Your figures are wrong.
The 2 pdr for its size was an excellent anti-tank weapon, its AP round could penetrate over 40mm at 30% at a distance of 1000 meters.
http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paterson/equipartillery.htm
An interesting take on Sealion
- Thread starter Grey Wolf
- Start date
The 2 pdr for its size was an excellent anti-tank weapon, its AP round could penetrate over 40mm at 30% at a distance of 1000 meters.
http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paterson/equipartillery.htm
No worries about the delay. My list is from the book "The Battle for Western Europe" by Michael Tamelander.
The list is from 11th of September and includes:
Shore defences, southeastern England (from west to east):
4. Infantry Division
1. MMG Brigade
29. Infantry Brigade
45. Infantry Division
1. Infantry Division
Immediately behind the shore defences, southeastern England:
AIF (Australian Division)
NZEF (New Zealand Division)
North of London:
15. Infantry Division
55. Infantry Division
52. Infantry Division
In London:
3. Infantry Brigade
20. Guards Bridage
23. Guards Brigade
GHQ, west of London:
43. Infantry Division
42. Infantry Division
1. Canadian Infantry Division
1. Armoured Division
2. Armoured Division (minus one armoured brigade)
1. Tank Brigade
21. Infantry Brigade
Southwestern England:
3. Infantry Division
48. Infantry Division
50. Infantry Division
21. Tank Brigade
Armoured Brigade (from the 2. Armoured Division)
70. Infantry Brigade
Midlands, Wales and Northern England:
1. Infantry Division
2. Infantry Division
2. (London) Infantry Division
18. Infantry Division
35. Infantry Division
44. Infantry Division
54. Infantry Division
59. Infantry Division
23. Tank Brigade
24. Tank Brigade
3. MMG Brigade
36. Infantry Brigade
37. Infantry Brigade
In Scotland and Northern Ireland:
5. Infantry Division
53. Infantry Division
46. Infantry Division
61. Infantry Division
51. Infantry Division
2. MMD Brigade
148. Infantry Brigade
Regardless if the 7. Armoured was set up in Egypt or not, those 50+ Matildas and 100+ Cruiser tanks could form another armoured brigade and another armoured division for the GHQ in England, should the Luftwaffe look like they can actually push the RAF north.
Besides, Fighter Command can still retreat north, out of German fighter range and wait until the invasion comes and then contest the German air superiority again. How will the Germans deal with this?
Also, Bomber Command was already causing damage on the French channel ports with nightly strikes. I think they would be attacking the ports the Germans manage to take as well as the French channel ports, making supply difficult even if the Royal Navy is out of the picture.
Even if the Luftwaffe has forced Fighter Command north and established full aereal superiority over the channel, it still needs to, when the invasion comes and the first week;
1. Attack Fighter Command that swarms south, going after the CAS (Stukas etc) supporting the landed troops.
2. Attack Bomber Command which attacks the German troops, any captured port, the landing and supply flotilla and the French channel ports and the infrastructure in the vincity nightly and perhaps even on daytime on occasion.
3. Attack the Royal Navy, light and heavy units, preferably BEFORE they can enter the channel and keep the light units from interfering with the landing and supply flottilla.
4. Drop and escort paratroopers (don't forget that the Germans lost massive amounts of transport planes in Norway and especially the Netherlands).
All at the same time. And don't forget that the Royal Navy si very well trained in night operations, while the Luftwaffe has litte or no radar in France at the time.
I think the Germans can get a lot of troops, but very little heavy equipment ashore. Then they will have major probelms supplying their troops. Even Lt Mk IIs and armoured cars will be a major nuisance to the German troops when they lack AT guns, artillery and tanks.
That's completely retarded reasoning. You're comparing military history to futurology. When France went to war with Prussia in 1870, they didn't know the Prussian diplomatic and military strategy, they weren't able to compare the relative competencies of their officer corps, how the Chassepot rifles and machineguns would be countered by Prussian artillery etc. etc. In the 21st century, we can assess how those factors combined together to produce the outcome that it did, because we have almost complete knowledge of the Franco-Prussian war.
What ASBs happened at Thermopylae, Isandlwana and Dien Bien Phu?
Graehame
Banned
I think Warbastard's point is that at each of his example battles (Thermopylae, Isandlwana, & Dien Bien Phu) a numerically &/or technologically inferior force won vs a larger &/or more technologically sophisticated one. (Although Thermopylae was a tactical defeat, it was a strategic victory.)
WarBastard
Banned
Exactly. Had a couple of factors changed and those battles gone the way one would have expected them to, the usual suspects on this board would be saying 'Of course Persia/UK/France won*. How could they not have won? Any other outcome would be ASB'. I know it bruises the hell out of some egos to have to admit they actually don't know for sure what might have happened, but there it is.
*I'm aware Persia defeated the Spartans at Thermopylae, but as Graehame says, it was an enormous strategic victory. If you don't see my point it's because you are pretending not to.
acually i think the Athenian navy pulled at Thermopylae was more asb than what the spartans pulled off. and the battle of midway was perhaps one of the biggest stroke of uncoordinated luck in my opinion.
as for sealion, to get the plan to change, it would require a more amenable hitler. possible just not likely.
as for sealion, to get the plan to change, it would require a more amenable hitler. possible just not likely.
I think there's a tendency, here and elsewhere, to view what happened historically as the most likely outcome. In actuality history is full of unlikely things happening.
I think Germany's conquests in the early part of WWII are a case in point. Germany was small, poorly armed, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and in serious economic troubles. That they got as far as they did is nearly miraculous. I think that is a problem with a lot of the ATL scenarios; they start with the assumption that Germany getting to a certain historical point (the conquest of France, say) is a reasonable baseline to start developments from. In actuality Germany was riding the edge of possibility the whole time, and going further rapidly requires ASB.
I think Germany's conquests in the early part of WWII are a case in point. Germany was small, poorly armed, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and in serious economic troubles. That they got as far as they did is nearly miraculous. I think that is a problem with a lot of the ATL scenarios; they start with the assumption that Germany getting to a certain historical point (the conquest of France, say) is a reasonable baseline to start developments from. In actuality Germany was riding the edge of possibility the whole time, and going further rapidly requires ASB.
Operation Sealion
I have just come across this site, so I hope what I write doesn't simply repeat earlier comments which I may have missed.
Don't get too interested in the results of the Sandhurst wargame. One of the organizers was my tutor at University and we had long arguments about it. Basically, he confirmed that the intention of the game was to bring about a scenario which pitted German invading troops against the British/Allied defenders. In other words, a land/air battle.
In order to make this possible, the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy anti-invasion forces were changed. Most of them were moved further north in order to provide a two day window during which the Germans could land. The reason for this was that, if the actual dispositions had been adhered to, the organizers realized, at an early stage, that no realistic or coherant German force would even get ashore!
Consequently, little attention was paid to which British ships were actually in the area. For example, HMS Coventry was described as being sunk whilst leaving Portsmouth, when she was actually in the Mediterranean at the time, and HMS Manchester sunk in the same area when she was actually in the Humber.
Thus, whilst the result of the game was probably accurate, the naval dispositions which brought it about were mythical.
Next, I loved the suggestion that large liners could be used as supply transports. In the real world, large liners carry large numbers of people, not goods, and the idea of them appearing in the channel fully laden, whether with troops or, improbably, with supplies, would have delighted Admiral Drax and the cruisers & destroyers of Nore Command.
The Channel, by the way, is a death trap for submarines, and in any case in September 1940 the U-boat arm had precisely 27 operational boats.
Landings in Eire. Why? Far from gaining Irish support, surely this would have alienated most Irish people. The result would probably have been active Irish support for Britain, and the opening up of the west coast Irish ports to British warships.
Landings in Scotland. Possibly this is a reference to Herbstreise, the supposed diversionary operation intended to distract the Home Fleet. As the Admiralty had no intention of sending the Home Fleet south anyway unless heavy German warships appeared in the southern North Sea (and as we know the heaviest available warship the Germans had operational at the time was a single heavy cruiser with defective engines) this is irrelevant for Sealion.
Airborne landings - In August 1940 the Luftwaffe had precisely 224 operational transport aircraft (according to their own records, captured post-war), so the maths doesn't really work, does it?
Barges - the powered invasion barges were incapable of crossing the channel under their own power, and half of the barges were unpowered anyway. They were to be towed in pairs by tugs/trawlers/ transports, of which the Germans only managed to assemble around 550. Thus, with no losses, they could move 1100 barges, but every towing vessel lost meant that two more barges became unusable.
Landings, the German navy estimated that, IF THE ROYAL NAVY DID NOT INTERVENE!! it would take thirteen days to land the nine divisions of the first wave. Assume for the sake of the fantasy that all nine divisions, plus 2 airborne division, landed, each division needed 300 tons of supplies per day simply to stay in action. Even if the Germans captured Dover & Folkestone intact, which was unlikely in the extreme, these ports could handle 1400 tons per day between them. How would the additional 1900 tons per day get there?
Finally, don't believe the myth that the Luftwaffe could drive the RN away from the invasion beaches. They had failed at Dunkirk, and their own commanders, such as von Richthoven & Oscar Dinort, were well aware of their shortcomings against warships. Von Richthoven in particular was adamant that the Luftwaffe could not protect the invasion convoys.
Sorry, but however, you try to fiddle it, Sealion was an impossibility in the face of overwhelming sea power.
I have just come across this site, so I hope what I write doesn't simply repeat earlier comments which I may have missed.
Don't get too interested in the results of the Sandhurst wargame. One of the organizers was my tutor at University and we had long arguments about it. Basically, he confirmed that the intention of the game was to bring about a scenario which pitted German invading troops against the British/Allied defenders. In other words, a land/air battle.
In order to make this possible, the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy anti-invasion forces were changed. Most of them were moved further north in order to provide a two day window during which the Germans could land. The reason for this was that, if the actual dispositions had been adhered to, the organizers realized, at an early stage, that no realistic or coherant German force would even get ashore!
Consequently, little attention was paid to which British ships were actually in the area. For example, HMS Coventry was described as being sunk whilst leaving Portsmouth, when she was actually in the Mediterranean at the time, and HMS Manchester sunk in the same area when she was actually in the Humber.
Thus, whilst the result of the game was probably accurate, the naval dispositions which brought it about were mythical.
Next, I loved the suggestion that large liners could be used as supply transports. In the real world, large liners carry large numbers of people, not goods, and the idea of them appearing in the channel fully laden, whether with troops or, improbably, with supplies, would have delighted Admiral Drax and the cruisers & destroyers of Nore Command.
The Channel, by the way, is a death trap for submarines, and in any case in September 1940 the U-boat arm had precisely 27 operational boats.
Landings in Eire. Why? Far from gaining Irish support, surely this would have alienated most Irish people. The result would probably have been active Irish support for Britain, and the opening up of the west coast Irish ports to British warships.
Landings in Scotland. Possibly this is a reference to Herbstreise, the supposed diversionary operation intended to distract the Home Fleet. As the Admiralty had no intention of sending the Home Fleet south anyway unless heavy German warships appeared in the southern North Sea (and as we know the heaviest available warship the Germans had operational at the time was a single heavy cruiser with defective engines) this is irrelevant for Sealion.
Airborne landings - In August 1940 the Luftwaffe had precisely 224 operational transport aircraft (according to their own records, captured post-war), so the maths doesn't really work, does it?
Barges - the powered invasion barges were incapable of crossing the channel under their own power, and half of the barges were unpowered anyway. They were to be towed in pairs by tugs/trawlers/ transports, of which the Germans only managed to assemble around 550. Thus, with no losses, they could move 1100 barges, but every towing vessel lost meant that two more barges became unusable.
Landings, the German navy estimated that, IF THE ROYAL NAVY DID NOT INTERVENE!! it would take thirteen days to land the nine divisions of the first wave. Assume for the sake of the fantasy that all nine divisions, plus 2 airborne division, landed, each division needed 300 tons of supplies per day simply to stay in action. Even if the Germans captured Dover & Folkestone intact, which was unlikely in the extreme, these ports could handle 1400 tons per day between them. How would the additional 1900 tons per day get there?
Finally, don't believe the myth that the Luftwaffe could drive the RN away from the invasion beaches. They had failed at Dunkirk, and their own commanders, such as von Richthoven & Oscar Dinort, were well aware of their shortcomings against warships. Von Richthoven in particular was adamant that the Luftwaffe could not protect the invasion convoys.
Sorry, but however, you try to fiddle it, Sealion was an impossibility in the face of overwhelming sea power.