1812-05-06.
The Battle of Magneburg have been called Napoleon's great 'lost' victory.
Bülow, to the great ire of von Blücher, retained command with the King's permission and the Prussian army, some 90 000 strong with a force of about 20 000 newly raised militia of questionable quality faced almost 120 000 French, Polish and German troops.
It was the day that would make or break Prussia.
The Prussians had erected field works and prepared the battlefield - a slightly marshy set of pastures and fields dominated by a low ridgeline, upon which the Prussian grand battery sat, some 300 guns strong.
Davout is said to have urged Napoleon to not attack the Prussians, as the cost would be too great but rather move around their flank and force them off their ridgeline. However, by this time Napoleon had it all. He had defeated several of the allied armies in sharp and quick engagements. He had the larger force, hardy veterans from Russia, well-trained French recruits, well-motivated Poles, plenty of supplies, all the food his troops could eat and above all a well-horsed and eager force of both light (if a tad few for his taste) and heavy cavalry.
What Napoleon did not have was time. While those that studied the battle agreed that attacking the Prussians head on was an inferior action to flanking them, as the well-trained French force still could outmarch the Prussians, since the reforms of Scharnhorst and other reformers had yet to take full hold of the Prussian army, but more recent research in the French archives showed that Napoleon was aware that both the Russians and Austrians were moving into Saxony as he was chasing the Prussians into Brandenburg. Napoleon had to defeat the Prussians and then turn on his other enemies.
So the battle was joined by the French bringing in their own grand battery of some 280 guns to challenge the Prussian artillery.
Both sides laboured at their guns, and casualties mounted as the morning progressed and the battlefield was covered in smoke, dust and gunpowder residue.
On the French right flank, Davout led his corps against the forces commanded by Bülow, using the smoke as cover he moved his infantry at a doublequick pace, ignoring potshots by Prussian light infantry Jägers and keeping his troops at a strict order to not stop or fire, the French force climbed the southernmost part of the ridge quickly and silently. By the time Bülow was aware that the French infantry was upon him, they were already descending on the other side, engaging his infantry hidden from French fire on the reverse slope.
The Prussians fought desperately in the close action, and there are my stories of bravery, some more legendary than others. A militia company supposedely dropped and reraised their banner at least a hundred times until the last man, mortally wounded, passed it to a line infantry officer coming up from the reserve.
It is however established that a guards regiment had at least eight banner carriers that day - every man was named, and awarded the Pour le Merite for their valour on the battlefield.
Regardless of such heroism, the French infantry made the Prussians pay in blood for each metre of slope they defended, and Bülows men were slowly pushed backwards, suffering horribly casualties. While the drill and firing was not up to Scharnhorsts reforms yet, unit cohesion and willingness to stay in the battle certainly were. Davout is said to have commented that they faced other Prussians than he had at Jena-Auerstädt 1807.
Towards the afternoon, the Prussian grand battery had problems with their flank as French cavalry raided them and the Prussian infantry was too bloodied and thinly spread to protect them.
On the French left flank, things were different, but not necessarily better for the Prussians, as von Blücher had launched his flank in a daring counter-attack on Napoleon's forces there.