Germany's 1914 Eastern Plan?

Perkeo,

The difference between Britain and all the rest is that Britain essentially cannot be attacked.

France, Germany, Russia, and A-H all faced a vastly more serious situation: once a belligerent neighbor mobilizes, the stakes go through the roof, because he has only to step across the border.

I'm pretty certain that Britain's leaders recognized the difference and understood its obvious implication.

The real problem with Britain mobilizing is that it could very well encourage the French, who could take it as a sign that Britain is favoring intervention.
That wouldn't convince the French to "jump the gun" and DOW Germany earlier; but it might well cause them to secretly encourage Russia even more than they did OTL.

And yes, there were some British statesmen who seemed every bit as concerned -- or even more concerned -- over the threat posed by a victorious Russia, as that posed by a victorious Germany.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
My own translation of the relevant passage is:

-snip-
THX a lot for this translation (spares me quite some time :openedeyewink:)

Other than that : great and well thought explanation for the timing for a french DOW, reasonable and plausible. *thumbs up*

Further, we have a vague number here ("a few"), taken from one man's memoir, while Hoetzsch, who used "Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarischen und der Provisorischen Regierung", offers a specific number.
That is "11" ? ... days until DOW.

Btw : do you have the "Hoetzsch" ? or is it from the citation by Jannen ?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
The one issue caused by waiting the ten (or four, or six, or eight) days, is the uncertainty that it causes Russia.
Russia can't back out, since Germany has already declared war. But she MIGHT try to change her deployment to a strictly defensive one (difficult and risky as it would be to change the plan in mid-execution), if she thinks the planned coordinated offensive with France is off the table.

This possibility can be prevented by giving diplomatic reassurances, which is precisely what Poincare and the Council were doing on the night of 1-2Aug.
Well, yes this convinces me, that Russia will still deploy and prepare fro attack. Combined with the fact, that the french tried to push/convince Russia for an even more aggressive scheme with invading Silesia and Posznan directly heading for Berlin instead occupying east prussia first.
 

Perkeo

Banned
Well, yes this convinces me, that Russia will still deploy and prepare fro attack. Combined with the fact, that the french tried to push/convince Russia for an even more aggressive scheme with invading Silesia and Posznan directly heading for Berlin instead occupying east prussia first.

And that wins the war for Germany:
As we know today, the weapons technology of the time favored the defense, not the offense. With France not joining immediately and Russia running into the open knife, no British sea blockade, Germany has the advantage. The invasion can be sold by the Germans as the last and final proof that the Russians were the aggressors, not them, just as the rape of Belgium IOTL.
 
Btw : do you have the "Hoetzsch" ? or is it from the citation by Jannen ?

I do not have Hoetzsch, so I confess that I'm relying for now upon Jannen's citation from it. Except insofar as it goes further and provides a specific length of delay, however, it accords with the other sources we have.

Here is the quote from Jannen; the quote from Hoetzsch is in bold:

'Poincare then called his ministers to the presidential palace. The French ministers met from midnight until almost 3:00 A.M. and authorized Viviani to inform Izvolsky, who was waiting in a nearby room, that France would fulfill its alliance obligations but wanted to complete its mobilization before "the opening of military operations, and this will take ten days. At that moment the Houses [of the French legislature] will be summoned" '.
(Jannen, The Lions of July, pp. 314-315)

Note that the clause placed in brackets [] is Jannen's, not mine.

That is a pretty specific quote; I don't think it terribly likely that either Jannen, or Hoetzsch (who drew on the archives of the Russian Tsarist and Provisional governments) simply invented it, given the controversial nature of the statement, which would automatically invite fact-checking by other scholars.

But I suppose it isn't impossible -- the Russian Orange Book deliberately back-dated the Austrian mobilization order by three days to make it look as if Russia hadn't actually mobilized first (Clark, The Sleepwalkers); the French Yellow Book supported this claim with a fictional communique by Paleologue (Clark); Poincare lied about having no knowledge of the Russian mobilization (Jannen); and the British White Paper left out or severely edited numerous embarrassing documents (Newton, The Darkest Days).

So I suppose Hoetzsch could have lied just like everyone else; but until I have evidence that he did, I see no reason to distrust him.
 
Well, yes this convinces me, that Russia will still deploy and prepare fro attack. Combined with the fact, that the french tried to push/convince Russia for an even more aggressive scheme with invading Silesia and Posznan directly heading for Berlin instead occupying east prussia first.

Russia has nothing but bad choices here.

She mobilized early, with the result that Germany declared war on her -- but not yet on France. So she can't just back down like France potentially could.

She urgently wants France to support her, but France wants to wait until later, hoping that Germany will invade, or Britain will pledge support, first. This leaves Russia in a very uncomfortable position.

Russia is obligated to launch an offensive on 14Aug no matter what, but so far she doesn't know for certain that France can be counted on to reciprocate.

But if she tries to change to a purely defensive mobilization, she risks confusing her deployment process; and if France finds out, they might yet refrain from declaring war, due to Russia "breaking her treaty commitment".

Under the circumstances, her best bet is to cling like a barnacle to Poincare's and the Council's promise to DOW within "a few days".

So yeah, under the circumstances, I think this is what she will do. But she won't be happy.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Just a lil' note on the sources.
I managed to find an accessable copy of 'The Hoetzsch' on this site. It is a collection of the russian documents in eight fat volumes. So : no 'opinion' or interpretation of Hotzsch.

In fact its Isvolsky himself in his telegrams to Sasanow. In shortness :
Everything said above :
2 days until parliament assembles when called to,
10 days to finalize french mobilisation and
THEN calling for the parliament.
Beside the full committment of the french councel of ministers to their alliance
is correct.
Poincaré also stressed on the first, as well as the ending talk with Isvolsky, that he feared Gedrmany might/will attack France earlier, hindering furthe french mobilisation.

-> Without german attack France would DoW Germany at the 12./13. August.
 
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