicia, it or the 10th would go to the Baltics and the other probably to some blocking position in central Poland.

Neither the Russians nor the Germans are going to waste resources in the Baltics until decisive confrontations in Poland are resolved. The Germans were obsessed with decisive battles and battles of annihilation, so sending a significant portion of its forces into the Baltic wilderness in the opposite direction to Russian forces seems improbable. However, running down the remains of the Russian 1st army and liberating East Prussia might distract a German army for a week or so.

The Russians would likely be familiar with the Prussian phrase, 'he who defends everything defends nothing'. The Russian 9th and 10th armies would almost certainly be redeployed within Poland to fend off the German armies in East Prussia, but with the benefit of hindsight, those forces will not suffice to hold the Germans for long. When do the Russians fully recognize this danger and what do the Russian 4th and 5th Armies do? Without the Russian 9th Army, the A-H front would be more of an arm wrestle.

From a German perspective, I think Brest-Litovsk (from North/East Prussia) would represent a worthy and achievable goal for late September-early October.

IOTL the 9th Army took from 13 July to 30 Sept, 11 weeks, to travel some 250ish miles following the Russian 'Great Retreat', but that didn't start with a major battle followed by sieges of fortresses.

In this scenario the initial battles in East Prussia are likely to be relatively quick and decisive in the German favour, far less draining on German logistics than Gorlice-Tarnow. Maintaining logistics of an advance of 2 German armies in 1914 is far less onerous than the 13 CP armies supported during the great retreat. I also speculate scorched earth would have been applied more methodically in the somewhat controlled 1915 retreat than in a 1914 Russian rout.

Some thoughts on the early "Great Retreat" ITTL compared to OTL.

The russian didn't do that after Tannenberg, as well as not after 1st Masurian Lakes and the Battle for Lodz, which gives you a situation similar to what we have here already in ~ early Sepmtember.

The key differences between OTL are instead of one exhausted 8th Army, the Russians will be facing 3 relatively fresh German Armies in East Prussia. Instead of a recently formed/ forming German 9th army, you have a fully formed German army and trainloads of siege artillery. OTL the German invasion of France forced Joffre to temporarily adopt more sensible defensive tactics at Marne, so my thinking was the dire circumstances facing Russia might force the hand of STAVKA to deal with reality.

It's not a matter of if there is an early 'Great Retreat', but when. From a Russian perspective, the sooner the better. As an aside, how quickly could the Russian 9th and 10th Armies effectively re-inforce the Russian fortresses along the Narew river?
 
A well considered and comprehensive post. I have expanded on a couple of points below:

For political reasons the French breach of Belgium territory would be a last resort and Joffre's offensive doctrine would have resulted in the cream of the French army being gutted before Christmas. The Anglo French forces did not have the quantum of heavy/ super heavy artillery to reduce Belgium fortresses in a timely manner, so the breach in Belgium territory is likely to be limited to the Ardennes. This offers rugged terrain, terrible infrastructure and strategic depth that goes from bad to worse.

In my opinion the absence of a German breach of Belgium territory would likely result in British neutrality by the narrowest of margins, but I prefer your conclusion for the sake of interest. If Belgium remains neutral, what is Britain's role in the great war? There is scarcely enough space along the German-French border for the BEF to make a meaningful contribution on the continent, the French industrial heartland is intact so France is less needy from an industrial/ financial perspective, Belgium is an additional neutral trading power making the imposition of a continental blockade more difficult to sell/implement.

Indeed! The more compelling questions are what happens where Belgium is not the obvious victim and the British go to war over a flimsier rationale. I think the shades of gray cast weird shadows over the Entente war effort. I am not convinced lack of invading Belgium compels British neutrality or assures victory to either side and I do not believe the French are any less cold blooded in seeing Belgium as the path of opportunity. These are cliché short cuts to me. I think they deserve better and more serious consideration as alternatives. I think we get a years long bloody war that reshapes the world but it how does the peace look with everyone equally culpable?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Indeed! The more compelling questions are what happens where Belgium is not the obvious victim and the British go to war over a flimsier rationale. I think the shades of gray cast weird shadows over the Entente war effort. I am not convinced lack of invading Belgium compels British neutrality or assures victory to either side and I do not believe the French are any less cold blooded in seeing Belgium as the path of opportunity. These are cliché short cuts to me. I think they deserve better and more serious consideration as alternatives. I think we get a years long bloody war that reshapes the world but it how does the peace look with everyone equally culpable?

What particular issues are you interested in being more seriously considered? Many of the issues have been done to death at one time or another, but I'm always interested in revisiting.
 
What particular issues are you interested in being more seriously considered? Many of the issues have been done to death at one time or another, but I'm always interested in revisiting.

That is what I am pondering. I dislike the dystopia and have no interest in re-playing WWII to improve the Nazis or hand the world to Stalin. Altering course in the Great War at least offers paths brighter and roads higher. I am not enamored of twisting Germany into a world conquering shade of the Third Reich, it reads tawdry and mocking. I do not mind the gray, a war without the easy to pass off simplicity, a war without victor, a world equally damaged but less so destroyed. I have seriously considered the nature of British neutrality and I think you as well as others are correct, it does the British good. I do not argue that the war was inevitable but I see how 1914 was a perfect storm, once the fire was set it can burn far and wide. To me keeping the British on the sidelines lets us off the hook. Having them stumble into this cauldron puts all the old players on stage. So I prefer digging into how Germany might blunder away from what we regard in hindsight its greatest blunder. I enjoy very much the discussions all over this map, tossing out the invasion of Belgium seems so easy yet does it actually simplify things? I think not. Thus I revisit it, its complicated.
 

BooNZ

Banned
That is what I am pondering. I dislike the dystopia and have no interest in re-playing WWII to improve the Nazis or hand the world to Stalin. Altering course in the Great War at least offers paths brighter and roads higher. I am not enamored of twisting Germany into a world conquering shade of the Third Reich, it reads tawdry and mocking. I do not mind the gray, a war without the easy to pass off simplicity, a war without victor, a world equally damaged but less so destroyed. I have seriously considered the nature of British neutrality and I think you as well as others are correct, it does the British good. I do not argue that the war was inevitable but I see how 1914 was a perfect storm, once the fire was set it can burn far and wide. To me keeping the British on the sidelines lets us off the hook. Having them stumble into this cauldron puts all the old players on stage. So I prefer digging into how Germany might blunder away from what we regard in hindsight its greatest blunder. I enjoy very much the discussions all over this map, tossing out the invasion of Belgium seems so easy yet does it actually simplify things? I think not. Thus I revisit it, its complicated.

I very much concur with all of above. The 'Germany avoids Belgium and heads East' scenario is a POD that fascinates me because it is a single, simple and plausible POD that changes the path of the 20th century.

It simplifies things for the CP powers in the west in 1914 because the Germans have the advantage of defense on a much narrower front, on terrain more suited to defense. The French offensive mindset and commitments to Imperial Russia compel the French to continue to assault strong German defensive positions when the French disadvantages are most pronounced (i.e. when the French shortage of heavy artillery is at its worst and the French offensive doctrine is total rubbish).

Even IF the British join the party on a timely basis, the British contribution would be underwhelming. If Belgium is neutral, then there is nothing for the BEF to do on the continent, let alone the OTL British continental army. If Belgium is neutral, then the British blockade becomes more difficult to implement and sell to the world. If Belgium is neutral, the French industrial areas remain intact and therefore the French war effort is more independent of British finance/industry. With no good options available to the British, the First Sea Lord can probably push through an 'enhanced' Dardanelles campaign...

In the east the details are less certain, but the destruction of the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, coupled with early presence of half the German armies at a minimum saves the majority of the A-H pre-war army, forces the Russians eastward and influences neutrals to maintain neutrality or join the CP cause. The most likely scenario is the Germans also inflict serious additional damage on the Russian armies that had limited resilience early in the war.
 
Top