Alternative Western Front in a no Schlieffen-Plan WW1

[Anchises]

Inspired by the massive 50 pages thread on a Germany that respects Belgian neutrality in an ATL I want to talk about the iconic front of WW1 in a very different scenario.

The scenario: Due to some non specified POD the OHL and the Kaiser decide to follow a different strategy ITTL.

- 3 armies in the East (2 used defensively in Eastern Prussia, 1 supposed to conduct an offensive into Silesia)
- Belgian neutrality is respected

Now my question is: How would the Western Front play out?

I don't care about your opinion on British neutrality. If you think Britain would stay neutral, fine. If you think we would still see a BEF, fine.

Tell me about where the French army and the Germans (+ a possible BEF) are fighting. How are they fighting?

1) Is the whole war a massive multi year slog on the Franco-German border?
2) Is France going to mirror OTLs Germany with an offensive into Belgium and the use of gas?
3) Is the war turning into a "Sitzkrieg" once the French realize that they won't break through the Franco-German Border?
4) Are the Germans doing something unexpected?
5) Is France going to break through German defenses, deep into Alsac-Lorraine ?
6) Something else entirely?

I have a hard time picturing this Western Front because it would be fairly different from the Western Front of OTL which was so important for popular image of WW1. I mean I can somewhat imagine what happens in 1914. But what about 1915, 1916, 1917 or even 1918 if the war is that long.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

1) Yes, but exactly like IRL nobody is going to have planned for, trained extensively for, organized for, or stocked up for such a campaign. The region is simply too industrially important, geographically defendable, and held by powers with too much internal stability and resources/manpower to be anything other in a total war.

2) No. Not only do the French already have a plan in place that puts their main offensive concentrations in the south (Which means they don't have free 1st rate armies equip for speedy advances to throw around), but aren't in the same strategically problematic position of having the ticking clock of Russian mobilization threatening them with a large scale second front after a certain timeframe. Gas will still emerge (The French actually used gas first, though it was tear gas grenades) as things bog down, but they can afford to honor Belgian neutrality very easily to retain their diplomatic reputation.

3) Not likely, since the broader Franco-Russian agreement means they're obligated to keep pressure on the Germans to keep resources split and prevent large scale offensives against their coalition partner which might result in an eastern success.

4) It'd be hard to hide...

5) no

 

[MichaelWest]

3 armies in the East (2 used defensively in Eastern Prussia, 1 supposed to conduct an offensive into Silesia)
- Belgian neutrality is respected

Now my question is: How would the Western Front play out?

I don't care about your opinion on British neutrality. If you think Britain would stay neutral, fine. If you think we would still see a BEF, fine.

Tell me about where the French army and the Germans (+ a possible BEF) are fighting. How are they fighting?

1) Is the whole war a massive multi year slog on the Franco-German border?
2) Is France going to mirror OTLs Germany with an offensive into Belgium and the use of gas?
3) Is the war turning into a "Sitzkrieg" once the French realize that they won#t break through the Franco-German Border?
4) Are the Germans doing something unexpected?
5) Is France going to breakthrough German defenses deep into Alsac-Lorraine ?
6) Something else entirely?

I have a hard time picturing this Western Front because it would be fairly different from the Western Front of OTL which was so important for popular image of WW1.

First I simply deploy the French as per Plan XVII. The real variable to me is the French 5th. If Britain is at war the BEF should take a position to its left (Northwest) screening the Belgian frontier and poised to protect the 5th flank. If no BEF is present the 5th might string out more or other forces scrapped up to fill in. And I would deploy the German Armies as OTL, only the First and Second deployments against Belgium are removed, the Third should still deploy to defend Luxembourg and screen the Belgian frontier. I have the Germans move into Luxembourg no matter.

One needs to decide if a more limited violation of Belgium still occurs, first by Moltke attempting to salvage his plan to flank the French and get behind the 5th Army (left-wing), here likely all South of the Meuse or if Joffre can get the "go" to send the 5th through Belgian Luxembourg towards German occupied Luxembourg. And I think this is debatable both ways.

The Battle of the Frontiers essentially plays out, I can argue some divergences in battles without the events occurring as First and Second move through Belgium, but I think the effect is minimal to the overall picture. The big divergence is the battle on the French left flank and revolving around the 5th. It is either entirely effective at putting war into Luxembourg or it is another French disaster as the Fourth meets it head on and the Third flanks it.

Obviously we need to know the progress made by both Germany and A-H in the East to get into the details of your question. But my very rough sketch would be:

1) Is the whole war a massive multi year slog on the Franco-German border? Yes, I think the French bleed themselves white foolishly attacking, and do so longer than they should, but Germany conducting counter-offensives will gain not enough ground and itself suffer losses sufficient to shut the front down into trench warfare and attrition as events to the East play out. On balance Germany will be edging ahead of France. I am open to some Germans gains, likely minor to the eyes on the ground but significant long term, like overrunning Lowry.

2) Is France going to mirror OTLs Germany with an offensive into Belgium and the use of gas? I am dubious. At most I would see Joffre cutting the corner but I am not convinced France could put together enough Army to invade Belgium and go at invading Germany. And if it can be conjured, Germany is better positioned to suspend the tempo to the East and shift forces West to meet the French as they hang up on Belgian forts. It makes more sense for the French to try gas to gain an advantage.

3) Is the war turning into a "Sitzkrieg" once the French realize that they won#t break through the Franco-German Border? A real possibility but I think French moral will hold long enough to get them dangerously past sanity and too close to breaking. The Western front will be a brutal grind far longer than it should.

4) Are the Germans doing something unexpected? Maybe. We are no longer on the script.

5) Is France going to breakthrough German defenses deep into Alsac-Lorraine ? Did not OTL so I vote no. The toss up might be how well the 5th performs and damage done to German iron production but I still do not see them marching to Berlin.

6) Something else entirely? We will hopefully find out as this discussion takes on a life of its own.

 

[Anchises]

1) Yes, but exactly like IRL nobody is going to have planned for, trained extensively for, organized for, or stocked up for such a campaign. The region is simply too industrially important, geographically defendable, and held by powers with too much internal stability and resources/manpower to be anything other in a total war.

Probably true. I don't think that the French would bash in their heads on solid German defenses forever. At some point it should be fairly obvious that the border region is a black hole that only produces casualties. And with the smaller population France has little hope to bleed the Germans white.

2) No. Not only do the French already have a plan in place that puts their main offensive concentrations in the south (Which means they don't have free 1st rate armies equip for speedy advances to throw around), but aren't in the same strategically problematic position of having the ticking clock of Russian mobilization threatening them with a large scale second front after a certain timeframe. Gas will still emerge (The French actually used gas first, though it was tear gas grenades) as things bog down, but they can afford to honor Belgian neutrality very easily to retain their diplomatic reputation.

At some point the Russians would pressure France to release some pressure from the Eastern Front. If they don't manage to do that we have the ticking clock of Russian collapse at some point. So after a year (give or take) the French leadership might rethink their offensive concentrations. I mean I would agree with your assessment for 1914 but in the later years the situation would be more fluid imho. So the question essentially is: How long can France allow to honor Belgian neutrality?

3) Not likely, since the broader Franco-Russian agreement means they're obligated to keep pressure on the Germans to keep resources split and prevent large scale offensives against their coalition partner which might result in an eastern success.

True. I considered a scenario where France abandoned Russia though. Relying on Great Britain and static trench warfare to deter Germany with the goal of achieving a white peace or at worst minor french concessions.

4) It'd be hard to hide...

Indeed.

5) no

Fair enough. I wouldn't completely agree though because of the creativity of General Staff Officers and the general unpredictability of war.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

First I simply deploy the French as per Plan XVII. The real variable to me is the French 5th. If Britain is at war the BEF should take a position to its left (Northwest) screening the Belgian frontier and poised to protect the 5th flank. If no BEF is present the 5th might string out more or other forces scrapped up to fill in. And I would deploy the German Armies as OTL, only the First and Second deployments against Belgium are removed, the Third should still deploy to defend Luxembourg and screen the Belgian frontier. I have the Germans move into Luxembourg no matter.

One needs to decide if a more limited violation of Belgium still occurs, first by Moltke attempting to salvage his plan to flank the French and get behind the 5th Army (left-wing), here likely all South of the Meuse or if Joffre can get the "go" to send the 5th through Belgian Luxembourg towards German occupied Luxembourg. And I think this is debatable both ways.

The Battle of the Frontiers essentially plays out, I can argue some divergences in battles without the events occurring as First and Second move through Belgium, but I think the effect is minimal to the overall picture. The big divergence is the battle on the French left flank and revolving around the 5th. It is either entirely effective at putting war into Luxembourg or it is another French disaster as the Fourth meets it head on and the Third flanks it.

I don't believe into a limited violation of Belgian neutrality to be honest. At least not from the Germans. They are either all in or they fully respect Belgian neutrality.

Obviously we need to know the progress made by both Germany and A-H in the East to get into the details of your question.

My rough draft for the East ( I am considering the idea of starting a TL, currently doing research):

The Germans can move significant troops from the Eastern Front to the West sooner than OTL. When exactly depends on ones assessment of The Russian capabilities. With increased German pressure on the Russians and in turn decreased pressure on A-H, I would optimistically say that the Germans can withdraw significant troops from the East in 1916, a year sooner than OTL. The pessimistic assessment would be half a year sooner than OTL. That doesn't mean that Russia necessarily capitulates sooner. They could simply be in no condition to threaten the CPs with another offensive, freeing substantial German formations for use in the West.

This earlier "victory" in the East will be more costly than OTL. ITTLs Eastern Front will swallow a lot of German material and lives that IOTL were lost on the Western Front. The Russians are no pushover and even IOTL where the Germans never fully committed to the Eastern Front they sustained heavy losses. ITTL this will be amplified. The collapse of Russia can only be accelerated so much with military means because the Russian defeat was not a military one. Military defeats and the loss of valuable real estate to the CPs just strengthens the underlying trends leading to a Revolution and the eventual collapse of the Russian war effort.

1) Is the whole war a massive multi year slog on the Franco-German border? Yes, I think the French bleed themselves white foolishly attacking, and do so longer than they should, but Germany conducting counter-offensives will gain not enough ground and itself suffer losses sufficient to shut the front down into trench warfare and attrition as events to the East play out. On balance Germany will be edging ahead of France. I am open to some Germans gains, likely minor to the eyes on the ground but significant long term, like overrunning Lowry.

I would agree with your assessment on french morale. The French fought valiantly and beyond any reasonable expectation. I don't see a reason why this would change. Unfortunately I don't see a reason why the french leadership wouldn't waste lives in the same way as OTL.

Yeah, we have to keep in mind that the Germans were often foolish themselves. Pointless counter offensives often were really costly affairs with little to show for, negating the positive effect of a successful defense to a certain extent.

German gains are a hard topic indeed. Early war I see little possibility for German breakthroughs. Later stages of the war get really interesting. If Bruchmüller is still inspired by Brussilovs use of artillery and Hutier still develops his Stoßtruppentaktik, I could definitely see a German breakthrough with new tactics, especially with french forces from the East. If the BEF is in play I don't think that the Germans could expand on a breakthrough because there are more than enough reserves to savagely attack anything that breaks through the french lines.

Another scenario would be a German offensive or counter-offensive during TTLs mutinies (if they happen). This would offer a lot of potential for some substantial or at least minor German gains.

2) Is France going to mirror OTLs Germany with an offensive into Belgium and the use of gas? I am dubious. At most I would see Joffre cutting the corner but I am not convinced France could put together enough Army to invade Belgium and go at invading Germany. And if it can be conjured, Germany is better positioned to suspend the tempo to the East and shift forces West to meet the French as they hang up on Belgian forts. It makes more sense for the French to try gas to gain an advantage.

Agreed, my gut also tells me that France is unlikely to attack through Belgium. And if they really do it would end in a disaster. Gas would probably turn the French-German border into a real hellhole, because the trenches would move even less than OTL and artillery fire would be even more concentrated.

3) Is the war turning into a "Sitzkrieg" once the French realize that they won#t break through the Franco-German Border? A real possibility but I think French moral will hold long enough to get them dangerously past sanity and too close to breaking. The Western front will be a brutal grind far longer than it should.

I thought about even more severe mutinies IOTL. Without the promise of "Americans and tanks" the french leadership might be in a position where the soldiers simply don't accept offensive orders. This would be a potential way to have a french army collapse. The Soldiers start electing Soviets and the officers become more powerless by the day. We have to keep in mind that Britain would probably intervene heavily (complete economic blockade), even in a neutral scenario, to prevent complete french collapse.

To summarize: I just think we shouldn't completely ignore the possibility that a "Sitzkrieg" might be enforced by the Soldiers tired with pointless offensives.

4) Are the Germans doing something unexpected? Maybe. We are no longer on the script.

True. I am hoping to gain some insight on what they could do to, to break the stalemate of the Frontiers.

5) Is France going to breakthrough German defenses deep into Alsac-Lorraine ? Did not OTL so I vote no. The toss up might be how well the 5th performs and damage done to German iron production but I still do not see them marching to Berlin.

Yeah, me neither. Given their OTL performance I don't think a decisive french breakthrough is likely in 1914. 1915 onward the Germans have probably raised enough additional armies to have enough reserves to prevent critical breakthroughs.

6) Something else entirely? We will hopefully find out as this discussion takes on a life of its own.

I hope so too. Completely unexplored paths not taken OTL would be really interesting.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Probably true. I don't think that the French would bash in their heads on solid German defenses forever. At some point it should be fairly obvious that the border region is a black hole that only produces casualties. And with the smaller population France has little hope to bleed the Germans white.



At some point the Russians would pressure France to release some pressure from the Eastern Front. If they don't manage to do that we have the ticking clock of Russian collapse at some point. So after a year (give or take) the French leadership might rethink their offensive concentrations. I mean I would agree with your assessment for 1914 but in the later years the situation would be more fluid imho. So the question essentially is: How long can France allow to honor Belgian neutrality?



True. I considered a scenario where France abandoned Russia though. Relying on Great Britain and static trench warfare to deter Germany with the goal of achieving a white peace or at worst minor french concessions.



Indeed.



Fair enough. I wouldn't completely agree though because of the creativity of General Staff Officers and the general unpredictability of war.

1. I think its important to draw a distinction between strategy and tactics here. While yes, eventually on a tactical level the French probably won't be running headlong over no-man's land in red pants and a suicidal display of elan, on a broader front the realities of coalition warfare, home morale, German population and industrial superiority in a longer haul, ect. means strategically they have to do something to change the status quo and not just allow the Germans to dig in unopposed. This is especially true if they make a habit of it, as at some point the Germans are going to realize they aren't actually under threat from the West and will have established, in an environment without pressure, far tougher to crack defensive positions which would allow them direct a greater and greater share of their resources into operations on other fronts were the tactics and techniques of trench warfare are less effective/can be deployed for their own benefit or as force multipliers to their less well-equip allies (Offensives against Russia, assisting AH in protecting the Carpathians or advancing into Serbia, supporting CP allies in the Balkans, ect.), which puts a ticking clock on the Entente's advantage in numbers and the benefits of putting the enemy in a two front war by speeding the rate at which the situation in the east and trust in eventual relief by allies depletes to the point Russia collapses or pursues a separate peace. How they go about doing this will probably depend alot on the broader trends of this alternative Western front: operations that capture territory/succeed in their goals/show good casulty ratios will slowly be adopted while less effective tactics are phased out through (bloody and costly) experience, responding to changes in German defensive tactics as best they can. I imagine alot of this will be an increased focus on artillery, particularly or the heavy and indirect variety (Gas counter-measures will be adopted by Germany quickly) and the use of specialized formations like Alpine troops... though I imagine loses in the later will slowly reduce their effectiveness as the war goes on as the proffesional, specialized character of divisions are diluted as those with pre-war skills are lost to casulties and a greater and greater proportion of the manpower is made up of troops getting less and less training from a smaller and smaller number of "free" professionals. France certainly can't afford to use human wave tactics to beat the Germans... but they also can't afford to just sit on their hands, even if we discount the negative effects at home (in terms of civilian approval, troop morale, government stability, ect.) of imposing the burdens of a war economy on the nation without showing results.
2. This depends partially on the international situation: Paris will be watching very closely and constantly reaching out to see just how preferable terms they can get from powerful neutrals compared to German (Nations like the US and Britain) in terms of the security of the import of and availability of war materials, access to and rates of credit, ect. The better economic-diplomatic position France manages to get and the longer they hold it (thus becoming dependent on it, in the perspective sense the "shock" to the system of having to fall back on less preferable terms is going to be a lot harsher on a more depleted/stretched domestic resource base). It also becomes progressively more difficult to free up the required formations and supplies to conduct an offensive against Belgium, due to them already being commited elsewhere and the fact that the quality of troops is steadily decreasing while the Belgian fortifications and army remain (as long as they're at peace) more or less undiminished. Honestly, unless the situation gets truely desperate (IE until international credit has already dried up), I'd say France can run the calculations and see that bringing the Belgians into the war as an effective German co-belligerant and losing the prospect of future alliances abroad is far too high a cost for the potential advantage of outflanking the Germans (Assuming they can punch through the Belgians quickly enough to prevent the re-jiggering of German lines)
3. If Russia drops out, especially if they do so earlier than IOTL (Which they would in any situation where France more or less gives them and their concerns the middle finger), I highly doubt the UK is going to be willing to prop up France long enough to wear down the Germans. Even if they're willing to ignore the fact that France just showed they can't be trusted to bear any notable cost to defend their ally's interest in the breach (A fact which London might take offense to, consider they feel France has obligations to them as well), Germany either has A) hegemony in the East in the face of a collapsing Russia, allowing direct integration of its resources in to their war economy once they pacify the area or B) Access to the output of a more stable Russia to help feed their population and supply their industry. Assuming no intervention by the US is on the horizon, credit and manpower is bound to dry up for them before it does for the CP who's vulnerability to blockade has been noticably reduced and morale and warmaking capacity for the Western front has just received a fairly substantial boost.
4. Yes, large scale troop movements tend to be difficult to conceal. The sheer time and amount of stuff moving around and whatnot.
5. There's always a chance, but I think its highly unlikely assuming the Germans are half way competent (which they are). France simply lacks the immediately available firepower or breath of strategic options needed to brute force or maneuver her way around a Germany adopting a more passive or defensive stance in the narrow, geographically defensable corridor of A-L, and German interior logistics are good enough in the region that they can respond fast enough for a reasonable number of localized mistakes or cases of bad luck to be compensated for without allowing for a major breakthrough. France needs quite the string of good dice rolls.

Personally, I'm interested in what the results of this shift would be in terms of the diplomatic stances of various neutrals and intra-CP relations. For example, if resources are freed in the West; especially offensive-heavy ones like siege artillery (that was historically directed against Belgian forts), I imagine they'd be available for a stronger initial showing against Serbia. Making that front quicker and far less bloody for Vienna really helps her keep an independent position within the alliance structure as well as improve her military prospects elsewhere, not to mention increases their standing in the eyes of other Balkan counteries. Does Bulgaria jump in on the CP bandwagon earlier (or, alternatively, try to stage a fait accompli in Macedonia) if the Serbian position is collapsing? The position of the Pro-interventionalist faction in Greece is certainly going to be shattered, at least those leaning on the Entente side, while Italy and Romania are going to perceive Austrian war-making capabilities as far greater than IOTL. If the Balkans look like a lost cause to the Entente, I could also see them trying to woo the Turks into joining the alliance or at least remaining neutral to allow for the flow of commerce via the Straits. The knock-on effects on an Entente Ottomans are something I'd really like to see...

 

[MichaelWest]

1. I think its important to draw a distinction between strategy and tactics here. While yes, eventually on a tactical level the French probably won't be running headlong over no-man's land in red pants and a suicidal display of elan, on a broader front the realities of coalition warfare, home morale, German population and industrial superiority in a longer haul, ect. means strategically they have to do something to change the status quo and not just allow the Germans to dig in unopposed. This is especially true if they make a habit of it, as at some point the Germans are going to realize they aren't actually under threat from the West and will have established, in an environment without pressure, far tougher to crack defensive positions which would allow them direct a greater and greater share of their resources into operations on other fronts were the tactics and techniques of trench warfare are less effective/can be deployed for their own benefit or as force multipliers to their less well-equip allies (Offensives against Russia, assisting AH in protecting the Carpathians or advancing into Serbia, supporting CP allies in the Balkans, ect.), which puts a ticking clock on the Entente's advantage in numbers and the benefits of putting the enemy in a two front war by speeding the rate at which the situation in the east and trust in eventual relief by allies depletes to the point Russia collapses or pursues a separate peace. How they go about doing this will probably depend alot on the broader trends of this alternative Western front: operations that capture territory/succeed in their goals/show good casulty ratios will slowly be adopted while less effective tactics are phased out through (bloody and costly) experience, responding to changes in German defensive tactics as best they can. I imagine alot of this will be an increased focus on artillery, particularly or the heavy and indirect variety (Gas counter-measures will be adopted by Germany quickly) and the use of specialized formations like Alpine troops... though I imagine loses in the later will slowly reduce their effectiveness as the war goes on as the proffesional, specialized character of divisions are diluted as those with pre-war skills are lost to casulties and a greater and greater proportion of the manpower is made up of troops getting less and less training from a smaller and smaller number of "free" professionals. France certainly can't afford to use human wave tactics to beat the Germans... but they also can't afford to just sit on their hands, even if we discount the negative effects at home (in terms of civilian approval, troop morale, government stability, ect.) of imposing the burdens of a war economy on the nation without showing results.
2. This depends partially on the international situation: Paris will be watching very closely and constantly reaching out to see just how preferable terms they can get from powerful neutrals compared to German (Nations like the US and Britain) in terms of the security of the import of and availability of war materials, access to and rates of credit, ect. The better economic-diplomatic position France manages to get and the longer they hold it (thus becoming dependent on it, in the perspective sense the "shock" to the system of having to fall back on less preferable terms is going to be a lot harsher on a more depleted/stretched domestic resource base). It also becomes progressively more difficult to free up the required formations and supplies to conduct an offensive against Belgium, due to them already being commited elsewhere and the fact that the quality of troops is steadily decreasing while the Belgian fortifications and army remain (as long as they're at peace) more or less undiminished. Honestly, unless the situation gets truely desperate (IE until international credit has already dried up), I'd say France can run the calculations and see that bringing the Belgians into the war as an effective German co-belligerant and losing the prospect of future alliances abroad is far too high a cost for the potential advantage of outflanking the Germans (Assuming they can punch through the Belgians quickly enough to prevent the re-jiggering of German lines)
3. If Russia drops out, especially if they do so earlier than IOTL (Which they would in any situation where France more or less gives them and their concerns the middle finger), I highly doubt the UK is going to be willing to prop up France long enough to wear down the Germans. Even if they're willing to ignore the fact that France just showed they can't be trusted to bear any notable cost to defend their ally's interest in the breach (A fact which London might take offense to, consider they feel France has obligations to them as well), Germany either has A) hegemony in the East in the face of a collapsing Russia, allowing direct integration of its resources in to their war economy once they pacify the area or B) Access to the output of a more stable Russia to help feed their population and supply their industry. Assuming no intervention by the US is on the horizon, credit and manpower is bound to dry up for them before it does for the CP who's vulnerability to blockade has been noticably reduced and morale and warmaking capacity for the Western front has just received a fairly substantial boost.
4. Yes, large scale troop movements tend to be difficult to conceal. The sheer time and amount of stuff moving around and whatnot.
5. There's always a chance, but I think its highly unlikely assuming the Germans are half way competent (which they are). France simply lacks the immediately available firepower or breath of strategic options needed to brute force or maneuver her way around a Germany adopting a more passive or defensive stance in the narrow, geographically defensable corridor of A-L, and German interior logistics are good enough in the region that they can respond fast enough for a reasonable number of localized mistakes or cases of bad luck to be compensated for without allowing for a major breakthrough. France needs quite the string of good dice rolls.

Personally, I'm interested in what the results of this shift would be in terms of the diplomatic stances of various neutrals and intra-CP relations. For example, if resources are freed in the West; especially offensive-heavy ones like siege artillery (that was historically directed against Belgian forts), I imagine they'd be available for a stronger initial showing against Serbia. Making that front quicker and far less bloody for Vienna really helps her keep an independent position within the alliance structure as well as improve her military prospects elsewhere, not to mention increases their standing in the eyes of other Balkan counteries. Does Bulgaria jump in on the CP bandwagon earlier (or, alternatively, try to stage a fait accompli in Macedonia) if the Serbian position is collapsing? The position of the Pro-interventionalist faction in Greece is certainly going to be shattered, at least those leaning on the Entente side, while Italy and Romania are going to perceive Austrian war-making capabilities as far greater than IOTL. If the Balkans look like a lost cause to the Entente, I could also see them trying to woo the Turks into joining the alliance or at least remaining neutral to allow for the flow of commerce via the Straits. The knock-on effects on an Entente Ottomans are something I'd really like to see...

(1) And I sadly too often give gloss to this assuming it is obvious. The French cannot achieve their war aims, the return of A-L, without an offensive, they must attack Germany, gain ground, defeat Armies, win the war. That does not mean the French do not change tactics, better infantry-artillery cooperation, camouflage, heavier artillery, etc., all should flow out but the French will be attempting to mount another offensive every time they can. Germany can sit defensive in the West but that is not passive. They will draw in the French, attempt to defeat them in detail, use artillery and machineguns, attempt to flank salients, counter attack, attempt offensives or counter-offensives for better position on the terrain, etc. And they will learn tactics as well. Germany here is weighing its effort towards Russia but still has a lot of men and forces to apply in not merely holding the French but defeating them in battles designed to waste their men and material. The problem in this era is that the gains are slight over the costs.

(2) And I am hopefully Germany learns both coalition and global war as this unwinds. Frankly I feel the POD is merely accident rather than design, but avoiding Belgium opens the German eyes to how war is more than just moves on the field, more than battles or tactics. I hope they re-read Clausewitz and apply the political aspects to victory. My grossly glossed thought is funds run dry by 1916, that is the Entente clock, and French morale remains good but when it falters ITL it breaks. In OTL French soldiers are still defending France, the Germans are invaders, and that may hold true here as big offensives begin after the shift back West, but after years of fighting the offensive war, it should be demoralizing to attack yet again, the objective just too hollow.

(3) We should consider a far less effective blockade as Britain's contribution and France should remain committed to taking pressure off Russia. But as she retires inland to trade space for time, France will press for her own relief. It will not break the Entente early but it is a new pressure point. We should not easily give Russia going for an early peace separate but separate peace deals should look better here. Without the bailout offered by the USA I think we see a more obvious precipice.

(5) This narrow front is an absolute cauldron, once we decide on where it settles into the stalemate, the attrition begins with no obvious ways to break it but Belgium. I think the thought lingers and it is constantly planned for, even as reacting to the other side. But long term it will be Germany who could mass enough forces to make a breakthrough. Unless you have a late war entry by Britain, France will be seeing a dangerous day looming once Germany can go defensive East and mass West. Victory? we shall see.

Indeed, the math for all the fence sitters gets recalculated. We might see some obvious choices, some not so obvious and a few weird realignments. This war is not so certain despite being so tempting as a CP-wank. Italy as a wavering neutral or the Ottomans being wooed to neutrality by Britain is truly epic alterations.

 

[MichaelWest]

Probably true. I don't think that the French would bash in their heads on solid German defenses forever. At some point it should be fairly obvious that the border region is a black hole that only produces casualties. And with the smaller population France has little hope to bleed the Germans white.

At some point the Russians would pressure France to release some pressure from the Eastern Front. If they don't manage to do that we have the ticking clock of Russian collapse at some point. So after a year (give or take) the French leadership might rethink their offensive concentrations. I mean I would agree with your assessment for 1914 but in the later years the situation would be more fluid imho. So the question essentially is: How long can France allow to honor Belgian neutrality?

True. I considered a scenario where France abandoned Russia though. Relying on Great Britain and static trench warfare to deter Germany with the goal of achieving a white peace or at worst minor french concessions.

Indeed.

Fair enough. I wouldn't completely agree though because of the creativity of General Staff Officers and the general unpredictability of war.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I do believe the French are more likely early to see Belgium as the easy path out of the stalemate France cannot win. Here Germany has fallen into the advantages of the Belgians as a shield. Later the Germans will likely revisit Belgium as the obvious golden ticket around the stalemate. Belgium is not guaranteed anything but a dangerous brink.

To have France abandon Russia is a big divergence. I will ponder that. My initial reaction is it should come late as the proverbial writing gets clear on the literal wall. But maybe we see it earlier. If Germany appears too close to crushing Russia, would the French break and talk? Might be more likely with Britain just hanging on the sidelines. A German hegemony is far better for France than occupation. France can hope to get peace while the war is still mostly fought on German territory.

For France simply surviving may be the goal at some point. Indemnity, colonial concessions, then concede yet more of France. To avoid the later I think we see the French fight hard and be more generous in terms on cash or overseas prizes. But I admit that Britain will be having a hand in things. Germany will be well served to be circumspect. All told I do not see Germany defeating France sooner than 1916, but the gravity will be waxing faster and more inevitable. That is where I hope to find a white peace end in the West. I tend not to prefer a simply Germany curb stomps France and goes on to conquer the world tropes.

 

[MichaelWest]

I don't believe into a limited violation of Belgian neutrality to be honest. At least not from the Germans. They are either all in or they fully respect Belgian neutrality.

My rough draft for the East ( I am considering the idea of starting a TL, currently doing research):

The Germans can move significant troops from the Eastern Front to the West sooner than OTL. When exactly depends on ones assessment of The Russian capabilities. With increased German pressure on the Russians and in turn decreased pressure on A-H, I would optimistically say that the Germans can withdraw significant troops from the East in 1916, a year sooner than OTL. The pessimistic assessment would be half a year sooner than OTL. That doesn't mean that Russia necessarily capitulates sooner. They could simply be in no condition to threaten the CPs with another offensive, freeing substantial German formations for use in the West.

This earlier "victory" in the East will be more costly than OTL. ITTLs Eastern Front will swallow a lot of German material and lives that IOTL were lost on the Western Front. The Russians are no pushover and even IOTL where the Germans never fully committed to the Eastern Front they sustained heavy losses. ITTL this will be amplified. The collapse of Russia can only be accelerated so much with military means because the Russian defeat was not a military one. Military defeats and the loss of valuable real estate to the CPs just strengthens the underlying trends leading to a Revolution and the eventual collapse of the Russian war effort.

I would agree with your assessment on french morale. The French fought valiantly and beyond any reasonable expectation. I don't see a reason why this would change. Unfortunately I don't see a reason why the french leadership wouldn't waste lives in the same way as OTL.

Yeah, we have to keep in mind that the Germans were often foolish themselves. Pointless counter offensives often were really costly affairs with little to show for, negating the positive effect of a successful defense to a certain extent.

German gains are a hard topic indeed. Early war I see little possibility for German breakthroughs. Later stages of the war get really interesting. If Bruchmüller is still inspired by Brussilovs use of artillery and Hutier still develops his Stoßtruppentaktik, I could definitely see a German breakthrough with new tactics, especially with french forces from the East. If the BEF is in play I don't think that the Germans could expand on a breakthrough because there are more than enough reserves to savagely attack anything that breaks through the french lines.

Another scenario would be a German offensive or counter-offensive during TTLs mutinies (if they happen). This would offer a lot of potential for some substantial or at least minor German gains.

Agreed, my gut also tells me that France is unlikely to attack through Belgium. And if they really do it would end in a disaster. Gas would probably turn the French-German border into a real hellhole, because the trenches would move even less than OTL and artillery fire would be even more concentrated.

I thought about even more severe mutinies IOTL. Without the promise of "Americans and tanks" the french leadership might be in a position where the soldiers simply don't accept offensive orders. This would be a potential way to have a french army collapse. The Soldiers start electing Soviets and the officers become more powerless by the day. We have to keep in mind that Britain would probably intervene heavily (complete economic blockade), even in a neutral scenario, to prevent complete french collapse.

To summarize: I just think we shouldn't completely ignore the possibility that a "Sitzkrieg" might be enforced by the Soldiers tired with pointless offensives.

True. I am hoping to gain some insight on what they could do to, to break the stalemate of the Frontiers.

Yeah, me neither. Given their OTL performance I don't think a decisive french breakthrough is likely in 1914. 1915 onward the Germans have probably raised enough additional armies to have enough reserves to prevent critical breakthroughs.

I hope so too. Completely unexplored paths not taken OTL would be really interesting.

And I do hope to keep Belgium neutral, it is the thing that really changes the war, not just for Belgians, or Germans, but Europe and it is such a weird twist on the war, a rather nice nod to the opening POD. Once we let any one power violate Belgium we return to the consuming war. I think France would argue a limited violation is staying limited, harmless really, but the German reaction should destroy Belgium, it will be the battleground.

Indeed, I think too many thinkers jump from German victories in the East to a crushing offensive against France, usually in 1914. I think German planners would want it, but the war in the East is no simple to wrap up quick. The East is not so much positional and features more maneuver, but there will be some deep bloody battles, a line will be drawn and Russia will defend it, opportunity to turn flanks and move will keep the war deadly. And I agree, Russia is not easy to break, the pressure needs to be intense to start the collapse, but here it can come quicker. And that is not necessarily to Germany's benefit.

If we want big moves over ground in the West it can come early, and it may, a failed French offensive by the 5th, the Germans turning that flank, we might see a huge pocket form, the Germans may be pulling troops too early from Russia to exploit the gain, or more wheeling battles moving over France. But I do think it finds a line of resistance and the trench stalemate forms. The breakthrough battle will consume France and by the end be more for Germany to try to achieve/win.

The mutinies might be more a factor in curbing the French offensives, I still think the French fight when Germany attacks, but the malaise might be more than enough to convince France to get peace before it all falls apart. I think the mutiny is overplayed in defeating France but the better interpretation is that France must give up on her war aims, the French soldier will not die for that. But a Sitzkrieg should be more unlikely, Germany here will return to defeat France, if France eases up the Germans will apply the pressure. If we get that much revolution things unravel.

My preference is to take France to the right after the war, I think the rhetoric will sound good as memories fade, I can see surviving France quite plucky and would love to explore a "cold" war with "rightist" France and increasingly "socialist" Germany.

My best bet for a "decisive" move for France is the 5th getting into Luxembourg and battle destroying the iron ore production and impacting steel making. After that we could have some odd battles that play out differently. If Germany gets out onto French soil they can still be defeated, but I do not see France breaking into Germany itself.

One of the unexplored topics might be how this war is fought more on A-L, German territory, impacts the long term. Here the scares will be on German soil, the countryside devastated "French", the population having the war on its home ground, etc. France proper is mostly unaffected. How will the populace regard France then?

 

[FillyofDelphi]

I do believe the French are more likely early to see Belgium as the easy path out of the stalemate France cannot win. Here Germany has fallen into the advantages of the Belgians as a shield. Later the Germans will likely revisit Belgium as the obvious golden ticket around the stalemate. Belgium is not guaranteed anything but a dangerous brink.

To have France abandon Russia is a big divergence. I will ponder that. My initial reaction is it should come late as the proverbial writing gets clear on the literal wall. But maybe we see it earlier. If Germany appears too close to crushing Russia, would the French break and talk? Might be more likely with Britain just hanging on the sidelines. A German hegemony is far better for France than occupation. France can hope to get peace while the war is still mostly fought on German territory.

For France simply surviving may be the goal at some point. Indemnity, colonial concessions, then concede yet more of France. To avoid the later I think we see the French fight hard and be more generous in terms on cash or overseas prizes. But I admit that Britain will be having a hand in things. Germany will be well served to be circumspect. All told I do not see Germany defeating France sooner than 1916, but the gravity will be waxing faster and more inevitable. That is where I hope to find a white peace end in the West. I tend not to prefer a simply Germany curb stomps France and goes on to conquer the world tropes.

(Miacheal: I'll weigh in on your response to my own post tomorrow, as the time I have before I need to sleep is short)

Perhaps the French military will, but I'm hesitant to simply assume the civilian government would be so quick to sign off on such a dramatic course during the initial actions due to the potential diplomatic repercussions, the affect on public moral and opinion of themselves as press censorship would have not yet been fully implemented (Self-interest and job security are always powerful motivators). Unfortunately, this is also the time where the military advantage of using Belgium as a 'golden road' into Germany is at its maximum alongside France's capacity to exploit it: given German's larger manpower pool but shorter training and retention time of its professional troops vs. France, and Belgium still not having fully implemented and prepared defensive contingencies with a better of its pre-war preparations being directed to defend against an attack from the east rather than south, the earlier France conducts an offensive the more likely they'll be able to exploit any breakthroughs and the less able Germany will be able to respond (Particularly if they're still in a position where they have to actively defend in the East simultaneously). By the time such an action becomes politically pallitable, I'd argue its rather likely the window of opportunity has closed and any invasion of Belgium would end up costing France more than they could hope to gain, since in addition to the costs of the invasion they'd need to be able to overrun Belgium before Germany can re-position its forces to block the flanking attempt in order to gain any broader advantage. If Germany can move faster, which I'd say is nearly guaranteed barring strong external pressure elsewhere (Such as from a major Eastern offensive) due to the fact they're moving unopposed along interior, secure lines of communication/supply, than all they've accomplished is lengthening the front when they're already outnumbered; a net advantage to their opponents.

The question of France abandoning Russia early on runs into issues in the sense that the Franco-Russian alliance is considered the cornerstone of French security on the geopolitical level. They'd spent decades prying the eastern giant loose from Germany, strengthening their mutual relations (particularly in the arms industry and other strategically vital areas for both parties), and fending off German attempts to break them apart on the grounds that it was the only long-term way to insure Germany remained contained to its current size and could have its ambitions on the continent checked (Britain could be counted on, in its own interests, to deter the Germans at sea, and the two long-term rivals had already come to a naval-colonial understanding). She's too deeply invested to just throw in the towel, and knows full well that any repraive they'd get is only temporary and that they'd forever surrender the initiative on pressing their own interests on A-L and security on the Franco-German border. Somewhat similar to Nazi Germany in the next war, the Triple Entente was about as good a global position as France could reasonably hope to get: throwing Russia away when there's no options to replace her can only make her weaker and essentially surrender any pretense to Great Power status. I agree with you that, later on, domestic pressure and diminishing prospects of Russia being able to provide any meaningful benefit to France as she's worn down means tossing her to the wolves becomes increasingly likely (and vice-versa) in order to save France in the short to medium term from collapsing in on itself. The question is, though, how France goes about trying to retain its own agency/iniative in international affairs in a situation of German hegemony on the Continent and British domination of the colonies, since during the pre-war decades the rest of the world has already been more or less parceled out in its entirety. Does she concede to become a junior partner or still try to formulate her own "pole" by using diplomacy and oppritunistic moments to pick off peripheral allies from her rivals' spheres of influence?

 

[Tibi088]

I dont think that french moral and performance will be as good as OTL - mainly because of the different way of the war.

OTL Germany attacked France and occupied wast territories of it. It was not hard to justify a war like that to the french people.

ATL France declared war on Germany to honor its alliance treaty to Russia. Germany didnt invade France, didnt rape Belgium - they are sitting at their border and defending. And im not sure but I dont think that Russia was that popular with the french people to begin with. Meaning France will have much less reason to fight, much less to steel their resolve than OTL. Combine it with the senseless throving away of their lives in the battles... We might see a french collapse/revolution before Russia collapses. Especially if England is not in.

 

[Dorknought]

Germany planned on a short war as it only had finances for a short war. They kept 120,000,000 gold marks (English Sovereigns hoarded from the 1870 French indemnity) in the vault at Spandau Castle outside Berlin as a War Chest to finance mobilisation. Germany was unique in this respect. Germany realised that it's gold reserves were insufficient for mobilisation and war during the Agadir crisis and built them up in 1912-13. There aren't any 'long-war' options - it's like having 'surviving nuclear winter' plans by today's standards.

The Schlieffen Plan required 1.36 million troops and was executed with only 970 000...It was a budget what-if, Schlieffen didn't even game it. It was hand written notes till it was typed up in 1911 and in 1914 was in the possession of his elderly daughters who kept it with the family photos in a chest.

1. No. within 5 months, Germany will figure it can't win and seek a peace through Russia first as Falkenhayen tried in 1914.
2. Why open another front with Germany when you can contain them further south?
3. No. The Germans will balk first - especially if GB decides to join in.
4. Starting the war in the first place is unexpected because money 'n' shit (pre-1914 war was widely regarded as economic suicide - the stock markets didn't even register the 'drift to war')
5. No. Neither side can break through on so narrow a front.
6. Offer Alsace-Lorraine back to the French in return for Neutrality (FFS its the thing that causes ALL the problems) then Germany can go full-monkey Teuton-Slav showdown.

In all this there is little in it for Germany. An 'independent' Poland - wow. Why would the Germans want more Poles? They didn't even want millions of catholic Germans (aka Austrians). They already have access to 'Poland' through beneficial economic treaties with the Russians. Austria/Russia and Germany need to cooperate to keep Poland divided.

 

[Tibi088]

Germany planned on a short war as it only had finances for a short war. They kept 120,000,000 gold marks (English Sovereigns hoarded from the 1870 French indemnity) in the vault at Spandau Castle outside Berlin as a War Chest to finance mobilisation. Germany was unique in this respect. Germany realised that it's gold reserves were insufficient for mobilisation and war during the Agadir crisis and built them up in 1912-13. There aren't any 'long-war' options - it's like having 'surviving nuclear winter' plans by today's standards.

The Schlieffen Plan required 1.36 million troops and was executed with only 970 000...It was a budget what-if, Schlieffen didn't even game it. It was hand written notes till it was typed up in 1911 and in 1914 was in the possession of his elderly daughters who kept it with the family photos in a chest.

1. No. within 5 months, Germany will figure it can't win and seek a peace through Russia first as Falkenhayen tried in 1914.
2. Why open another front with Germany when you can contain them further south?
3. No. The Germans will balk first - especially if GB decides to join in.
4. Starting the war in the first place is unexpected because money 'n' shit (pre-1914 war was widely regarded as economic suicide - the stock markets didn't even register the 'drift to war')
5. No. Neither side can break through on so narrow a front.
6. Offer Alsace-Lorraine back to the French in return for Neutrality (FFS its the thing that causes ALL the problems) then Germany can go full-monkey Teuton-Slav showdown.

In all this there is little in it for Germany. An 'independent' Poland - wow. Why would the Germans want more Poles? They didn't even want millions of catholic Germans (aka Austrians). They already have access to 'Poland' through beneficial economic treaties with the Russians. Austria/Russia and Germany need to cooperate to keep Poland divided.

Im no expert in this regard but if your arguments in regards of the monetary situation is true how comes Germany was capable of more than 4 years of total war OTL among circumstances that seems much worse (meaning no Brittain ATL)?

And the german leaderhip went to war because they feared Russias growing army and because Russia decided that it will go to war against Austria because of Serbia. In its aims this was a defensive war for them.

 

[Dorknought]

4years total war trashed the worlds 3rd largest economy followed up by hyperinflation to wipe out every Germans lifetime savings.

 

[Tibi088]

4years total war trashed the worlds 3rd largest economy followed up by hyperinflation to wipe out every Germans lifetime savings.

Which is absolutly true. However OTL Russia collapsed well before that and I dont think that an ATL where Germany focuses on Russia the situation will be better for Saint Petersburg. And without british and especially american entry and much less aid my guess is France will be open for peace latest after the russian collapse. And thats if it doesnt collapse before it - not economically but the people simply refusing to throw away their lives by attacking german defenses without any result. They also wont have the motivation of liberating occupied France.

However you were talking about Germany collapsing first - actually much earlier than OTL in a comparativly better situation.

 

[MichaelWest]

(Miacheal: I'll weigh in on your response to my own post tomorrow, as the time I have before I need to sleep is short)

Perhaps the French military will, but I'm hesitant to simply assume the civilian government would be so quick to sign off on such a dramatic course during the initial actions due to the potential diplomatic repercussions, the affect on public moral and opinion of themselves as press censorship would have not yet been fully implemented (Self-interest and job security are always powerful motivators). Unfortunately, this is also the time where the military advantage of using Belgium as a 'golden road' into Germany is at its maximum alongside France's capacity to exploit it: given German's larger manpower pool but shorter training and retention time of its professional troops vs. France, and Belgium still not having fully implemented and prepared defensive contingencies with a better of its pre-war preparations being directed to defend against an attack from the east rather than south, the earlier France conducts an offensive the more likely they'll be able to exploit any breakthroughs and the less able Germany will be able to respond (Particularly if they're still in a position where they have to actively defend in the East simultaneously). By the time such an action becomes politically pallitable, I'd argue its rather likely the window of opportunity has closed and any invasion of Belgium would end up costing France more than they could hope to gain, since in addition to the costs of the invasion they'd need to be able to overrun Belgium before Germany can re-position its forces to block the flanking attempt in order to gain any broader advantage. If Germany can move faster, which I'd say is nearly guaranteed barring strong external pressure elsewhere (Such as from a major Eastern offensive) due to the fact they're moving unopposed along interior, secure lines of communication/supply, than all they've accomplished is lengthening the front when they're already outnumbered; a net advantage to their opponents.

The question of France abandoning Russia early on runs into issues in the sense that the Franco-Russian alliance is considered the cornerstone of French security on the geopolitical level. They'd spent decades prying the eastern giant loose from Germany, strengthening their mutual relations (particularly in the arms industry and other strategically vital areas for both parties), and fending off German attempts to break them apart on the grounds that it was the only long-term way to insure Germany remained contained to its current size and could have its ambitions on the continent checked (Britain could be counted on, in its own interests, to deter the Germans at sea, and the two long-term rivals had already come to a naval-colonial understanding). She's too deeply invested to just throw in the towel, and knows full well that any repraive they'd get is only temporary and that they'd forever surrender the initiative on pressing their own interests on A-L and security on the Franco-German border. Somewhat similar to Nazi Germany in the next war, the Triple Entente was about as good a global position as France could reasonably hope to get: throwing Russia away when there's no options to replace her can only make her weaker and essentially surrender any pretense to Great Power status. I agree with you that, later on, domestic pressure and diminishing prospects of Russia being able to provide any meaningful benefit to France as she's worn down means tossing her to the wolves becomes increasingly likely (and vice-versa) in order to save France in the short to medium term from collapsing in on itself. The question is, though, how France goes about trying to retain its own agency/iniative in international affairs in a situation of German hegemony on the Continent and British domination of the colonies, since during the pre-war decades the rest of the world has already been more or less parceled out in its entirety. Does she concede to become a junior partner or still try to formulate her own "pole" by using diplomacy and oppritunistic moments to pick off peripheral allies from her rivals' spheres of influence?

For clarity, my opinion is that France cannot abandon Russia, and in her commitment to Russia will be further obligated to launch every offensive she can. To the extent that position changes, it happens once the war is obviously lost, either as Russia collapses or if France is on the verge of utter defeat. Admittedly even after defeat we saw the Provisional Government in Russia stay to course. But at bottom each nation must save itself. So I agree but I remain open minded to the arguments or scenarios.

 

[MichaelWest]

Im no expert in this regard but if your arguments in regards of the monetary situation is true how comes Germany was capable of more than 4 years of total war OTL among circumstances that seems much worse (meaning no Brittain ATL)?

And the german leaderhip went to war because they feared Russias growing army and because Russia decided that it will go to war against Austria because of Serbia. In its aims this was a defensive war for them.

And I think this scenario reinforces the "defensive" nature of the war for Germany, beset by enemies, surrounded, the war to preserve Germany against her would be murderers. That puts German morale at 11 and gives her a different moral tone. A different coloring to the back drop of war that plays in both the Entente and CP sides.

As I did through war financing the subject is both complex and fascinating, we simply invented money, a house of cards that I believe we still live with. Internally I think each belligerent had capacity to finance the war it fought, limited by its domestic production and resources, you need trade or gold to get things you do not grow, mine or make, that was the throttle. Here France has more industry so is less dependent upon Britain, France could be exporting to Russia, using more of its gold versus credit. In some ways better off really. Germany might be importing more but losing gold faster, still creating more phantom money, winning she is in as bad of shape post-war. Russia has gold but weak ability to print money, the internal markets are too primitive to finesse the funny money, they still want tangible for tangible and they are beset by corruption and inefficiency. Britain might be a bigger lender, substituting for New York, but maybe not as much as we assume. France might buy a lot but France makes a lot more, Britain might not quite "get rich" on the war. The whole topic gets glossed because it is not sexy like battles, but here the pieces can fit different and the outcomes should be very interesting. This whole back stage part of the war will be an interesting dialogue.

 

[MichaelWest]

4years total war trashed the worlds 3rd largest economy followed up by hyperinflation to wipe out every Germans lifetime savings.

Germany "invented" funny money, triple book keeping, printing, inflation, the whole house of cards we run on today, but in theory all that internal debt could have led to greater wealth post-war. Rather than use inflation to devalue the debt and destroy the savings it represents, a post-war Germany could repay it from taxes, a circle, revenue in, payments out, and where does the money go? Restrict gold conversion and it is spent internally or re-invested in yet more new debt. Germany has created a massive national saving account, that funds bond floats to build infrastructure, it circulates wealth through the consumer economy, Germany invents the triple accounting economy where it is bigger on paper. That dog and pony show can go for decades, so long as no one cashes in or asks how it really works, we just debt up and spend, pushing the bubble to another day. Hyperinflation had more to do with tanking the reparations for me, the collateral damage was German savings, here the incentive is reversed, damp down inflation and our money looks more valuable so it is. Self fulfilling blue smoke and mirrors.

 

[Anchises]

1. I think its important to draw a distinction between strategy and tactics here. While yes, eventually on a tactical level the French probably won't be running headlong over no-man's land in red pants and a suicidal display of elan, on a broader front the realities of coalition warfare, home morale, German population and industrial superiority in a longer haul, ect. means strategically they have to do something to change the status quo and not just allow the Germans to dig in unopposed. This is especially true if they make a habit of it, as at some point the Germans are going to realize they aren't actually under threat from the West and will have established, in an environment without pressure, far tougher to crack defensive positions which would allow them direct a greater and greater share of their resources into operations on other fronts were the tactics and techniques of trench warfare are less effective/can be deployed for their own benefit or as force multipliers to their less well-equip allies (Offensives against Russia, assisting AH in protecting the Carpathians or advancing into Serbia, supporting CP allies in the Balkans, ect.), which puts a ticking clock on the Entente's advantage in numbers and the benefits of putting the enemy in a two front war by speeding the rate at which the situation in the east and trust in eventual relief by allies depletes to the point Russia collapses or pursues a separate peace. How they go about doing this will probably depend alot on the broader trends of this alternative Western front: operations that capture territory/succeed in their goals/show good casulty ratios will slowly be adopted while less effective tactics are phased out through (bloody and costly) experience, responding to changes in German defensive tactics as best they can. I imagine alot of this will be an increased focus on artillery, particularly or the heavy and indirect variety (Gas counter-measures will be adopted by Germany quickly) and the use of specialized formations like Alpine troops... though I imagine loses in the later will slowly reduce their effectiveness as the war goes on as the proffesional, specialized character of divisions are diluted as those with pre-war skills are lost to casulties and a greater and greater proportion of the manpower is made up of troops getting less and less training from a smaller and smaller number of "free" professionals. France certainly can't afford to use human wave tactics to beat the Germans... but they also can't afford to just sit on their hands, even if we discount the negative effects at home (in terms of civilian approval, troop morale, government stability, ect.) of imposing the burdens of a war economy on the nation without showing results.
2. This depends partially on the international situation: Paris will be watching very closely and constantly reaching out to see just how preferable terms they can get from powerful neutrals compared to German (Nations like the US and Britain) in terms of the security of the import of and availability of war materials, access to and rates of credit, ect. The better economic-diplomatic position France manages to get and the longer they hold it (thus becoming dependent on it, in the perspective sense the "shock" to the system of having to fall back on less preferable terms is going to be a lot harsher on a more depleted/stretched domestic resource base). It also becomes progressively more difficult to free up the required formations and supplies to conduct an offensive against Belgium, due to them already being commited elsewhere and the fact that the quality of troops is steadily decreasing while the Belgian fortifications and army remain (as long as they're at peace) more or less undiminished. Honestly, unless the situation gets truely desperate (IE until international credit has already dried up), I'd say France can run the calculations and see that bringing the Belgians into the war as an effective German co-belligerant and losing the prospect of future alliances abroad is far too high a cost for the potential advantage of outflanking the Germans (Assuming they can punch through the Belgians quickly enough to prevent the re-jiggering of German lines)
3. If Russia drops out, especially if they do so earlier than IOTL (Which they would in any situation where France more or less gives them and their concerns the middle finger), I highly doubt the UK is going to be willing to prop up France long enough to wear down the Germans. Even if they're willing to ignore the fact that France just showed they can't be trusted to bear any notable cost to defend their ally's interest in the breach (A fact which London might take offense to, consider they feel France has obligations to them as well), Germany either has A) hegemony in the East in the face of a collapsing Russia, allowing direct integration of its resources in to their war economy once they pacify the area or B) Access to the output of a more stable Russia to help feed their population and supply their industry. Assuming no intervention by the US is on the horizon, credit and manpower is bound to dry up for them before it does for the CP who's vulnerability to blockade has been noticably reduced and morale and warmaking capacity for the Western front has just received a fairly substantial boost.
4. Yes, large scale troop movements tend to be difficult to conceal. The sheer time and amount of stuff moving around and whatnot.
5. There's always a chance, but I think its highly unlikely assuming the Germans are half way competent (which they are). France simply lacks the immediately available firepower or breath of strategic options needed to brute force or maneuver her way around a Germany adopting a more passive or defensive stance in the narrow, geographically defensable corridor of A-L, and German interior logistics are good enough in the region that they can respond fast enough for a reasonable number of localized mistakes or cases of bad luck to be compensated for without allowing for a major breakthrough. France needs quite the string of good dice rolls.

Personally, I'm interested in what the results of this shift would be in terms of the diplomatic stances of various neutrals and intra-CP relations. For example, if resources are freed in the West; especially offensive-heavy ones like siege artillery (that was historically directed against Belgian forts), I imagine they'd be available for a stronger initial showing against Serbia. Making that front quicker and far less bloody for Vienna really helps her keep an independent position within the alliance structure as well as improve her military prospects elsewhere, not to mention increases their standing in the eyes of other Balkan counteries. Does Bulgaria jump in on the CP bandwagon earlier (or, alternatively, try to stage a fait accompli in Macedonia) if the Serbian position is collapsing? The position of the Pro-interventionalist faction in Greece is certainly going to be shattered, at least those leaning on the Entente side, while Italy and Romania are going to perceive Austrian war-making capabilities as far greater than IOTL. If the Balkans look like a lost cause to the Entente, I could also see them trying to woo the Turks into joining the alliance or at least remaining neutral to allow for the flow of commerce via the Straits. The knock-on effects on an Entente Ottomans are something I'd really like to see...

1. I agree. Germany is probably going to get into a "Siegesrausch/victory craze" in the East once they realize that the feared steamroller is not going to materialize. National morale in Germany is going to be high due to the new "Drang nach Osten". France on the other hand will bleed itself white against german trenches for Alsace-Lorraine and to relieve Russia. Revanchism might not have the same weight once entire villages perish at the Frontier and Russia isn't particularly likeable (Autocracy and all...) and from 1915 onward even the average Frenchmen might see the writing on the wall for Nicky...

2. Good arguments. In my opinion Britain would "bankroll" the French war effort to a degree. Preferential trade, low interest credits, subtile diplomatic help and even limited material support. The same might be true for Russia to a degree.

As an aside: I was thinking about the Russian munition crisis. Assuming that Britain is neutral, they might be able to deliver more artillery shells than OTL. What effect would this have ? On the one hand foreign shells are cheaper, delaying the massive inflation. On the other hand being dependent on foreign production is a weakness. My gut tells me that a functional domestic production would be better in the long run. Maybe we would see British deliveries to prevent the Munition crisis ITTL. This might lead to a bloodier 1915. However more shells don't necessarily lead to a better Russian performance. If we don't see a Great Retreat the Russians might lose Tsarist discipline earlier because the Tsarist armies would be grinded to dust in the Galicia-Poland meat grinder. Potentially we might even some encirclements ITTL. Without the "munition scapegoat" it becomes much harder for STAVKA to justify necessary retreats in a climate of nationalist fervor.

A French attack through Belgium as a desperate hail mary would have potential for a great TL...

3. Well I think Great Britain would not necessarily prop up France in such a scenario. With trade barriers and a potential economic blockade they have the leverage to moderate German demands in the West though. Britain is going to play an active role in the peace negotiations and Germany is forced to make some concessions. I could see a scenario where France gets away with "a black eye and a few broken rips", meaning massive debts to GB and the loss of some colonies to Germany. Germany needs free trade in a post war situation, so they are forced to cooperate with Britain. Especially if they are exhausted and in debt.

4. True.

5. Yeah and in all honesty the German army in the early war years (at least 1914) was better suited for this new kind of war. France needs time to adapt their offensive strategies, which gives Germany enough time to develop defensive measures.

Neutrals: Indeed that is an interesting field.

I agree with your assessment about A-H. With reduced Russian pressure in 1914 A-H is a political and military player on its own and not the dead weight of OTL. This completely changes the situations in the Balkan.

Entente Ottomans are unlikely I think. Once the writing on the wall for Russia is obvious the Ottomans could easily launch an opportunistic offensive into the Kaukasus. On the Entente side they don't have much to gain I think.

And I do hope to keep Belgium neutral, it is the thing that really changes the war, not just for Belgians, or Germans, but Europe and it is such a weird twist on the war, a rather nice nod to the opening POD. Once we let any one power violate Belgium we return to the consuming war. I think France would argue a limited violation is staying limited, harmless really, but the German reaction should destroy Belgium, it will be the battleground.

Indeed, I think too many thinkers jump from German victories in the East to a crushing offensive against France, usually in 1914. I think German planners would want it, but the war in the East is no simple to wrap up quick. The East is not so much positional and features more maneuver, but there will be some deep bloody battles, a line will be drawn and Russia will defend it, opportunity to turn flanks and move will keep the war deadly. And I agree, Russia is not easy to break, the pressure needs to be intense to start the collapse, but here it can come quicker. And that is not necessarily to Germany's benefit.

If we want big moves over ground in the West it can come early, and it may, a failed French offensive by the 5th, the Germans turning that flank, we might see a huge pocket form, the Germans may be pulling troops too early from Russia to exploit the gain, or more wheeling battles moving over France. But I do think it finds a line of resistance and the trench stalemate forms. The breakthrough battle will consume France and by the end be more for Germany to try to achieve/win.

The mutinies might be more a factor in curbing the French offensives, I still think the French fight when Germany attacks, but the malaise might be more than enough to convince France to get peace before it all falls apart. I think the mutiny is overplayed in defeating France but the better interpretation is that France must give up on her war aims, the French soldier will not die for that. But a Sitzkrieg should be more unlikely, Germany here will return to defeat France, if France eases up the Germans will apply the pressure. If we get that much revolution things unravel.

My preference is to take France to the right after the war, I think the rhetoric will sound good as memories fade, I can see surviving France quite plucky and would love to explore a "cold" war with "rightist" France and increasingly "socialist" Germany.

My best bet for a "decisive" move for France is the 5th getting into Luxembourg and battle destroying the iron ore production and impacting steel making. After that we could have some odd battles that play out differently. If Germany gets out onto French soil they can still be defeated, but I do not see France breaking into Germany itself.

One of the unexplored topics might be how this war is fought more on A-L, German territory, impacts the long term. Here the scares will be on German soil, the countryside devastated "French", the population having the war on its home ground, etc. France proper is mostly unaffected. How will the populace regard France then?

1) The only way I could see a violation of Belgian neutrality without the "return" (start in this TL) to the consuming war is a late war scenario. Britain has abandoned France for some reason and Russia has already collapsed. It is clear that France is going to lose and Germany goes all in with a late war attack through Belgium. This is highly unlikely though and I would prefer continued Belgian neutrality.

2) Oh the Russian collapse could potentially be even more messy than IOTL. Especially if A-H is still a force to be reckoned with at the end of the war. Inter CP fights over the spoils, no Lenin and a more messy political situation etc.

3) Agreed.

4) I honestly think French Soldier Soviets and a widespread Revolution starting in the Army is a realistic and cool way to end the war for France. Without the "Tanks and Americans" (at least without the Americans) that Petain promised the mutinies could be more severe than IOTL.

5) Ooooh, the postwar political situation in Europe is were the BIG butterflies happen.

A right wing France: Very interesting indeed. If we don't want a mere "Center-Right" government french losses have to be lower than IOTL to allow renewed Revanchism. And you have a lot of ways to shape a very interesting radical right in post war France. Depending on how the French war effort collapses the french radical right would develop radically different ideas from OTLs Fascism.

For example: If we have army mutinies slowly escalating into a full blown "Revolution for Peace" there is no way that a "stab in the back myth" forms. So we might see a National Populist right wing that deeply mistrusts the French army establishment.

Socialist Germany: There I am not on board. Germany wouldn't be Socialist imho. The SPD is pretty much destined to move to the Center. After the Burgfrieden of WW1 they would probably start a slow but fundamental transformation towards being a political party accepted by the Elites of the Kaiserreich. This would probably lead to an even faster drift to the Center than IOTL. Given their potential coalition partners (Liberals) I just don't think we would see Socialist economic reforms. The SPD would probably focus on Civil Rights, corporatist measures of worker participation (Betriebsräte and strengthening the Unions), expanding the social security net and fighting against the deeply entrenched economic cartels.

The way I see it a victorious Kaiserreich would have the following political players:

The two large parties would be Reactionaries and the SocDems (championing a mixed economy with corporatist elements, essentially a less refined slightly more lefty version of OTLs "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" that is the basis for the FRG economy).

We would have Liberals (with a left party wing and a nationalistic party wing). A genuine Socialist party that is formed due to a SPD split (Luxemburg in the Reichstag is a hilarious thought) and at some point the Zentrum would probably drop their strict Catholicism and turn into a genuine Center-Right party with a "Volkskonservativ" bent (essentially the ideological predecessor to today's CDU).

 

[Anchises]

(2) And I am hopefully Germany learns both coalition and global war as this unwinds. Frankly I feel the POD is merely accident rather than design, but avoiding Belgium opens the German eyes to how war is more than just moves on the field, more than battles or tactics. I hope they re-read Clausewitz and apply the political aspects to victory. My grossly glossed thought is funds run dry by 1916, that is the Entente clock, and French morale remains good but when it falters ITL it breaks. In OTL French soldiers are still defending France, the Germans are invaders, and that may hold true here as big offensives begin after the shift back West, but after years of fighting the offensive war, it should be demoralizing to attack yet again, the objective just too hollow.

(3) We should consider a far less effective blockade as Britain's contribution and France should remain committed to taking pressure off Russia. But as she retires inland to trade space for time, France will press for her own relief. It will not break the Entente early but it is a new pressure point. We should not easily give Russia going for an early peace separate but separate peace deals should look better here. Without the bailout offered by the USA I think we see a more obvious precipice.

(5) This narrow front is an absolute cauldron, once we decide on where it settles into the stalemate, the attrition begins with no obvious ways to break it but Belgium. I think the thought lingers and it is constantly planned for, even as reacting to the other side. But long term it will be Germany who could mass enough forces to make a breakthrough. Unless you have a late war entry by Britain, France will be seeing a dangerous day looming once Germany can go defensive East and mass West. Victory? we shall see.

Indeed, the math for all the fence sitters gets recalculated. We might see some obvious choices, some not so obvious and a few weird realignments. This war is not so certain despite being so tempting as a CP-wank. Italy as a wavering neutral or the Ottomans being wooed to neutrality by Britain is truly epic alterations.

2) After a costly victory in a more limited WW1 (probably would be called the Long War or the Great War even in Germany) Germany would probably "grow into its shoes" actually mastering Coalition warfare and global strategy.

That being said: As I wrote in my previous post: A genuine break of French morale is really interesting. Mutinies spiraling out of control offer a lot of interesting butterflies for a post war France.

3) A separate peace deal for Russia is a potential cop-out if one wants to avoid all the nastiness of Russian history IOTL. Nicky won't stay but if more of the Tsarist state survives the war we might see a more moderate political landscape ITTLs post war Russia.

5) I always assumed that, once the Great German offensive in the West becomes a real possibility, France might drop Russia for a separate peace with acceptable conditions. Britain at this point might back them with economic muscle to at least salvage some kind of balance of power in Western Europe.

Perhaps the French military will, but I'm hesitant to simply assume the civilian government would be so quick to sign off on such a dramatic course during the initial actions due to the potential diplomatic repercussions, the affect on public moral and opinion of themselves as press censorship would have not yet been fully implemented (Self-interest and job security are always powerful motivators). Unfortunately, this is also the time where the military advantage of using Belgium as a 'golden road' into Germany is at its maximum alongside France's capacity to exploit it: given German's larger manpower pool but shorter training and retention time of its professional troops vs. France, and Belgium still not having fully implemented and prepared defensive contingencies with a better of its pre-war preparations being directed to defend against an attack from the east rather than south, the earlier France conducts an offensive the more likely they'll be able to exploit any breakthroughs and the less able Germany will be able to respond (Particularly if they're still in a position where they have to actively defend in the East simultaneously). By the time such an action becomes politically pallitable, I'd argue its rather likely the window of opportunity has closed and any invasion of Belgium would end up costing France more than they could hope to gain, since in addition to the costs of the invasion they'd need to be able to overrun Belgium before Germany can re-position its forces to block the flanking attempt in order to gain any broader advantage. If Germany can move faster, which I'd say is nearly guaranteed barring strong external pressure elsewhere (Such as from a major Eastern offensive) due to the fact they're moving unopposed along interior, secure lines of communication/supply, than all they've accomplished is lengthening the front when they're already outnumbered; a net advantage to their opponents.

The question of France abandoning Russia early on runs into issues in the sense that the Franco-Russian alliance is considered the cornerstone of French security on the geopolitical level. They'd spent decades prying the eastern giant loose from Germany, strengthening their mutual relations (particularly in the arms industry and other strategically vital areas for both parties), and fending off German attempts to break them apart on the grounds that it was the only long-term way to insure Germany remained contained to its current size and could have its ambitions on the continent checked (Britain could be counted on, in its own interests, to deter the Germans at sea, and the two long-term rivals had already come to a naval-colonial understanding). She's too deeply invested to just throw in the towel, and knows full well that any repraive they'd get is only temporary and that they'd forever surrender the initiative on pressing their own interests on A-L and security on the Franco-German border. Somewhat similar to Nazi Germany in the next war, the Triple Entente was about as good a global position as France could reasonably hope to get: throwing Russia away when there's no options to replace her can only make her weaker and essentially surrender any pretense to Great Power status. I agree with you that, later on, domestic pressure and diminishing prospects of Russia being able to provide any meaningful benefit to France as she's worn down means tossing her to the wolves becomes increasingly likely (and vice-versa) in order to save France in the short to medium term from collapsing in on itself. The question is, though, how France goes about trying to retain its own agency/iniative in international affairs in a situation of German hegemony on the Continent and British domination of the colonies, since during the pre-war decades the rest of the world has already been more or less parceled out in its entirety. Does she concede to become a junior partner or still try to formulate her own "pole" by using diplomacy and oppritunistic moments to pick off peripheral allies from her rivals' spheres of influence?

1) A well reasoned argument. However a desperate French gamble with a late war attack into Belgium before the Germans start rapidly deploying Eastern Front troops to the West is appealing. Especially because I could see a revolutionary approach where France tries to use tanks even more than IOTL. Maybe due to some butterflies their development of tank models is more successful and they enjoy some successes.

2) France would abandon Russia early on, only under very rare circumstances. But in the Mid and Late War this is a reasonable possibility from my point of view. Once it becomes clear that A-L is an unreachable goal the order of the day would probably be damage control. Later on I could definitely see a France that "rages" against being a second rate power with all means. This could lay the groundwork for renewed conflict in Europe or the colonies. Not even necessarily a military conflict but a "fault line" of European politics.

4years total war trashed the worlds 3rd largest economy followed up by hyperinflation to wipe out every Germans lifetime savings.

In this scenario they don't necessarily need 4 years. Once we see the initial victories in the East the OHL and the Reichskanzler would probably accept a very high price to ban the danger of a future two front war. Neutering Russia would be something highly prioritized, so I don't think Germany would sue for peace IOTL.

Germany "invented" funny money, triple book keeping, printing, inflation, the whole house of cards we run on today, but in theory all that internal debt could have led to greater wealth post-war. Rather than use inflation to devalue the debt and destroy the savings it represents, a post-war Germany could repay it from taxes, a circle, revenue in, payments out, and where does the money go? Restrict gold conversion and it is spent internally or re-invested in yet more new debt. Germany has created a massive national saving account, that funds bond floats to build infrastructure, it circulates wealth through the consumer economy, Germany invents the triple accounting economy where it is bigger on paper. That dog and pony show can go for decades, so long as no one cashes in or asks how it really works, we just debt up and spend, pushing the bubble to another day. Hyperinflation had more to do with tanking the reparations for me, the collateral damage was German savings, here the incentive is reversed, damp down inflation and our money looks more valuable so it is. Self fulfilling blue smoke and mirrors.

Agreed. Without the Reparations who crippled the German export driven economy (no merchant marine etc.) they are able to slowly pay back the debts or get a "house of cards" economy going. My gut says that the pretty conservative German financial elite would be hellbent on austerity and deflationary measures to quickly reduce the massive war debt. It wouldn't be a pretty time but with gains in the East, an intact economy, possible French reparations and maybe a shorter war Germany would be able to stomach high war debt.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

(1) And I sadly too often give gloss to this assuming it is obvious. The French cannot achieve their war aims, the return of A-L, without an offensive, they must attack Germany, gain ground, defeat Armies, win the war. That does not mean the French do not change tactics, better infantry-artillery cooperation, camouflage, heavier artillery, etc., all should flow out but the French will be attempting to mount another offensive every time they can. Germany can sit defensive in the West but that is not passive. They will draw in the French, attempt to defeat them in detail, use artillery and machineguns, attempt to flank salients, counter attack, attempt offensives or counter-offensives for better position on the terrain, etc. And they will learn tactics as well. Germany here is weighing its effort towards Russia but still has a lot of men and forces to apply in not merely holding the French but defeating them in battles designed to waste their men and material. The problem in this era is that the gains are slight over the costs.

(2) And I am hopefully Germany learns both coalition and global war as this unwinds. Frankly I feel the POD is merely accident rather than design, but avoiding Belgium opens the German eyes to how war is more than just moves on the field, more than battles or tactics. I hope they re-read Clausewitz and apply the political aspects to victory. My grossly glossed thought is funds run dry by 1916, that is the Entente clock, and French morale remains good but when it falters ITL it breaks. In OTL French soldiers are still defending France, the Germans are invaders, and that may hold true here as big offensives begin after the shift back West, but after years of fighting the offensive war, it should be demoralizing to attack yet again, the objective just too hollow.

(3) We should consider a far less effective blockade as Britain's contribution and France should remain committed to taking pressure off Russia. But as she retires inland to trade space for time, France will press for her own relief. It will not break the Entente early but it is a new pressure point. We should not easily give Russia going for an early peace separate but separate peace deals should look better here. Without the bailout offered by the USA I think we see a more obvious precipice.

(5) This narrow front is an absolute cauldron, once we decide on where it settles into the stalemate, the attrition begins with no obvious ways to break it but Belgium. I think the thought lingers and it is constantly planned for, even as reacting to the other side. But long term it will be Germany who could mass enough forces to make a breakthrough. Unless you have a late war entry by Britain, France will be seeing a dangerous day looming once Germany can go defensive East and mass West. Victory? we shall see.

Indeed, the math for all the fence sitters gets recalculated. We might see some obvious choices, some not so obvious and a few weird realignments. This war is not so certain despite being so tempting as a CP-wank. Italy as a wavering neutral or the Ottomans being wooed to neutrality by Britain is truly epic alterations.

1) You almost read my mind on this point. If I could add one detail, though, I think its important to also emphasize that the nature of western front style low-mobility warfare gives a natural advantage not only to the defender, but to militaries with a certain operational culture that happened to be the forte of the German General staff. The German idea focused more on breaking down broader, specifically defined strategic goals (though still limited in scope) into a series of shorter-term and lower-intensity actions and adaptions, which naturally fits into an environment in which the risk of any active advance is greater and the costs inherently higher, and the effect of any single move/decision on the final tally is limited compared to maneuver warfare. Though both sides will of course innovate on a tactical level, strategic thinking in France is only going to fully advance once the staff officers get weeded through, which by the nature of Third Republic politics and popular sentiments could take years (See American Civil War for a similar effect). The dominant clique in that nation still takes a more bird's eye view of consolidating actions into more impactful, broad scale offensive packages where they can seize and exploit a decisive result/advantage that can be exploited and rolled over into further successes (Which is why the French military is likely to be far more eager to take the Belgian hinge than Paris is, while the opposite was true in Germany and really only adopted IOTL as an 'only viable option' in the on paper highly unbalanced geopolitical balance of total military power)

2) Germany I imagine moves faster in terms of innovation of technique at least, though technology/equipment is more of a toss up and depends on how much funding, human, industrial/engineering, and infrastructural resources they can dedicate to innovation and how much they can risk the disruptions/inefficiencies in shifting production during critical moments. Lots of butterflies here. But such rate will swing towards Germany over time as they'll have a broader range of experiences to draw on from officers and cadres of troops operating on other fronts and France's higher casualty rate among its "innovative" troops from using them offensively will slow the accumulation of experience and quality of informal training/experience. Over time, relative lose rates would snowball in Germany's favor... Though considering the tight control France has over its press during the war the impact of this is probably minimized until it reaches a critical pressure and the repressed news of just how far reality differed from the widely dispensed and government approved illusion on the situation at the front and in Germany is exposed. This is likely either when credit runs dry and there's a notable import drop, or a major mutiny occurs, which would create a backlash strong enough to bring down the government and cause France to seek peace even at Russia's expense. When exactly that is depends a lot on the situation in Russia (who also needs capitalization to keep running), the degree to which normal commerce can continue to reduce dependency on a fast rate of tapping gold/forgien currency reserves and securable assets abroad (Especially by Russia, and decided in many ways by the status of the Straits and the ability to export via the Black Sea) by using commodity exports as a revenue stream and slow the impact of the decline in civilian consumption of private industry, and just how much Westminster is willing to stick out its neck and press it's thumb on the City of London to "ease" French access to credit.

3) in order to formally blockade Germany Britain needs to have entered the war; something of which I'm not exactly sure of

(I'll continue my response later; I have work to do)