Alternative Western Front in a no Schlieffen-Plan WW1

[BooNZ]

This is a fascinating premise - one of the most interesting of recent times.

Schlieffen was more than just a plan, it was predicated on the Prussian (German) way of making war but the France of 1914 wasn't the France of 1870. Schlieffen provided a possible answer to that by using neutrality, speed and manoeuvre to gain a decisive advantage. Its existence and the premise on which it was created shaped German policy.

No, the Schlieffen Plan was the antithesis of the Prussian way of making war. It essentially surrendered German mobility and flexibility to seek a decisive battle at the furthest reaches of its logistical capacity.

If there is no plan or Schlieffen is so altered by Moltke as to be an essentially defensive object, the nature of the immediate pre-war period changes. The defences in Alsace and Lorraine, in particular, are built up even more strongly in the expectation of a French thrust in support of Russia. The immediate start of the war would be envisaged as offensive against Russia and defensive against France - the not inconsiderable advantages of terrain allied to the fortifications of the Kaiser Wilhelm Line (let's call it that) make it a different kind of campaign to what happened in OTL.

No, the Germans recognized there were no good options available for French offensives across the Franco-German border, so it per OTL, the Germans would likely only fortify key positions so as not to deter French offensives. The German counter attack doctrine explicitly contemplates enemy offensives...

So, on August 1st 1914 German forces strike against the Russians, supported by the Austrians in the south. Efficient mobilisation has brought substantial French forces (no British yet) to the border areas but they face substantial fortification and the Vosges Mountains which are heavily defended by the Germans. Initial French attacks lead to little ground gained and heavy losses. It isn't until substantial artillery pieces are brought in from Paris that the walls of the fortresses are breached and some ground captured (or liberated).

No, there were no substantial artillery pieces in Paris, unless you referring to re-tooling fortress guns, which is a slow an ad-hoc solution at best. OTL how much dead flat ground defended by earthworks did the French liberate?

By September the BEF has arrived and re-enforced the north of the front around Thionville, a name hallowed by successive generations of British Infantry. The initial British assault to turn the defence line failed but on October 6th 1914 the British broke through and Thionville fell. The British tried to advance toward Saarburg but were soon held well to the west of the Sarre river.

How effective would British offensives, if the Germans have weeks to strengthen their defensive positions? Would the British seriously attempt an offensive?

How does it go from there ?

There would be trenches but not quite as in OTL. It would be more a duel of artillery than sniping with the Germans using the high ground and their defences to hold back the French, British and later American forces. I suspect the British and French would try an outflanking move via Luxembourg at some point but unless the Germans collapse in the East, it seems unlikely there would be a decisive break through. Without the line of trenches there would be more British and French troops to commit to Italy from 1915 and the possibility of fronts opening up elsewhere.

The Germans will secure Luxemburg in almost all possible scenarios, so any flanking move will need to be going through Belgium. I'm not sure how the Russians are expected to collapse a stronger A-H and a greater number of Germans than OTL. I'm also not sure why Italy would want to go up against a stronger A-H, when the Russian starting armies have probably already been busted. The Italian front would rival Gallipoli beaches for daft places to deploy spare Entente troops. Where is the American skin in this game?

 

[BlondieBC]

Yes, all of Archduke Karl Stephans children began to learn polish in the same years from 1895 onwards. ... seems he didn't found a suitable teacher before ...

And ofc these preparations included, that his daughters had to renounce any claims and titles from their habsburgian heritage.

Btw, regarding your fist post about this :
which prussian princes do you speak of ?

We focusing on a POD that with this many butterflies between the start and the end, it is best to focus on the higher probability events. Germany will likely not do major annexations both because they did not IOTL and clear internal political issues with more Poles in the Reichstag. And more Catholics in the Reichstag. Clients states to the eas is the simplest way to avoid making A-H even less German.

There will likely be German Prince in charge of the new countries as King since this matches the prior patterns of actions and customs at the time.

Picking which Prince is harder. It might well be the Austrian ones we discussed earlier. It might be a Prussian favorite. It might be some compromise candidate that is a lot less obvious.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

Also in response to Stodge, the Germans did fortify the frontier with France, fairly extensively, and anyway the POD doesn't involve moving a single German unit away from that area, it only effects the 1st and 2nd Armies detailed to invaded Belgium, so I don't understand your comments.

The thread has established that Germany had alternative plans to invading Belgium up until 1913, and improvising something different at the last minute was considered at least half seriously during the diplomatic fluctuations in early July and late August. The biggest infrastructure improvement directly related to invading Belgium they did pre-war was the railroad bridge across the Rhine, and that was one of those things that made sense anyway, in fact it would have greatly assisted the redeployment of forces to the east.

 

[BooNZ]

No, I guess I was unclear here. What happens is about 5-6 weeks into the plan, there is a option. If the Germans turn east, the 1st and 2nd Army goes on the defense. The armies that go into the Congress of Poland IOTL stop at the Bug River fortress. The 5 armies attacking A-H pause.

Based on the scenario provided, 5-6 weeks is more than enough time for 3 German armies to do some very nasty things to the Russian 1st, 2nd and 4th armies. The Russians would simply no longer have the numbers to hold against multiple German armies and stationary Russian defenders would be methodically enveloped and eliminated. The best possible option for the Russians is to retreat eastward immediately, although your suggested Russian action is more realistic.

After that, the Russian commander has freedom of action. But if we look at the time line, I think we see a winter pause. Add 90-120 days after August 1, 1914, and I think the Russian commander plans minor winter operations, and then a Spring offensive. Assuming the CP does not beat him to the punch.

1 October 1914 would have the understrength Russian 9th and 10th Armies attempting to hold three or four German armies. The best use of that freedom of action would be to run away.

 

[BlondieBC]

Based on the scenario provided, 5-6 weeks is more than enough time for 3 German armies to do some very nasty things to the Russian 1st, 2nd and 4th armies. The Russians would simply no longer have the numbers to hold against multiple German armies and stationary Russian defenders would be methodically enveloped and eliminated. The best possible option for the Russians is to retreat eastward immediately, although your suggested Russian action is more realistic.

1 October 1914 would have the understrength Russian 9th and 10th Armies attempting to hold three or four German armies. The best use of that freedom of action would be to run away.

The Russian plan was to trade space for time on the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Army. Now nothing prevents mistake or odd event, but looking at the two war plan, the outcome is pretty clear. The Germans and Austrians take the Congress of Poland unoppossed. The Russians dig in some 10's of miles east of the border at a line of good terrain to defend and/or fortresses. Serbia will fall. No later than the later of mid-October or the fall of Serbia/Poland, we see the Germans and probably the Austrians begin a series of offensives. The Russians will have a much, much better supply situation than OTL. The Russians will be dug in deep. The Germans will have a worse situation since the Germans are fighting 10's of miles pass their dense rail network.

And then the maneuver war begins. Largely a war of attrition for a few years.

 

[NoMommsen]

The Russian plan was to trade space for time on the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Army. ...

What "plan" do you speak of ?
The Plan 19 of 1912 was in both its iterations, varian "A" as well as variant "G" an offensive plan with the 'main attention' in variant "A" for Austria, in variant "G" for Germany ... or rather Easdt-Prussia in the beginning, after East-Prussian would be taken it was expected, that the germans would be (almost) defeated by the russians partner France in the west and all that wouidl be needed would be marching on to Berlin.

There WAS NO DEFENSIVE element in either Plan 19 iterations, like "trading space for time".

... The Russians dig in some 10's of miles east of the border at a line of good terrain to defend and/or fortresses. ...

What "border" do you speak of ?
With your "some 10'2 of miles" you're still west of the Warthe and west of Tschenstochau ... and far west of the Vistula with the fortress complexes of NovoGeorgiesk and Ivangorod.

 

[BlondieBC]

What "plan" do you speak of ?
The Plan 19 of 1912 was in both its iterations, varian "A" as well as variant "G" an offensive plan with the 'main attention' in variant "A" for Austria, in variant "G" for Germany ... or rather Easdt-Prussia in the beginning, after East-Prussian would be taken it was expected, that the germans would be (almost) defeated by the russians partner France in the west and all that wouidl be needed would be marching on to Berlin.

There WAS NO DEFENSIVE element in either Plan 19 iterations, like "trading space for time".


What "border" do you speak of ?
With your "some 10'2 of miles" you're still west of the Warthe and west of Tschenstochau ... and far west of the Vistula with the fortress complexes of NovoGeorgiesk and Ivangorod.

Yea, there was room for trading space for time if needed. Russians put optionality in their plans. We are talking about the same plans.

Eastern border of east Prussia.

 

[Anchises]

Yea, there was room for trading space for time if needed. Russians put optionality in their plans. We are talking about the same plans.

Eastern border of east Prussia.

The Russians can pull a Great Retreat early on, which is pretty ASB. There was no way the Russians would just give up the valuable real estate in Poland.

And withdrawing 10-20 miles doesn't really cut it. Without overextended Prussian lines the Russians don't have a real advantage.

The likely scenario is that the Russians attack, get a very bloody nose just like IOTL. And the Germans attack the weakened Russian armies in Poland. Stavka panics because ITTL the Germans have the numbers to seriously threaten Poland in 1914. Stavka withdraws armies from the A-H front which leads to a dangerous and vastly more capable A-H in 1915.

 

[MichaelWest]

The Russians either can pull a Great Retreat early on, which is pretty ASB in itself. There was no way the Russians would just give up the valuable real estate in Poland.

And withdrawing 10-20 miles doesn't really cut it. Without overextended Prussian lines the Russians don't have a real advantage.

The likely scenario is that the Russians attack, get a very bloody nose just like IOTL. And the Germans attack the weakened Russian armies in Poland. Stavka panics because ITTL the Germans have the numbers to seriously threaten Poland in 1914. Stavka withdraws armies from the A-H front which leads to a dangerous and vastly more capable A-H in 1915.

My theory is that a shift of some additional 10 Divisions (5 Corps) to East Prussia is essentially not enough, either not noticed or discounted, as Russia expected more Germans than the rather bare bones Eighth, to halt the planned offensive. At most I see the 4th moved but even that is a toss up. Russia has compelling reasons to invade East Prussia and has effectively talked itself into believing the Germans are ripe for the picking. From OTL we know the Eighth was far from a speed bump but the grand victory was not planned, instead the Eighth was to hold and harass and slow the Russians until forces could be released and now deep in German territory easier to destroy, but for Rennenkampf's halt the Eighth would not have done quite the one upping it did. Indeed I think the overall look is the same with a second Army on the field, each opposing a Russian Army, defeating them in detail. Those two Russian Armies were badly coordinated and extended, until I see more the result is Russia has an equally bad opening night, maybe worse.

If we also pull a third German Army to the East we now ave the makings of an earlier campaign to ind, encircle and destroy Russian armies, a campaign to carve Poland off and hurt Russia as badly as can be expected in 1914. Russia is compelled to contest Poland and I cannot see them just running away. Poland will be where Russia takes its worst beginning in 1914 and opening 1915 to look truly dreadful. Unless something significant occurs in the West we can release some of that as well as gain the newly formed Ninth as early as late Fall, the gravity to the East gets heavier. We could see 4 to 5 German Armies plus a better A-H force now converging into Poland. The second Act is a tragedy for Russia.

 

[Anchises]

My theory is that a shift of some additional 10 Divisions (5 Corps) to East Prussia is essentially not enough, either not noticed or discounted, as Russia expected more Germans than the rather bare bones Eighth, to halt the planned offensive. At most I see the 4th moved but even that is a toss up. Russia has compelling reasons to invade East Prussia and has effectively talked itself into believing the Germans are ripe for the picking. From OTL we know the Eighth was far from a speed bump but the grand victory was not planned, instead the Eighth was to hold and harass and slow the Russians until forces could be released and now deep in German territory easier to destroy, but for Rennenkampf's halt the Eighth would not have done quite the one upping it did. Indeed I think the overall look is the same with a second Army on the field, each opposing a Russian Army, defeating them in detail. Those two Russian Armies were badly coordinated and extended, until I see more the result is Russia has an equally bad opening night, maybe worse.

If we also pull a third German Army to the East we now ave the makings of an earlier campaign to ind, encircle and destroy Russian armies, a campaign to carve Poland off and hurt Russia as badly as can be expected in 1914. Russia is compelled to contest Poland and I cannot see them just running away. Poland will be where Russia takes its worst beginning in 1914 and opening 1915 to look truly dreadful. Unless something significant occurs in the West we can release some of that as well as gain the newly formed Ninth as early as late Fall, the gravity to the East gets heavier. We could see 4 to 5 German Armies plus a better A-H force now converging into Poland. The second Act is a tragedy for Russia.

Without the Munition crisis as a smokescreen a Great Retreat is not politically feasible from my point of view. What is the legitimization for retreating? Yeah, actually we can't win against the Germans and evacuating one of our core industrial regions surely is going to help?

No, Russia is going to bleed in Poland. And if we give A-H an intact officer corps AND adequate equipment I think a really dangerous offensive into the Ukraine is not out of the question. I am not entirely sure about agriculture in the Russian Empire but if the Austrians manage to threaten Ukraine in 1915, is there a serious risk of earlier starvation in Russia ?

 

[BooNZ]

The Russian plan was to trade space for time on the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Army. Now nothing prevents mistake or odd event, but looking at the two war plan, the outcome is pretty clear. The Germans and Austrians take the Congress of Poland unoppossed. The Russians dig in some 10's of miles east of the border at a line of good terrain to defend and/or fortresses. Serbia will fall. No later than the later of mid-October or the fall of Serbia/Poland, we see the Germans and probably the Austrians begin a series of offensives. The Russians will have a much, much better supply situation than OTL. The Russians will be dug in deep. The Germans will have a worse situation since the Germans are fighting 10's of miles pass their dense rail network.

I would love you to provide a reference to explain how this is not the absolute antithesis to OTL Russian doctrine, pre war planning and treaty commitments to France, which OTL Russia exceeded with some enthusiasm - and continued to do so throughout most of the war.

Further, what do you imagine would be the trigger such a spontaneous and immediate change in Russian actions (and dramatically improved performance) with the OPs scenario being substantially similar to what the Russians were expecting and the fog-of-war settings being switched on?

And then the maneuver war begins. Largely a war of attrition for a few years.

Those are two different things?

 

[BooNZ]

Without the Munition crisis as a smokescreen a Great Retreat is not politically feasible from my point of view. What is the legitimization for retreating? Yeah, actually we can't win against the Germans and evacuating one of our core industrial regions surely is going to help?

Further, the Russian supplies and munitions contained within the Polish fortresses would be another reason why Stavka would likely let the Russian armies linger too long in the Polish salient. Even if the Russians were to immediately execute a perfect great retreat, the Russian munition crisis will be far earlier and far worse than OTL.

No, Russia is going to bleed in Poland.

I would expect vast numbers of Russians to die heroically

And if we give A-H an intact officer corps AND adequate equipment I think a really dangerous offensive into the Ukraine is not out of the question. I am not entirely sure about agriculture in the Russian Empire but if the Austrians manage to threaten Ukraine in 1915, is there a serious risk of earlier starvation in Russia ?

The above coupled with the probable absence of an Italian front makes this scenario an A-H wank. Further, the potential influence of perceived A-H strength and Russian weakness has on Bulgaria, Romania and Greece gives the scenario an R rating. ​

 

[Dorknought]

The Redl affair ensures that the Austrians going into Serbia are always going to be creamed.

 

[MichaelWest]

The Redl affair ensures that the Austrians going into Serbia are always going to be creamed.

I would think that Redl's betrayals certainly improved Russian performance and gave Serbia the ability to punch above weight but Serbia could not win despite the injury they could inflict, Russia here likely still over commits to defeating Austria since they have such strong intelligence and the planning that came from it, the unbalancing that Germany does to the East is something Russia has not learned until it happens and its reactions unravel its war against the A-H Empire. It is that chaos that gives A-H time to recovery and likely not get as pummeled by Russia. The Serbian sideshow will be a black eye to Austria but then we should see the other butterflies flutter as Germany imposes more will upon the East and Russian fragility shows. That should underscore Italian hesitancy and stoke Bulgarian ambition, unbalance Greek thinking and keep Romania off kilter. But it is interesting to see just how active espionage was in an age of fountain pens and ere how the gains to Russia may undo its plans with the Germans doing something unexpected!

 

[Anchises]

Further, the Russian supplies and munitions contained within the Polish fortresses would be another reason why Stavka would likely let the Russian armies linger too long in the Polish salient. Even if the Russians were to immediately execute a perfect great retreat, the Russian munition crisis will be far earlier and far worse than OTL.

Hence an early Great Retreat is ABS-territory. The very thing that "allowed" the Great Retreat politically and militarily would be caused by an earlier one. It just makes no sense to retreat this early, neither politically nor strategically. And in 1914 the Russians expected to win once they reached numerical superiority. They won't just give up because their offensive into East Prussia failed.

I would expect vast numbers of Russians to die heroically.

I am not sure but could Poland turn into a military disaster. If Russia is stubborn could Germany win a decisive military victory? Encircling a few armies or something along these lines?

These might be a way to create a TL with a (somewhat) stable Russia that at least avoids the Bolsheviks. The Tsar sues for peace in late 1915.

​

The above coupled with the probable absence of an Italian front makes this scenario an A-H wank. Further, the potential influence of perceived A-H strength and Russian weakness has on Bulgaria, Romania and Greece gives the scenario an R rating.

Agreed. ITTL Russia is in a dangerous situation. If A-H survives 1914 with an intact officer corps, despite all the blunders, then Russia has to wage a genuine two front war. A-H is not a dead weight but a player in its own right. If France doesn't manage to relieve German pressure, Russia simply isn't able to adequately hold off A-H when most troops have to be devoted to fighting the Germans.

 

[MichaelWest]

Hence an early Great Retreat is ABS-territory. The very thing that "allowed" the Great Retreat politically and militarily would be caused by an earlier one. It just makes no sense to retreat this early, neither politically nor strategically. And in 1914 the Russians expected to win once they reached numerical superiority. They won't just give up because their offensive into East Prussia failed.



I am not sure but could Poland turn into a military disaster. If Russia is stubborn could Germany win a decisive military victory? Encircling a few armies or something along these lines?

These might be a way to create a TL with a (somewhat) stable Russia that at least avoids the Bolsheviks. The Tsar sues for peace in late 1915.

​

Agreed. ITTL Russia is in a dangerous situation. If A-H survives 1914 with an intact officer corps, despite all the blunders, then Russia has to wage a genuine two front war. A-H is not a dead weight but a player in its own right. If France doesn't manage to relieve German pressure, Russia simply isn't able to adequately hold off A-H when most troops have to be devoted to fighting the Germans.

It would appear that the offensive into East Prussia is either a greater disaster if 1st and 2nd face two German Armies, likely the 2nd is still nearly destroyed and 1st retreats, not destroyed but effectively useless for some time, or stands to fight and is badly damaged, OR the 4th joins and the battle sees both 1st and 2nd damaged with 4th incurring some losses but having no effect on the battles versus A-H where things go worse. A third German Army in Silesia can launch an attack into Poland that disrupts operations versus A-H, draws away the forces attacking East Prussia and forces an earlier commitment to the defense in Poland. Combined the CPs could impose greater losses overall and gain ground more quickly, at least by 1915 being on an offensive tempo and securing Poland, pushing into Lithuania and/or Ukraine.

Russia's stubborn defense of Poland means no decisive defeat nor relief for France in 1914 or 1915, in fact drawing in resources, maybe a Dardanelles campaign, support for Greece to aid Serbia, at least arms and munitions from France, but the situation should be dire enough that Russia can contemplate defeat. And your bolded might be best case for Russia, an abdication by Nicholas, yield to Germany early enough to get the lightest victor's peace possible, lose "only" Poland, Lithuania, some pieces of Ukraine border? Big indemnity that likely is ameliorated later and give trade concessions to Germany? Release German forces to hammer France and Britain steps in to try to broker a similar bad yet edible deal for France? War ends in late fall or winter of 1915?

 

[trajen777]

I think this is a good summary of the planning for the Russian plans -- from 1912 and where it ended up -- the plan was offensive in nature
1. Get troops as fast as possible into action
2. France and Russian attacks at the same time to limit the Germans using interior lines to shift forces back and forth (so no defensive fall back plan after 1900 or so)

https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pre-war_military_planning_russian_empire

In practice, war against the more economically and culturally developed Germany became only possible for Russia by choosing one of two alternative strategic plans: the permanent deployment of large forces in the border districts relying on a system of fortification, or concentrating armies in the rear governorates of European Russia. It is no accident that mobilization schedule 18, prepared by the General Staff in 1910, focused on the second option, and therefore had a defensive character, taking into account the danger of an attack on the empire by Turkey and even Japan. The authors’ of schedule 18 and War Minister Sukhomlinov himself pointed out the excessive expense to the treasury of modernizing forts on the borders of Germany and Austria-Hungary.[16]

Severe criticism of the adopted plan from a wide range of military leaders, above all the commander of the Kiev Military District, Mikhail Vasil’evich Alekseev (1857-1918) and the Quartermaster-General of GUGSh, Iurii Nikiforovich Danilov (1866-1937), gave rise to lively debate. The essence of the disagreement was the choice of strategic priorities. While Alekseev claimed that the main aim of a Russian attack had to be the capture of Budapest, followed by Vienna, Danilov argued the necessity of a concentrated strike against German forces in East Prussia, the subsequent occupation of Königsberg and the “straightening out” of the Polish Salient. In Danilov’s opinion, a chance to carry out an East Prussian operation had arisen thanks to a sixty-day “window” opening for the Russians as a result of the main German forces being diverted for the attack on Paris. The empire’s top generals reconciled the two ideas at a meeting on 21 February (5 March) in a compromise that was approved as mobilization schedule 19. This plan entailed advancing military units to the western borders for the onset of offensive operations in two different directions – to the northwest against Germany and to the southwest against Austria-Hungary without waiting for the completion of general mobilization. The general opinion was that it proposed an incomparably more active involvement of the Russian armies than its predecessor, though it did have two scenarios – A and G.

According to option A, which would become the guide for action in the event of Germany launching its main forces against France while leaving only a few corps in the east to cover the border with Russia, Austria-Hungary would be the main opponent, against whom the 3rd, 4th, 5thand 8th armies would be concentrated on the South-Western Front along the line of Ivangorod – Liublin – Kholm – Dubno – Proskurov, while the 1st and 2nd armies, which were the best in terms of personnel and armaments, would be deployed at the boundary of Shavli – Kovno and the Neman, Narev and Western Bug rivers against Germany. Plan G would come into force should Germany prefer to throw its main forces into battle with Russia. According to this plan, in addition to the 1st and 2nd armies, the 4th army would be sent to the German front. However, GUGSh officers and the command staff of the border districts considered the second scenario as the less likely of the two.[17]

Regardless of the obvious differences in the choice of targets of attacks in the west, it is significant that both plans almost identically formulated the task of overcoming East Prussia, although Plan A’s aim was to achieve a decisive defeat of Austria-Hungary, while Plan G’s intention was to prevent Austrian forces reaching the rear of the Russian forces conducting operations on the German front. But no plan mentioned organising an attack by Russian forces from the Polish Salient towards Berlin during the first weeks of the war, which the French had constantly been requesting.[18]

At first glance the plans for divergent advances on the North-Western and South-Western Fronts looked doomed from the outset, but the Tsarist command believed that the general strategic situation in the opening period of the war would give the Russian armies a good chance of carrying out both offensive actions. The General Staff firmly believed in the superiority of the forces available to the command of the South-Western Front over those of Austria-Hungary. As for Germany, the success of East Prussian and then, perhaps, Vistula-Oder campaigns were reliant on German divisions being distracted by overcoming French defences.[19] As Sukhomlinov was later to recall, in 1912 he had a notable conversation with the French Chief of Staff, Joseph-Jacques Joffre (1852-1931) concerning the future war. “We were of one opinion – the German plan was to first defeat France with a number of decisive strikes, and then to descend upon Russia. From this we concluded that our task was to advance simultaneously on Germany from the east and west”.[20]

Other conditions for the implementation of this plan were the favourable geographical positioning of the Polish Salient, which could be used as a launching pad for offensive operations in Central Europe, a liberal government coming to power in Sweden on the eve of the war that was inclined to maintain neutrality, and the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire, if only during the first months of military action.[21]

 

[MichaelWest]

According to option A, which would become the guide for action in the event of Germany launching its main forces against France while leaving only a few corps in the east to cover the border with Russia, Austria-Hungary would be the main opponent, against whom the 3rd, 4th, 5thand 8th armies would be concentrated on the South-Western Front along the line of Ivangorod – Liublin – Kholm – Dubno – Proskurov, while the 1st and 2nd armies, which were the best in terms of personnel and armaments, would be deployed at the boundary of Shavli – Kovno and the Neman, Narev and Western Bug rivers against Germany. Plan G would come into force should Germany prefer to throw its main forces into battle with Russia. According to this plan, in addition to the 1st and 2nd armies, the 4th army would be sent to the German front. However, GUGSh officers and the command staff of the border districts considered the second scenario as the less likely of the two.[17]

Regardless of the obvious differences in the choice of targets of attacks in the west, it is significant that both plans almost identically formulated the task of overcoming East Prussia, although Plan A’s aim was to achieve a decisive defeat of Austria-Hungary, while Plan G’s intention was to prevent Austrian forces reaching the rear of the Russian forces conducting operations on the German front. But no plan mentioned organising an attack by Russian forces from the Polish Salient towards Berlin during the first weeks of the war, which the French had constantly been requesting.[18]

At first glance the plans for divergent advances on the North-Western and South-Western Fronts looked doomed from the outset, but the Tsarist command believed that the general strategic situation in the opening period of the war would give the Russian armies a good chance of carrying out both offensive actions. The General Staff firmly believed in the superiority of the forces available to the command of the South-Western Front over those of Austria-Hungary. As for Germany, the success of East Prussian and then, perhaps, Vistula-Oder campaigns were reliant on German divisions being distracted by overcoming French defences.[19] As Sukhomlinov was later to recall, in 1912 he had a notable conversation with the French Chief of Staff, Joseph-Jacques Joffre (1852-1931) concerning the future war. “We were of one opinion – the German plan was to first defeat France with a number of decisive strikes, and then to descend upon Russia. From this we concluded that our task was to advance simultaneously on Germany from the east and west”.[20]

Other conditions for the implementation of this plan were the favourable geographical positioning of the Polish Salient, which could be used as a launching pad for offensive operations in Central Europe, a liberal government coming to power in Sweden on the eve of the war that was inclined to maintain neutrality, and the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire, if only during the first months of military action.[21]

And the bold I think underscores why so many argue that the Russians are indeed coming, they had adopted and further committed to an offensive strategy, they would attack into east Prussia with two or three Armies, attack A-H with the rest as fast as possible. Thus I agree with the opinion that Russia must attack even if they figure out that Germany is not invading Belgium and once committed likely do not shift the 4th army unless they think more than another Army has deployed. Earlier German plans called for about as many divisions as two Armies should be expected to employ, and Russia likely knew enough of that planning to have already calculated it in, thus I do not see any changes in Russian actions. Certainly no defensive or retire inward strategy will be plausible. I genuinely think Germany could get two Armies deployed in East Prussia without fully alerting Russia or provoking a change in how 1st and 2nd Armies deployed. A third Army in Silesia should reinforce the decision to keep the 4th in the Southwest. I rate the Germans as effectively 2 to 1 so Germany has at least twice the force on the ground as Russia, a recipe for destroying both Russian Armies. Here A-h should be doing better once the 1st and 2nd engage and get pinned, as their fight unfolds it should send shock through the Russian command. If Germany does well in standing firm in the West it might be panic.

 

[NoMommsen]

Yea, there was room for trading space for time if needed. Russians put optionality in their plans. We are talking about the same plans.
...

Room in terms of werst after werst there was, without a doubt.

But not within the russian military planning and thinking from 1912 onwards.

 

[BlondieBC]

Room in terms of werst after werst there was, without a doubt.

But not within the russian military planning and thinking from 1912 onwards.

IOTL, as soon as things went bad (Germans hit at Gorlic-Tarnow), the Russians went to an immediate space for time type effort. Since at least the Napoleonic days, and Russia flag officers has 'space for time' in his DNA.