A Blunted Sickle

[Crust3038]

No NDRC due to the lack of France falling. He's deeply embedded in the military-industrial complex though.
Lyman Briggs's actions are exactly in OTL. In OTL Marcus Oliphant flew across the Atlantic and started banging tables until someone listened to him and looked at the report. Here, the British aren't being quite so open about everything with the US (see the TTL Tizard mission) - so Oliphant's behaviour will be different.

So Lyman Briggs' action will backfire on the US's nuclear program?

 

[pdf27]

So Lyman Briggs' action will backfire on the US's nuclear program?

Problem is at this point in OTL the US was really only interested in Uranium boilers for power station use, and they were more of a physics research project than anything else. The Einstein–Szilárd letter had made them aware that a bomb was a theoretical possibility, but talked in terms of a bomb suitable for delivery by ship - making it a major task to build, and in terms of TTL essentially no threat to the US.
Roosevelt's response to the letter was to set up the Advisory Committee on Uranium, under Lyman Briggs. The comments I've seen about him indicate that he wasn't very outgoing or driven, and appears to have a fairly typical academic outlook on life.
His locking the MAUD committee report up in his safe is OTL by the way - at this point both in OTL and TTL the British thanks to the Frisch–Peierls memorandum were the only people to realise that an air-dropped nuclear bomb was a practical device. The MAUD committee report was essentially a blueprint for a working bomb project - see http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/MAUD.shtml , but it's all there. They were proposing a double-gun type device using U-235 obtained by gaseous diffusion of uranium hexaflouride, based on a pilot plant built on a lab scale by ICI - they even included estimated costings and production rates. All this in early 1941 - at a time when nobody else thought a bomb was a practical weapon, and the Germans had more or less given up on it being possible at all.

Now in OTL the MAUD committee were very keen on sharing both information and probably the bomb programme with the US. Here, that relationship is rather more distant - they've shared the MAUD report, but if rebuffed they aren't likely to push terribly hard to get the US to start work on it. In OTL Oliphant was pretty much banging the table to everybody involved in the US atomic programme and shouting about bombs - and even then things only took off when the US entered the war. Here, with the cooler relations and weaker British dependence on the US he's less likely to do so - and in the event that he does, there is less likely to be a looming war with Japan to lend urgency to a US programme.

 

[Karelian]

Ghaa, I wrote a textwall about DEI and then the forum ate my post.

If their colonial rule continues undisturbed through WW2, the Dutch will most likely seek to impose a postwar settlement that fractures the region into federalized United States of Indonesia where colonially priviledged minority groups like local Christian ethnic groups and collaborationist old elites getting autonomous areas within the federation. The next step they might attend is a creation of a personal union-based Kingdom of Netherlands-Indonesia.

This was their game plan in OTL. The key decisionmakers to watch are van Mook from the Dutch side and the usual suspects of Indonesian nationalism on the local side. Then you have Socialists, split into Trotskyists under Tan Malaka and Moscow-supported faction led by former rebel leader Musso, who may or may not return from his exile to DEI after WW2. Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo and his Darul Islam-movement are also quite likely to make themselves known.

All in all, a merry mess that has the potential to destabilize the region for a long while.

 

[Xgentis]

One as to remember is that the US and the USSR will try to undermine the various colonials empire by arming various independentist groups of their liking.

 

[HJ Tulp]

I think some form of Pacific war is inevitable, the only question being who does the fighting and where. Relations between the US and Japan can only get worse, and ultimately that puts them in a use it or lose it situation. The deal they've done with the Dutch for oil ITTL is only a sticking plaster that will buy a few months at worst - but the timing of the OTL campaigns was in any case largely decided by the Monsoons.

Hmmm point taken. However, in this scenario I sincerely doubt the Japanese invasion will be as earthshattering as OTL. The core (Sumatra and Java) will be held at the very least. The outer possessions may be lost but those are the least Nationalist and with Japanese occupation policy being what it is that will not change much.

It's one of those areas where my understanding of the history is rather weaker than I'd like (probably at least in part because a lot of it will be written about in languages other than English). I'd certainly agree that it was the Japanese invasion which destroyed any chance the Dutch had of retaining control, but given that I don't see any of the empires lasting very much longer than they did in OTL. Decolonisation will almost certainly be much slower and less traumatic, and post-colonial relations with the former powers broadly better, but it's hard to see the colonial powers hanging on to anything but the odd island chain that isn't really viable without big subsidies from outside.

What prompted my reaction was your comment that the Dutch will leave East Asia pretty soon after the war. I think that decolonization in this timeline will lead to a situation very similair to the situation of the Francophonie in West-Africa where all countries a decolonized but there still is a significant (and permanent) French military and economic presence. Note that West-Papua was Dutch until 1961 (!) and TTL it's hard to see that not being the case in places such as the Moluccas as well.

So in summary:
- In OTL everything was frozen by the occupation of the Netherlands, and the whole setup was swept away by the Japanese invasion never really to be reimposed.

Practically yes.

- "Indonesian" nationalism was at least in part a creation of the Japanese occupation - without it you're going to see different groups pulling in different directions.

No to the first part. There was a pretty vibrant nationalist movement pre-WWII (though not on the level of for example India) however the Japanese occupation did make it gain much more traction with the general public. The second part most certainly though.

- Nobody really has a clue what the Dutch government would have done.

Only educated guesses.

Are there any prewar reforms that might give an indication for their thinking?

Not really. During the war there was a proposal written by post-WWII Governor General van Mook.

- End to all race-based inequality.
- Dutch East Indies to be known as Indonesia.
- Indonesia to have it's own department/ministry.
- Governor-General stays supreme commander.
- The Peoples Council transformed into a parliament with robust Indonesian majority. This parliament would not have to right to fire the department/ministry.
- The Governor General would have the right to appoint a unknown number of seats to safeguard the rights of the minorities.

This proposal would certainly not satisfy the Nationalists in 1945 but if Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer resigns in 1940 out of protest for troop movements to Europe and van Mook or Labour leader Alberda becomes Governor General and they start this in 1940-1941 it has a shot as start of a proces.

I'm working on the assumption that the overriding war plan is to sit behind the Water Line conserving their manpower until the German army is beaten and starts to withdraw, at which point they're likely to start pushing forwards. The same reasons that made it impossible for the Germans to finish the invasion will however make it very hard for the Dutch to move forward against a determined German defence, so they're unlikely to be planning on recruiting large numbers of soldiers from overseas for service in the Netherlands - there isn't really a task for them.

I will comment on this later tonight

 

[RyuDrago]

Finally managed to caught all the entire TL, no nitpick to notice from me so keep it on, pdf.

I am curious to know anyway how will you handle the affairs of the Allied conferences TTL; guess the first OTL one, the U.S.–British Staff Conference (ABC–1) from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941 is butterflied believing the British-Australian meeting in London could be considered in a way of sort the first TTL one of the series.

The Moscow OTL conference was surely scrapped too (unless maybe the British could make a diplomatic advance towards Stalin TTL in anti-German role), so I guess Churchill could be brought to make more frequent meetings with the French: and honestly, a trip to Paris will not hurt him but instead raise his popularity within the Transalpines.

Guess with a more than alive and kicking France, Daladier or who for him on French side will be entitled to partecipate at full title and let weight his own opinions.

 

[RyuDrago]

Meanwhile, I was thinking... It could be possible the ignition for the flame of a conflict in the Balkans will be Yugoslavia rather than Romania? Sure, we have seen the start of a Commie underground penetration in the latter country, but unless of a Soviet invasion seems unlikely the Romanian Comunists will manage to win the day against the Loyalist troops plus the Italian presence...

I'm betting on Yugoslavia because of the Croat issue, because of a double insurrection which could come from the Nationalists (Pavelic's Ustacia, backed by Italy) and the Communists (leaded by Tito supported by the USSR and maybe propped by supplies brought by the Romanian comrades)... So starting a civil war.

The odds apparently could be in favour of Italy, because then he could intervene on behalf of the Ustacia and at the same time pushing all the surrounding Balkan countries to intervene on Rome's side (Hungary, to seize Banat; Bulgaria to take North Macedonia and Nis; Romania because despite it had nothing to gain, siding with Italy will surely give Bucharest protection against Hungarian claims in Translyvania). Turkey could likely stay neutral but favourable to the Italian intervention (in part to spite on the Serbs, in part to keep at bay Greece, and also to prevent eventual Bulgarian hungry on Thrace - in the sense, if Ankara will stay in good terms with Rome, Sofia will unlikely attempt to reclaim Adrianople in the future). The main problem could regard the fate of Bosnia, but probably if the Italians are going to raise themselves as guardians of the Balkans, Ankara could accept a Croatian rule in the region in exchange of the protection of the rights of the Muslim Bosnians; despite in that case the Italians will have to hold the possible Ustacia violence against that ethnicity...

France probably will be pissed, but if Rome will play well its cards... for example, if the Serbians react harshly against the Croats and for repercussion on the Italians of Dalmatia and on the border in Slovenia (in few words, foibe), then Mussolini could say "See how reliable were the Serbs?" and then have the legitimacy to destroy Yugoslavia... Plus if he will convince the Entente he will not reclaim no less of what Italy asked in 1915, and not annex directly Yugoslavia (creating three client states of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro through dynastical unions with the Savoia...) the games with the allies are probably done, and the Italians could finally make the umbrella gesture to the ghost of Wilson.

Germany could however intervene on behalf of Yugoslavia (unprobable but not impossible if Hitler is seeking at that point a more easy victory against the more weak Slavs and Italian people, and considering also Rome is slowing cancelling the racial laws, surely it is enough to claim Mussolini as a traitor of the past pacts), albeit Mussolini could still win him with the promise to give Germany Slovenia (former Austrian territory, hence German claim) after the end of the war.

Maybe Greece will support Yugoslavia with supplies, but not more because it will be a suicidal move for Athens: first, the Turks will jump in the wagon and then Britain will not guarantee them further if they were the first to attack. But I bet Athens, even if former Yugoslavian ally, will remain out from being involved in a growing mess such in the Balkans.

USSR is the unexpected guest, as Stalin could attempt to take advantage of the situation invading the Balkans when the others are eating Yugoslavia, or to attempt to implant a more extensive underground network of partisan which will strike at the right time.

As far as I can foresee, Italy and its allies could have easy victory, but if the Italian performance will not be stellar, the USSR or Germany could take the hint and then chaos will erupt in the Balkans...

 

[lukedalton]

Regarding Italy:

- If the allies make clear their 'suspicios' and 'dislike' of Italy continued commerce with Germany Mussolini answer (before the translation in diplomatic speak ) will be: stuff it, we surely won't starve or freeze for your pretty face.
In this moment Germany is one of our biggest commercial patners, and more is our biggest supplier of coal, so if now Italy had more 'strenght' in her economic relation with the nazi, suddenly cut out or even greatly reduce that tie will cause severe damage to the italian economy so it will be a gradual thing...unless the allies (or better the UK) decide to step in and offer to supply her Italy (better if it a good deal.)
In OTL a similar offer was done, but at the same time of the menace of bombard rail and ships who were transporting the german coal to Italy...so no, Benny really doesn't like that proposal.

- Speaking of colony, well sure Ethiopia will be always violent and a resistance movement exist even at the moment. Unfortunely even if the war created a surplus of weapon, the big problem (not only in this situation, but worldwide...and this will affect any immediate postwar liberation movement) is the fact that is very zone specific. Unlike OTL, Africa (and south Asia) is quiet and there will be no left over to arm any rebels, and even if the Soviet want supply the Ethiopians, there are lot of logistic problem, the coast that are not in italian hand are under French and British control so i doubt that they will gladly help the rebels, plus in the italian controlled coastline the local population really don't like the ethiopians (who were likely to fight each others as the italians)...to put it mildly. The rest is desert actually controlled by others colonial powers so any supply route will be difficult to mantain.
Lybia will be pacific for at least another generation...due to the previous italian anti-insurgent campaign (aka massacre anyone that even think to resist) and during that time the number of italian colonist will increase greatly even due to the discovery of oil, so by the 60's the native will be a minority in their land and a similar situation (great numbers of colonist) will be repeated in East Africa muddling even more the situation.

- conceive the exact number of nuclear weapons from the Soviet is difficult but not impossible, expecially in the 50's and 60's...at least directly.
Air reconissance at long range was never the strenght of the soviets and any communist agent or anyone really, found near the lab, nuclear central and deposit will not fare well.
Indirectely is possible, soviet can penetrate the French and British intelligence ...and they are good in send aircraft over the possible italian nuclear site and from that data they can extrapolate the possible numbers.

- Italian will declare war...at least when the writing will be on the wall, on that anyone can be his reproductive organ.
Benny will surely want be part of any diplomatic conference about the post-war new order, plus for Mussolini Austria need to return on the italian sphere of influence or at least become as OTL Finland and surely any communist thrust need to be blocked.

- on the italian forces on Romania, honestly i know that from a narrative pow there is the need to keep Italy occupied; still a force on par of the Armir will not be kept unless there is a war due to the cost (for both Italy and Romania) and the need of the men for harvest and industry and even the URSS can cheaply keep almost a million of men mobilizated indefinetly if there is no war. In the end, the bulk of the troops will come home, something akin to the italian expeditionary force in Spain will remain in place, a formal alliance will be signed (even with Hungary) so in case of another crisis Stalin will know that there will be a strong military resistance and reinforcements will be on the way, some agreement with Yugoslavia for the passage of troops in case of the mentioned crisis, maybe some 'request' to Franco for send some troops to help against the communist aggression and protect the Balkans.

- as i said relations with Italy will be complicated, first even if there is a sizeble presence of italian troops on the Balkans this doesn't mean that others cannot be raised (even with difficulty regarding equip them...but less than OTL) and the troops are in Romania so Mussolini can take (at least theoretically) the decision to bring them all back home if he feel that is more important so or the Wallies (or anyone for the matter) are too menacing.
The Anglo-French on their side are not losing the war, not winning, the end seem (on their perception) distant and there is the need of lot of preparation, expecially if they want minimize the loss both human and material on their side.
Not counting that with Japan seem to want to start trouble in Asia, the war (and the relative cost) will expand...so keep Italy happy will be paramount for the Wallies diplomacy, expecially if they are seen as an help to contain the Soviets (that honestly from ITTL pow can be considered an hair short to be effective and co-belligerant german allies). Not counting that if the postwar see an URSS on the expansionist route, bring Italy on a renewed Stresa front will be seen as paramount; sure after the invasion of Abyssinia the relations between the powers deteriorated but never on the breaking point and the Wallies till before the OTL fall of France worked to patch things up (ITTL both London and Paris are really unware on Benny intentions of enter the war on German side as frankly there were no italian preparations regarding that...and the only official document see as the italian goverment tried to stall things when Berlin asked them to attack France.)
So even if they are not BFF, between the three powers things are not so bad and in the postwar situation seem that they will need each others (even regarding decolonization)

 

[pdf27]

This was their game plan in OTL. The key decisionmakers to watch are van Mook from the Dutch side and the usual suspects of Indonesian nationalism on the local side.

Question: how much support did van Mook have back in the Netherlands? From what little I've managed to read (wiki so far, mostly) he seems to have been more tolerated than supported by the local Dutch - which is a very insecure base from which to introduce what will seem to them to be radical changes.

All in all, a merry mess that has the potential to destabilize the region for a long while.

Oh yes

One as to remember is that the US and the USSR will try to undermine the various colonials empire by arming various independentist groups of their liking.

Yes, with limits. The USSR will no doubt be sticking their oar in although will probably be engaged elsewhere (Europe, mainly, and possibly the Soviet Far East) in the early days. The US is IMHO more likely to be isolationist unless they get involved in a Pacific war.

Hmmm point taken. However, in this scenario I sincerely doubt the Japanese invasion will be as earthshattering as OTL. The core (Sumatra and Java) will be held at the very least. The outer possessions may be lost but those are the least Nationalist and with Japanese occupation policy being what it is that will not change much.

With half the RN in Singapore, that's a good bet.

What prompted my reaction was your comment that the Dutch will leave East Asia pretty soon after the war. I think that decolonization in this timeline will lead to a situation very similair to the situation of the Francophonie in West-Africa where all countries a decolonized but there still is a significant (and permanent) French military and economic presence. Note that West-Papua was Dutch until 1961 (!) and TTL it's hard to see that not being the case in places such as the Moluccas as well.

On reflection I'd agree that some parts of the Dutch East Indes will remain under Dutch rule for extended periods of time - West Papua and Timor (possibly even the whole island) are quite probable. Compared to the prewar situation, though, most if it is gone - and what is left doesn't really need a major commitment from the Dutch to protect it.

Not really. During the war there was a proposal written by post-WWII Governor General van Mook.

- End to all race-based inequality.
- Dutch East Indies to be known as Indonesia.
- Indonesia to have it's own department/ministry.
- Governor-General stays supreme commander.
- The Peoples Council transformed into a parliament with robust Indonesian majority. This parliament would not have to right to fire the department/ministry.
- The Governor General would have the right to appoint a unknown number of seats to safeguard the rights of the minorities.

This proposal would certainly not satisfy the Nationalists in 1945 but if Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer resigns in 1940 out of protest for troop movements to Europe and van Mook or Labour leader Alberda becomes Governor General and they start this in 1940-1941 it has a shot as start of a proces.

The other problem is that this risks alienating the strongest supporters of the Dutch (who were the ones benefiting from the race-based inequality) without satisfying the nationalists. India is going to be fully independent before very long, and that's going to be a powerful incentive - although they are following a gradual Indianisation process so the Dutch might get away with arguing that it's a gradual process rather than the end state.

I will comment on this later tonight

Bump

Finally managed to caught all the entire TL, no nitpick to notice from me so keep it on, pdf.

Good to know, thanks

I am curious to know anyway how will you handle the affairs of the Allied conferences TTL; guess the first OTL one, the U.S.–British Staff Conference (ABC–1) from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941 is butterflied believing the British-Australian meeting in London could be considered in a way of sort the first TTL one of the series.

There have been a long series of Anglo-French meetings, but they're so routine they don't often appear in the story. There are a few occasions when they have, notably in the crisis when the French lost Paris. It's routine day-to-day stuff however rather than the odd summit conference - the strategy is pretty straightforward (attacking through Belgium in overwhelming force when they're ready, using machines rather than men wherever possible), and the fact that they're so close together makes communication very much easier. The entire BEF is pretty much co-located with the French general staff - much easier than in OTL where they were divided by the Atlantic.

The Moscow OTL conference was surely scrapped too (unless maybe the British could make a diplomatic advance towards Stalin TTL in anti-German role), so I guess Churchill could be brought to make more frequent meetings with the French: and honestly, a trip to Paris will not hurt him but instead raise his popularity within the Transalpines.

He'll probably come over for the day about once a month accompanied by the CIGS and a few others - with Daladier doing the same thing in reverse. But yeah, Moscow is right out - it took a German invasion of Russia for Britain to make allies of them, and while there might be the odd diplomatic mission it's very clear to Stalin who can offer (and is offering) more: the Germans are much more desperate.

Guess with a more than alive and kicking France, Daladier or who for him on French side will be entitled to partecipate at full title and let weight his own opinions.

Very much so - and since the French army is carrying the bulk of the work in this war the British will tend to conform to his wishes more often than the other way around. However, this isn't really a great hardship for either of them - it's clear to both that the war is going to be won with an armoured thrust across Belgium into the Ruhr, and that the land and air arms cannot be decisive by themselves. That sets the broad confines of military and industrial strategy, there are obviously some quibbles about how best to do it but they are generally pretty easily resolved. It's a combination of a simpler and less controversial strategic situation and two allies whose natural instincts are much closer together.

 

[pdf27]

Does anybody know how the French artillery observers worked? Numbers on reaction time for the British (1-2 minutes) and Germans (~10 minutes) are easy to find, but I can't find anything for the French.

 

[Hecatee]

I'm not sure there is such info availlable for WW2, but we have to remember that quite a bit of their artillery was 75mm left over from WW1, so maybe finding the numbers for that period might be close enough for your need. Actually I'm not even sure that IRL artillery was used that often by the French during the early months of WW2, and later they were fully re-equiped and re-trained so may have had different characteristics closer to US or British stats.

 

[pdf27]

I'm not sure there is such info availlable for WW2, but we have to remember that quite a bit of their artillery was 75mm left over from WW1, so maybe finding the numbers for that period might be close enough for your need. Actually I'm not even sure that IRL artillery was used that often by the French during the early months of WW2, and later they were fully re-equiped and re-trained so may have had different characteristics closer to US or British stats.

The problem isn't the guns - once the fire order reaches the battery the reaction time will be pretty much the same for all sides. In the UK system the FOO was permitted to give fire orders, which were passed straight onto the battery. This had huge implications - an individial lieutenant could, in the right circumstances give the orders "Yoke Target" and bring down the fire of an entire Army Group, Royal Artillery - but also meant you relied totally on the judgement of a junior guy at the front as to how to allocate fires. Under the German and American systems, the forward observers put in requests for fire to a central command post, which made the decisions and issued fire orders to the batteries. That's very much slower, but should in theory mean the artillery was used more effectively.

Unfortunately the WW1 comparison isn't very helpful, since the big problem there was getting the information back to the batteries in time - hence the emphasis on straight lines and pre-planning because they were usually unable to correct the fall of shot unless they had an airborne observer in place with a radio. With man (or at least vehicle) portable radios proliferating between the wars, that was no longer a problem - and doctrine changed to suit.

 

[von Adler]

Does anybody know how the French artillery observers worked? Numbers on reaction time for the British (1-2 minutes) and Germans (~10 minutes) are easy to find, but I can't find anything for the French.

The French had an interesting system - they deployed and started calculating all the data they could possible use once in place. Which means that the forward observers (often using telephone or telegraph lines in 1940) could get accurate fire on any spot at 2-3 minutes, if the French artillery unit had been in place for a day or two.

This made a formidable artillery system for trench or static warfare, and it served the French VERY well 1918. OTL 1940 was very fluid, and they had to use the old ww1 system for those situations, which was slow.

1-2 minutes for the British must be ideal circumstances in 1944, hardly in 1941. One of the advantages of the British divisional artillery in 1944 was that it was all 25pdrs - data calculated for one gun could be used for all guns in the division (with modifications for their different placement) and calculation was aided by mechanical calculation machines. In 1940 and 1941, the British are bound to still be using a lot of ww1 vintage artillery - 13pdr, 18pdr, 4,5" howitzer, 3,7" mountain gun and so on. And they will not have radios for each forward observer nor will they have the mechanical calculation machines.

In 1940, the list would be something akin to this:

Soviets: 30-60 minutes from request for fire until several batteries could pour concentrated fire on the target. Lack of radios, lack of mechanical calculation equipment, differing calibers and range of artillery (at least 3 76,2mm, at least 2 122mm and at least 2 152mm systems existed in the divisional artillery).

Germans: 10-30 minutes from request for fire until several batteries could pour concentrated fire on the target - this is for the lower welle divisions that had only 10,5 leFH18 and 15 sFH18. The higher welle divisions often had Czechoslovak or ww1 vintage artillery and a broader mix, and would be slower.

French: 2-30 minutes (depending on wether they have been in place for a few days or not).

British: 5-20 minutes (with 25pdrs, longer with a mixed or ww1 vintage artillery park).

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

West Papua and Timor, possibly the whole island.....

The Portuguese are selling their half, why?

 

[pdf27]

West Papua and Timor, possibly the whole island.....

The Portuguese are selling their half, why?

That's a possibility, not a spoiler. A lot of these colonies were actually net money sinks, and at some point the Portuguese will run out of money to do so if OTL is anything to go by. It was really raising the possibility that the Dutch are in a better position to hang on to it than the Portuguese.

 

[Xgentis]

I think the German are going to launch an offensive in summer 1941. If they wait longer the Entente/allies will get too strong.

 

[Roisterer]

One as to remember is that the US and the USSR will try to undermine the various colonials empire by arming various independentist groups of their liking.

That's a very interesting point. It means that we could see both communist and anti-communist insurgent groups, who fight each other when they're not busy fightng the colonial powers. Yet more fun for Africa and Asia.

I could also see long-standing US support for South Africa in this situation, while the South African policies deviate a lot from the rest of the commonwealth.

Regards

R

 

[Archangel]

That's a possibility, not a spoiler. A lot of these colonies were actually net money sinks, and at some point the Portuguese will run out of money to do so if OTL is anything to go by. It was really raising the possibility that the Dutch are in a better position to hang on to it than the Portuguese.

Any selling of a colony would be political suicide, regardless of public finances.

 

[pdf27]

I think the German are going to launch an offensive in summer 1941. If they wait longer the Entente/allies will get too strong.

Right now they're just waiting for the weather to improve. And yes, I did dig through the only OTL weather reports for the region I could find to work out when that would be

That's a very interesting point. It means that we could see both communist and anti-communist insurgent groups, who fight each other when they're not busy fighting the colonial powers. Yet more fun for Africa and Asia.

I think it's liable to be more nuanced than that - the US was quite willing to support governments they really didn't think much of in OTL provided they were anti-communist. Since the big empires are clearly anti-communist, they're likely to be rather scanty in their support of insurgents fighting them. I could certainly see it happening in some parts of the world though.

I could also see long-standing US support for South Africa in this situation, while the South African policies deviate a lot from the rest of the commonwealth.

This is one of the areas that the chances in India will potentially have an enormous influence. Relations between India and the rest of the Commonwealth are going to be stronger ITTL (how much stronger is still to be decided, but the process of independence being less traumatic has clearly started). That will mean the way the Commonwealth responds to events in South Africa and Rhodesia is likely to be rather more robust.

Any selling of a colony would be political suicide, regardless of public finances.

OK, cheers. Stuff like that is rather hard to find online. I was merely going off the fact that the Portuguese lost quite a lot of small colonies like Goa and East Timor in OTL without doing much to try and get them back.

 

[lukedalton]

OK, cheers. Stuff like that is rather hard to find online. I was merely going off the fact that the Portuguese lost quite a lot of small colonies like Goa and East Timor in OTL without doing much to try and get them back.

Goa was more due to logistic, there were the impossibility to send reiforcements as any ships or aircraft with portughese troops was denied access to suez or the neighbourgh air space (or simply the US refused to lend aircraft with enough autonomy)...still the troops there were ordered to not surrender and fight to the last but the local commander decided to not follow this order.
East Timor happened after the carnation revolution when Portugal basically give up the entire empire...so it was no more their problem.