An interesting take on Sealion

[usertron2020]

Now that could have been interesting. Not to say pretty disastrous for de Valera...

Landing troops in Eire? This more than anything convinces me this is a tale told for a good meal and a cold beer. By air? I don't think Ju-57's would make it. By sea? Glug-glug. By sub? Even the Irish Guarda could handle THAT! The Guarda was comparable to about one good Italian division in terms of numbers, equipment, and training. But when mobilized, they'd be up to a full corps. Of course, there'd be freedom of passage for Commonwealth forces as well. Even De Valera won't be able to stop such a development.

 

[Saxon Dog]

Realistically, landings in Ire or Scotland are just diversions. British uniforms might buy landing forces an hour of uninterrupted unloading. Without a harbor, over the beach unloading without specialized craft would be far slower than say, the US landing on Guadalcanal, which also suffered from cargo problems.

Realistically, maybe the Germans do get 9 divisions ashore, without many tanks, minimal artillery, minimal AA support, short on ammo. First night doesnt get interdicted, UK response predictably slow and disorganized.

Realistically, the Germans dont get a port captured or more importantly, cleared, for 3 or 4 days. By then, long range UK arty and especially RAF bombing keeps the port essentially useless. Its a pretty short hop to the coast, and even your most obsolete planes will do damage against the meager German AA.

Realistically, every force involved, Air Forces, Naval Forces, Army divisions, and German supply ship units lose 10% of their strength per day. ***Notable exceptions - German surface naval units, rendered basically ineffective by 2nd day, certainly by end of 3rd. - German supply boats - drops to half by 4th day, delays in unloading leave them open to daylight strafing by any RAF plane with ammo left after a bounce. - UK ground forces would gain approx 2 Divisions effective strength per day. 9 vs 3 on 1st day becomes weakened 9 vs 11 by time port is secured. German supply ships nearing point by Day 5 of not being able to supply even 9 weak Divs.

Realistically, Goering will still be claiming ability to supply by air. By Day 10, Germans may have reached inland objectives at some places, secured a port, inflicted heavy losses on British troops. RAF strength down by half. RN heavy units uncommitted, light units exhausted, decimated, but still scrapping nightly. German supply ships now heavily attrited coming and going, and also during loading and unloading. No more heavy items shipped, only food and ammo. Some supply now delivered by dumping offshore and hoping tides wash crates and barrels onto beach. Didnt work for the Japs on Guad, wont help the Germans much.

Realistically, by Day 14 Germans are pushed back into a shrinking perimeter around Dover. Airdrops fall into British hands, supplies left on the beach are captured. Supply ships are forced to unload into a smaller area and present a dense target to RAF bombers. A single British light cruiser, steams unmolested thru the German screen and blasts the shore parties and lighters at dawn. The German Commander realizes the hopelessness of the situation and requests evacuation begin that night. Over the next two nights 10 or 15 thousand troops return to France.

Realistically, for the loss of 6 or 7 German divisions and approx half the Luftwaffe first line strength, and virtually the entire KM smaller than a cruiser, the UK loses 1/3 of its fighters, 1/4 of its bombers, a replacable amount of DDs and MTBs, and ties down an additional 5 or 6 Divisions for the remainder of the War manning much improved beach defenses. The next year is noticably quieter, but by '42 everything returns to OTL.

BUT HEY, wheres the fun in THAT? I can read OTL on the Wiki. I come here to read ATL.

 

[Graehame]

For the benefit of those of you who may have missed or were too bored to actually read my post on the subject, I repeat-- "A lot of ifs, which argues against the possibility. (Personally, I agree with Adolf Galland that Hitler never really intended to invade Britain. It was all to convince the Soviets that he wasn't interested in invading them.)"
...but not for the reasons that several of you are so fond of spouting.

MAJOR MAJOR
"Most of the 'English speakers' were barely fluent. ...Not very plausible for getting into a British garrison."
The SS British Legion alone had 50 expatriate Brit Nazis who would have loved the chance to do this. And in an infiltration op not everyone needs to be fluent in the local lingo. A 1-to-5 ratio is plenty.

"The British had 30 divisions, including IIRC a Canadian armored division, dedicated to the defense of SE England."
Not in Oct 1940, they didn't. They had 22 inf divs in the whole country (not just in SE England), freshly evacked from Dunkirk & consequently of low morale, with about a sixth of their artillery & an average of 10 rounds per gun. In other words, the equivalent of about 5 full-strength divs with v limited staying power. The Brit 1st Armd Div had left for Egypt in Sep, the 6th Brit Armd Div had only a signals rgt on establishment (making it a "ghost" div strictly to impress the Germans), & the Canadians hadn't arrived yet.

"...the German formations they'd be facing (No tanks, no artillery)?"
The main reason the Germans needed a port was to unload their tanks & artillery. The 16th Armee’s Artillerie Kommand 106 was slated to land w/the 2d Wave. This unit alone consisted of 24/15 cm (5.9 in) guns & 72/10 cm (3.9 in) guns.

"And where is the Navy's small boats patrol during all this?"
Strafed into impotence by the Luftwaffe after achieving air superiority over the Channel-- an eventuality the plausibility of which is described in my thread, "Seelowe".

"Your Scots landings will be wrapped up by the Local Defence Volunteers."
The Scots landings are a small-scale DIVERSION!!!

"...the invasion flotilla, which is going to be bad off enough in the October weather."
From the RAF Meteorological Office-- "Beginning the night of 27 Sep strong northerly winds prevail, making passage hazardous thru 10 Oct, but calm conditions return on 11-12 Oct. Hazardous weather 13-15 Oct, followed by calm weather during 16-20 Oct. After 20 Oct light easterly winds prevail which would actually assist invasion craft traveling towards the invasion beaches, but by the end of Oct very strong southwest winds (force 8) prohibit any non-seagoing craft from risking a Channel crossing." I rest my case.

"This scenario has been done to death, and the more the research that is done the more implausible it gets."
I agree it was a long shot, but you do it in stages. Aug & Sep is for neutralizing RAF Fighter Command & driving the RN out of the Channel, either of which is eminently feasible-- but both of which I agree is a bit of a stretch. A bit. If those go well, then early Oct is for diverting the Home Fleet-- a bit of a long shot. If that goes well, then you have to hope that calm weather coicides. It did. If that happens, then you have to hope that it lasts. It did (although this could not have been known ahead of time). If that happens, then you have to take a deep breath & ask yourself if you really want to risk 10 divs in converted river barges on the unpredictable Channel. If you do, then you're in business. Wet newspaper-- except for the possibility of mustard gas. The thing is, it would have taken one hell of a lot of mustard gas to stop 10 German divs, & the effects on SE England would have been profound into the 21st Century. Mustard is a persistent agent that gets into the ground & tree trunks & everything & lasts almost forever. No sane gov't would use it on its own soil, & the immediate effects are diluted by the wet weather characteristic of SE England in the fall.

"those '8 or 10 divisions'...can't be supplied."
8 or 10 divs is a small enough force to have been partly supplied by air. Part of their food & petrol requirements could have been requisitioned from local sources once they arrived. 2400 river barges is enough to have dedicated many of them to supply over the beaches at night. And the Germans had a lot more transport ships than most postwar correspondence gives them credit for. A partial post-Norway list:
Hansa Ger/21,000 grt/1923 21kts (12x3½")
Deutschland Ger/21,000 grt/1923 21 kts (12x3½")
Bremen (& Europa) Ger/51,656 grt/1929 27 kts (24x4") (x2)
Gneisenau (& Scharnhorst)* Ger/18,160 grt/1935 21 kts (10x3½") (x2)
Potsdam Ger/17,000 grt/ 21 kts (10x3½")
Stavangerfjord Nor/13,000 grt/1917 18 kts (8x3½")
De Grasse Fr/17,707 grt/1924 17 kts (10x3½")
De Ruyter Dut/15,000 grt/1925 20 kts (8x3½")
Hamburg Ger/22,000 grt/1926 20 kts (12x3½")
Cap Arcona Ger/27,560 grt/1927 20 kts (12x3½")
Stella Polaris Norw/5209 grt/1927 15 kts (6x3½")
Alborg Dan/18,000 grt/1929 20 kts (8x3½")
Wlhm Gustloff (& Rob't Ley) Ger/25,484 grt/1938 15 kts (12x3½") (x2)
(* not the battlecruisers, but transport ships of the same names.)
These 16 ships are enough for at least 4 attempts to supply the landings, with U-boats, mines, & the Luftwaffe holding the Home Fleet & a diminished RAF at bay. In combination with the river barges, some of this stuff is gonna get thru.

...so was Sealion a long shot? Absolutely. But impossible? No.

USERTRON2020
"IIRC, 37 RN DD's directed just at any Channel invasion forces alone."
By my count 1 cruiser & 22 destroyers in late Oct. By re-equipping the BF-110 as a fighter-bomber & rededicating the Ju-87 to attack warships, harbor, & coastal targets you would have provided a mission to 2 a/c types that otherwise didn't have one. (I know-- Gering would never have gone for it. Screw him.) By timing unescorted coastal raids at the same time as larger, fully escorted bombing raids you'd have given RAF Fighter Command a choice. Try to defeat both, in which case you'd have only half the RAF fighters going after the big bombing raids; or pick one-- & if you go after the coastal raids then they break off & withdraw. RAF Fighter Command ends up fighting the big bombing raids, leaving the coastal targets to fend for themselves. So the ships get sunk or driven off.

"There ought to be an entry whenever new members join up about the 1975 Sandhurst wargame on Sealion. It was umpired by surviving British and West German officers responsible for fighting Sealion."
I'm v aware of the Sandhurst wargame, in which the Brits made the rules. I remember wargames from my days in the Army where the effects of artillery were arbitrarily cut by three-quarters because otherwise it screwed up the game, where the effects of weather on the traffickability of secondary roads were ignored because otherwise it screwed up the game, & where all units were simply assumed to have full supply because otherwise it screwed up the game. Forgive me if I'm not unduly impressed by wargames in which one side makes the rules. (BTW, one of the things that led to the Japs losing their Pacific campaign was that in their pre-PH wargames all Jap naval units were assumed to have full supply & full aircrews. Oops!)

"The result? 9 divisions get across, 7 are supplied..."
7 is probably enough to take London if the Luftwaffe has air superiority, which is a prerequisite for those 7 divs being there in the 1st place.

 

[Graehame]

SAXON DOG
See my thread, "Seelowe", for a more realistic appraisal of German chances.

 

[Saxon Dog]

IMHO the truly epic aspect of an actual attempt would have been the Air Battle.

Everything up til then, as bloody as it was, would be considered preliminary sparring compared to the desprate fighting over the invasion beaches.

The Germans gain a bit of advantage back by shortening the distance. Since the focus is now the British coast, rather than farther inland, they gain some combat time. The RAF bombers that will obviously be concentrating on the sitting duck barges are even closer. RAF fighters will be mixing it up over the Channel rather than overland, and there will be swarms of Germans bobbing in the water in anything the Fuhrer says will float and carry a machine gun. Pilot wastage will exceed OTL badly. But the Germans HAVE to engage as far inland as possible. No days off to regroup.

OTOH, any old RAF clunker that can carry a grenade will be dropping it on the German beachhead. "Take off at first light, fly to the right of the large column of smoke, turn left, and attack anything afloat near the beach." Its a training run. Chances of a successful intercept by the Luftwaffe are low. The Germans on the beach should run low of AA ammo by Day 3.

 

[usertron2020]

Am I the only one noticing that the heavy units of the Royal Navy have been wiped out by Handwavium? This I have found is the most recurrent aspect of the Sea Mammal TL. That and giving the Luftwaffe an instant Maritime strike force. But dismissing Hermann Goering's influence? That's new. At least I haven't seen the German "super naval minefields" so often mentioned. As to the 1975 Sandhurst wargame? Considering who was there, I'd give them the benefit of the doubt over any of us here on this forum.

 

[Astrodragon]

If it wasnt for the fact that Blair152 could actually format text, I'd be having dark suspicions about who 'Graehame' really is about now.....

Personally I blame the long school summer vacations...

 

[MrP]

MAJOR MAJOR
"Most of the 'English speakers' were barely fluent. ...Not very plausible for getting into a British garrison."
The SS British Legion alone had 50 expatriate Brit Nazis who would have loved the chance to do this. And in an infiltration op not everyone needs to be fluent in the local lingo. A 1-to-5 ratio is plenty.

I recall reading of that formation that it was stationed in the East, against the Russians, precisely because the Germans didn't trust the soldiers to fight their own countrymen. That argues against the likelihood that these men would be trusted by the Germans in a Sealion invasion.

 

[Saxon Dog]

Simple explanation: the "Instant Maritime Strike Luft" is simply a function of Hermann ordering his Stukas to attack the RN DDs and MTBs that are thrashing the barges. They dont actually have to be very good at it, or survive the effort.

And the RN Heavies staying North, thats not a huge leap of logic. The Channel is swarming with U-Boats!! Its the DDs job to clear that lot out, til then we sit and have a spot of tea, eh?

Besides, and RN Adm worth his salt can see the trend, and why risk letting a major ship take a torp, hit a mine, or present a decent target to the Stukas while the little guys are actually doing a swell job?

 

[Major Major]

MAJOR MAJOR
"Most of the 'English speakers' were barely fluent. ...Not very plausible for getting into a British garrison."
The SS British Legion alone had 50 expatriate Brit Nazis who would have loved the chance to do this. And in an infiltration op not everyone needs to be fluent in the local lingo. A 1-to-5 ratio is plenty.

The British Frei Korps wasnt't founded until 1943. It never had more than 27 men at any time. And the point was that they would be fighting Communists, not sneaking into home.

You can't assume that your only fluent speaker will be available, much less the only one questioned. And you're talking about sailing boats into Dover, and going into various strongpoints. Those have sentries, who tend to ask for things like orders.

"The British had 30 divisions, including IIRC a Canadian armored division, dedicated to the defense of SE England."
Not in Oct 1940, they didn't. They had 22 inf divs in the whole country (not just in SE England), freshly evacked from Dunkirk & consequently of low morale, with about a sixth of their artillery & an average of 10 rounds per gun. In other words, the equivalent of about 5 full-strength divs with v limited staying power. The Brit 1st Armd Div had left for Egypt in Sep, the 6th Brit Armd Div had only a signals rgt on establishment (making it a "ghost" div strictly to impress the Germans), & the Canadians hadn't arrived yet.

You're talking about June and saying it's October. Try again.

"...the German formations they'd be facing (No tanks, no artillery)?"
The main reason the Germans needed a port was to unload their tanks & artillery. The 16th Armee’s Artillerie Kommand 106 was slated to land w/the 2d Wave. This unit alone consisted of 24/15 cm (5.9 in) guns & 72/10 cm (3.9 in) guns.

And this assumes your commandos can capture the port facilities undamaged. Yet another assumption. Assumptions can be piled up too far.

"And where is the Navy's small boats patrol during all this?"
Strafed into impotence by the Luftwaffe after achieving air superiority over the Channel-- an eventuality the plausibility of which is described in my thread, "Seelowe".

Your assault craft have to move at night. The Luftwaffe strafers --- which had already proven themselves less than optimal at hitting bigger ships during the Dunkirk evacuation --- are not going to be flying night missions.

"Your Scots landings will be wrapped up by the Local Defence Volunteers."
The Scots landings are a small-scale DIVERSION!!!

One which you seem to be putting a lot of significance in. Thirty men landed from a U-Boat --- and try to persuade Dönitz that he has to risk his boats for this --- are going to be a blip on the radar.

"...the invasion flotilla, which is going to be bad off enough in the October weather."
From the RAF Meteorological Office-- "Beginning the night of 27 Sep strong northerly winds prevail, making passage hazardous thru 10 Oct, but calm conditions return on 11-12 Oct. Hazardous weather 13-15 Oct, followed by calm weather during 16-20 Oct. After 20 Oct light easterly winds prevail which would actually assist invasion craft traveling towards the invasion beaches, but by the end of Oct very strong southwest winds (force 8) prohibit any non-seagoing craft from risking a Channel crossing." I rest my case.

Seven days out of the month. Even then, the Reich met office can't guarantee this beforehand; they don't have stations in the Atlantic.

"This scenario has been done to death, and the more the research that is done the more implausible it gets."
I agree it was a long shot, but you do it in stages. Aug & Sep is for neutralizing RAF Fighter Command & driving the RN out of the Channel, either of which is eminently feasible-- but both of which I agree is a bit of a stretch. A bit. If those go well, then early Oct is for diverting the Home Fleet-- a bit of a long shot. If that goes well, then you have to hope that calm weather coicides. It did. If that happens, then you have to hope that it lasts. It did (although this could not have been known ahead of time). If that happens, then you have to take a deep breath & ask yourself if you really want to risk 10 divs in converted river barges on the unpredictable Channel. If you do, then you're in business. Wet newspaper-- except for the possibility of mustard gas. The thing is, it would have taken one hell of a lot of mustard gas to stop 10 German divs, & the effects on SE England would have been profound into the 21st Century. Mustard is a persistent agent that gets into the ground & tree trunks & everything & lasts almost forever. No sane gov't would use it on its own soil, & the immediate effects are diluted by the wet weather characteristic of SE England in the fall.

"those '8 or 10 divisions'...can't be supplied."
8 or 10 divs is a small enough force to have been partly supplied by air. Part of their food & petrol requirements could have been requisitioned from local sources once they arrived. 2400 river barges is enough to have dedicated many of them to supply over the beaches at night. And the Germans had a lot more transport ships than most postwar correspondence gives them credit for. A partial post-Norway list:
Hansa Ger/21,000 grt/1923 21kts (12x3½")
Deutschland Ger/21,000 grt/1923 21 kts (12x3½")
Bremen (& Europa) Ger/51,656 grt/1929 27 kts (24x4") (x2)
Gneisenau (& Scharnhorst)* Ger/18,160 grt/1935 21 kts (10x3½") (x2)
Potsdam Ger/17,000 grt/ 21 kts (10x3½")
Stavangerfjord Nor/13,000 grt/1917 18 kts (8x3½")
De Grasse Fr/17,707 grt/1924 17 kts (10x3½")
De Ruyter Dut/15,000 grt/1925 20 kts (8x3½")
Hamburg Ger/22,000 grt/1926 20 kts (12x3½")
Cap Arcona Ger/27,560 grt/1927 20 kts (12x3½")
Stella Polaris Norw/5209 grt/1927 15 kts (6x3½")
Alborg Dan/18,000 grt/1929 20 kts (8x3½")
Wlhm Gustloff (& Rob't Ley) Ger/25,484 grt/1938 15 kts (12x3½") (x2)
(* not the battlecruisers, but transport ships of the same names.)
These 16 ships are enough for at least 4 attempts to supply the landings, with U-boats, mines, & the Luftwaffe holding the Home Fleet & a diminished RAF at bay. In combination with the river barges, some of this stuff is gonna get thru.

...so was Sealion a long shot? Absolutely. But impossible? No.

Can those ships carry 2000 tons a day to one port (that lacks a 2000 ton unloading capacity) for several days?


When I was first reading AH, back in the seventies, I found Gary Gygax's Victorious German Arms. In it, the Germans make assumptions piled on assumptions and everything works perfectly for them, while the Allies can't make a right decision. So I call that "Victorious German Arms Syndrome" and not "Draka Syndrome".

 

[Graehame]

The wargame of Operation Sealion conducted at Sandhurst War College in 1974 has been proposed as a rebuttal of my suggested plan to invade Britain in 1940. As it happens I have a copy of the summary of that wargame, which I used as part of the source material for my plan. I thought that it might be instructive to include here my appreciation of the relevance of that exercise.

To begin with, the umpiring staff was structured with 6 umpires-- a Brit 4-star, a German 3-star, 2 Brit 2-stars, & 2 German 2-stars. In any disagreement over rules the Brit 4-star would have the final word, favoring the desired Brit outcome. In any dispute among the Germans the 3-star would have the final word, & of the 3 Germans this 3-star was the least qualified to judge. VAdm. Friedrich Ruge was a mine warfare officer who'd served 20 years on mine warfare ships before being posted to a staff job in Paris during Sealion. He played no active role in planning the operation. Adolf Galland, while a famous fighter ace who fought in the Battle of Britain-- & indeed, helped pave the way for Sealion-- also played no role in planning the operation. Only Heinz Trettner, the Chief of Operations of 7th Fliegerdiv during the planning of Sealion, had any relevant staff experience.

Assumptions: "a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather & tides (for a high water attack) & c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping."
a) In my scenario the Luftwaffe has won air supremacy, & I've described in detail how they did it.
b) My invasion dates are equally constrained by the weather & tides, but by waiting until late Oct that isn't such a problem.
c) By waiting until late Oct more shipping has been assembled.

22 Sep-- "The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield."
330,000 men reflects the size of the original 25-30 division invasion force, which was completely untransportable, unsupportable by the KM, unsupplyable, crazy, & part of a German plan that by 22 Sep had been completely superseded.
Brighton also reflects the original (Heer) plan of the invasion-- not the multiservice Dover plan developed a month later. Brighton is 'way too far from Calais, & even too far from Boulougne. My scenario is based on the Dover plan.

"The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing..."
This amounts to an admission by the Brits themselves that the Germans could get ashore-- even with converted river barges-- with the lead elements of 9 freaking divisions!

"...but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged..."
Heavy losses.

"...the landings...overwhelmed the beach defenders..."
"Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent."
My other sources say 22 divs, but I'll bow to the Brits. And I seriously doubt that only 4 months after Dunkirk the Brits had been able to "fully equip" 17 divs. My other sources say not.

22 - 23 Sep-- "The Germans had still not captured a major port..."
That's because they were going for Brighton with amphibiously delivered ground forces. With my plan, Brighton would be taken by surprise by a paratroop div & a glider-borne airlanding div. Dover would be taken by a glider-borne airlanding div with an elite gebirgsdiv landing just north & another just south of town. These options were denied to the Germans playing at Sandhurst because they were constrained by the plan as it existed in Aug-- not as it might have developed into Oct had serious multiservice planning begun in Jul, which is the essence of my scenario.

"Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids..."
...which would have been avoided had the Luftwaffe 1st achieved air superiority, as I've specified & described in detail.

"...then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows & had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats, & 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk & one damaged."
More heavy RN casualties with little or nothing to show for them in return.

"However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed..."
My diversionary sortie happened at the beginning of the invasion, in the Denmark Straits, & it wouldn't have been destroyed because as soon as the Home Fleet heard about the invasion they'd break off & run for home.

23 Sep-- "The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters & 70 bombers), & the RN had suffered losses such that it was keeping its BBs & CVs back..."
Harold Faber, the author of "Luftwaffe: A History", writes that official RAF strength figures for the end of Sep reflect 665 fighters, not over a thousand. But anyway, more heavy Brit losses.

"Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg & forces were diverted to the South West."
A German buildup in Cherbourg is more craziness, unless done as a diversion. The Cherbourg forces were originally earmarked to land in Lyme Bay, 90+ miles away. (Dover is 21 miles from Calais.) The plan for landings in Lyme Bay was part of OKW Direktiv 16, issued on 16 Jul-- but abandoned by mid-August, with the publication of the 13-div "Dover Plan"! So at the time when the wargame was conducted-- 22 thru 28 Sep 1940-- the Brits were forcing the German players to use an operational plan that had been published on 16 Jul, but superceded by a heavily revised plan in mid-Aug!!!

"German...preparations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div (which) airlanded successfully at Lympne... 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty..."
Wait a minute!!! 7th Panzer Div??? It's only Day #2 of the invasion!!! I thought the Germans hadn't captured a port yet, it'd take 3 days to offload a panzer div even in a port, there's no way they could land heavy equipment over the beaches, they were just light infantry with no artillery or tank support... All that kind of stuff. Are the Brits themselves actually admitting that a whole German panzer div could get ashore under these conditions? In 2 Days? But what does that do to all the learned criticisms of this alt-history board?

23d - 24th-- "The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, & the navy protested that the weather was unsuitable..."
Of course it was unsuitable. The Brit umpires insisted that the invasion be launched in the unsuitable weather of Sep instead of waiting 'til Oct. I know that's what Hitler insisted upon-- but alt-history is all about what-if. What if Hitler had been talked into waiting a month for better weather? If it's good we go for it, if not then we call it off?

"The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440."
Fewer than that if my plan had been followed.

"The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming."
Even constrained by Goering's idiotic decisions, the Luftwaffe has still managed to virtually annihilate RAF Fighter Command.

"On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover..."
Not as good as they would have if they'd done it my way. (Or if they'd used English-speaking troops in British uniform.)

The wargame ended on 28 Dec in a decisive German defeat, based mainly on the absence of supply. But that's because the rules prevented the Germans from establishing air superiority, prevented them from choosing a later invasion date, prevented them from downsizing their invasion force to a more manageable level, prevented them from adding more paratroop & airlanding units, prevented them from diverting the Home Fleet by a ruse, prevented them from using the short invasion route from Calais to Dover, forcing them to use the longer route to Brighton instead... In fact prevented them from exercizing good common sense, forcing them to use the rules devised by the Brit umpires of the Sandhurst War College instead.

Note also (1) that the Brits in this wargame very sensibly kept their heavy fleet units far away from the Luftwaffe (whose pilots the contributors to this board insist were inept at attacking ships), & (2) made no use of mustard gas, or indeed chemical weapons of any kind.

I hope that this essay has illustrated why I feel that the Sandhurst wargames of 1974 can in no way be considered a decisive commentary on the plan for Operation Sealion that I have proposed on this board.

 

[Astrodragon]

The wargame of Operation Sealion conducted at Sandhurst War College in 1974 has been proposed as a rebuttal of my suggested plan to invade Britain in 1940. As it happens I have a copy of the summary of that wargame, which I used as part of the source material for my plan. I thought that it might be instructive to include here my appreciation of the relevance of that exercise.

To begin with, the umpiring staff was structured with 6 umpires-- a Brit 4-star, a German 3-star, 2 Brit 2-stars, & 2 German 2-stars. In any disagreement over rules the Brit 4-star would have the final word, favoring the desired Brit outcome. In any dispute among the Germans the 3-star would have the final word, & of the 3 Germans this 3-star was the least qualified to judge. VAdm. Friedrich Ruge was a mine warfare officer who'd served 20 years on mine warfare ships before being posted to a staff job in Paris during Sealion. He played no active role in planning the operation. Adolf Galland, while a famous fighter ace who fought in the Battle of Britain-- & indeed, helped pave the way for Sealion-- also played no role in planning the operation. Only Heinz Trettner, the Chief of Operations of 7th Fliegerdiv during the planning of Sealion, had any relevant staff experience.

Assumptions: "a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather & tides (for a high water attack) & c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping."
a) In my scenario the Luftwaffe has won air supremacy, & I've described in detail how they did it.
b) My invasion dates are equally constrained by the weather & tides, but by waiting until late Oct that isn't such a problem.
c) By waiting until late Oct more shipping has been assembled.

22 Sep-- "The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield."
330,000 men reflects the size of the original 25-30 division invasion force, which was completely untransportable, unsupportable by the KM, unsupplyable, crazy, & part of a German plan that by 22 Sep had been completely superseded.
Brighton also reflects the original (Heer) plan of the invasion-- not the multiservice Dover plan developed a month later. Brighton is 'way too far from Calais, & even too far from Boulougne. My scenario is based on the Dover plan.

"The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing..."
This amounts to an admission by the Brits themselves that the Germans could get ashore-- even with converted river barges-- with the lead elements of 9 freaking divisions!

"...but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged..."
Heavy losses.

"...the landings...overwhelmed the beach defenders..."
"Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent."
My other sources say 22 divs, but I'll bow to the Brits. And I seriously doubt that only 4 months after Dunkirk the Brits had been able to "fully equip" 17 divs. My other sources say not.

22 - 23 Sep-- "The Germans had still not captured a major port..."
That's because they were going for Brighton with amphibiously delivered ground forces. With my plan, Brighton would be taken by surprise by a paratroop div & a glider-borne airlanding div. Dover would be taken by a glider-borne airlanding div with an elite gebirgsdiv landing just north & another just south of town. These options were denied to the Germans playing at Sandhurst because they were constrained by the plan as it existed in Aug-- not as it might have developed into Oct had serious multiservice planning begun in Jul, which is the essence of my scenario.

"Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids..."
...which would have been avoided had the Luftwaffe 1st achieved air superiority, as I've specified & described in detail.

"...then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows & had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats, & 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk & one damaged."
More heavy RN casualties with little or nothing to show for them in return.

"However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed..."
My diversionary sortie happened at the beginning of the invasion, in the Denmark Straits, & it wouldn't have been destroyed because as soon as the Home Fleet heard about the invasion they'd break off & run for home.

23 Sep-- "The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters & 70 bombers), & the RN had suffered losses such that it was keeping its BBs & CVs back..."
Harold Faber, the author of "Luftwaffe: A History", writes that official RAF strength figures for the end of Sep reflect 665 fighters, not over a thousand. But anyway, more heavy Brit losses.

"Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg & forces were diverted to the South West."
A German buildup in Cherbourg is more craziness, unless done as a diversion. The Cherbourg forces were originally earmarked to land in Lyme Bay, 90+ miles away. (Dover is 21 miles from Calais.) The plan for landings in Lyme Bay was part of OKW Direktiv 16, issued on 16 Jul-- but abandoned by mid-August, with the publication of the 13-div "Dover Plan"! So at the time when the wargame was conducted-- 22 thru 28 Sep 1940-- the Brits were forcing the German players to use an operational plan that had been published on 16 Jul, but superceded by a heavily revised plan in mid-Aug!!!

"German...preparations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div (which) airlanded successfully at Lympne... 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty..."
Wait a minute!!! 7th Panzer Div??? It's only Day #2 of the invasion!!! I thought the Germans hadn't captured a port yet, it'd take 3 days to offload a panzer div even in a port, there's no way they could land heavy equipment over the beaches, they were just light infantry with no artillery or tank support... All that kind of stuff. Are the Brits themselves actually admitting that a whole German panzer div could get ashore under these conditions? In 2 Days? But what does that do to all the learned criticisms of this alt-history board?

23d - 24th-- "The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, & the navy protested that the weather was unsuitable..."
Of course it was unsuitable. The Brit umpires insisted that the invasion be launched in the unsuitable weather of Sep instead of waiting 'til Oct. I know that's what Hitler insisted upon-- but alt-history is all about what-if. What if Hitler had been talked into waiting a month for better weather? If it's good we go for it, if not then we call it off?

"The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440."
Fewer than that if my plan had been followed.

"The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming."
Even constrained by Goering's idiotic decisions, the Luftwaffe has still managed to virtually annihilate RAF Fighter Command.

"On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover..."
Not as good as they would have if they'd done it my way. (Or if they'd used English-speaking troops in British uniform.)

The wargame ended on 28 Dec in a decisive German defeat, based mainly on the absence of supply. But that's because the rules prevented the Germans from establishing air superiority, prevented them from choosing a later invasion date, prevented them from downsizing their invasion force to a more manageable level, prevented them from adding more paratroop & airlanding units, prevented them from diverting the Home Fleet by a ruse, prevented them from using the short invasion route from Calais to Dover, forcing them to use the longer route to Brighton instead... In fact prevented them from exercizing good common sense, forcing them to use the rules devised by the Brit umpires of the Sandhurst War College instead.

Note also (1) that the Brits in this wargame very sensibly kept their heavy fleet units far away from the Luftwaffe (whose pilots the contributors to this board insist were inept at attacking ships), & (2) made no use of mustard gas, or indeed chemical weapons of any kind.

I hope that this essay has illustrated why I feel that the Sandhurst wargames of 1974 can in no way be considered a decisive commentary on the plan for Operation Sealion that I have proposed on this board.

Changing history to support your views doesnt make it correct.
The war game was conducted on the basis that split descisions were decided by cutting cards - it says so quite specifically in the book. Nowhere does it mention the British side somehow having a deciding vote.
So what precisely are your sources that say this was now a lie?

Your ideas of the LW beating the RAF areacile, and have been shown to be so many times

One CA and 3DD sunk are trivial losses for the RN, especialy in an invasion scenario. Have you NO idea of its size in 1940??

Your idea of the Home Fleet again shows you dont have any concept of the naval forces available to the british, or how they intended to deply them.

The Dover plan was madness, as anyone whos seen Dover and looked at the defending force realises. The best you could hope for was to get a thouroughly (as in destroyed) port area. Wont help you getting anything ashore for weeks at least. You dont seem to understand that to the British the use of Dover as a port was a luxury, while denying it to the enemy was a necessity.

 

[WarBastard]

Jesus H this Forum is taken over by people who have no imagination.

How many American Commandos landed just before D-Day and attacked Pont du Hoc? A few hundred? Was that the entire Invasion Force?

Jeez, why do so many of you get your jollies attacking every idea?

Finally someone said it. I'm so sick of people here acting as if they know for sure when were are discussing something that is inherently unknowable. So many things throughout history have turned out exactly the opposite as you would have expected, yet there are still some who never learn their lesson.

Who knows, perhaps in an alternate universe there is some guy on an AH board being laughed at for suggesting the VC could have defeated the Americans.

 

[Graehame]

ASTRODRAGON-- This one's for you...

Finally someone said it. I'm so sick of people here acting as if they know for sure when were are discussing something that is inherently unknowable. So many things throughout history have turned out exactly the opposite as you would have expected, yet there are still some who never learn their lesson.

Thank you, Warbastard. I couldn't have said it better myself.

 

[Astrodragon]

Finally someone said it. I'm so sick of people here acting as if they know for sure when were are discussing something that is inherently unknowable. So many things throughout history have turned out exactly the opposite as you would have expected, yet there are still some who never learn their lesson.

Who knows, perhaps in an alternate universe there is some guy on an AH board being laughed at for suggesting the VC could have defeated the Americans.

Yes of course, all the military studies which have shown SeaLion impossible, all the experts, they are all wrong because..er, why exactly? Because you dont like the result? Sorry, RL isnt like that....

 

[Graehame]

Yes of course, all the military studies which have shown SeaLion impossible, all the experts, they are all wrong because..er, why exactly? Because you dont like the result? Sorry, RL isnt like that....

They're wrong because they take the wrong point of departure. Of course Sealion was impossible-- as planned by Hitler, Goering, & co.! The Sandhurst wargame proved that. And every single postwar analysis that I've read-- & I've read most of them-- criticizes the broad-front Heer plan as if the narrow-front Dover plan didn't even exist. But make a couple of relatively minor changes & the whole things starts looking-- if not militarily wise, then at least militarily possible.

You criticize the Luftwaffe gaining air superiority-- when Churchill's own statements & the Sandhurst wargame demonstrate that it's possible even in OTL. You make a big deal about the all-powerful Home Fleet-- when in the Sandhurst wargame the Home Fleet didn't even come into the picture because of high RN losses to the Luftwaffe. You carry on about the unseaworthy river barges, when at Sandhurst those very barges landed nearly 12 divisions-- including the 7th Panzer Division.

 

[MrP]

You carry on about the unseaworthy river barges, when at Sandhurst those very barges landed nearly 12 divisions-- including the 7th Panzer Division.

Speaking as a wargamer, I don't think either side would have had much fun if the two opposing teams hadn't been able to, erm, have a game. That the Sandhurst game allowed the landings is no argument for the practicality of the landings, but an argument that the game organisers wanted something more than to have the German side enter the room, be told that their units had been sunk prior to landing and walk out again.

 

[Astrodragon]

They're wrong because they take the wrong point of departure. Of course Sealion was impossible-- as planned by Hitler, Goering, & co.! The Sandhurst wargame proved that. And every single postwar analysis that I've read-- & I've read most of them-- criticizes the broad-front Heer plan as if the narrow-front Dover plan didn't even exist. But make a couple of relatively minor changes & the whole things starts looking-- if not militarily wise, then at least militarily possible.

You criticize the Luftwaffe gaining air superiority-- when Churchill's own statements & the Sandhurst wargame demonstrate that it's possible even in OTL. You make a big deal about the all-powerful Home Fleet-- when in the Sandhurst wargame the Home Fleet didn't even come into the picture because of high RN losses to the Luftwaffe. You carry on about the unseaworthy river barges, when at Sandhurst those very barges landed nearly 12 divisions-- including the 7th Panzer Division.

Actually, they have tried versions of the Sandhurst game (the one they wrote the book on is just one of them, its a regular thing) where they eliminated both the RAF and the RN (not telling the German player). The invasion still failed.

They even once eliminated the army as well! Guess what, invasion failed again....

And the idea of huge RN losses to the LW is ASB without divergences from the early 30's (at least), which them also assume the British look on at germany in amasement as they produce weapons that can damage ships.

As for the LW, I suggest you read Michelles 'A better show', which basically gives the LW all the reasonable advantages, and better strategy, without going ASB-insane

 

[Astrodragon]

Speaking as a wargamer, I don't think either side would have had much fun if the two opposing teams hadn't been able to, erm, have a game. That the Sandhurst game allowed the landings is no argument for the practicality of the landings, but an argument that the game organisers wanted something more than to have the German side enter the room, be told that their units had been sunk prior to landing and walk out again.

Apparently its fixture each time they play the game that the RN light forces are having a night off and that the barges cross. Otherwise, as you said, it would be rather boring.
They actually fix a number of things in the German favour just to allow it to be interesting.

 

[WarBastard]

Yes of course, all the military studies which have shown SeaLion impossible, all the experts, they are all wrong because..er, why exactly? Because you dont like the result? Sorry, RL isnt like that....

I'm not talking about Sealion specifically (and I'm not saying the experts are wrong about it), but military planners and experts are frequently wrong. which military planners would have predicted Vietnam? Prussia giving Austria and France such a hiding in 1800s? Which military planners in Wasington planned post-invasion Iraq, and how come they got it so wrong when they are experts? RL is exactly like that.

This forum suffers from a massive surplus of 'experts' who cannot accept we are dealing with a medium with so many variables and so many random events that they cannot possibly know what would have happened.

Look through a history book my friend, you'll find Alien Space Bats repeatedly landing at locations as diverse as Thermopylae, Isandlwana or Dien Bien Phu.