A different Finnish War

I just found this TL and caught up over the past few days. Very nice. Keep going.

I wonder how a stronger French force in 1813 would affect the War of 1812 and the respective British reinforcements sent in 1813/14.

The British never started the Walcheren expedition, and have returned Dansih Virgin Islands to Denmark and have turned over Guadeloupe to Sweden. This combined with a slightly stronger Spanish navy under La Romana's regency and Denmark and Sweden holding down the Baltic and most of the North Sea have lessened the strains of the British land and sea forces. Combined with stronger support in Spain (both from Portugal and La Romana's forces), the British have slightly more resources to commit to the War of 1811 (the war of 1812 ITTL).
 
1812-04-14
Davout and his corps arrives to join forces with Napoleon in Saxony, bringing the strength of the French army under Napoleon up to some 130 000, including almost 20 000 cavalry as the horses Davout had brought were enough to re-horse most of the severely depleted French cavalry from the Russian campaign.

This is a competent force, consisting of the veterans from the Russian campaign - the hardest of the hard, well-trained French recruits from France, the best of Bernadotte's corps and a decent force of enthusiastic Polish volunteers as well as some of the best German troops.

Behind them, Bernadotte commands roughly 40 000 men, mostly Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine, who are showing less and less enthusiasm for the war and French overlordship in general. Desertions are rampant, and the promised 100 000 men from the Confederation of the Rhine are trickling in at an increasingly slow rate.

Napoleon, deciding that the Prussians are his closest enemy and that the Russians and Austrians are too far away to properly support them after his earlier victories, and that men such as von Blücher will stand and challenge him (and be defeated) starts a forced march with his now re-invogorated army, headed by his now muich stronger cavalry into Prussian Brandenburg.

Bülow and von Blücher denied battle at first, retreating in the face of the large and capable French force, but as Napoleon crossed the Elbe at Dessau, they had to fight sooner or later. The battle would stand at Magdeburg on the 6th of May 1812 and would either save or break Prussia.
 
Yes, I'll happily second that. We need more Sweden-centric TLs on here, especially ones as well researched and enjoyable as this one.
 
1812-05-06.

The Battle of Magneburg have been called Napoleon's great 'lost' victory.

Bülow, to the great ire of von Blücher, retained command with the King's permission and the Prussian army, some 90 000 strong with a force of about 20 000 newly raised militia of questionable quality faced almost 120 000 French, Polish and German troops.

It was the day that would make or break Prussia.

The Prussians had erected field works and prepared the battlefield - a slightly marshy set of pastures and fields dominated by a low ridgeline, upon which the Prussian grand battery sat, some 300 guns strong.

Davout is said to have urged Napoleon to not attack the Prussians, as the cost would be too great but rather move around their flank and force them off their ridgeline. However, by this time Napoleon had it all. He had defeated several of the allied armies in sharp and quick engagements. He had the larger force, hardy veterans from Russia, well-trained French recruits, well-motivated Poles, plenty of supplies, all the food his troops could eat and above all a well-horsed and eager force of both light (if a tad few for his taste) and heavy cavalry.

What Napoleon did not have was time. While those that studied the battle agreed that attacking the Prussians head on was an inferior action to flanking them, as the well-trained French force still could outmarch the Prussians, since the reforms of Scharnhorst and other reformers had yet to take full hold of the Prussian army, but more recent research in the French archives showed that Napoleon was aware that both the Russians and Austrians were moving into Saxony as he was chasing the Prussians into Brandenburg. Napoleon had to defeat the Prussians and then turn on his other enemies.

So the battle was joined by the French bringing in their own grand battery of some 280 guns to challenge the Prussian artillery.

Both sides laboured at their guns, and casualties mounted as the morning progressed and the battlefield was covered in smoke, dust and gunpowder residue.

On the French right flank, Davout led his corps against the forces commanded by Bülow, using the smoke as cover he moved his infantry at a doublequick pace, ignoring potshots by Prussian light infantry Jägers and keeping his troops at a strict order to not stop or fire, the French force climbed the southernmost part of the ridge quickly and silently. By the time Bülow was aware that the French infantry was upon him, they were already descending on the other side, engaging his infantry hidden from French fire on the reverse slope.

The Prussians fought desperately in the close action, and there are my stories of bravery, some more legendary than others. A militia company supposedely dropped and reraised their banner at least a hundred times until the last man, mortally wounded, passed it to a line infantry officer coming up from the reserve.

It is however established that a guards regiment had at least eight banner carriers that day - every man was named, and awarded the Pour le Merite for their valour on the battlefield.

Regardless of such heroism, the French infantry made the Prussians pay in blood for each metre of slope they defended, and Bülows men were slowly pushed backwards, suffering horribly casualties. While the drill and firing was not up to Scharnhorsts reforms yet, unit cohesion and willingness to stay in the battle certainly were. Davout is said to have commented that they faced other Prussians than he had at Jena-Auerstädt 1807.

Towards the afternoon, the Prussian grand battery had problems with their flank as French cavalry raided them and the Prussian infantry was too bloodied and thinly spread to protect them.

On the French left flank, things were different, but not necessarily better for the Prussians, as von Blücher had launched his flank in a daring counter-attack on Napoleon's forces there.
 
I've caught up to the 'now' as it were and really do enjoy the timeline. Personally I might have rather liked the idea of Sweden holding onto the Estonian isles and only annexing Nordnorge, with southern Norway becoming independent, but I can make no claims to actually knowing much about this time period.

Thinking about the future of this timeline, it seems reasonable to assume that a more decisive British victory in 1812 (really, the war ought to keep the OTL name, since the war started so late in the winter of 1811 that all the important events ought to take place in the following year{s}) would lead to the USA being a staunch ally of France. Since Otto von Bismarck is not even born yet and thus is likely butterflied, it seems reasonable to suppose that Germany might not unite under Prussia and thus would remain a grouping of secondary and tertiary powers. If the French side with Russia in the Crimean war and bring in the USA (but see several or even all the German powers side against them and possibly unify as per the OTL Franco-Prussian war), that in itself would be a definite contender for a first world war (though the Napoleonic wars did have theatres outside Europe as well, so maybe in this timeline they are retroactively called a 'world war'?), moreso than the OTL WWI in fact since there'd be much heavier fighting in Africa and some (in fact plenty) actual warfare in the Americas.
 
Top