Perhaps define in what fashion Turkey would have joined the Axis. Would it have been due to war or would there be some treaty like the Tripartite Pact tiring Turkey to the rest? Considering Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria were in the Tripariate Pact before Yugoslavia the Pact itself might not have nececcsarilly been seen by the Yugoslavs themselves as vital. Even if Turkey is in the war against Greeze or the French or British (and Arabs probably, if they are invading Iraq and Syria with land claims on their mind) I don’t see it effecting the Yugoslavs/Serbs. They didn’t have much in the way of Turks. But yes, if basically the only country in the Balkans not a member of the Pact gets invaded and torn apart, the Yugoslavs would decide if they didn’t stay in the Pact then they would be the obvious next candidate.
AHC: Turkey joins the Axis in/by 1940
- Thread starter Wesley_Lewt
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Something I thought of, given how the Armenian population was only 1.3 million depending on how long or if the Soviets can retake Armenia. It's quite likely for the Armenians to be nearly eliminated or non-existent in South Caucasus with Armenian population of any significance being limited to the diaspora.
Capbeetle61
Banned
Simple: just have Britain exit the war after a failed/no evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk scenario in 1940, and Hitler and Ribbentrop coerce Turkey into the Anti-Comintern Pact with the promise of some territories in the Caucasus after the conclusion of the German-Soviet War.
Re "non-existent tankers"...
FWIW the Italian Merchant Marine included 82 tankers with a displacement greater than 1,600 tons, gross in 1939 with a total displacement of 427,000 tons, gross and 613,000 deadweight tons. The source for this is Appendix VII of the British official history on merchant shipping and the demands of war.
Unfortunately, I don't have any information handy on the number of Italian tankers that were in the Mediterranean and Black Sea when Italy joined the war.
During the war Italy got most of its oil from Romania and it came by sea via the Black and Aegean Seas. The distances from Brindisi to Constanta, Romania; Haifa, Palestine; and Tripoli, Lebanon are about the same, i.e.
- 1,200 nautical miles Brindisi to Tripoli, Lebanon.
- 1,243 nautical miles Brindisi to Haifa.
- 1,304 nautical miles Brindisi to Constanta.
Source: http://ports.com/sea-route/
Yes, the tankers will have to get past the British Mediterranean Fleet, but it's likely that the tankers will have a strong escort. The Regia Marina will have enough fuel to put all its operational battleships to sea at the same time.
I do know (from the British history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East) that the oil refineries at Haifa were in "shore bombardment" range and the same could also apply to the oil refineries at Tripoli. Therefore, bombarding the ports and refineries instead of attacking the convoys might be a better tactic.
It's also about 300 miles by air from the Nile Delta to Haifa and 400 miles from the Nile Delta to Tripoli which means that both ports were within bombing range. (Source: https://www.distancefromto.net/) However, IOTL the RAF only had a few squadrons of Wellingtons in the Middle East in 1940-41 IOTL. Is that enough to do significant damage to the refineries and ports? OTOH if they're spending most of their time bombing Haifa and Tripoli ITTL they're not bombing that targets they attacked IOTL.
I was going to write that that the tankers and their escort would have support from aircraft based in the Dodecanese Islands and southern Turkey. However, when I looked at the map I also saw that Cyprus was slap bang in the middle of the route from Haifa and Tripoli to Italy and less than 200 miles away from those ports. So it's perfectly placed to act as an air base to attack the ports and the tankers.
However, AFAIK it didn't have any military airfields in June 1940 and IIRC the British garrison in June 1940 consisted of one infantry company. It will need to be more heavily defended ITTL which will divert resources that were used elsewhere in the theatre IOTL. Similarly, the resources needed to develop the air bases will have to come from elsewhere in Mediterranean and Middle East theatre.
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I thought that Yugoslavia would be more isolated if Turkey was in the war and the Yugoslavs would be less likely to do anything that might provoke a German invasion.
Which would be good for the Axis because the occupation troops could be used elsewhere and they might get more raw materials out of the country.
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Man, some people will get their minds blown when they read how there was an entire active front and everything in the ME in WW1, despite the Turks beinng apparently unable to send even a company into this super-remote logistical hellholes. Hellholes for the Axis, that is, the Brits obviously would have a dozen divisions at the ready on the Turkish frontier the minute Ankara sided with Berlin.
That's the route that the Germans took when they invaded Greece in April 1941.
Agreed.
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While that's true they were in the Axis sphere of influence in the second half of 1940 and it shouldn't be too hard to persuade them to allow German troops to pass through their territory.
Something that I didn't write in that post is that IOTL Italy's invasion of Greece meant that it was cut off from its supply of Romanian oil for six months. If Turkey does "join in" ITTL and it that does shorten the campaign then Italy's supply or Romanian oil is interrupted for a shorter period of time.
It might help the Germans because they don't have to invade mainland Greece in April 1941 and Crete in May 1941. However, it might also be a blessing in disguise for the BEC because their armies don't loose the men and equipment that were lost in Greece and Crete IOTL. Furthermore, the Mediterranean Fleet doesn't receive the beating that the Luftwaffe put it through during the OTL evacuation of Crete.
I think people are asking the wrong question when they ask, "What's in it for Nazi Germany?"
The more pertinent question is, "What's in it for Fascist Italy?"
However, I repeat, I agree with the others who have written that Turkey wouldn't join the Axis.
FWIW the BEC didn't have a dozen divisions in the entire Mediterranean and Middle East theatre in June 1940 and that was roughly the total in January 1941.
I very much doubt that the BEC had the logistical capacity to send more troops to that theatre than they did IOTL by January 1941 ITTL even if the formations had been ready to send. If I'm correct (and I'm reasonably confident that I am) the reinforcements needed to secure Iraq and Palestine from an attack by/from Turkey would have to be found from the forces in the MEDME at the time IOTL.
That's why I wrote that there won't be an Operation Compass ITTL and that the invasion of Italian East Africa might be delayed.
There's also the possibility that the British have to abandon Malta in order to reinforce Cyprus, Iraq and Palestine or at least some of the fighter aircraft and AA guns that were sent to Malta IOTL have to be sent elsewhere in the theatre.
In some ways it could be a blessing in disguise for the BEC. That is W Force won't be sent to Greece so it doesn't loose most of its equipment and some of its men. Ditto the BEC forces in Cyrenaica when Rommel attacked. Plus there wouldn't be a siege of Tobruk.
This is before Japan's entry into the war. Britain uses divisions from India.
I'm not sure if you're agreeing or disagreeing with me.
Said Indian divisions have to be trained, equipped and transported to the MEDME theatre and what they sent IOTL is probably the practical limit. The same applies to forces from Australia, New Zealand and the UK.
I've done some more research on this.
Most of the information came from https://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/. My secondary source was the copy of Volume I of the British official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-Contents.html. Last and least I had to resort to Wikipaedia as a last resort to fill the gaps in the information in my primary source about the movements of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade.
Four static infantry divisions (1st to 4th) were formed in the late 1930s, but the 1st to 3rd Indian Divisions were disbanded prior to September 1939. This left the 4th Indian Division which according to the main source that I'm using was formed in 1938 and was the administrative unit of the brigades designated for overseas deployment.
- The 11th Indian Infantry Brigade Group arrived in Egypt on 11th August 1939.
- The divisional headquarters and 5th Indian Infantry Brigade sailed from India on 23rd September 1940.
- However, the division didn't reach full strength until 12th October 1940 when the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived at Alexandria.
- The division was ordered to the Sudan on 12th December 1940 - its place in Egypt was taken by the 6th Australian Division.
- The 5th Indian Division formed in India in June 1940. The main source says that it sailed for the Middle East in late 1940. Unfortunately, it doesn't give any more detail. The copy of the British official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East (Volume I, Page 171) on Hyperwar says "...on August 2nd, the destination of the 5th Indian Division was changed from Iraq to the Middle East, General Wavell at once ordered the leading brigade group to be disembarked at Port Sudan." I thought that the official history said that the first of the division's brigades arrived at Port Sudan in September 1940, but I couldn't find it when I looked.
- The 1st Indian Armoured Division formed in India in July 1940 with the 1st and 2nd Indian Armoured Brigades. In late 1941 they were renumbered the 31st Indian Armoured Division and the 251st and 252nd Indian Armoured Brigades. The division's headquarters moved to Iraq in June 1942. However, the 252nd Indian Armoured had been in Iraq since late 1941 (probably June).
- The 9th Indian Division formed in India in 15th September 1940. It was transferred to Malaya in the spring of 1941 and arrived in April and May of that year. The division was broken up in Malaya on 1st February 1942.
- The 7th Indian Division formed on 1st October 1940 and was still in India at the end of 1941. It spent the rest of the war in Burma and India.
- The 11th Indian Division formed in Malaya on 12th October 1941. The divisional headquarters was captured at Singapore on 12th February 1942.
- The 8th Indian Division formed in India on 15th October 1941. This was the second of three Indian divisions to be sent to Iraq in 1941. The first brigade arrived in May and the transfer was completed the following June.
- The 10th Indian Division formed in India on 15th January 1941. It was the first of three Indian divisions to be sent to Iraq in 1941. The divisional HQ and the first of its brigades arrived in April but the transfer of the division wasn't completed until the following May.
- The 6th Indian Division formed in India on 1st March 1941. It was the last of the three Indian divisions to be sent to Iraq in 1941. The division was transferred from India to Iraq in September of that year.
- 12th Indian Infantry Brigade that had been part of the 4th Indian Division. It arrived in circa September 1939 and according to my main source was the reserve brigade in Malaya Command.
- The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in August 1941 to act as the corps reserve for III Indian Corps.
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Carrying on from Post 93...
Of the nine Indian divisions (one armoured and eight infantry) that existed at the outbreak of World War II or were formed between then and March 1941.
- 3 infantry divisions (6th, 8th and 10th) plus one brigade of the 31st Armoured Division were sent to Iraq.
- 2 infantry divisions (4th and 5th) were sent to Egypt and the Sudan.
- 2 infantry divisions (9th and 11th) were sent to Malaya.
- This left the 7th Indian Division and the rump of the 31st Armoured Division in India in December 1941.
For the sake of completeness these are the other six Indian divisions that were formed in 1941.
- The 14th Indian Division were formed on 1st June 1941.
- The 17th Indian Division were formed on 1st June 1941.
- The 1st Burma Division was formed in July 1941. It was renamed the 38th Indian Division on 20th June 1942.
- The 1st Indian Armoured Division was formed on 15th September 1941. It was renamed the 32nd Indian Armoured Division in October 1941.
- The 18th Indian Division was formed on 1st October 1941. However, it was renamed the 19th Indian Division in December 1941.
- The 34th Indian Division was formed in October 1941.
As one of the objectives is to capture the Middle Eastern oil fields I thought this is informative. The source is: https://www2.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldArchive.html
I've divided the countries into three groups to show:
Even if it were done the convoys of tankers would be attacked by air and sea from Egypt and Cyprus. Those threats would disappear if the Axis forces were able to fight their way into Egypt but protecting them from attack by British supported resistance groups would tie down a large number of troops.
However, I repeat, I agree with the others who have written that Turkey wouldn't join the Axis.
I've divided the countries into three groups to show:
- The OTL crude petroleum the Axis had access to.
- The production of Egypt and Iraq which they have a slim chance of using.
- The production of the Persian Gulf countries which the Axis will have no chance of using. In the unlikely event of their armies getting that far there aren't enough tankers and even if they were the Royal Navy would sink them in the Arabian Sea.
Even if it were done the convoys of tankers would be attacked by air and sea from Egypt and Cyprus. Those threats would disappear if the Axis forces were able to fight their way into Egypt but protecting them from attack by British supported resistance groups would tie down a large number of troops.
However, I repeat, I agree with the others who have written that Turkey wouldn't join the Axis.
I mean yeah elements of the Ottoman forces during WW1 did pretty damned well considering shortness of pretty much everything and bad logistics ( though generally to my knowledge they tended to do so much better on the defense then offense. Though their were obviously exceptions like the humiliating for the Brits siege of Khut) and then often did pretty well in the resulting wars of Turkish independence.
And while the Brits were relatively weak in the Mideast at the time this doesn't change the facts on the ground in regards to Turkey at the time. Namely
1) They've got a numerically large army and many of the troops are tough fighters but large parts of it are not well trained or experienced. More importantly they are very very lacking in things like modern artillery, motorization of all sorts, few and mostly obsolete tanks, little modern AT or AA guns, very low stockpiles of virtually every needed supply, and in general a really poor logistics system for supporting an offensive. They would fight like hell with proper motivation in defense especially in mountainous Anatolia but in a offensive their likely to be much less effective.
2) The Turkish Airforce and Navy are small and mostly obsolete.
3) Turkey is at the time a country with little of the needed industry and resources needed to properlu rectify these shortcomings or even just provide things like enough artillery shells and small arms ammo in the quantities needed. And Germany is unlikely to be able to provide much more then OTL ( though you might see the Germans handing over more French, Belgian, Dutch, and British equipment captured in the fall of France.) Once the war starts there is little chance of Turkey being able to purchase much from anyone else ( Partially because their short on hard currency and any supply ships would risk the RN.)
4) In general the infrastructure at the time in Eastern Anatolia was pretty poor. And unlike WW1 when the war starts they don't already hold the railroads and such in Iraq, The Levant, and Arabia.
So its less a matter of Turkey being unable to fight a war and more material, training, organization, logistical, and Industrial limitations of the Turks and poor or foreign occupied infrastructure make a successful large scale offensive that both initially succeeds and lasts being rather poor odds.