How could arab Sicily survive the meddle ages and maybe even to the modern times? What sort of butterflies would this set in europe and the arab world?
AHC/PC/WI survival of the muslim Sicily.
- Thread starter EnvarKadri
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- arab islam italy north africa sicily
Not having the Normans ever gain any control in southern Italy would definitely lead to less interest in conquering Sicily. It might be seen similar to the Muslim states in Iberia since it is in such close proximity to Christian states, but southern Italy is much more splintered in the middle ages than Iberia was. Before the Normans conquered southern Italy, the Eastern Roman Empire still ruled over certain regions in the south, so this lack of Norman presence would impact that as well. It's possible that, with longer Eastern Roman presence in the south of Italy, there are more Greek speakers and more Orthodox Christians. There may be additional Norman domains elsewhere in Europe or the Mediterranean, but that's not really certain.
With regards to Sicily itself, I would imagine it would continue to have a largely Arab population with some Romance and Greek speakers, but it would be very close culturally to north Africa, especially Tunisia. I could easily see a Muslim state based in Tunisia conquering Sicily and impeding commerce and trade between the eastern and western mediterranean. Could it even be possible that such an African state could even potentially expand into southern Italy?
With regards to Sicily itself, I would imagine it would continue to have a largely Arab population with some Romance and Greek speakers, but it would be very close culturally to north Africa, especially Tunisia. I could easily see a Muslim state based in Tunisia conquering Sicily and impeding commerce and trade between the eastern and western mediterranean. Could it even be possible that such an African state could even potentially expand into southern Italy?
jocay
Banned
The problem is that Muslim Sicily on its own would not be enough to prevent attempts at conquests by either Constantinople, the mainland Italian city-states or the Normans; it'll at least be an appendage of some North African state. Time would eventually erode the Greek/Romance Christian majority. Malta is likely not to exist as it would remain part of this Sicilian Muslim state.
Koprulu Mustafa Pasha
Gone Fishin'
A strong North African State covering from Morocco to Libya or Egypt to Tunisia. The Fatimids not losing Tunis is an option. If the Normans are absent/not attacking Sicily or Sicily is still united post-1055 they could wait out until the Almoravids start to get strong.
Without a strong power in North Africa the Emirate of Sicily has little chance to survive. With or without the Normans. Odds are a strong East Roman Empire or the Holy Roman Emperor attacks it in the 12th/13th century.
And what if they survive until the rise of the ottomans? Would the ottomans make them part of the north african regencies or a province? Would this mean a stronger ottoman navy in the mediterrean? In case of ottoman collapse like in otl, would sicily became part of italy ala otl lybia or a british protectorate like malta?
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Koprulu Mustafa Pasha
Gone Fishin'
If the butterflies do not affect too much too prevent the Ottomans from rising... they would turn Sicily in to a vassal.
Do you know of any thread here that includes a surviving muslim Sicily?
Ok, thanks anyway. Its just a really obscure part of medieval history, there are many al andalus or ERE survives tl but nothing about arab Sicily, so it picked my interest.
To be honest it seems hard to have Sicily survive with a Christian Iberia, so you might have a recurrence of Andalus survivals in TLs where there is a long lasting Muslim Sicily.
Moonlight in a jar had it survive a bit and has a cool stuff around it.
Koprulu Mustafa Pasha
Gone Fishin'
I think a stronger Byzantines or united Southern Italy is a bigger threat. Iberia has Morocco and Algeria to worry about.
The Arab revolt of the 1220s succeeds?
They came close to regaining their freedom and had they succeeded the Arab presence might have recovered and endured on the island indefinitely.
Koprulu Mustafa Pasha
Gone Fishin'
Almost like the Morisco revolt. It needs a strong power to back them up. Or there is no chance.
I found an interesting document
The Norman invasion of Sicily (1061-1072): Numbers and Military Tactics,” War in History 17 (2010), pp. 381-402
- https://www.academia.edu/2401443/_T...ry_Tactics_War_in_History_17_2010_pp._381-402
After reading this document, it seems obvious that the main Arab weakness was their political division and the treason of the emir of Syracuse. A lack of division, especially better relations between Ibn al-Hawas and Ibn al-Timnah, could be an interesting political POD, but too complicated. The treason of Ibn al-Timnah can’t easily be avoided.
We know that the Islamic army, the troops of Ibn al-Hawas, were only reinforced by the Zirid forces in 1063. It’s the year of the famous battle of Camari, a battle that merely confirmed the Norman hold on the north-eastern part of Sicily. This north-eastern part was named Val Domine and mainly populated by Greeks and former Byzantine subjects.
Outside of Massina, the Normans owned two major strongholds from which they launched raids in order to plunder and to lure the Muslim troops out of their fortifications looking for an open battle. Those raids were also a way to submit the population through fear in order to get hostages and supplies. Those strongholds were Tarnià (close to Camari) and another named San Marco d’Alunzio.
At the battle of Camari, Roger's force was tiny. It consisted of 136 mounted Norman knights who were highly disciplined and well versed in the Frankish tactic of the heavy cavalry charge. The Norman force would also have contained an infantry element but, owing to the Roger's chronic shortage of manpower, this almost certainly did not exceed approximately 200 troops and would have consisted of Norman as well as Calabrian Lombard sergeants and dismounted knights and squires.
This battle surely wasn’t the epic battle described in the chronicles with ten of thousands Muslims against this small number of Christians. Even in this case, I don’t see any reasons why the writers would inflate the number of Christian troops who fought there. It means that Roger did actually suffer from a manpower shortage.
In my opinion, the second siege of Tarnà could be an interesting POD, it happened prior to the battle of Camari in 1062 and Roger’s forces were clearly unprepared for this siege. Worse Robert was in Italy to quell Byzantine remnants and revolts leaving only garnison forces in Messina.
After the capture of this citadel, Ibn al-Hawas launched a counterattack which besieged Roger's wife and a handful of retainers in Troina. Roger had to return from plundering and his relief force broke through the siege lines and managed to occupy the citadel, but the Normans found themselves besieged by the Muslims as well as the Greek townsfolk, who were tired with the harsh Norman rule.
In OTL, early in 1063, Roger broke the siege of Troina, his besiegers got drunk on local wine according to chroniclers. He resumed his harrying of the Sicilian interior and following events led to the battle of Camari in June. This open battle was a victory for the Normans.
A death of Roger de Hauteville, in 1062, during the siege of Troina could lead to a renewed impetus among the Ibn Al-Hawàs forces and a swift siege of Massina could be a victory in the absence of charismatic and wise commanders. Norman conquerors and Robert would later consider the situation in Italy as more important and precarious than Sicily. In OTL, Robert was only able to focus on Sicily in 1064.
This two-years or longer pause could give enough time for a powerful Arab leadership to take power in Sicily. Ibn Al-Hawas is a good candidate, but he needs a backer.
He could continue to get help from the relatively weak Zirid dynasty, based in Ifriqya with Tamin ibn Al-Mu’izz or thanks to butterflies later get direct support from Fatimids or Abbassids who would recognize the strategic importance of Sicily and Malta.
The Norman invasion of Sicily (1061-1072): Numbers and Military Tactics,” War in History 17 (2010), pp. 381-402
- https://www.academia.edu/2401443/_T...ry_Tactics_War_in_History_17_2010_pp._381-402
After reading this document, it seems obvious that the main Arab weakness was their political division and the treason of the emir of Syracuse. A lack of division, especially better relations between Ibn al-Hawas and Ibn al-Timnah, could be an interesting political POD, but too complicated. The treason of Ibn al-Timnah can’t easily be avoided.
We know that the Islamic army, the troops of Ibn al-Hawas, were only reinforced by the Zirid forces in 1063. It’s the year of the famous battle of Camari, a battle that merely confirmed the Norman hold on the north-eastern part of Sicily. This north-eastern part was named Val Domine and mainly populated by Greeks and former Byzantine subjects.
Outside of Massina, the Normans owned two major strongholds from which they launched raids in order to plunder and to lure the Muslim troops out of their fortifications looking for an open battle. Those raids were also a way to submit the population through fear in order to get hostages and supplies. Those strongholds were Tarnià (close to Camari) and another named San Marco d’Alunzio.
At the battle of Camari, Roger's force was tiny. It consisted of 136 mounted Norman knights who were highly disciplined and well versed in the Frankish tactic of the heavy cavalry charge. The Norman force would also have contained an infantry element but, owing to the Roger's chronic shortage of manpower, this almost certainly did not exceed approximately 200 troops and would have consisted of Norman as well as Calabrian Lombard sergeants and dismounted knights and squires.
This battle surely wasn’t the epic battle described in the chronicles with ten of thousands Muslims against this small number of Christians. Even in this case, I don’t see any reasons why the writers would inflate the number of Christian troops who fought there. It means that Roger did actually suffer from a manpower shortage.
In my opinion, the second siege of Tarnà could be an interesting POD, it happened prior to the battle of Camari in 1062 and Roger’s forces were clearly unprepared for this siege. Worse Robert was in Italy to quell Byzantine remnants and revolts leaving only garnison forces in Messina.
After the capture of this citadel, Ibn al-Hawas launched a counterattack which besieged Roger's wife and a handful of retainers in Troina. Roger had to return from plundering and his relief force broke through the siege lines and managed to occupy the citadel, but the Normans found themselves besieged by the Muslims as well as the Greek townsfolk, who were tired with the harsh Norman rule.
In OTL, early in 1063, Roger broke the siege of Troina, his besiegers got drunk on local wine according to chroniclers. He resumed his harrying of the Sicilian interior and following events led to the battle of Camari in June. This open battle was a victory for the Normans.
A death of Roger de Hauteville, in 1062, during the siege of Troina could lead to a renewed impetus among the Ibn Al-Hawàs forces and a swift siege of Massina could be a victory in the absence of charismatic and wise commanders. Norman conquerors and Robert would later consider the situation in Italy as more important and precarious than Sicily. In OTL, Robert was only able to focus on Sicily in 1064.
This two-years or longer pause could give enough time for a powerful Arab leadership to take power in Sicily. Ibn Al-Hawas is a good candidate, but he needs a backer.
He could continue to get help from the relatively weak Zirid dynasty, based in Ifriqya with Tamin ibn Al-Mu’izz or thanks to butterflies later get direct support from Fatimids or Abbassids who would recognize the strategic importance of Sicily and Malta.
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Marc
Donor
Quick note:
While more speculative extrapolation than confirmed data, several estimates of the population of Sicily in that time period are around 2-2.5 million - this would suggest the ability to raise very substantive military forces; Sicily's vulnerability is a leadership question than anything.
While more speculative extrapolation than confirmed data, several estimates of the population of Sicily in that time period are around 2-2.5 million - this would suggest the ability to raise very substantive military forces; Sicily's vulnerability is a leadership question than anything.
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What? This seems to be an exaggeration, the island today has just 5 million people and Italy's population grew a lot during the 19th century as a whole, so it's safe to say that number is unrealistic to say the least.
Planet of Hats
Donor
The real problem with Kalbid Sicily is that it has all the problems of Al-Andalus but is smaller and doesn't have a manpower pool.
Al-Andalus survived as long as it did because the locals could always draw upon mercenaries from the Maghreb as hired muscle, even if the hired muscle eventually took over and kept the Iberian territories around as the northern province in a greater Berber Empire after a certain point. Sicily couldn't do that. Sicily also has the problem that the Umayyads tried to staunch by declaring a Caliphate: The ruler of Sicily is always just an emir appointed by someone else, whether by the Aghlabids or the Fatimids, and as such doesn't really have much weight behind his authority in the absence of a bigger power. The island remained most solidly within the Muslim sphere during the period when the island was subject to a strong power with its centre in Ifriqiya - that is, Tunisia. The nature of the western Islamic states - in which an Islamized ruling class sits on top of a vast and surly underclass of dhimmi and a few native conversos whom they do not want to empower - ensured that, unless Sicily survived long enough to somehow convert most of the island to Islam and undergo a big shu'ubiyya revolt which somehow put power in the hands of Islamized Sicilians who could then form their own army, Sicily was always going to be under the thumb of whomever controlled Ifriqiya. This worked fine until 973, even once the Fatimids came in; the Fatimids actually had a large navy based in Ifriqiya, where their seat of power was, and they could just nip across the Med and reinforce their Sicilian proxies.
Then the Fatimids moved the capital to Egypt. The navy went with it. From 973 on, the Sicilians were basically hung out to dry.
Probably what you would need for Sicily to survive is to ensure a strong, persistent power centred in Ifriqiya, which can hold Sicily as a proxy kingdom - that could be a Fatimid empire which doesn't expand into Egypt, or it could be some other Berber empire which gains control of Ifriqiya and figures out what a boat is. It's less likely with the Zirids, who themselves are proxies of the Fatimids; at that point, Sicily is a proxy of a proxy, and bound to fracture.
Al-Andalus survived as long as it did because the locals could always draw upon mercenaries from the Maghreb as hired muscle, even if the hired muscle eventually took over and kept the Iberian territories around as the northern province in a greater Berber Empire after a certain point. Sicily couldn't do that. Sicily also has the problem that the Umayyads tried to staunch by declaring a Caliphate: The ruler of Sicily is always just an emir appointed by someone else, whether by the Aghlabids or the Fatimids, and as such doesn't really have much weight behind his authority in the absence of a bigger power. The island remained most solidly within the Muslim sphere during the period when the island was subject to a strong power with its centre in Ifriqiya - that is, Tunisia. The nature of the western Islamic states - in which an Islamized ruling class sits on top of a vast and surly underclass of dhimmi and a few native conversos whom they do not want to empower - ensured that, unless Sicily survived long enough to somehow convert most of the island to Islam and undergo a big shu'ubiyya revolt which somehow put power in the hands of Islamized Sicilians who could then form their own army, Sicily was always going to be under the thumb of whomever controlled Ifriqiya. This worked fine until 973, even once the Fatimids came in; the Fatimids actually had a large navy based in Ifriqiya, where their seat of power was, and they could just nip across the Med and reinforce their Sicilian proxies.
Then the Fatimids moved the capital to Egypt. The navy went with it. From 973 on, the Sicilians were basically hung out to dry.
Probably what you would need for Sicily to survive is to ensure a strong, persistent power centred in Ifriqiya, which can hold Sicily as a proxy kingdom - that could be a Fatimid empire which doesn't expand into Egypt, or it could be some other Berber empire which gains control of Ifriqiya and figures out what a boat is. It's less likely with the Zirids, who themselves are proxies of the Fatimids; at that point, Sicily is a proxy of a proxy, and bound to fracture.
Marc
Donor
Nope, Italy, including Sicily, had nearly the highest population densities in medieval times. An example of working out estimates: Palermo under the Arabs had a population of 50,000+; rule of thumb is an urban to rural ratio 5-10/100; suggesting 500 thousand to one million living in the countryside of northern and western Sicily. There were at two more cities with populations over 20,000 - again the multiples suggest perhaps another 1 million. Low ball it, and say perhaps as few a 1-1.5 million in total on the island. Still, that makes them not that much a minor player.
Going a bit further back, using Imperial census data that has survived, suggests a population for Sicily and Sardinia (they were generally lumped together) of around 500 thousand to 1 million in 14 CE.
Quoting: "The Italian population was 7 million at the death of the emperor Augustus; after a decline from the 2nd/3rd century, it regained momentum in the 10th, reaching 11 million in 1300 {12.5 million is gaining as more likely}, 13.5 million in 1700 and 18 million in 1800. It attained 26 million in 1861."
Population growth prior to the 19th century is filled with remarkable ups and downs with a real shallow exponential curve.
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