AHC: British military response to Rhodesia's UDI

[Strategos' Risk]

Found a paper just now.

Chapter Two
Alternatives: The United Nations, and the Use of Force
[...]

The Government’s reluctance to hand over the problem to the United Nations is worth examining, because it saddled Britain with primary responsibility for Rhodesia until it obtained its legal independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. This chapter will argue that the most significant reason why the British Government sought to maintain control of the Rhodesian problem at the United Nations is that it was desperate to avoid creating a precedent for UN sanctions against South Africa, which would be highly damaging to the British economy. Another key issue at the time, which has remained controversial ever since, is whether the Wilson Government could, or should, have used force against Ian Smith’s regime in order to prevent UDI or, after it had occurred, to compel Rhodesia to walk a legal path to independence. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1965-1966) wrote in his memoirs that military intervention would have been too risky: ‘All the evidence before us was to the effect that [Rhodesia’s] forces were well-armed and well-trained; and that they would fight. This would not be a colonial expedition but a medium-sized war of uncertain duration.’ On the other hand, James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1964-1967), recognised in retrospect that a more coercive strategy might have yielded beneficial results: ‘I do not disguise my regret nor my belief that more forceful action by us at the time might have saved Britain from many uncomfortable moments in later years.’ This chapter demonstrates that the British Government rejected the option of using force because it was engaged in a desperate struggle to limit its military liabilities for economic reasons. These were the chief concerns guiding the Government’s calculations, but publicly it was prudent to argue that the use of force was neither militarily feasible, nor desirable because of popular sympathy for Rhodesian ‘kith and kin’. However, it will be argued below that even though the circumstances were not particularly favourable to military intervention, the ‘more forceful action’ advocated by Callaghan was practicable and likely to have succeeded.

Lots of juicy stuff:

In November 1964, a British Cabinet sub-committee considered a list of proposals for the solution of the Rhodesian problem, which Arthur Bottomley presented ‘roughly in ascending order of acceptability to Mr Smith’:

1. Hand over to the UN, admitting that the UK has no solution to the problem (similar to Palestine).

2. Suspend the Rhodesian Constitution and impose direct rule by force.

3. Amend the current Constitution to enfranchise the Africans.

4. Summon an immediate Constitutional conference in London or Salisbury.

5. Allow independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, provided that the Africans are enfranchised beforehand.

6. Persuade Smith to accept a Commonwealth Commission to try to devise a solution to the problem.

7. [Her Majesty’s Government] to devise a new Constitution with a bicameral legislature, the second chamber of which would contain an African majority.

8. Ask Smith to provide greater evidence of Rhodesian support for independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution.

9. Suggest a national meeting similar to the ‘National Convention’ held under the governorship of Sir J. Kennedy in 1960.

10. Suggest a political moratorium on the independence issue, with the UK or Commonwealth intervening to dissuade the African Nationalists from unconstitutional action.

11. Persuade Smith to make a concession to the African Nationalists by incorporating a few of them into his Government.

12. Propose that the convention of non-intervention in Rhodesian affairs by the British Parliament be formalised, but with [Her Majesty’s Government] retaining responsibility for external affairs.

13. Grant immediate independence with safeguards against repeal of the entrenched clauses of the Constitution.

14. Grant unconditional independence.

Officials in the Foreign Office West and Central Africa Department later suggested: ‘This is a threat to which precisely the most reactionary and stubborn Rhodesians would be likely to be most susceptible.’ It was argued that handing over the problem to the United Nations would have several advantages: it would accept the facts of the situation (namely that the British Government had no ability to control the situation in Rhodesia); it would obviate the need for a general trade embargo; and it would demonstrate that British policy was not motivated by favouritism towards the white minority in Rhodesia. It also became apparent shortly before UDI that a majority of the British public (some 63 per cent) was in favour of handing responsibility for Rhodesia to the United Nations.

This article goes on to give three reasons for why the Wilson government might not have wanted to let the U.N. handle things. Anyway I think it's worth a skim and I'm not going to quote it all verbatim, but really provides more meat for this discussion.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Bunker Hill wasn't broadcast live.

And even if it was any anti war protests in Britain would have faced the redcoat's fire and bayonets. That was during the era of the Bloody Code and civil unrest was treated as open rebellion.

 

[Quintuplicate]

How would the UN have handled Rhodesia?

 

[Strategos' Risk]

The above paper's coverage on the possibility of Britain using force:

the conclusion (tl;dr)

In the Foreign Office, which had to defend Britain’s policy to the international community, there was a feeling that the European minority in Rhodesia should not be allowed ‘to hold our whole international policy to ransom’. Handing the matter over to the United Nations would have rid Britain of this problem. However, Foreign Office officials were concerned that if Britain conceded UN competence to deal with Rhodesia it would lead to an international campaign against South Africa, which would gravely prejudice British economic interests. Foreign Office officials also acknowledged that ‘Logically the obvious course would be to use troops’, but noted that ministers had explicitly ruled this out.

The Wilson Government was highly resistant to military intervention in Rhodesia for several reasons. First, and perhaps most significant, Britain’s economic weakness generated a rolling defence review that was progressively undermining the capability of the British armed forces to execute their various roles, which constituted a powerful constraint on any deployment in southern Africa. Second, parliamentary and electoral concerns made Wilson and the Cabinet reluctant to take what it perceived as unnecessary risks. Against this background the Government received pessimistic advice from the Chiefs of Staff and officials in the Ministry of Defence, which was based on erroneous assessment of the respective attitudes and capabilities of the Rhodesian and British armed forces. This advice, combined with the ‘kith and kin’ factor, became a convenient pretext to avoid the use of force. All of this tends to support Sir Oliver Wright’s belief in the ‘supremacy of the domestic over foreign’.

Yet none of these factors taken in isolation or, indeed, in combination, precluded the use of force as a viable option, particularly if military intervention had been politically well-orchestrated. The failure to implement a successful deterrent was perhaps the most lamentable aspect of the Wilson Government’s policy on Rhodesia.

Five factors are explored in detail-

Douglas Anglin has observed that debate about the feasibility of British military intervention revolved around five factors: availability of sufficient forces; logistical support; the likely extent of Rhodesian resistance; the danger of South African intervention; and the willingness of British soldiers to fight against their ‘kith and kin’.

Tasty morsels from the third and fourth points:

Attitudes among senior Rhodesian Army officers were not sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front regime. On the morning of UDI the Governor in Salisbury, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, received a visit from four Army officers who arrived armed at Government House. They informed Gibbs that if he provided them with a warrant for the arrest of Smith as a rebel against the Queen, they would do their duty. The Governor refused, and the soldiers left. In Gibbs’ obituary Patrick Keatley commented that ‘This was the fatal moment of hesitation.’72 The Governor had in fact considered the possibility of resisting UDI. [...]

Flower also advised that the possibility of bloodshed could not be discounted because the attitude among middle and junior ranks was more belligerent, especially in the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which Flower said ‘would willingly “jump into the Makabusi (a muddy river on the outskirts of the city [Salisbury]) for Smith, even if this meant going against their seniors.’

On the one hand it was in the interests of the South African Government that white rule should be maintained in Southern Rhodesia, but on the other hand the South African Government had always remained committed to legality in international affairs and the principle of non-interference in domestic politics. The problem of the mandated territory of Southwest Africa was also entering a crucial phase at the United Nations and a negative reaction against South Africa could have resulted on this issue if its Government intervened in support of Rhodesia. A further point of concern was that if the United Nations applied sanctions against Rhodesia in the event of a UDI, they might next be applied against South Africa. Ian Smith suggested in his memoirs that this actually worked in Rhodesia’s favour, because the South Africans made it clear to the British Government: ‘South Africa would not abandon Rhodesia, not only for moral reasons and because of our strong mutual ties, but because there was much evidence to indicate that if sanctions succeeded against Rhodesia, South Africa would be next on the list.’

As far as the last point goes, the paper says reluctance of British troops to fight the Rhodesians were definitely reported, but somewhat at the rumor level and ambiguous. While some of the officers and command staff had ties to Rhodesia, it doesn't necessarily mean that they would have overridden the British military's traditionally apolitical role. It instead concludes that the Wilson government was in a very tight financial situation and was already cutting defense spending at the time, much less spending more for a costly excursion overseas. The Labour majority was also only down to one seat at the time, and precarious as the left wing was concerned over the Vietnam War. The paper speculates Wilson could have gotten the Liberals on board, and reports that the Conservatives were surprisingly diverse in views (there was a small, but vocal Rhodesia Lobby, there was also a small faction of Progressives opposite of them, and the vast majority of Conservative MPs were uncommitted on the Rhodesian issue).

Soon after Ian Smith made a visit to London for talks with Wilson in October 1965, an opinion poll showed that the British public was divided almost equally three ways between sympathy for the Europeans in Rhodesia, Africans and ‘neither/both’. An overwhelming majority believed that independence should not be granted unless the conditions were acceptable to Rhodesians as a whole. However, there was almost no support for military intervention in the event of a UDI, with a majority in favour of referring the issue to the United Nations. During Smith’s visit, a Gallup Poll found that 41 per cent approved of the British Government’s handling of the problem, 24 per cent disapproved and 35 per cent were undecided. After UDI, however, approval of British policy rose to 68 per cent and disapproval fell to 12 per cent, with 22 per cent in favour of the use of military force.

Whoa:

Even the Archbishop of Canterbury put forward a case for military intervention. Shortly before UDI, Dr Michael Ramsay issued a message on behalf of the British Council of Churches, which assured the Government that many Christians would support the use of force if all other efforts to find a solution failed. A group of 35 MPs sent a message to the Archbishop, congratulating the Council of Churches on its courageous stand.

There's a whole section about how Wilson publicly ruling out the use of force basically committed a "classic strategic blunder" that destroyed any chance of deterrence, egging on Smith to declare UDI. Kind of a Chamberlain move I suppose.

I recommend skimming it for more information.

 

[Quintuplicate]

The above paper's coverage on the possibility of Britain using force:

the conclusion (tl;dr)


Five factors are explored in detail-



Tasty morsels from the third and fourth points:





As far as the last point goes, the paper says reluctance of British troops to fight the Rhodesians were definitely reported, but somewhat at the rumor level and ambiguous. While some of the officers and command staff had ties to Rhodesia, it doesn't necessarily mean that they would have overridden the British military's traditionally apolitical role. It instead concludes that the Wilson government was in a very tight financial situation and was already cutting defense spending at the time, much less spending more for a costly excursion overseas. The Labour majority was also only down to one seat at the time, and precarious as the left wing was concerned over the Vietnam War. The paper speculates Wilson could have gotten the Liberals on board, and reports that the Conservatives were surprisingly diverse in views (there was a small, but vocal Rhodesia Lobby, there was also a small faction of Progressives opposite of them, and the vast majority of Conservative MPs were uncommitted on the Rhodesian issue).



Whoa:



There's a whole section about how Wilson publicly ruling out the use of force basically committed a "classic strategic blunder" that destroyed any chance of deterrence, egging on Smith to declare UDI. Kind of a Chamberlain move I suppose.

I recommend skimming it for more information.

Is "Flower" Ken?

 

[Strategos' Risk]

Is "Flower" Ken?

Yep- here's the excerpt:

The Governor had in fact considered the possibility of resisting UDI. He consulted Ken Flower, Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to ascertain his views. Flower recalled in his memoirs:

Although I considered that the loyalty of the Chiefs of Staff, Putterill and Hawkins, was not in doubt and that many of their senior officers would follow their lead, I advised Gibbs that an appeal for their support would put them in an almost impossible position, between the government that paid them and an overseas Queen to whom they owed their allegiance.

 

[arrowiv]

I did some reading up on the Beira Patrol and it basically turned out to be a complete waste of time for the Royal Navy and for the British taxpayers. It reportedly bored to tears many a crew operating off Beira. What is funny and ironic is that a number of RN crews took shore leave in Rhodesia in some resort hotels at Lake Kariba and the Rhodesian Midlands., leaving behind some souvenir plagues of their ships for the hotels.

 

[Chris Nation]

[Snip]

The situation in November 1965 did not appear out of a vacuum. Indeed, there had been concerns over a Federal (as in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) UDI during the 1950s, and up until the date of dissolution. Welensky himself had used the metaphor of the American Revolution that you used previously on multiple occasions, threatening a "Boston Tea Party" on at least three separate occasions. Each time, Whitehall had quietly, and with increasing alarm, considered whether the use of force was possible. Each time the suggestion was balked at, not least because they couldn't even get a proper defence consultation on the subject due to the presence of Rhodesian officers on British military planning committees. During the 1961 constitutional crisis when Welensky again implicitly threatened UDI, the British government did manage to put together a plan for a possible military intervention in the Federation - but only under cover of only being conceivably applicable to a scenario in which the black population were in a state of revolt. Even then, the implication that this plan (KINGFISHER, in case you're wondering) could be used against the white population caused Lord Mountbatten (the CDS) to deny that the British military could ever be used against them.

In 1964, when it was assumed that Smith would declare independence, the Chiefs of Staff told the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that "it cannot be contemplated that a situation should be allowed to develop in which HMG found itself in a position of being required to use military force to coerce a recalcitrant regime in Southern Rhodesia. There should be no question of using British forces against the white population of that country." ('An Intricate and Distasteful Subject': British Planning for the Use of Force against the European settlers of Central Africa 1952-1965, Philip Murphy)

Later that same year, because it was assumed that Ian Smith would use the occasion of Nyasaland's independence (in July) to declare independence, given that it was, to him, fairly ridiculous that the most developed and only self-governing member of the Federation was to be left for last for independence, the Defence Planning Staff said in a report that encountering any resistance from the Territorial Force or Police in Southern Rhodesia would "place a severe strain on the loyalties and morale of British troops." It goes on to say that if British forces encountered any resistance from the Southern Rhodesian Regular Army or the RRAF, it would "not only place an unacceptable strain on the loyalty of British troops but would also prove militarily impracticable."

The same report went on to suggest that any conflict in the territory was likely to be protracted and would drain British military resources to the limit, but were consoled by the fact that such a resource drain would likely not be fatal, due to the likelihood that the conflict would end early as a result of political considerations. They dismissed the idea out of hand.

Throughout the remainder of 1964, even limited military interventions were dismissed, due to the considerations that for Britain to be able to conduct even limited aerial operations in Southern Rhodesia, it was considered necessary to destroy the entire RRAF. Which is, again, something that the RAF simply would not do. Not only because they would be raining down bombs on people who had fought with them for half a century and were in many cases their relations, but also because almost all airfields in Southern Rhodesia at the time were both military and civilian, and those bombs would be likely to be hitting not only their comrades, but also the wives and children of their comrades.

The idea of military intervention was always far more popular with politicians than it was with the British military, who consistently warned against the idea for well over a decade. At several points, the prospect of a renewed Curragh incident was held up as a real possibility (i.e. that British forces sent to Southern Rhodesia would simply refuse to fight). By the British military itself. Given that even the most left-wing prime minister that Britain has ever had also rejected had also rejected the option, because he knew it would be political suicide in the country, I'd say it's fairly safe to say that any such action is likely to only result in a left-wing Suez. Posturing by the Archbishop of Canterbury notwithstanding.

 

[marktaha]

Sure, easy enough, Wilson takes leave of his senses and forgets how tenuous his majority is. Sends Vulcan bombers over Salisbury. The Times runs a front page report on the carnage, and profiles a young widow of an ex-National Serviceman.

10-20 Labour MPs support a motion of no confidence. The resulting February 1966 general election produces a Tory majority on the Rhodesia question.

Newly inaugurated Defence Secretary Enoch Powell announces an end to the bombing campaign. Rhodesian independence on roughly Tiger terms in 1966.

As an added bonus, Britain is spared the worst excesses of socialism.

People forget that even economic boycott to the extent that Wilson brought in was highly controversial in Britain at the time. A bombing campaign, let alone a ground invasion, would be

Last National Servicemen discharged in 1963.

 

[marktaha]

Could the Brits even find any mercenaries willing to fight against Rhodesia, and not for them? Because hey there's another idea.

There was an apparent attempt to recruit them in 1975 which turned into a total fiasco.

 

[marktaha]

The situation in November 1965 did not appear out of a vacuum. Indeed, there had been concerns over a Federal (as in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) UDI during the 1950s, and up until the date of dissolution. Welensky himself had used the metaphor of the American Revolution that you used previously on multiple occasions, threatening a "Boston Tea Party" on at least three separate occasions. Each time, Whitehall had quietly, and with increasing alarm, considered whether the use of force was possible. Each time the suggestion was balked at, not least because they couldn't even get a proper defence consultation on the subject due to the presence of Rhodesian officers on British military planning committees. During the 1961 constitutional crisis when Welensky again implicitly threatened UDI, the British government did manage to put together a plan for a possible military intervention in the Federation - but only under cover of only being conceivably applicable to a scenario in which the black population were in a state of revolt. Even then, the implication that this plan (KINGFISHER, in case you're wondering) could be used against the white population caused Lord Mountbatten (the CDS) to deny that the British military could ever be used against them.

In 1964, when it was assumed that Smith would declare independence, the Chiefs of Staff told the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that "it cannot be contemplated that a situation should be allowed to develop in which HMG found itself in a position of being required to use military force to coerce a recalcitrant regime in Southern Rhodesia. There should be no question of using British forces against the white population of that country." ('An Intricate and Distasteful Subject': British Planning for the Use of Force against the European settlers of Central Africa 1952-1965, Philip Murphy)

Later that same year, because it was assumed that Ian Smith would use the occasion of Nyasaland's independence (in July) to declare independence, given that it was, to him, fairly ridiculous that the most developed and only self-governing member of the Federation was to be left for last for independence, the Defence Planning Staff said in a report that encountering any resistance from the Territorial Force or Police in Southern Rhodesia would "place a severe strain on the loyalties and morale of British troops." It goes on to say that if British forces encountered any resistance from the Southern Rhodesian Regular Army or the RRAF, it would "not only place an unacceptable strain on the loyalty of British troops but would also prove militarily impracticable."

The same report went on to suggest that any conflict in the territory was likely to be protracted and would drain British military resources to the limit, but were consoled by the fact that such a resource drain would likely not be fatal, due to the likelihood that the conflict would end early as a result of political considerations. They dismissed the idea out of hand.

Throughout the remainder of 1964, even limited military interventions were dismissed, due to the considerations that for Britain to be able to conduct even limited aerial operations in Southern Rhodesia, it was considered necessary to destroy the entire RRAF. Which is, again, something that the RAF simply would not do. Not only because they would be raining down bombs on people who had fought with them for half a century and were in many cases their relations, but also because almost all airfields in Southern Rhodesia at the time were both military and civilian, and those bombs would be likely to be hitting not only their comrades, but also the wives and children of their comrades.

The idea of military intervention was always far more popular with politicians than it was with the British military, who consistently warned against the idea for well over a decade. At several points, the prospect of a renewed Curragh incident was held up as a real possibility (i.e. that British forces sent to Southern Rhodesia would simply refuse to fight). By the British military itself. Given that even the most left-wing prime minister that Britain has ever had also rejected had also rejected the option, because he knew it would be political suicide in the country, I'd say it's fairly safe to say that any such action is likely to only result in a left-wing Suez. Posturing by the Archbishop of Canterbury notwithstanding.

Why were the views of Archbishop Ramsay any more significant than those of Alf Ramsey?

 

[Chris Nation]

Why were the views of Archbishop Ramsay any more significant than those of Alf Ramsey?

Quite. At least Ramsey gave England a World Cup.

 

[Strategos' Risk]

Based on the paper, the implied turning point of Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs declining to ask the Rhodesian military to arrest Ian Smith as a rebel is quite interesting, and seems to me the last semi-plausible POD for the British trying to exercise anything similar to force. Quoting this in full with the previous Ken Flower section-

(a) Rhodesian attitudes
The attitude of the Rhodesian Service Chiefs can be assessed on the basis of the reports of the British Defence Liaison Staff (RAF Element) in Salisbury.In his report for the period from June to August 1964, Group Captain Slade advised that members of the Rhodesian Front Party, including Ministers, had been meeting officers and airmen informally and socially to casually enquire if the Rhodesian Government could rely upon them in the event of a UDI. Slade reported that the Chief of the Air Staff in Rhodesia, Air Vice Marshal Bentley, had ‘taken great exception to this being done’ and had made this clear to Ian Smith ‘in no uncertain terms.’ Just before the end of his tour, Slade wrote to Air Vice Marshal Sir Peter Fletcher, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy), in London, commenting on the likely reaction of the Rhodesian Chiefs of Staff in the event of a UDI: ‘I have never found it difficult to state where the Armed Forces would stand. As you know I have never had any doubts whatsoever about Bentley’s position or reactions; similarly my Army colleague has had no doubts about the Army.’ However, Slade suspected that Bentley would be removed before his official retirement in July 1965. On the following day, the General Officer Commanding Rhodesia, Major General John Anderson, was ‘retired’ on the grounds of age (at 51). Anderson, who was known to oppose a UDI, was reported to have said: ‘I have been represented politically as being the only stumbling block. But I do not believe that this is so. I think I have the support of some members of the other services and Security Forces in my attitude.’

There was some questioning in the British Cabinet about the loyalty of the Rhodesian armed forces. Healey was tasked with improving intelligence on this issue, but there does not appear to be any evidence that the matter was discussed further, either in the Cabinet or the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee.66 However, it is now clear that Anderson’s replacement, Major-General Rodney Putterill, held similar views to those of his predecessor. Air Vice Marshal Bentley was retired slightly early in April 1965, as Group Captain Slade had predicted. Air Vice Marshal Harold Hawkins replaced Bentley, who quickly assured Slade’s successor, Group Captain Johns, the relationship between the Royal Air Force and its Rhodesian counterpart would not change. In his report for the period from April to August 1965, Johns commented: ‘On the surface the attitude of the Rhodesian Defence Forces has not changed. They continue to be friendly and co- operative.’ In November 1965, Hawkins actually advised Johns that UDI was imminent and, further, ‘he had told his stations that he would not issue any illegal orders i.e. orders would be confined to those necessary for the country’s security.’ This might be considered slightly ambiguous, but Hawkins also referred to the hard-liners in the Rhodesian Front as ‘madmen’, which is a reasonable indication of his hostility to UDI.71 The attitude of the Rhodesian Service Chiefs, even after the purge of Anderson and Bentley, might therefore have helped to prevent a full-scale confrontation between British and Rhodesian forces.

Attitudes among senior Rhodesian Army officers were not sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front regime. On the morning of UDI the Governor in Salisbury, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, received a visit from four Army officers who arrived armed at Government House. They informed Gibbs that if he provided them with a warrant for the arrest of Smith as a rebel against the Queen, they would do their duty. The Governor refused, and the soldiers left. In Gibbs’ obituary Patrick Keatley commented that ‘This was the fatal moment of hesitation.’72 The Governor had in fact considered the possibility of resisting UDI. He consulted Ken Flower, Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to ascertain his views. Flower recalled in his memoirs:

"Although I considered that the loyalty of the Chiefs of Staff, Putterill and Hawkins, was not in doubt and that many of their senior officers would follow their lead, I advised Gibbs that an appeal for their support would put them in an almost impossible position, between the government that paid them and an overseas Queen to whom they owed their allegiance."73

Flower also advised that the possibility of bloodshed could not be discounted because the attitude among middle and junior ranks was more belligerent, especially in the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which Flower said ‘would willingly “jump into the Makabusi (a muddy river on the outskirts of the city [Salisbury]) for Smith, even if this meant going against their seniors.’ Some former RLI troops have since expressed a view that they would, without question, have fought against British troops or any other invading force. Victor Lee Walker, a Captain in 1RLI who at the time of UDI was seconded to the Military Intelligence Section of the CIO, has commented:

"The general feeling within the RLI, and other Rhodesian Defence organisations was one of intense loyalty to the country and its government and all members were prepared to fight for Rhodesia (this was later proved during the terrorist campaign). I was prepared to resist any intervention in our country’s affairs as were all my fellow officers who were still serving in 1RLI."

The Rhodesian Front could also have counted on the support of the Territorial Force and reservists, who reflected the political mood of the European population in Rhodesia and were therefore likely to offer some resistance to British military intervention.

Couple of interesting footnotes:

66 TNA: PRO, CAB 130/206, Minutes of Meeting, 28 October 1964. In fact, British intelligence on Rhodesia was extremely weak; the Joint Intelligence Committee did not even task MI6 with obtaining intelligence on Rhodesia.

67 Putterill told the Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation that he would support the Governor if so requested. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 56. When Putterill retired, he joined the multi- racial Centre Party in protest against the Rhodesian Front’s racial Constitution of 1969; he also opposed the regime’s efforts to make Rhodesia a republic. See Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 28; and Good, UDI, p. 57.

71 Hawkins’s comment referred, in particular, to the Minister of Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke, and Commissioner of Police Barfoot. Hawkins also told Flower that he was fully in support of the Governor.

72 Patrick Keatley, Obituary of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Guardian Weekly, 18 November 1990. Quoted in Alan Megahey, Sir Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 110-11. In his autobiography Wilson’s security adviser, George Wigg, suggests that he was in favour of demanding Ian Smith’s arrest. George Wigg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972), p. 326.

73 Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 55. Lieutenant General Peter Walls, who commanded the RLI in 1965, has suggested to one historian that his orders were to resist any invading force. Walls said it would have been a ‘sad duty’ to fight against the British, but any reservations would have disappeared after the first casualties had been sustained. Interview with Donal Lowry, Johannesburg, 8 July 1983. Cited in Lowry, ‘Ulster resistance and loyalist rebellion in the Empire’, in Keith Jeffery (ed.), ‘An Irish Empire’? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 213, n. 69.

The paper also covers the potential loyalties of African troops (they might have followed the Rhodesian government) and the British South Africa Police paramilitary (many pro-government, but there were many desertions by UK recruits after UDI who felt they were breaking their Oath of Allegiance to the Queen).

Would be interesting if Gibbs makes the request to arrest Ian Smith and the Rhodesian military brass acquiesces, and is met with a pro-Smith revolt among the ranks. A Rhodesian civil war among the white population, or at least a coup within the military.