A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One​

How a Little Napoleon Was Drowned​

Taken from "A Revolution at Sea: How the Confederate States Navy changed the making of war at sea" by Admiral Sir James Sinclair-Davies RN KCMG

Portsmouth Press 1978​

“The enmity between the Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory and the Chief of Sea Coast, River and Harbour Defences, Matthew F. Maury had the potential to be extremely prejudicial to the effective operation of Maury’s branch of the Naval Service. Commander Maury had not forgiven Mallory for the latter’s work in instituting compulsory retirement for old and incompetent officers in the Naval Service when Mallory served on the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. Though Commander Maury was certainly not incompetent, as his tenure in the Confederate service was to prove, he was considered too old for the United States Naval Service prior to the Civil War…

...It is unclear who persuaded Maury to seek a reconciliation with Secretary Mallory on his appointment. His own letters refer only to “a good friend and better subordinate than any man deserves”. Some suggest Lieutenant Hunter Davidson of Maury’s office, but there is no evidence to support this. The results however were immediate. Commander Maury sought a private meeting with Secretary Mallory on 10 October 1861 to effect a reconciliation. Secretary Mallory is reported to have graciously reciprocated and one of the most effective relationships in the Confederate Government was born. One of the first beneficiaries of this spirit of co-operation was Commander Maury’s plan for the deployment of “torpedoes” (modern day mines) in the rivers and inlets of the Confederate coastline in the event of a naval incursion by Union forces. To this end Commander Maury’s office began, with the full support of the Naval Department, stockpiling torpedoes at key points along the Atlantic Coasts from as early as January 1862. Furthermore Secretary Mallory channelled some of his Department’s limited resources into Commander Maury’s scheme for “electric torpedoes”. A new threat to Navy shipping was being birthed by the partnership of Mallory and Maury.”

The Last Photograph of the USS Galena​

Taken from "The Sinking of an American Napoleon" by Professor Bartlett L. Keane
LSU 1957

“Why Major General George Brinton McClellan thought his place during the Battle of Malvern Hill was on board the USS Galena 12 miles away on the James River remains an open question. He was completely out of contact with his forces for most the day, leaving effective command of the battle in the hands of Brigadier General Fitzjohn Porter.

Nonetheless on 1 July 1862 General McClellan was to become the most significant Union casualty to date. At approximately 1.34pm the USS Galena struck a torpedo which tore out a huge section of her hull and in 8 minutes the ship had heeled over on its side and sank. It would be more than 24 hours before the fate of General McClellan was known to General Porter and it would be another 24 hours before the first news began to circulate in Washington. It is now well established Civil War legend that both Secretary Seward and Major General Joseph Hooker coined the same quip on the same day about the fate of General McClellan – “he died as he had fought – all at sea”…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Two

The Army has a Fitz and needs a Lie Down

​

"General Porter, you are hereby ordered to take command of the Army of the Potomac until such time as directed otherwise. You are to take steps immediately to prepare your troops for transfer north to support the operations of General Pope and the Army of Virginia..." Extract from the order of Secretary Stanton dated 6th July authorizing General Porter to formally adopt the command he had effectively been exercising since Malvern Hill.

Taken from "The Gallant Fitz - The Life and Letters of Major General Fitzjohn Porter" Edited by Terence O. Oliver
Great Bear Books 1982

"David I must warn you, should you come up to the [Harrisons] Landing you will see a forlorn sight. The heart has gone out of this army. The fight has gone out of this army. It mourns as I never imagined such a company could for its great Captain. This army will be fit for little until we can return to the banks of the Potomac to refit and rest. Frankly I tell you this army will not be fit to fight until the wounds it has suffered, in its lost comrades and beloved commander, have had time to heal. There are those here who believe otherwise. Who cry out for an attack - men like Hooker, Kearny and Richardson. They do not know this Army. They do not know, they do not feel its love for my great friend and beloved Captain - even now I cannot bear to write his name.

Do not mistake me now for I still believe this Army is the finest weapon our country has. I have inherited a great burden but my friend has left me the finest weapon this country has ever known in this, the Army of the Potomac. I hope and trust in God that in a short time the shock of our loss will begin to pass and this Army will begin to think on revenging itself for the dishonourable assassination of its Captain. When that time comes no force in the rebellious South can stop us. I was all for peace with honour to end this war before the murder of our Captain, but by God I hope there will be no peace - no peace until this Army has been revenged..." [A letter to his cousin, Admiral David Dixon Porter].

Taken from "The Slumbering Giant - The Army of the Potomac in the Rappanhannock Campaign" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing

"The Army of the Potomac had certainly been stunned by the loss of its Commanding General, but the depressing picture painted by the letters and reports of General Porter and certain of his subordinates (William F Smith and George Morrell in particular) was not an accurate reflection of its fighting readiness. Indeed several divisional and brigade commanders reported that "The fighting spirit in this army is undiminished. Indeed the fighting spirit of revenge is abroad in this army with a will. And we mean to have our revenge soon as we can." (General Dan Sickles in a private letter to Edwin Stanton).

However it was the spirit of depression and loss that pervaded the highest councils of the Army of the Potomac over the two months following McClellan's death. Porter was slow to overcome the personal loss he had suffered in both a close friend and trusted commander. Though he moved quickly to replenish the supplies and stores lost in the retreat to Harrisons Landing, he was in no hurry to respond to the call for troops to support General Pope. It was therefore 23rd August before large numbers of troops from the Army of the Potomac were transported north, and these landed at Alexandria, well north of the landing at Aquila Creek were Lincoln and Stanton thought they had ordered Porter to land.

Yet Lincoln and his cabinet gave Porter time, for in truth they too were stunned by the unexpected loss of their Commanding General. McClellan may not have been a willing subordinate to the executive power, but his presence had been taken for granted, even by his enemies who had no expectation of getting anyone "better" for the time being. The choice of Porter to retain the command left to him on the day of Malvern Hill by McClellan was always seen as a stop gap measure by the President and his cabinet for Porter was "McClellan's creature" (William Seward in a note to Thurlow Weed 15 July 1862). Indeed while Fitzjohn Porter may have proved a harder fighter than McClellan in a scrape, he seemed no keener than his old captain to get into one. Pressure to end his "temporary" command of the Army mounted just as events on the Rappanhannock took a turn..."

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Three​

We want No Pope Here
Part I: On the Union Side of the Rappanhannock​

​

Extracts from "The Campaign along the Rappanhannock Line - In their own words" by Professor John C. Dunning
New York 1995

"Henry Wager Halleck's appointment as Commander in Chief to replace the fallen McClellan, and John Pope's appointment to command the Army of Virginia were not popular among the officers and men of the Armies of the East...Samuel Sturgis expressed the views of many in his own colourful language - "I don't care for John Pope one pinch of owl dung"...

It was also the view of several of Pope's senior commanders that he was out of his depth organising and leading an army. "I feel that disgrace here is inevitable. This is the state of things - no order - no system - all is confusion" according to Brigadier General Marsena R. Patrick...

Nonetheless General Pope was ordered to defend the line of the Rappanhannock with the three corps of the Army of Virginia - Sigel's I Corps, Bank's II Corps and McDowell's III Corps, and one corps of the Army of the Potomac which had been pried from Porter - Burnside's IX Corps. The language of Halleck's order to "dispute every inch of ground and fight like the devil till we can reinforce you" expresses an urgency not felt either by John Pope or Fitzjohn Porter. Indeed Pope was looking for an opportunity to attack any isolated elements of Lee's army. In correspondence with General Burnside, in seeking support for a bold stroke, Pope was very clear "of course I shall be ready to recross the Rappanhannock at a moment's notice"...

While Pope, Banks and Burnside believed there might be an opportunity to strike at Lee others thought it was the ambition to be appointed to the Potomac Command that drove all three (the rumours of Porter's "temporary" appointment now being widespread). In a meeting with his old friend Pope, George Meade expressed himself forcefully "What are you doing out here? This is no place for this army. It should at once fall back so as to meet the Army of the Potomac coming up and by superior force overwhelm Lee". An angry Pope is reported to have responded that he could "whip Jackson's whole force before me with half the number of Westerners, but I shall have to make do whipping them with twice the number of Easterners". Pope not only fell out with his old friend Meade during these summer months. He had feuds running with Franz Sigel, Samuel Sturgis and Gordon Granger...

​

Taken from "The Slumbering Giant - The Army of the Potomac in the Rappanhannock Campaign" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing

“With Burnside’s IX Corps assigned to Pope and Keyes’ IV Corps still in Eastern Virginia under John A. Dix’s command, Porter had full four Corps at Alexandria – Sumner’s II Corps, Heintzelman’s III Corps, Franklin’s VI Corps and Philip Kearny’s V Corps. Porter had wanted to raise up George Morrell or George Sykes to command his old corps, but Lincoln’s will had prevailed – “I mean for this corps to go to one of my fighting Generals”. In trying to placate Joe Hooker who was also campaigning for the Corps Lincoln said “I do feel sorry [General Hooker] for General Kearny has given you hard standard to beat, for I expect you, with both your arms, to fight twice as hard”…

As the Army of the Potomac was to march off for the Rappanhannock, General McClellan intervened one final time to slow his old army down. “I have the sad duty to inform you that the rebels have found the remains of General George McClelland [sic] which have been identified by means of many personal items still on his person. General Lee has very kindly made arrangements to return the remains and I have made immediate arrangements to return the same to Washington on the first steamer out.” General John A. Dix to Secretary Stanton…

To Stanton’s fury and Halleck’s bewilderment President Lincoln agreed to the request of General Porter that the four corps might remain for a few more days so as to pay their respects to their beloved commander with a final march past. “They must see him buried and with him I hope the spirit of shyness and defeat that has dogged this army”. It was a view not shared by the newest of the Army’s Corps Commanders Phil Kearny – “let us have no more of this damned nonsense [referring to the funeral parade]. It’s well enough when there’s nothing else to do; now we are up here to fight, and, when we can’t fight, let your men sleep. Feed ‘em well, give ‘em plenty of sleep and they’ll fight like hell!”

Those few days became a week, a week that was to cost the Union dear...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Three​

We Want No Pope Here
Part II: On the Confederate Side of the River​



From “Baiting the Trap: The Southern History of the Rappahannock Campaign” by Professor Virgil Earp Stacey.
LSU 1983

“It was not in General Lee’s character to show personal dislike of anyone, friend or foe, but in the Summer of 1862 General Lee found a man so detestable that even he could not conceal his dislike. That man was John Pope…in one of his dispatches he refers to him as the “miscreant Pope”, and in a private letter, when he mentioned his nephew Louis Marshall, who had sided with the North, he remarked “I could forgive [his] fighting against us , but not his joining Pope”. Lee had acquired a contempt for John Pope and he had resolved to “suppress that man”…

Pope had settled in with the Army of Virginia at Rappahannock Station. Buford’s cavalry was barely pushing patrols out as far as Brandy Station., while Burnside’s Corps rested at Fredericksburg. Lee had initially planned a wide flanking maneuver around Pope’s western flank but while he understood McClellan, Fitzjohn Porter was more of an unknown character. Lee resolved not to divide his army in the face of Porter and Pope, rather it was Stuart who presented an initial idea to lure Pope’s cavalry, under Buford and Bayard, out in the open around Brandy Station. A germ of an idea that Lee grew into a plan to destroy the Army of Virginia before it was joined by the Army of the Potomac.”

From “The Trojan Cigars” an article by William F. Williams in Virginia History Quarterly 1953

“George Dashiell Bayard was skeptical. One thing he had learned about the Colonel of the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry was that he was given to a certain amount to hyperbole, but then Colonel Alfred Duffie was French and a certain amount of that kind of thing was to be expected. But when he reviewed the orders a Rhode Islander had found in Beverley Robertson’s camp, wrapped around a bundle of cigars, he realized the Colonel was not exaggerating for once. Not only had the Rhode Islanders driven off the complacent rebel cavalry from an encampment arrogantly close to the Union Army, but they had captured a order detailing the marching orders for the entire rebel army in Northern Virginia.

Bayard and Duffie immediately rode into Rappahannock Station looking for General Pope. They first met Generals John Reynolds, George Meade and Marsena Patrick. The three generals were quickly consulted. Meade confirmed that the scrawled amendments to Jackson’s marching orders were definitely in Lee’s hand. Meade was certain - he and Lee had served together in on Scott’s staff in the Mexican War. A few minutes later the four generals and one colonel arrived at Pope’s headquarters at the Bowen House. Pope reviewed the document, in silence for a moment. “By God if I can’t lick Bobby Lee now I deserve to be hung!” proclaimed Pope “and all before Porter can come up.”

“Special Order No.73
Hdqrs Army of Northern Virginia
August 24, 1862

1. General Jackson’s command is to return to Culpepper Court House from the area of the Manassas Gap with General W.H.F Lee’s Brigade. [The following in General Lee’s own hand writing] General Jackson is not to bring on an engagement with the enemy but is to return by the same route, again using Lee’s brigade to screen his movements. The movement towards Warrenton is cancelled - the enemy is concentrating.
2. General W.H.F Lee is to detach no more than one regiment with instructions to interrupt and damage the railroad between the Manassas and Thoroughfare Gaps as practical and to return by the same route bringing up all stragglers who may have been left behind.
3. General Longstreet is to concentrate his corps at Culpepper Court House. Of the two divisions before Fredericksburg, Kemper’s Division has been directed to report to you on August 30. Hood’s Division is to remain before Fredericksburg and is to be considered as under the commanding general’s direct orders.
4. General Evans is directed to take his Brigade to Orange Court House to assist in obtaining supplies and forage for the concentration of this army.
5. All officers belonging to the commands of Generals French and D.H. Hill , still with the Army of Northern Virginia for whatever reason, are to disregard Special Order No. 71 to return to their commands, having missed the demonstration.
6. All commanders are reminded of the General Orders pertaining to the placement of appropriate pickets to detect any movement by the enemy, which the commanding general has had cause to notice has not been complied with in several instances heretofore.”

The indications were that Longstreet was isolated with only part of his command at Culpepper Court House. Jackson was off on a, now defunct, raid on Pope’s flanks. It could two, three, perhaps even four days before Jackson would receive the order and return to Culpepper Court House as ordered. The skeptics in Pope’s command were silenced upon receipt of confirmation that the commands of Generals S. French and D.H. Hill had launched a demonstration against Dix and Keyes during the previous evening, in the Peninsular theater, with the obvious intention of distracting attention away from the Rappahannock.

That settled it - Pope gave the order: Banks, Sigel and McDowell were to prepare for an advance on Longstreet on the following morning (August 25). Burnside was ordered to leave a division to hold Fredericksburg and to hasten to Rappahannock Station as swiftly as possible. Pope’s intention was to use Burnside to deal with Jackson should the forward elements of his command arrive while Pope was still mopping up Longstreet’s forces. And the message to Halleck - "Am planning a reconnaissance in force in the morning. Will report progress throughout the day." As far as Pope was concerned the laurels were his for the taking and he'd be damned if Halleck or Porter would share, and anyway he did not want to spoil the "festivities". The Army of the Potomac had just paid its final respects to General McClellan that afternoon, and come the morning there would be more than a few sores heads in Alexandria and Washington.

So on the morning of August 25 the Corps of Banks, Sigel and finally McDowell began crossing the Rappahannock by the Rappahannock Bridge and several nearby fords. The Army of Virginia was on the march, with Burnside in its wake..."

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Four​

"I mean to bag the lot"
The Battle of the Rappahannock​

Part I

​

Taken from "The Slumbering Giant - The Army of the Potomac in the Rappanhannock Campaign" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing

“It was just after 10.30am when the sound of cannon fire was heard by the outlying pickets of the Army of the Potomac. A hand full of generals quickly gathered at General Porter’s Headquarters. “There is no need for alarm gentlemen. General Halleck has informed me that General Pope is carrying out a reconnaissance in force this morning to establish the enemies numbers between the Rappahannock and Culpepper Court House. There is no need to rush our departure.” General Porter’s words that morning satisfied most of the Generals present, but Kearny and Hooker were straining at the leash to be off. Kearny had given orders to his divisional commanders to be ready to march as soon as the reports of cannon fire had been heard…”

Extracts from "The Campaign along the Rappanhannock Line - In their own words" by Professor John C. Dunning
New York 1995

“Why we hesitate I cannot imagine. It is fearful infatuation to wait. The men are ripe for it, as you remark. Of course they are. First they are as earnest as patriots, and next they have an instinct of the storm brewing on the horizon.” General Kearny to General Hooker upon leaving the first conference at Porter’s HQ.

Taken from "The Slumbering Giant - The Army of the Potomac in the Rappanhannock Campaign" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing

“It was around 11.45am when rumours of the Marching Order began to circulate that again a bevy of Generals descended on Porter’s Headquarters. Several proposed the immediate departure of troops by rail to Warrenton and Rappahannock Station. “It is criminal that General Pope would not immediately warn us of the potential presence of 30,000 troops near Thoroughfare Gap. Regardless of what this Marching Order says we must take action to secure Warrenton and our communication with Pope”. General Porter then sought reports from his Corps commanders – when could they march? Kearny confirmed the V Corps could march immediately. Heintzelman confirmed that Hooker’s Division could move immediately and that Sickles’ Division would be ready by 1pm. Of the remaining commanders only Sumner could report that Richardson’s Division would be ready to move in less than two hours. The parade and McClellan’s send off on the previous day had left commands scattered and ill prepared for an immediate march.

General Porter then made what many consider his best decision of the day: General Kearny was ordered to go by rail with Hooker’s Division as far as Warrenton. He was to act as forward commander as troops were sent up – Hooker’s and Richardson’s Divisions by rail and V Corps by road. Kearny was to report on the security of Warrenton and try to maintain communication with Pope. Kearny was to be assisted by Colonel Haupt to get the troops up to Warrenton as fast as possible.

At this point, however, no one in the Army of the Potomac knew the precise contents of the marching Order or, more importantly, that Pope’s “reconnaissance in force” consisted of the entire Army of Virginia…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Four​

"I mean to bag the lot"
The Battle of the Rappahannock​

Part II​

​

From “Bird on a Rail – the Civil War Career of Colonel Herman Haupt” by Jacob W. Hunsacker
Carlisle Press 1972​

“From the moment Kearny alighted from the first train into Warrenton Junction and met Haupt, it was clear to Haupt that Kearny did not believe Warrenton was threatened or that he intended long to remain at Warrenton. Kearny’s first enquiry of Haupt was how quickly he and his staff could get Hooker and Richardson to Warrenton. Haupt then interrupted to tell Kearny that Pope had in fact advanced with his whole Army over the Rappahannock, and that by now Burnside with his remaining division may have crossed too. For a moment, Haupt reports, there was silence. Then Kearny spoke – could Haupt continue to transport more divisions from Alexandria to Warrenton and still have enough rolling stock to transport two divisions to Rappahannock Station. Haupt, thoughtful, nodded his assent.”​

From “The Forgotten Service – A History of the Cavalry under McDowell, McClellan and Porter” by Col. Jack Danish
United States Military Society​

“Kearny took no chances however. He dispatched Col. William W. Averell and his 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry to scout towards and indeed beyond Thoroughfare Gap. “Do whatever is necessary to establish the location, and particularly the numbers of any rebel formations in that area. And for God’s sake make sure word gets through to me” instructed Kearny. It was not the for the last time over the next few days that Kearny was to bemoan the neglect of the mounted arm – its dearth of numbers and the absence of organisation.”​

From “Bird on a Rail – the Civil War Career of Colonel Herman Haupt” by Jacob W. Hunsacker
Carlisle Press 1972​

“Haupt put the time at precisely 3.28pm when the crescendo of cannon fire became clearly audible. This was not the occasional fire of the morning. This had the sound of massed batteries. Kearny confided to Haupt that he believed Pope was fighting for his life. If the Movement Order was real Pope should have rolled over Longstreet’s weakened opposition and be moving on Culpepper Court House. In Haupt’s presence Kearny telegraphed his reading of the situation to General Porter, with Haupt's intelligence on Pope's movements and requested authority to take the V Corps to Rappahannock Station when it arrived. Porter refused but did confirm Kearny’s authority over all troop formations of the Army of the Potomac until such time as Porter arrived in person. Kearny is reported to have exclaimed “How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell, Jackson and Longstreet? Get me and my fighting corps with Pope – with Pope I would be able to breath again.” Some credit Haupt with the observation that the order prohibited the advance of V Corps beyond Warrenton but made no mention of Hooker or Richardson’s divisions or the division of Sickles which would follow. However Kearny’s earlier enquiry as to the ability to move troops to Rappahannock Station undermines the assertion that it was anything but his own idea.”​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume II” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1960​

“Kearny ordered Hooker and Richardson to follow Haupt’s direction in forwarding their troops to Rappahannock Station. He also left orders that George Morrell was to assume command of Warrenton Junction upon his arrival with the I Division of V Corps. Morrell was instructed to establish contact with Averell’s patrol and report urgently to both Kearny and Porter the position at Thoroughfare Gap. A final order was left for Dan Sickles. Sickles was also to follow Haupt’s direction to continue on to Rappahannock Station but critically Sickles (who was likely to be accompanied by the III Corps commander, Samuel Heintzelman) was to consider himself under Kearny’s direct orders and was to brook no delay by Heintzelman, Morrell or anyone else.​

Upon the completing the final order to Sickles, Kearny leapt onto the first train to Rappahannock Station which was pulling out carrying the first part of Hooker’s Division, surprising onlookers by swinging onto the trains footstep with his one good arm. Kearny had made an important decision. He had decided not to confirm his departure or his orders to Hooker, Richardson, Sickles or Morrell to General Porter. Like Pope the previous day his last report was disingenuous – it was to report the dispatch of Averell’s patrol, the increased cannonade from the south and the arrival of Hooker’s Division. Only upon the arrival of Hooker and Richardson at the river would Kearny formally report the movement in the hope that once committed Porter would not order them back…”​

​

From “Bird on a Rail – the Civil War Career of Colonel Herman Haupt” by Jacob W. Hunsacker​

Carlisle Press 1972

“Haupt, who had been privy to both deceptions, privately hoped that Kearny’s would have better results. It would be almost 6pm before Kearny arrived at the Rappahannock with the better part of Hooker’s Division..”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Four​

"I mean to bag the lot"
The Battle of the Rappahannock​

Part III

​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume II” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1960

“The scene at the Station was chaotic. There were large numbers of wounded milling about, and a disturbing number of what were obviously skulkers. It was a difficult scene to make sense of, particularly because of the dearth of senior officers present. However Kearny, accompanied by Hooker, found Christopher Augur, commander of a division in Banks Corps, sitting on the porch of the Bowen House, having wounds to both his right arm and chest sown up (General Augur had been “touched” by five separate shell fragments but only the wound to his right arm was serious). Augur was able to give the generals a sense of the day's events…"

From “Battle of the Rappahannock” by Roger Galton
Osprey 2003

“From north to south Pope’s dispositions had been:

1. Beverly Ford

1.1 Bayard’s Cavalry Brigade (minus Duffie’s regiment)
1.2 Schurz’s Division of I Corps with Franz Sigel
1.3 Schenck’s Division of I Corps

2. Rappahannock Station

2.1 Duffie’s Cavalry Regiment
2.2 Augur’s Division of II Corps with Nathaniel Banks and John Pope
2.3 William’s Division of II Corps
2.4 Von Steinwehr’s Division of I Corps

3. Norman’s Ford

3.1 King’s Division of III Corps
3.2 Ricketts’ Division of III Corps with Irvin McDowell
3.3 Reynolds’ Division of II Corps

4. Kelly’s Ford

4.1 Buford’s Cavalry Brigade

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume II” by Professor Kearny Bowes​

MacArthur University Press 1960

“Augur gave a summary of the days events from his perspective at the head of the lead division in the centre: In the light of the morning it was clear that there was a formation of infantry on Fleetwood Hill [Wilcox’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps] and a force of cavalry near the Fleetwood House just south of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad [Robertson’s Cavalry Brigade]. Wilcox’s Division did not stand but quickly withdrew back along the Farley Road, pausing briefly at Brandy Station. Robertson too withdrew, slowly along the Old Carolina Road, eventually reforming at the foot of Mount Dumpling. Pope and Banks quickly came up, and Pope’s “blood was clearly up”. Sigel was to press quickly press down the Farley Road in pursuit of Wilcox. Banks was to push along the line of the railroad and Old Carolina Road in the hope of beating Wilcox to Brandy Station. McDowell was to try to cross Flat Run and press towards Mount Dumpling, in the hope of reducing congestion on the Old Carolina Road. No other troops were in sight and Pope was confident he had caught Lee’s forces divided.

Augur was clearly disgusted as he related the next stage: Bank’s and Sigel’s leading divisions were now clogging up Brandy Station. Sigel was to proceed down Auburn Road and Banks down the Culpepper Road. McDowell had sent King to drive of Robertson and continue down the Old Carolina Road with a view to swinging west on Kirtley’s Rolling Road to come up on Culpepper Court House from the south. Augur understood Ricketts was to follow. He had no idea what Reynold’s orders were.

As Banks came up a rebel force appeared before him on the ridge north of Culpepper [Jones’ Division of Longstreet’s Corps]. Pope, still with Augur, was not alarmed. This was what he was expecting. A few minutes later a second force appeared, again on the high grounds, further to the north in front of Sigel’s advance [Anderson’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps]. About 15 minutes later, Augur then heard reports of a third force moving in, again to the north, behind Muddy Run [Ewell’s Division of Jackson’s Corps].

Augur was concerned by the amount of artillery coming into place with these three forces in extremely advantageous positions. Augur had the sense that these dispositions had been planned - the rebels had their range too quickly. Before he could communicate his concerns he had been injured by shell fragments and carried to the rear at Fleetwood House. Coming round he met Von Steinwehr going in the wrong direction back towards the river. Von Steinwehr had reports from Bayard that a huge force [Taliaferro and Hill’s Divisions] was crossing Hazel Run in the army's rear with the clear intention of cutting it off from Beverley Ford and the Rappahannock Crossing. Von Steinwehr had ordered the wounded, including General Augur back over the Rappahannock Crossing.

​

That was not the end of Augur’s tale for Kearny and Hooker were not the first generals to meet Augur at Rappahannock Station upon his return. Ambrose Burnside and Jesse Reno was arrived at the head of Reno’s Division to hear the same report. Astonishingly Burnside confirmed that he had heard from Buford that Reynold’s was being pressed from the south and that Longstreet had been sighted near Mountain’s Run [Hood’s and Kemper’s Divisions were here supported by WHL. Lee’s cavalry].

“Gentlemen, Pope has marched the whole army into a trap and Burnside has gone in after him. I sincerely believe, General Kearny, that if you follow them you will not come back”…

“It was early evening now with darkness approaching. Kearny did not hesitate. “General Hooker get your men across the river here and dig in. You will hold the crossing tonight until we can sort ourselves out and see what we can salvage from this day's battle. I will send Richardson and Sickles up if I have to have them moving all night”…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Four

"I mean to bag the lot"
The Battle of the Rappahannock

Part IV​

Extracts from “The Campaign along the Rappahannock Line - In their own words” by Professor John C. Dunning
New York 1995

“If Kearny slept that night I saw no evidence of it. God knows I did not.” General Joe Hooker to General Dan Sickles.

From “Battle of the Rappahannock” by Roger Galton
Osprey 2003

“In the late evening Kearny established Hooker’s division south west of the Rappahannock crossing facing in that direction. Later Richardson’s division filed in on Hooker’s right, forming up at a right angle facing north west. Kearny anticipated Sickles’ division forming up at the Jameson farm facing south east and so boxing off the Rappahannock Crossing, but it became clear during the course of the night that Sickles would not cross until morning…

With Hooker and Richardson in place around midnight, Kearny took the risk of setting off down the railroad to discover where Pope’s Army had established itself. It was a risky undertaking at night, but a necessary one. Kearny found William’s division straddling the railroad line. With Alpheus Williams Kearny was astonished to discover the acting commander of the Army of Virginia - Irvin McDowell. McDowell indicated that Pope had been injured early in the cannonade during an attack by Anderson, and was injured and presumed captured. No one knew where Banks was but McDowell was certain he was no longer on the field of battle - “captured, dead or fled, I cannot say, but Banks is not here”. Sigel was with McDowell, but with a bandaged head and a glazed look in his eyes, he said nothing during McDowell's and Kearny’s early morning conference. McDowell’s report made for dire hearing - Bayard dead, his brigade scattered; King missing, Ricketts injured, their divisions smashed and running [some were reforming behind Hooker’s line even at this early hour]; Augur injured, his division routed; Schenk dead; Schurz injured; both divisions reduced to perhaps no more than three under strength brigades under discipline on the field; and Buford forced back across the river over Kelly’ Ford.

But there was a line beyond Kearny’s. The Army of Virginia was not yet routed as Lee had hoped. Facing north west, with his flank on the river was Von Steinwehr, who McDowell praised to the heavens for his day’s work, then Reno, the combined forces of Schenk and Schurz refused the line, with Schenk troops facing north west and Schurz south west, all under the command of Burnside, then Williams. Williams' flank was in the air at the Stringfellow farm, but in the distance beyond that was Reynold’s division facing south (with both flanks in the air). That was state of McDowell’s forces. “During the many failures and few successes that day, McDowell shone. He formed the line that held the rebels til [sic] nightfall. He rode the line, roaring and cajoling the troops where necessary. When the men talk of McDowell now, there is no mention of Bull Run, only Fleetwood Hill where he anchored the Army of Virginia.” (Alpheus Williams in a letter to his daughter).
​

From “A Reputation Redeemed - Irvin McDowell at the Rappahannock” by Major James Chase
Erie 1883

“But McDowell was tired. His redemption that day had called upon all his reserves of strength. He gladly deferred to Kearny’s opinion. Come the morning should they stay and fight or should the troops begin to fall back? “Why General, if you’ll have me and my boys, I mean to stay and come the morning we’ll greet General Lee together”…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Five

“I mean to bag the lot”
The Battle of the Rappahannock

Part V​



From “Baiting the Trap: The Southern History of the Rappahannock Campaign” by professor Virgil Earp Stacey
LSU 1983

“Lee’s quandary was clear - should the attack be renewed in the morning. Ewell had reported that troops were heard crossing at Rappahannock Station during the night. Porter arriving or Pope’s army fleeing?

It was clear that Lee was disappointed. The objective, so aptly described by General Jackson, “to bag the lot”, had not been realized. Yet it had been tantalizingly close at times. Ewell’s division had smashed Schenk head on and flanked Schurz causing the Dutchmen to flee. Jones and Wilcox done the same to the divisions of Augur and King. Yet those attacks had only pushed the Yankees back closer to the fords and bridges. Hill had failed to break the Dutchmen before him, leaving Beverly Ford in a no man’s land between both lines, and while Hood had taken Kelly’ Ford, Kemper’s push towards Norman’s Ford was decisively stopped by Reynold’s Division. And of course the shrouded body but a few feet from Lee was evidence enough that General John Pope was beyond further chastisement in this world.

Longstreet believed the objective of “putting the Army of Virginia out of action” had been achieved. Of the 9 divisions (including the two cavalry brigades as 1 division) only 3 bore any resemblance to a division, 3 were smashed , and 3 were now brigade sized forces in disarray. At the same time Confederate casualties had been low, outside of Kemper’s and Hill’s Divisions. “We should withdraw before Porter comes up as he must soon”.

Jackson, still smarting from Hill’s failure to sweep the fords, was for renewing the fight. “Porter will be no more active that McClellan. We will have the morning at least to finish these people”.

Lee resolved to renew the attack at first light. Hood was to abandon Kelly’s Ford and assist Kemper in renewing the attack on Reynold’s in the south. Both his flanks were temptingly in the air. Wilcox was to flank Williams while Jones attacked him head on. Anderson would attack the refused lines of Schurz and Schenk. Taliaferro was to attack Reno’s line, though he overlapped slightly with Schenk’s line. However it was Hill’s attack that was given the most attention by Lee and Jackson. He was to attack Von Steinwehr and to do it he was reinforced with Ewell’s Division which had been pulled out of line during the night and marched by Jackson himself to a position behind Hill, alongside the river. “General Ewell, you are to drive your brigades along this river bank until you are in the rear of the enemy. You are to take Beverly Ford, yes, but your objective is the Rappahannock Bridge. Stop for nothing until it is taken…” Jackson’s verbal orders to Ewell according to Captain Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff.

From “The Slumbering Giant - The Army of the Potomac in the Rappahannock Campaign” by George Cresap Ord
McMahon publishing

“General Hooker noted that one tended to hear the Army of the Potomac’s Chief of Topographical Engineers, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, before you saw him. His ability to cuss was renowned for its variety and volume. In the old army only Dick Ewell was supposed to be in his league. Yet it was no reflection on his zeal which was in evidence that morning as he rode up to report to General Kearny for duty. Without particular duties, and in frustration with General Porter’s slow progress , he had literally ridden to the sound of the guns to see what he could do. Kearny is reported to have clapped him on the back with his one good hand and assigned him to assist General Burnside who was almost out of general officers to assist in managing the remains of Schenk and Schurz’s division…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Five​

“I mean to bag the lot”
The Battle of the Rappahannock​

Part VI​

Extracts from “The Campaign along the Rappahannock Line - In their own words” by Professor John C. Dunning
New York 1995

“It was a fight of giants on that second day” Colonel Sir Percy Windham…

…Reynolds’ Division was being pressed to the point of breaking by Hood and Kemper. Brigadier General Jackson was mortally wounded, General Seymour too was wounded. Reynolds and Meade had refused both flanks, and Captain Dunbar Ransom of the 5th US Artillery would earn a Medal of Honour working his guns to repel several attacks by Kemper. But the morning was going ill for the men of Reynolds’ Division until General Dan Sickles brought up his division on Reynolds’ left. “I never thought I would ever write the words “I was desperately glad to see Dan Sickles” but whenever I think about the likely fate of my division that morning I feel inclined to write another few lines praising General Sickles” General John Reynolds…

“with Sickles troops up in support of Reynolds, and with WHL Lee reporting that Buford and been reinforced heavily with infantry [Isaac Stevens’ Division] and pushing across Kelly’s Ford in our rear I judged our position perilous. I had no option but to order Generals Hood and Kemper to break off contact and withdraw south east towards Culpepper Court House” General James Longstreet…

“We had them. By heaven we had them. Pryor’s brigade hit the Yankees on their open flank but my brigade and Wilcox’s old brigade were marching in the air! We were in the rear of the Yankee’s army. We passed the Stringfellow Farm capturing scores of wounded, and we had reached the railroad when a second line of Yankees appeared [Hooker’s Division]. There was a horde of them deploying into line, so I didn’t wait – I give an immediate order to charge…

We had a devil of a time pulling out. The Yankees had stood firm and then come on. But for Pryor keeping the first line at bay I doubt I would have got my brigade out. In the end we fell in with Kemper’s boys and fell back” General Winfield S. Featherston…

…Anderson’s attack on the remains of Schurz and Schenk was supported by a brigade of Taliaferro’s division which overlapped the right wing of the reconstituted division. Burnside had taken direct control of Schurz’s forces and Humphreys Schenks. It was extremely difficult for these officers to hold the men in line – they were outnumbered, the Confederate starting position overlooked their own, and their moral had barely begun to recover from the previous days hammering. “At some time between 9 and 9.30 there were several breakthroughs. The fighting was hand to hand in places and General Burnside ordered a withdrawal from the position. I believed the position and indeed the battle was lost at that moment” (Colonel Alexander Schimmelfennig). At that point General Kearny rode up berating Burnside – “We shall not withdraw while I breath” (Lt. George B. Haskin). He came upon the 74th Pennsylvania, still in good order. “Where is your Colonel boys? We don’t know. Well then follow me!” (Major Franz Blessing). Forward went Kearny and forward went the 74th and so doing drove back the worst of the breakthroughs steadying that part of the line…

We must look to Humphreys to find who steadied the remainder of the line on the right. “I could not repeat the words he used to inspire the boys of our fine regiment, but I was a site [sic] more scared of him than I was of the Rebs. So when he took up our flag and rode back up the line we, everyone of us, followed him back for fear he would address us again!” Private Myles Barry of 75th Ohio…

“From all I hear you would have thought Stinnwear’s [sic] boys would have had enough but they held Hill off and when Trimble’s boys appeared at the head of Ewell’s column, rather than break and run, his right wing swung back like a door and let them right through. Of course the wiley Dutchman [sic – von Steinwehr was a Brunswicker] knew we where coming up behind and would welcome game old Trimble as he deserved.” Major James Kavanagh 69th New York. Trimble brigade led the riverside attack by Ewell’s division in column of brigades. Trimble and indeed Ewell believed, after Von Steinwehr gave way, that they were in the rear of the Union army. Trimble’s surprise at running into Meagher’s Irish Brigade almost cost him his life. In the end it cost him his liberty…”Ewell had a devil of a time getting his troops out of the trap. He had stuck his head into the maw of the Union army and he nearly lost it at the neck. In the end he saved all but Trimble and his brigade” Colonel Sir Percy Windham…

At around 10.25 am Jackson spotted, from his vantage, large Union formations at the Rappahannock bridge and others approaching the Beverly Ford. Reluctantly and in poor temper General Jackson order his corps to break off the contest and withdraw…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Six​

“We’ll fight them one handed”
The Rise of Phil Kearny​

From “The Slumbering Giant - The Army of the Potomac in the Rappahannock Campaign” by George Cresap Ord
McMahon publishing

“It was after 1pm when General Porter arrived on the field. He found General Kearny in conference with Generals Burnside, Reno, Richardson, Humphreys, Stevens, Buford and Hooker planning a pursuit of the retreating rebels. Porter quickly asserted his authority and quashed any suggestion that a pursuit was possible – “it is neither practical nor desirable for this army to move forward in its current condition” was Porter’s view given later to Secretary Stanton…

Kearny, with a hand full of willing subordinates, had breathed life into the Union Armies in Virginia for a day before the soporific hand of a higher command had wafted the armies back to sleep. It had not gone unnoticed in Washington…”

Extracts from “The Campaign along the Rappahannock Line - In their own words” by Professor John C. Dunning
New York 1995

“Kearny’s action, by universal testimony, was magnificent” – General A.A Humphreys

“I shall never forget the arrival of the brave General Kearny and his troops” – General Irvin McDowell

“In the midst of the battle, his appearance certainly filled my beau ideal of a general better than anything I ever saw. It made the blood thrill through one’s veins, and would inspirit men, if anything could.” – Major Charles S. Wainright

From “Battle of the Rappahannock” by Roger Galton
Osprey 2003

“Though the Armies of Virginia and of the Potomac still held the field at the end of the battle, many refused to consider the Battle of the Rappahannock a victory… The Army of Virginia had almost been wiped out… The failure of the commanders to communicate was hard to ignore, even though the true extent of those failures is perhaps only now understood: Pope had lied to Halleck; Banks had conspired with Pope; Burnside had omitted to report to Porter; McDowell had fallen silent when he needed help most; Porter had failed to pursue reports or maintain communications with Kearny at the Rappahannock or Stevens at Fredericksburg; and even Kearny had avoided communicating with Porter to avoid the anticipated order to retreat…

One thing was clear though, both armies would need a major reorganisation. An army commander was dead [John Pope]. A corps commander captured [Nathaniel Banks] and another injured [Franz Sigel]. Of the divisional commanders, Robert Schenk was dead, King, Ricketts and Schurz were prisoners, and Christopher Augur was injured. The price among brigade and regimental commanders was much higher…In return the Union had only General Trimble to show for its troubles. It was not then known that General Taliaferro was mortally wounded, while General Kemper would be out of action for some months…”

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume II” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1960

“It did not take long for President Lincoln to act. With the Armies of Virginia and the Potomac safely back on the north bank of the Rappahannock, the President and the Secretary of War were not content to wait for the arrival of the reports of the battle via General Halleck to end General Porter's "temporary" tenure in command, nor were they satisfied to rely on wildly contradictory newspaper reports of the battle. Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck interviewed 18 General officers over the course of 8 days in September…The last to be “invited” was General Kearny…

“General, if General Porter were to be superseded in command who would you recommend for the combined command of the Armies of the Potomac and Virginia?” Stanton asked straight out. Kearny is said to have paused before responding.

“Sir I would recommend Generals Hooker or Reynolds for the highest command. Of course gentlemen I will be happy to serve whomever you place at the head of the army.” It was Lincoln who responded;

“General Kearny, I have asked that question of every other general we have spoken to these past few days and for once I am pleased to say they finally agree on something. They would all follow you. Which saves me the trouble of offending them with a decision I had already resolved upon. General Kearny, I would appoint you to the command of the Army of Potomac. I am convinced that you have the spirit to lead this army as it should be led. But we both know this command is a burden replete with risks. I understand that. I know you do. Therefore I will not command, I will only ask - will you take up this burden?”

“Mr President, Mr Secretary, General Halleck I thank you for the honor you do me. I accept. I will make no vows or promises. I will only say what I have said from the beginning - that I am of the firm opinion that the Army of the Potomac can defeat Lee and take Richmond; that I believe the key is to put all of its power into each battle, to leave none out, and to press the enemy closely at every opportunity…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Seven

Shuffling the Deck​

From “Lincoln: A Life in Stories” by James Piper McCrory
North Carolina State

“It reminds me of an old dray horse, called Hercules, owned by a hotel keeper back in Illinois. That was the worst tempered horse you ever saw. If you got near it, why it would bite and snap and kick and roll over. Why it’d do just about anything it could to hurt you. But if you were man enough to harness that old horse without getting hurt or bit, why there was no cart too heavy, no load to great, that that old horse couldn’t pull. Now what were we talking about General? Oh yes - the Army of the Potomac…” A story attributed to Lincoln’s interview with Kearny.

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield - the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1960

“I am to have some say in the reorganization certainly, but I am not to have things all my own way. Perhaps that is no bad thing. I cannot claim to know all my corps commanders well. I certainly cannot be sure of the mettle of many. I have even less claim to knowledge about all my divisional commanders. Yet I have seen sound officers at work, and fighters in the field, and I mean to replace as many of those affected with the McClellan “slows” or an excess of respect for Lee as I can name…” General Kearny to General Sedgwick…

“I do not know Howard well but he has been recommended to me by Reynolds from their West Point Days [teaching not as students] and I will not take a general I trust to fight out of the field…Davidson’s appointment has caused the most uproar here. People have not forgotten his overeagerness and his whipping at the hands of the Apache. Well I need an eager Cavalry commander. And I believe the man has thoroughly learned his lessons from his whipping by the finest light cavalry in the world. Like many men, I believe his whipping to have been the making of him…Von Steinwehr’s appointment is temporary, until Sigel is fit. I mean to keep the Prussian and damn Sigel…Come down and we will find you a division. We well heeled New Yorkers must set an example…” General Kearny to General Wadsworth.

The Army of the Potomac under Major General Philip Kearny - October 1862 (with former Army of Virginia designations in brackets)

Chief of Staff Brigadier General Oliver O. Howard

Chief of Artillery Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt

I Corps (III Corps AoV) Major General John F Reynolds

II Corps Major General Israel B Richardson

III Corps Major General Joseph Hooker

IV Corps Major General Erasmus D Keyes

V Corps Major General John Sedgwick

VI Corps Major General William B. Franklin

IX Corps Major General Jesse L. Reno

XI Corps (II Corps AoV) Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr

XII Corps (I Corps AoV) Major General Joseph K. Mansfield

Cavalry Corps Brigadier General John Wynn Davidson

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Eight​

You Can Forget Kentucky​

The Battle of Mount Vernon - Part I​

From “The Kentucky Campaigns of 1862” by Professor Dickson S. Foote
LSU​

“The Battle of Richmond is now, as it was then, overshadowed by the Battle of the Rappahannock in the East 3 days earlier and the Battle of Mount Vernon 7 weeks later. Yet Edmund Kirby Smith achieved at Richmond the nearest thing to a Cannae scored by any general, North or South, in the course of the whole war.​

The aftermath of the battle had an immediate effect on the direction of the campaign in Kentucky. William “Bull” Nelson withdrew the pitiful remainder of his force to Lexington. In the meantime Churchill and Cleburne sought Bragg’s guidance as to their next move. Smith’s injuries, initially perceived to be minor, quickly had a debilitating effect on the General who was subsequently evacuated to the hospital at Knoxville…​

Smith had sought to use his independent command to acquire personal glory at the expense of the campaign’s original objectives. Now, in the absence of the commander of the Army of Kentucky, Bragg had at last command of a united force…”​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee – Teach Them How to War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison​

“Bragg had initially planned to gather his forces at Versailles, but Buell was coming on too quickly. Bragg refused to bring on an engagement until he could unite his command with that of Smith’s. It was then that Bragg decided to give ground to Buell, all be it slowly. In the meantime he needed an officer to take command of Smith’s force. Cleburne was a foreigner, and no professional. Churchill was supposed to have performed well at Richmond, but he was unknown to Bragg. Therefore Bragg resolved to appoint Hardee to the command, elevating Simon Bolivar Buckner to command of the Right Wing of the Army of Mississippi…Hardee’s instructions were clear – to withdraw south along the main road from Richmond to met up with Bragg’s force somewhere in the vicinity of the Mount Vernon crossroads…​

Hardee was impressed with both of his new subordinates. The reports he obtained direct from the brigade and regimental commanders reflected luster on their reputations... Hardee quickly established a solid working relationship with both men, that developed into a friendship that would serve the three men well over the course of several campaigns…​

From “The Kentucky Campaigns of 1862” by Professor Dickson S. Foote
LSU​

“Buell was coming on with an uncharacteristic rapidity. Little did Bragg know that Buell had actually been relieved by General Halleck and replaced by George Thomas. Thomas however had refused to relieve Buell “mid-campaign”. In an attempt to redeem his reputation Buell pushed his three corps on in pursuit of Bragg following the line of the Old Wilderness Road south east to Danville and beyond…Gilbert’s III Corps in the lead skirmished with Bragg’s rearguard, under Cheatham, at Stanford and Crab Orchard…​

Bragg ultimately settled his forces on the hills west of the village of Mount Vernon. His right flank rested a top the high ground at Hysinger Farm behind the Linville Creek. His line then ran south west making good use of the forested high ground behind the Maret Cabin and the Sayer Farm, before finally curving in a short "hook" at the end of line pointing north west around a bowl of low ground, finally coming to rest at Carl Brown’s Farmhouse…Behind Bragg the Richmond road ran south through Mount Vernon. If Bragg was to link up with Hardee this was the place to do it…​

Gilbert’s performance was to become a byword for incompetence on 17th October, but even before that day Gilbert had consistently failed to send out proper scouts. The engagements at Stanton and Crab Orchard had both been surprises. He knew he was on Bragg’s heels, but he had no idea that Bragg had stopped and deployed until he ran head long into three of Patton Anderson’s brigades straddling the Old Wilderness Road and the heights on either side…

Buell hurried to the sound of the guns. His three corps were spread out on two narrow rutted roads, if road was not too an exaggerated term for them. In the words of Thomas, riding with Buell, “we all hoped Gilbert was just getting another bloody nose”. The Battle of Mount Vernon had begun…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Eight​

You Can Forget Kentucky​

The Battle of Mount Vernon - Part II​

From “The Kentucky Campaigns of 1862” by Professor Dickson S. Foote
LSU

“The Old Wilderness Road, or Brodhead Road as it sometimes called ran south east towards Mount Vernon. To the south west the ground quickly rose and it was littered with little stream and creeks which had worn unseen scars in the lands. To the south there was an open triangle of land (subsequently called Sayer’s Bowl after the Sayer Farm there) and beyond that there rose the Brown Ridge (a grandiose name for the rising ground upon which Carl Brown had built his farm) and Marek’s Hill adjacent to the road. Just across the road rose Jones' and Liddell’s hills (named after the brigade commanders who initially occupied them). Between these two hills rose Linville Creek flowing north east. On the east bank was Hysinger’s Hill. Linville Creek then became Renfro Creek and flowed, in its meandering fashion, north. On its east bank was the North Wilderness Road which led to Richmond…”

“Cheatham had placed his troops on the reverse slope of Brown’s Ridge with the left end of his line anchored on Brown’s Farmhouse by Wheaton’s Cavalry and the right on Sayer’s Farmhouse by an advanced company of D.S.Donelson’s Brigade. Cheatham had the Bowl covered in an enveloping field of fire. Patton Anderson was next in line, straddling the road. He occupied Marek’s Hill and cabin on the left and Jones’ Hill to the right of the road. Slightly further back on his right was Buckner’s old division. Liddell occupied Liddell’s Hill in Anderson’s right rear. Then on Hysinger’s Hill, just behind Linville Creek, were the other three brigades, including Wheeler’s cavalry. Bragg made his headquarters at the Hysinger Farm just west of the village of Mount Vernon…”​

“The area to the north of the road was marked by three streams, Long Branch, Bowman Branch and Boone Fork. But beyond the cluster of these streams, and to the north of the road, was a slightly elevated plateau of land and fields clear all the way to Renfro Creek and the North Wilderness Road…”​

“Schoepf blundered into Adams brigade on the road. He tried to shake his division into line as a crescendo of enveloping fire opened up from Marek's and Jones’ Hill. Adams had even tried to turn the cabin into a block house in the limited time available to him. Gilbert sought to bring Mitchell up on Schoepf’s right to relieve the pressure. Instead Mitchell’s men stumbled into the Bowl where the fire was worse than that experienced by Schoepf…”​

The 82nd Indiana tries to take Marek's Cabin from the 13th Louisiana​

As Sheridan came up, Gilbert ordered him into the bowl, “Sir you are to take that high ground [Brown’s Ridge]”, “General Gilbert, sir, that is a cauldron from which my men will not emerge. We should look for their flank sir”, “General Sheridan you have your orders. Attack or I will relieve you” (Col. D.McCook) and so went Sheridan’s Division into the Bowl…”

“Buell realised this was no rearguard skirmish. One sight of the hell into which Gilbert had sent Sheridan and Mitchell convinced him that his right was not the place to turn the rebels' flank (though indeed it was perhaps his best chance if he could only have found Cheatham's left flank). He therefore led Wood and Van Cleve north of the road, shook them out and had them advance south east towards Mount Vernon. The lack of accurate maps or scouting work meant that Buell had no idea the advance would be interrupted by the Linville Creek or Buckner’s Division, although the high ground beyond (Hysinger’s Hill) could be seen…”​

“Smith was still back at Brodhead advancing as quickly as he was able. Jackson and Rousseau were still on the Negro Creek Road marching in from the west. It was about midday and it would be at least an hour, and perhaps two before Buell could expect Rousseau or Smith to arrive. In the meantime a runner from Van Cleve brought disturbing news – there were more troops coming down from the north along the North Wilderness Road and the leading elements were deploying into line. The implications were clear. The Army of Kentucky had arrived and Hardee meant to sweep into the rear of Crittenden’s two divisions and cut the road before reinforcements could come up or Buell could extricate himself…”​

Mitchell's Division marches into the "Bowl"​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee – Teach Them How to War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison

“General Hardee sent 4 messages to Bragg over the next two hours, and 2 to Buckner. “The enemy is seeking to disengage and withdraw. I am in a position to cut some or all off. Press your attack and advance. Do not let them disengage…”. Bragg did not respond nor did he order an advance. As it was Churchill and Cleburne moved quickly to cut the road, gathering up scores of prisoners from Van Cleve’s, Wood’s (including Wood himself) and particularly Schoepf’s Divisions. Sheridan managed to pull his troops out and in doing so advised Mitchell to follow, which Mitchell did in direct breach of orders to stand from Gilbert.

Such a performance should have pleased Hardee, but he was incensed. As indeed was Buckner who had asked for permission to advance beyond his lines on receipt of Hardee’s direct request. As word spread that Bragg had missed an opportunity to bag “the lion’s share of Buell’s sheep” [Col. Joe Wheeler] the whole army became angry and disturbed…​

Many have suggested that Bragg’s inaction was a result of professional jealously. Hardee would have been the one to cut the road and take the prisoners. Might not then the glory reflect on him and not on Bragg? Bragg’s detractors have long maintained envy and incompetence played their parts. However to stand at the Hysinger Farm, from which Bragg fought the battle, is to stand out of sight of the plateau over which Hardee advanced; and out of sight of the Bowl where Anderson and Cheatham were chewing up Gilbert. Bragg’s reluctance to advance may be explained by his ignorance of the success of his defence, the remoteness of three of Buell’s eight divisions, or perhaps the fear of leaving exceptionally strong defensive positions for a running battle in broken ground…”​

Cleburne and Churchill advance​

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky​

“Bragg remained largely silent on his reasons. Any desire to explain himself evaporated in the open hostility now being shown him by the majority of the senior officers in his army. He had won a decisive victory over Buell, who was now in retreat. But he was short on supplies with a fractious command. The question for Bragg was complex: advance on Louisville; pursue Buell; or withdraw and resupply – Eastern Kentucky had not been the land of milk and honey, or recruits, he had been expecting. Winter was near at hand and Bragg had a quandary. Little did he know the decision would soon be taken out of his hands…”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nine​

We Are All Wet Alike​

The Rapidan Campaign - Part I​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992​

“In the fall of 1862, and in the midst of three campaigns (Kearny’s Rapidan Campaign, Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign and Rosecrans’ part in the Kentucky Campaign) the Union Army under went a substantial reorganisation. Twenty four corps were created numbered I through XXIV. Each of these corps was assigned a symbol for the purposes of identification. This had been a enthusiasm of General Kearny’s when he had been a divisional commander, and he had extended it to the Army of the Potomac on his appointment to command. It had been well received and General Halleck rolled it out to the army as a whole. In each corps the first division’s would red, the second white, the third blue. In the rare instances where fourth and fifth divisions existed these were later assigned green and yellow respectively…​

First Division I Corps Badge​

Major General Fitz John Porter was assigned to the Department of the Gulf with a corps strong force and headquarters at New Orleans. Major General Ambrose Burnside was appointed to command the Department of the South with a reinforced corps of 5 divisions, and responsibility for South Carolina, Georgia and Eastern Florida. Major General Irvin McDowell was assigned to the Department of Virginia with his headquarters at Suffolk. He commanded a further corps with responsibility for Eastern Virginia and North Carolina…​

Lincoln had several meetings with General Kearny. Halleck had not met Lincoln’s idea of a commander in chief. So Lincoln began to treat him as a “Chief of Staff” and began to run his own strategy…​

Lincoln was not satisfied that a victory of sufficient magnitude had been won upon which to base the issue of his Emancipation Proclamation. He desired a victory over Lee before the new year. Kearny, with initial reluctance, took the President into his confidence.​

“Richmond, from its moral importance, is the point which will prove the most decisive, and to carry with it the Valley of the Mississippi, as Grant intends, would isolate the war to little more than South Carolina and parcels of the extreme secession states. I intend to either turn out Lee from Richmond or trap him there until his army withers on the vine. To that end I plan to turn his flank in the west. First General Reynolds will secure the Shenandoah Valley so we will not have a hostile valley at our backs and then I will turn Lee’s flank near the Orange Court House. And if Lee should split his forces to stop Reynolds I will wedge this army between the split elements and defeat them in detail. It may not happen overnight. We may be hostage to the weather Mr President, our movements slowed by rain and mud. But so will Lee’s. I will not halt this movement simply because of poor weather…”​

Kearny had assigned Reynolds I Corps to the valley, with von Steinwehr’s IX Corps and Buford’s Division of the new cavalry corps. Reynolds was also permitted to call upon Generals Heintzelman and Wool, the commanders of the Washington and Middle departments for reinforcements as needed…
​

Kearny had requested that diversions be staged by McDowell and Burnside to distract troops from crucible of the coming campaign, but Halleck’s orders left the timing vague and the discretion to the local departmental commanders. In the end little was done in time to support Kearny’s campaign…​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nine

We Are All Wet Alike

The Rapidan Campaign - Part II​

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania”
Cadogan 1891

“A brief spell in the luxury of a former cattle truck on the O&A has forever made me fond of the smell of manure. We only traveled as far as Warrenton, and then it was out into the driving rain. We marched from Warrenton, over Carters Mountain and past Baffle Mountain. Then we passed over Thornton’s Gap. I say passed over. Our brigade was near the front so I only had to wade up to my knees in mud. The poor Dutchmen in the rear swam uphill and were washed down again. Having lost my boots several times in the mud I realized they made a better necklace and marched on foot sole. I am told that mud is good for the skin so I was surprised my feet were no smoother by the time we squelched into Luray. It was in Luray I saw General B and his cavalry. Carrying the poor beasts they were, foot sore and weary, I could not tell who was horse and who was horseman…

The Dutch left us at Luray and pressed on to New Market with the poor American Horse. General R had of course kept the sophisticated European Horse Gentlemen with us, Cols. PW and AD. An Englishman and a Frenchman to keep we amateurs right. So down we went a far as Milam Gap and there one night while General R decided whether to keep on south on our watery holiday in the Valley or cross the gap to visit our seccess neighbors I met a Georgia Bull. Says he to me “Do you know who I am? Why I’m a senator, secretary, general and what’s more I’m a Georgia Bull!”. Says I to him “Why sir if you don’t stand still I'll elect you with this here patented Yankee voting stick!”

From “The Battle of Milam Gap” an article by Jeff Trembly in North & South Magazine
2011

“Reynolds had to rely on the Cavalry Brigade of Colonel Wyndam for intelligence. In the horrendous rain and sleet the Colonel’s men had not stirred far from the main column, its fires and supplies. So when Reynolds' cold and tired men stumbled towards the Gap in the middle of the night they had no idea they were stumbling into the cold and tired men of Jones’ Division of Longstreet’s Corps. General Robert Toombs of Georgia was the first casualty of the night when wandering from the main column, to relieve the call of nature, he had a “political disagreement” with a "ragamuffin" of the 13th Pennsylvania Reserves, and was taken a reluctant prisoner…”

“Jones’ Division received a bloody repulse from Reynolds who moved faster, getting Meade’s and Doubleday’s Divisions into place first and gaining control of the gap. The “highlight” of the battle however was the charge of Wyndam’s Brigade from some dead ground on the leading elements of Drayton’s Brigade of Jones’ Division which looked like breaking through…”

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous
Cadogan 1891

“If two more dapper gentlemen ever invited a Southern Belle to the ball I never meet them. But then I’m a Northern Belle and likely wouldn‘t know.

In they went, sabers and mustaches flying European style, to invite the Rebs to dance. And dance they did on the end of those big old cavalry razors. And them that couldn’t find a partner tore off back down the road to Madison. And so General R had his victory at the hands of two of the biggest goddam fools in Christendom. But they can’t take all the credit, for the Rebel General must have been more cold and stiff than our General R, for I never saw him all night but that he moved like lightening…”

One of the many stylized depictions of "Sir Percy's Charge"​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nine

We Are All Wet Alike

The Rapidan Campaign - Part II​

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“The efficiency of Lee’s cavalry under Stuart was without question. Stuart’s troopers were masters of the art and science of light cavalry. In the case of scouting and intelligence Lee was extremely well informed as a result. He knew that the I and XI Corps had withdraw from the Rappahannock line. Captured and traded Yankee newspapers suggested the XI Corps was returning to Washington to recruit (indeed the third division under the newly minted Brigadier General Schimmelfenning had). The ultimate destination of I Corps was less clear. “General Reynolds is fine gentleman, and a better officer. Where he goes, he goes to fight. I must know where the I Corps goes” as Lee told Stuart.

Kearny’s appointment had, and continued to, cause General Lee concern. Kearny was no sluggard like McClellan. Nor was he a fool like Pope. Kearny was a more dangerous opponent and Lee knew it. On 11 November when Stuart reported that the bulk of the Union Army was departing north Lee knew Kearny was not retreating. An advance; an attack of some kind was in the offing.

Sedgwick’s V Corps and Reno’s IX Corps remained behind. Sedgwick covering the fords west of Rappahannock Station, and Reno those east. Wynn Davis and Pleasonton were also still “lurking about” according to Stuart who sent Hampton to investigate Fredericksburg only to find Pleasonton waiting for him…

A few days later the first reports from the Valley arrived. Cavalry and large formations of infantry had chased off the militia from Luray and New Market. The reports of lootings and burning in New Market confirmed Lee’s worst suspicion that the Dutchmen of IX Corps were abroad in the valley. But to what end? A concentration of Union forces in the valley would expose Washington and Baltimore to an attack. So what then? Perhaps Kearny had been forced to split his forces as McClellan had. An attack on the Shenandoah would give the Yankee newspapers something to crow about, but a weakened Kearny might feel the need to draw off Lee a little bit. "If it was McClellan", said Lee, “I would know it was a retreat to winter quarters and I would release Jackson once more into the valley to deal with the invader. But this is Kearny and I do not his mind yet.”

In the end Lee sent Jones and Walker’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps towards Milam Gap to secure that passage to the Valley and investigate the Yankee threat. Stuart was to dispatch Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade via the Swift Run Gap with similar instructions. “Get me all the intelligence you can on the forces and disposition of the invader”.

Jackson, however, was convinced Kearny was in retreat. “General, if we press Sedgwick he will withdraw. Let us push at him, at all the fords. I’ll find where he is soft and push hard. He will fall back and then we can cross and chase these invaders back to the Potomac”…

From “The Maverick - General D.H.Hill” by Duncan Frasier Jones
Buffalo 1988

“Daniel Harvey Hill did not get on with Jackson. He had ample indication to be certain in his own mind that Jackson neither liked nor trusted him. Jackson never consulted or explained. He simply ordered. D.H. Hill often wrote he was not fit for the army life for he despised taking arbitrary orders. As a result Hill hated Jackson about as much as Jackson seemed to distain Hill…

Jackson arrived in person to give Hill his orders: to attack Beverly Ford head on; to push the northerners defending it to see if they would stand; a reconnaissance in force; a reconnaissance to the other side of the river.

“General Jackson, I do not need to attack the ford head on. I shall merely go around it.”

“General Hill, my orders are clear. You will comply. Or I will relieve you. You will attack the ford as ordered come the morning.”

It was perhaps an instinctive response for Jackson then paused, turned to look Hill in the eye and tilted his head [all according to Doctor Hunter McGuire of Jackson's Staff].

“General, how can you go around the ford?”. General Hill then led General Jackson to some nearby wagons laden with rough looking boats and loose planks.

“We have been idle here for two months General so I put the men to making something of a pontoon train.”. Jackson’s response is reported to have put the normally acidic Hill in a sunny mood for days.

“Well done General. You may proceed as you have suggested. I will pray for your success”…

D.H.Hill's troops appear on the flank​

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“The Battle of Oak Grove was a shambles for the Union. Sedgwick had intended to give way slowly and orderly. General Morrell, who commanded the First Division of V Corps, was fully briefed on the plan. Morrell however was ill and had relieved himself to depart for Washington. General Daniel Butterfield was appointed to the command. He was at Sedgwick’s headquarters that morning being briefed on the plan himself when the sounds of gunfire were heard. The First Division was under attack from the far side of the river by John R. Jones’ Division. A short time later it was attacked by D.H. Hill’s division on its own side of the river. Hill had crossed out of sight by way of an improvised pontoon bridge.

Brigadier Charles Griffen was the senior officer, but he did not know it. Forty minutes and more passed before he took command and ordered a withdrawal, but not before the division had taken a thorough mauling. Sedgwick and Reno withdrew north east up the line of the railroad. Not in the orderly fashion envisaged, but in a running fight with the lead elements of Jackson’s Corps which were continually at their heel. Sedgwick could not even save the supplies at Warrenton as planned. These were burned as Sedgwick and Reno settled on the other side of Cedar Run. The pall of smoke could be seen for miles. Lee and Jackson were exultant. Kearny had miscalculated surely. Even the arrival of Longstreet with the balance of his Corps and the news of Milam Gap could not completely quell their optimism.

As it was, the running fight to Cedar Run served Kearny’s purpose better than he could have planned…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nine​

We Are All Wet Alike​

The Rapidan Campaign - Part III​

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“As Kearny’s remaining corps had marched north from the Rappahannock, leaving Sedgwick and Reno behind, the question was asked “who knows where we are bound?”. Lincoln’s own papers clearly indicate he knew and had taken Stanton into his confidence. General Halleck did not know and it would appear no other members of the cabinet were informed. Of Kearny’s lieutenants Oliver O. Howard knew. As chief of Kearny’s staff he had to know, and Kearny clearly trusted Howard to remain silent. John F. Reynolds knew all, the better to conduct his critical operations in the valley. John Sedgwick had had a part of the plan explained to him so that he could better understand the role he would play but as he said to Jesse L. Reno “I know but a portion of the plan and it clear to me that it is the least part of it”. For all his claims in later life there is no evidence that Joe Hooker had been brought into Kearny’s confidence. Kearny trusted Hooker to fight, but not to keep confidences. “He is more political than a hundred senators” was a frequent refrain of Kearny…

“The weather was atrocious but the evidence was that Kearny intended to keep the men marching, and marching hard, for the wagon train carried “a cobbler’s lifetime of shoes and boots” (Major George Armstrong Custer of Kearny’s Staff)…

“Some marched and some entrained to Warrenton. Then the first surprise order came. “Westwards”. The rumours and newspapers had said Fredericksburg, a surprise flanking manoeuvre to cross the Rappahannock. Others had said it was back to the Peninsula. A few more eccentric characters had suggested the Shenandoah Valley to follow Reynolds. The march westwards inflated the perceived wisdom of the eccentrics among the rank and file, but concerns were raised among the officers:

“Washington will be exposed, and Baltimore too”, “What possible sense is there to march this army into the Valley where it could barely deploy?”, “Lee will crush Sedgwick and Reno while they are isolated”, “An advance down the Valley takes us away from Richmond and Lee!” (Taken from the Gentlemen Officers – Letters from the Potomac by George Hazard, Kennedy Publishing 1963)…

The cavalry brigade of Colonel Benjamin F. Davis did sterling work. With Buford in the valley and the bulk of Pleasanton’s troops distracting Stuart around Fredericksburg in the east, it was left to Davis to screen the march. Screen it he did, between Carters and Baffle Mountain, then between Baffle and Red Oak Mountain. Finally, as the army approached Sperryville and Thornton’s Gap, Davis turned south to Woodbridge, screening the army from Red Oak Mountain to the Hazel Run. His troops were barely noticed. Lee was chasing Sedgwick and what he hoped was Kearny’s rear. Stuart was at Fredericksburg sparring with Pleasanton. Fitzhugh Lee was south, in the valley, while Jones’ force was in retreat to Madison Court House. But one person was taking note of Union movements near Red Oak Mountain. He was calling himself John Lowrey, but he was known to the Secretary of War in Richmond simply as Harrison…”

From “Spies: Lies and Misdirection in the Civil War” by Major James Pearson
Bison 1991

“Harrison was taken by a Captain Brewer in Benjamin F. Davis’ brigade. He was dressed as a well to do farmer, had a saddleback full of greenbacks, and week’s worth of Northern newspapers. Davis immediately concluded Harrison was a spy. He sent an orderly to Kearny for instructions. “Hang the damnable man. Immediately” was Kearny’s response. His comment to Howard, who suggested a tribunal or referral to Washington, “We hang spies here Oliver. It is a coward’s profession, and a rogue’s tool. He shall be hung without further discussion and let him explain his cowardly profession to the almighty, and when this campaign is over let it be known that such is the fate of all spies masquerading as civilians in my Department”. It was the first of such executions under Kearny’s reign. It was not to be the last…”

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

For a day the army sat at Sperryville within sound of the Battle of Oak Grove. For Kearny and many of his officers and men it was a difficult day. It was not in their nature to sit idly by within sound of a battle…

Instead over crossing over Thornton’s Gap the army turned south on a neglected old turnpike towards Hazel Run and Slate Mountain. The route was narrow and full of mud. The engineers and sappers worked day and night to improve and maintain the road. Speed was essential, but in a cold wet November near miracles were asked of the engineers. In the end the army successfully crossed the Run with its artillery and wagon train largely intact. Passing between Slate Mountain and Turkeyhole Mountain the army was now west of Culpepper Court House and technically well in Lee’s rear…”

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous
Cadogan 1891

“What a surprise: we crossed over German Ridge down to Robertson’s Creek, expecting Rebs and meeting Old Magnificent. Why I nearly shot one of his staff to be sure they were real. In the end the rain, and a damp charge, saved me from some difficult conversations with the provosts and my Colonel.”

Colonel Benjamin F.Davis attacks Culpepper​

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“With no need for secrecy now, Davis and Wyndham joined together to raid and burn Lee’s supplies at Culpepper Court House. It was the first indication to Lee had that Kearny was in his rear. Lee could not advance further, though Sedgwick and Reno might just be vulnerable, for he was far in advance of his supply train. Jackson, initially keen to attack across Cedar Run regardless, was quick to sense Lee’s concern. Jackson undertook to act. His foot-cavalry would march south and stop Kearny before he could cross the Rapidan. Longstreet was notably sceptical: the roads were a mess after two armies had passed over them; the weather was abysmal and worsening; and Kearny was two and perhaps three days marches ahead of Jackson. Having little choice Lee ordered Jackson to be off…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nine

We Are All Wet Alike

The Rapidan Campaign - Part IV​

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“A dozen letters and memoirs record David Rumph Jones’ reaction to the order. He slumped down onto a camp stool, thrust the order into the hands of John G. Walker, and put his heads in his hands. Looking up after a moment into Walker’s ashen face “Well John I shall be surprised if you and I see another night”. General Lee had ordered Jones and Walker, with their bloodied divisions, to stand at Madison Court House and hold the Army of the Potomac for two days. In truth even Lee believed it was utterly impossible…”

David R Jones and John G Walker​

From “A Man in Search of Death - The Life of Richard Brooke Garnett” by Ganett Brooke
Orange & West

“It was the most beautiful ground for the task you could imagine. German Ridge on the left, the north face of which was steep and would be difficult for a force to scale in the face of sustained fire. On the right Lost Mountain…

General Jones then did a brave and noble thing. He addressed the brigade and regimental commanders. He explained the order and its significance. The Unionists had flanked our main force and if they were not slowed the Army and indeed Richmond were imperiled. It was not long before the men understood the task. It was do or die…” General Garnett in a letter to the injured General Kemper.

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous

“My corporal was nearby when the dandy from K’s staff, Custard or some such [Custer] came to get our General R. Old General K it seems was in a fiercesome rage and it was hoped the presence of his friend would keep him from shooting Generals F and K. That Custard must have been one of life’s optimists…”

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“The narrow front of the battlefield meant General Kearny could not bring his full force into action as he had wished. Franklin’s VI Corps was in front of the column and he pushed Stoneman’s and Rodman’s divisions into action. Too few, too rushed, the attack failed. Franklin then put Slocum in, but Stoneman and Rodman failed to co-ordinate and the second attack failed. It was after the second attack that Kearny appeared with Keyes of IV Corps, who were second in line…

A third attack under the eye of Kearny but under Franklin’s direction, deploying all three divisions, failed. Kearny was not impressed with Franklin’s performance. It was mid-afternoon but realizing VI Corps was not the tool for the job, Kearny had Keyes bring up IV Corps. Couch, Casey and Baldy Smith took some time deploying their divisions into line, but Kearny was not going to allow another piecemeal attack…

The eight Confederate brigades fought like an entire Corps that day: Col. Henry Benning leading Toombs’ Brigade, General Drayton’s, General Garnett’s, Col. Montgomery D. Corse leading Kemper’s Brigade, Col. Joseph Walker leading Jenkins’ Brigade, Col. George Tige Anderson leading Jones’ Brigade, Col Van Manning leading Walker’s Brigade and General Ransom’s…

Keyes interfered in the deployment of his Corps mid attack. As a result Casey came into action in the centre well behind Couch and Smith on the flanks. The attack was repelled. The day was wearing on. General Kearny was seen in a towering rage berating Franklin and Keyes…

It was the final attack of the day in the failing light. Couch, Casey and Slocum went in. At his own request Kearny had allowed Baldy Smith to withdraw his division from the line to see if a way could be found over or around Lost Mountain. In the twilight Smith swept around the crest, falling on an open the flank, crushing Manning’s troops. The line gave way…but Jones and Walker had held for a day and their command was still reasonably intact. Jones however had been right in one respect, he did not live to see a second night. He had been felled by a shot to the chest during the third attack and died a short way behind the line alongside the source of Beautiful River…

Kearny had ultimately won the Battle of Lost Mountain but Jones had bought some of the time that had been asked of him, and his command, though bloodied, was still in a reasonable fighting condition as it fell back, under Walker’s command, toward Orange Court House…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nine

We Are All Wet Alike

The Rapidan Campaign - Part V​

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

“As the Army of the Potomac emerged at Madison Court House, the next stage of Kearny’s plan began to develop. The army fanned out to seize its objectives:

• Keyes’ IV Corps pursued and pressed Walker back towards Orange Court House;
• Franklin’s VI Corps moved to Keyes’ right to control the two roads leading to Gordonsville;
• Mansfield’s XII Corps moved south to seize the gap at Charlottesville;
• Hooker’s III Corps marched towards Rapidan (the town);
• Richardson’s II Corps followed Hooker to prevent any flanking maneuver between the Cedar and Fox Mountains;
• Reynolds I Corps was kept in reserve by Kearny at Madison Court House…

The has been a great deal of speculation about Kearny’s objective in the Rapidan Campaign. If he intended a dash to Richmond in Lee‘s rear (in weather where dashing involved a slow, wearying march in rivers of mud) why fan out to seize the gaps and roads in the last screen of mountains and hill before Richmond. Many have concluded Kearny had already given up on an advance to Richmond and was already planning to settle into winter quarters behind this screen. He could then plunder the Shenandoah and secure his communications through it, while at the same time tying Lee down to the defense of Richmond. If Lee moved on Washington, Kearny would be on his flank and Sedgwick would have his own V Corps and Reno’s IX Corps to screen Washington while Heintzelman’s newly constituted XXII Corps directly defended the city.

Others suggested that Kearny was merely keeping his options open regarding his line of advance and it was the surprise Joe Hooker got at Rapidan that changed the nature of the campaign…

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“If the dismounted cavalry which skirmished with III Corps leading regiments concerned Hooker there is no evidence of it. Yet two of his division commanders, Birney and Sickles, later wrote of their own growing sense of unease that they should run into a body of Stuart’s cavalry so soon…

The weather was worsening at an alarming rate. An icy rain lashed down, seeming to come at the troops sideways. The sky had darkened to such an extent that it seemed that the sun had failed to rise that morning. It was nearly impossible for troops to keep their arms and cartridges in any condition to fire in weather like that. And thus it was in poor visibility, in a rainstorm, that III Corps collided with the division of Dick Ewell. Jackson’s foot cavalry had arrived…

The fighting was hand to hand. There was no other option for men who could not keep anything dry. No other battle in the civil war records so many instances of bayonets charges and hand to hand combat. The gap between the hills at Rapidan was narrow and Ewell’s men where determined to hold it…

“As I saw him [Hooker] that afternoon on his white horse riding in rear of his line of battle, and close up to it, with the excitement of battle in his eyes, and that gallant and chivalric appearance which he always presented under fire, I was struck with admiration. As a corps commander, with his whole force operating under his own eye, it is much to be doubted whether Hooker had a superior in the army” General Phil Kearny…

“Hooker…alert and vigilant, conspicuously mounted on a white horse - with flashing eyes, florid face and high shirt collar, that soon wilted down when we got engaged - but as cool and collected under fire as if directing a parade or a picnic…He always seemed to know exactly what to do and when to do it…” General Dan Sickles…

The one enduring myth of the Battle of the Rapidan (known of veterans as the Battle of the Lightening Bolts - a dozen soldiers on both sides having been struck down in the midst of the battle by this unexpected “artillery”) is that in personally leading charges Hooker and Dick Ewell came to blows. What is certain is that in a melee between Hiram Berry’s brigade of Birney’s Division and Hays’ brigade of Ewell’s Division, Ewell and Hooker were at one point only a few feet apart. Multiple witnesses in 52nd Virginia, 1st New York and 17th Maine attest to this fact. However both Ewell and Hooker always denied coming to blows, though Hooker was always more equivocal about it than Ewell…

Kearny: “Joe, I believe you met my old comrade Ewell from the 1st Dragoons today. Was he well?”
Hooker: “I regret to say General, when I left him, he was still very much in the flower of health.”

From “Three Victories and a Defeat - Kearny and Lee in the Fall of 62” by Carl Zeigler
Georgetown Press 1972

While Hooker was grappling with Ewell, Richardson found himself dealing with the advance elements of A.P Hill’s Light Division trying to slip into the rear of the Army of the Potomac. At the same time Walker had stopped at the Orange Court House and had begun a second contest with Erasmus Keyes. The nature of the narrow fronts in each case, and the appalling weather made these brutal contests of steel that seemed to ebb and flow throughout the remainder of the day and through the night…

In the end Ewell and Walker were forced to withdraw, and Hill was ordered back. Kearny had won another battle, but Jackson had come up in time to blunt the Kearny’s plan. Lee was on the field, as was Stuart’s cavalry. Longstreet would not be far away, and the weather was an abomination. Yes Kearny has won three of the four contests, but Lee with the help of Jackson’s foot cavalry had effectively won the campaign…”