A Destiny Realized: A Timeline of Afsharid Iran and Beyond
- Thread starter Nassirisimo
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Well the main objects toward economic development in the future will be low population densities, and really, really poor communications. Iran is largely free of navigable rivers (the Karun being a notable exception), and distances are enormous. A good comparison would actually be Russia, which had pretty low densities and enormous distances (St Petersburg is about 700 km from Moscow, to compare to Iran Mashhad is about 800 km from Tehran). In the UK, Birmingham is a mere 170 km from London, and the relatively easy terrain made a canal network an easier proposition than in Iran and Moscow. Things in Iran can only really change with the railway, though it would be hard to do worse than OTL (in the 1900s Iran had about 30 kilometers of railway in the whole country!).
Who would have think that girls get so upset when you murder their families?................
Reza Qoli, you are a terrible husband. I know why you did it, but still...
A very good question. Christendom had originally shared the Islamic dislike of many of the features of a modern banking system, but nothing changes attitudes like need. In the 19th century of OTL, banks in the Muslim World tended to be owned and financed by Westerners, which took away the impetus to develop indigenous financial institutions akin to those in Europe (though they were hardly unique in this. Japan of course had a sophisticated system of credit and finance in place, and was able to develop without significant recourse to foreign capital).
To try and bring these strains of thought together, I suppose that what happens depends largely on the role of European finance in TTL's 19th century. Although Iran will have a better 18th century economically, as I pointed out earlier Iran's geography hampers the creation of a truly modern economy before technologies like the railway. As long as a national market cannot be developed, it is likely that economies will remain local and financial institutions will remain primitive.
(of course, if someone does have more expertise on this, I am always happy to be schooled!)
And *hopefully* it's better this time around too!
Iran's Expansion to the North and South: 1740 to 1743
Empire of Pearls: Nader's Expansion in the Persian Gulf
The lands surrounding the Persian Gulf had long been under the sphere of influence of the power which held the Iranian Plateau, and the same had been true of the Safavids. However, for the Safavids the region was not a particularly important one, despite the not-too-insignificant revenue generated [1]. The Safavids had chased the Portuguese from the region, capturing their strongholds of Bahrain and Hormuz, but the area never figured as great in the mind as poorer regions closer to home. Despite the heat and aridity of the Persian Gulf, the area had been home to a number of areas of population and was something of a centre of economic activity. Bahrain in particular was a centre of the pearling industry, and alongside Bandar Abbas and Bushehr served as an important port for trade between Iran, Mesopotamia and India. However, the region had suffered greatly from the collapse of the Safavid Empire, as both the Omanis and Arabs from Central Arabia had raided and settled in the region, laying waste to its settlements and leading to a significant decline in population [2].
Bahrain had been held by the Omanis, sold back to the Iranians and then occupied once again by Houla tribes, but in 1736 Nader Shah had sent a fleet under Latif Khan to recapture the island and restore it to Iranian rule. For the time being, this merely represented the restoration of previous Iranian control in the Gulf, though Nader’s ambitions for the region were wider than a simple repetition of what had come before. With his victories in India and the subsequent glut of cash, Nader finally had the resources to undertake a serious project of expansion in the region. Leaving his most trusted subordinate, Muhammad Taqi Khan in control of the region, he ordered the construction of a number of ships. The Persian Gulf region was very lightly forested, so wood was brought at great expense from the Alborz Mountains, and English and Dutch merchants were press-ganged as ship builders and commanders for the fleet. However, this first incarnation of the Iranian fleet ended up in disaster, as the Houla Arabs who manned the fleet deserted, and the Omanis inflicted a stinging defeat, even killing an English vice-admiral in Iranian service [3].
Nader was not one to give up so easily however, and this time imported ships from India to add to his fleet at Bandar Abbas. This naval force, although not quite up to European standards, was an imposing force nonetheless. The predominate “Ship of the Line” as would be recognised by Europeans, was the Grab, an Indian design which incorporated European rigging. These ships were crewed by a mixture of Houla Arabs who had returned back to the fleet as well as Bengali deserters from English and French ships operating from India (much as the Europeans resented this, there was little they could to return these fugitives back to their service). This force was further augmented by two large ships from the Imam of Oman, who hoped for Iranian support in the Civil War ongoing in Oman. In 1743, the Iranians successfully took Muscat, and with the help of Imam Saif bin Sultan, pacified much of the rest of the country over the next few years, turning it into a tributary of Iran.
This would not be the only success of the Iranian navy during the rule of Nader. The Iranians were able to go quite some way toward curbing piracy in the Gulf, targeting the pirate strongholds in Dubai and Abu Dhabi and capturing the oasis of al-Hasa on the Eastern coast of Arabia. These successes would also be followed up in the later wars with the Ottomans, with the navy assisting with the campaign in Southern Mesopotamia. Although it had been difficult to establish, and indeed was still largely crewed by non-Persians, the Iranian navy had by the latter part of Nader Shah’s reign become a relatively effective tool for protecting trade, fighting piracy and projecting power in the Persian Gulf and Arabian sea, and had encouraged the construction of a much smaller fleet in the Caspian Sea to protect Iranian interests there.
[1] – The revenue that came from the Gulf in the Safavid era was roughly 65,000 Tomans a year, which was probably slightly more than the income from Gilan, a wealthy rice and silk producing province on the Caspian Sea coast. An astonishing figure when one considers the aridity of the region, or the fact that it is “hotter than hell” from June to September.
[2] – Not as bad as OTL’s 18th century decline though. Bahrain reportedly lost most of its villages, as well as most of its native population in OTL due to continuous conflicts. The al-Khamis mosque in Bilad al-Qadeem which was Bahrain’s first, was probably ruined in this era and stands as a testament to the disaster of the 18th century for Bahrain.
[3] – Which actually happened in OTL. The English seemed to have more demanded of them by the Iranians than the Dutch did, which is somewhat unfair, but seems to have paid off somewhat as the Iranians relied mainly on EIC shipbuilders in Surat to build their navy.
* * * * * *
Khiva: October, 1740
Khiva: October, 1740
Every now and then, an isolated cannon shot would ring from the walls of Khiva. Most fell too short, and simply didn’t have the range to meet the Iranian guns. And yet the Iranian guns were too low calibre to do anything other than chip away at the masonry of the walls.
To the uninitiated, it would have seemed that the siege of Khiva had turned into a stalemate similar to that of the previous siege of Kandahar, more than two years ago. However, things had changed since then. Reza Qoli waited at the head of his men, in a shallow trench about 300 meters away from the wall. He peered at the walls, waiting for the signal to move.
A flash of light, the sounds of an enormous explosion, and the expulsion of smoke and debris was the signal, as Iranian Sappers blew an enormous hole in the walls of the city. A section of the wall came crumbling down, and Reza unsheathed his sword, held it aloft and screamed “Allah-u-Akbar!” His men cheered, and followed him, sprinting toward the walls.
A sound of shot from the wall, and a man beside him fell. But for every man that fell, there were ten behind him, and the resistance to the Iranian assault seemed dispirited. A party of determined Uzbeks stood at the breach, stood with swords ready and flanked by musketeers fumbling to load their guns. The Iranian assault troops smashed into the Uzbeks, swords swinging and blood spraying. Reza held the sword-arm of an Uzbek, as he thrust his dagger until his belly. The Uzbek looked with surprise as he fell, screaming in agony and terror.
Reza lunged at one of the musketeers who was attempting to scramble up the remains of the wall to safety, slashing at the man’s tendons, and watching him tumble back down, before his neck was broken by the boot of another Iranian.
With only a minute of fighting, the rest of the Uzbeks fled into the city, the others throwing down their weapons and crying for mercy. Reza and his troops cautiously approached them, as a turbaned figure on a horse emerged from between two buildings.
The man held his arms aloft, and called out to Reza. “I am Ilbars Khan, Emir of Khiva. Whom do I have the honour of addressing?”
Reza sheathed his sword. “I am Reza Qoli, son of Nader Shah of Iran. You can get down from your horse now”
The man complied, silently dismounting, and taking his sword in its sheath from its belt, which he presented to Reza. “I surrender my city… and my kingdom”.
Reza shook his head. “I am not the Shah. Come with me, and you will present your surrender to my father”
As Ilbars Khan was led through the Iranian Army, he was met with the many faces of the Iranian soldiers. Some were painted with disgust, others seemed to be smirking mockingly. Many of these men were from Khorasan, and had experienced first-hand the terror of Khivan slavers. Ilbars’ heart sank, when he realised that these men would be satisfied with nothing less than his death.
Reza, Ilbars and the accompanying men reached Nader, who was sat outside his tent. A soldier hit his Jazāyer into the back of Ilbars’ knees, forcing him to kneel in front of the Shah.
“What a miserable looking fellow” Nader remarked
“The Great Khan of Khiva, Ilbars Khan” Reza’s tone was mocking as he explained to his father.
“It would appear as though your circumstances have been reduced, ‘Great Khan’” Nader smiled as he looked down at Ilbars, whose eyes glared at the ground in front of Nader. He could not bear to look the Shah in the eye.
Nader turned to Reza. “How many men dead in the assault my son?”
Reza shrugged. “I’m not sure. I suppose around 2000 or 3000?”
Nader’s head shook as he looked back at Ilbars. “That’s a lot of men who will never go back home, for the obstinacy of one man”
Ilbars was still silent, still glaring at the ground. “Look at me!” Nader roared at him, finally provoking a reaction from Ilbars, who looked at Nader, grimacing in fear.
* * * * * *
Nader's Smaller Campaigns: Central Asia and Dagestan
Nader's Smaller Campaigns: Central Asia and Dagestan
Nader had experienced a great deal of success in Turkestan as he had done in India. Though there were not the enormous riches to be seized, he had successfully suppressed the slavers of the Khanates of the region, returning a great number of slaves to their original homelands (including several thousand Russians) and annexing much of the region with the exception of Bukhara, which remained autonomous as an Iranian tributary. Upon his successful conquest of the region, he returned once again to Khorasan. Although his stay would only be two months, much was to change. Both Kalat, the site of his palace and treasury, as well as Mashhad, the administrative centre of Khorasan, were endowed with public buildings including baths, markets and mosques. More than many other actions, Nader’s preferential treatment of Khorasan perhaps betrayed his ultimate loyalty, which was not to his Afshar tribe but to his home province, which was spared the rapacious tax regime seen elsewhere in Iran. His treasury and his mausoleum were located in the region, and it was the main recruiting ground in Iran for his armies.
As well as various building projects, Nader also took stock of his court. The preceding year had seen a deterioration of relations between Nader and his eldest son, Reza Qoli. Following Reza’s brave conduct in Turkestan, as well as a perceived moderation in his behaviour, Nader seemingly decided it was time to mend bridges with his eldest, marrying him to the young daughter of Abu ‘Ul-Faiz as he desired and appointing him as the governor of Fars. For the time being, he was in control of the rivalries that had occurred in his court, and was confident enough to embark on a campaign into Dagestan, where his armies overawed the Lazgi tribes and secured the submission of most Lazgi Chiefs. In the winter of 1741, the last centres of Lazgi resistance had collapsed, and for the time being at least, the province had been pacified [4].
However, success against the Lazgis was overshadowed in the January of 1742 by the return of envoys from the Ottoman Empire with an answer to the messages Nader had sent in 1738. The Ottomans remained intransigent, refusing to accept the Ja'fari Madhab or Iran’s status as a Sunni Muslim country. This time, Nader’s reply highlighted threats against Mesopotamia and Eastern Anatolia, both of which had been ruled by Iranian Empires in the past. Although this was underlined by a stated desire for friendship and a peaceful end to their differences, Nader made it undoubtedly clear that war was on the cards was the Ottoman Sultan not to prove agreeable. To back up his proclamation of Iran as a Sunni Nation, a decree was also sent to Iran, re-affirming the bans on Ashura Commemorations including “Haydar”, or ritual self-flagellation. In an effort to discredit his predecessors, the Safavids were condemned as stirring up disputes through their support of militant Shi’ism. Perhaps hinting at future ambitions to the North, Nader also sent a complaint to the Russian Tsar, accusing him of supporting rebels in the Caucasus.
However, although several preparations were made for a war with Russia, these had to be put on hold once news came that the Ottomans were mobilizing troops in both the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. Apparently, this was to be the Ottoman answer to Nader’s demands and veiled threats. Nader was determined to meet this mobilization in kind, and began assembling the largest army in Iranian history so far, one that was to dwarf the forces at Marathon and Thermopylae.
[4] – In OTL, Nader’s ailments had resulted in his campaign slackening in the final stages, allowing the Lazgi rebels to recover. In TTL, his better health ensures that he is able to finish off the rebels and avoid the subsequent ravages of the region.
* * * * * *
Author's Notes: Things have begun to diverge quite noticeably. The Lazgis have been largely suppressed, though for how long who knows? Reza Qoli, rather than wallowing blindly in Kalat has largely restored himself in his father's esteem. Iran has seen more success in the Gulf, and although there is still resistance in Oman the Iranian candidate has the upper hand. Nader is thus able to face the Ottomans on a much stronger footing than OTL.
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So is Iran going to attempt to be Sunni ITTL or is this "merely" diplomatic efforts on the part of Nader?
I confess I'm not so hot on Shi'ite history in general and when they became overwhelming as an establishment in Iran.
I confess I'm not so hot on Shi'ite history in general and when they became overwhelming as an establishment in Iran.
If I am being honest, it seemed like an Ottoman semi wank in the previous timeline.
What are Iranian goals in a war with Russia? Did Nader want to war with them in OTL?
IOTL the Russians backed down (they had occupied a portion of the former Safavid state) after he trashed the Ottomans.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Ganja
So late to the party!
I'm more interested in what the Persian navy will do under Nader's guidance. Piracy and trade are definite upsides, but I wonder if he knows how such a fleet could also influence the coastal politics of India. The towns of Surat and the pepper hubs of the Malabar coast would be well poised to rake in Iranian coins, and I think it's during this time that Mysore began it's upward swing under Hyder Ali & Tipu Sultan. If their analogues show up ITTL, they might find a good ally in Afsharid Iran, or at least a trade and weapons partner.
Also, a fleet on the Caspian Sea? Should I expect Iranian ships to sail up mother Volga and into the Tsar's courtyard?
I'm more interested in what the Persian navy will do under Nader's guidance. Piracy and trade are definite upsides, but I wonder if he knows how such a fleet could also influence the coastal politics of India. The towns of Surat and the pepper hubs of the Malabar coast would be well poised to rake in Iranian coins, and I think it's during this time that Mysore began it's upward swing under Hyder Ali & Tipu Sultan. If their analogues show up ITTL, they might find a good ally in Afsharid Iran, or at least a trade and weapons partner.
Also, a fleet on the Caspian Sea? Should I expect Iranian ships to sail up mother Volga and into the Tsar's courtyard?
Couldn't Nader have also secured Naval assets from the Marathas, as they had a powerful naval asset at the time?
Honestly, it depends. As in Europe, rivers were favoured, and the Amu Darya (Oxus) river was initially used by Nader Shah as a border in Central Asia, though he did show signs of desiring expansion beyond that (and his successor, Adil Shah did prepare for a campaign beyond it before he lost his throne). Beyond the Amu Darya river is the Syr Darya river and the fertile Fergana Valley, and beyond that is the desert that gradually merges into the more fertile land of the Kazakh Steppe where a tremendous amount of grain is grown in modern times.
Really, it depends on who you ask. Nader's religious policy for most of his reign was rather two faced, presenting to Shi'a Iranians a little changed religious policy, with the banning of practices such as passion plays and ritualistic self-harm. To the Ottomans, he presented his policy as a deep change in religious practices. However, Sunnis who engaged Nader and his ministers were reportedly unimpressed, and Abdullah al-Suwaydi noted that Nader's chief religious official Ali Ackbar was little interested in theological nuance or debate. Despite this, al-Suwaydi personally attested that Iran had indeed left Shi'ism behind and had become Sunnis. I suspect that with a severe enough defeat, the Ottomans would afford the Jafari' Madhab the other trappings of the Sunni Madhabs, including a pillar at Mecca and a Persian Amir-ul-Hajj. Not to delve too much into what will happen in the future, but there will be a serious divergence from OTL Iranian religious developments.
The 18th century represented the victory of the Usuli branch of Twelver Shi'ism over the Ackbari, the former of which had a stronger emphasis on the religious establishment found in Iran today.
Those who supported the al-Busaidi faction in the Omani Civil War are unlikely to be satisfied with Persian control of Oman. However, the Iranians are far too distant to exert significant influence over Omani possessions further afield, particularly in Zanzibar which was supported of Ahmad al-Busaidi. Not to spoil anything, but OTL's dynasty of Oman may well have a future.
Well, the Ottomans do have a great advantage in their size. Some among the Ottomans (most importantly Osman II) recognised a need for reform as early as the 1620s, though significant reform was not to come until the 1790s. Despite this, it was not until the 1770s that the Ottomans began losing land to the extent that the security of their center was threatened. Nader does not have the ability to conquer the Empire as a whole, as the Ottoman Dynasty still enjoys too much in the way of legitimacy for the most part. That being said, a confrontation with Iran is unlikely to go well for them.
It did look for a time that Iran and Russia would war at the end of 1742 (the previous Russian occupation had ended with Ganja), seemingly as a border-war over fortresses. Little was known as to Nader's motivations, though were one to extrapolate from Nader's other conquests, he may well have looked to campaign further within Russia, emulating Timur who sacked the capital of the Golden Horde at Sarai. The situation in the region, unsurprisingly, had changed somewhat since Timur's time however.
It's a long way off to speculate, but an Iran which controlled the Gulf would be in control of a tremendous amount of oil. This could mean a key position for Iran in future, should she retain those lands, when oil becomes an important economic resource. Alternately however, it may act as an enormous target on her back.
In OTL, the Gulf was not policed properly until the arrival of a strong British presence and the creation of the Trucial States. A Gulf that is free of piracy will definitely have effects in India and Mesopotamia, as of course would a strong Iranian state. Iran's interest in the Arabian Sea and beyond is likely to be dictated by trade, especially if Iranian-based Armenians spread as far as they did in OTL (they didn't call it Lebuh Armenian for nothing). Considering the advantage that Indian exports had in Iran, Iranian merchants may look further afield for trade partners, and considering the Iranian state's traditional support for merchants, the navy may have a role to play in this. But this will all come later.So late to the party!
I'm more interested in what the Persian navy will do under Nader's guidance. Piracy and trade are definite upsides, but I wonder if he knows how such a fleet could also influence the coastal politics of India. The towns of Surat and the pepper hubs of the Malabar coast would be well poised to rake in Iranian coins, and I think it's during this time that Mysore began it's upward swing under Hyder Ali & Tipu Sultan. If their analogues show up ITTL, they might find a good ally in Afsharid Iran, or at least a trade and weapons partner.
Also, a fleet on the Caspian Sea? Should I expect Iranian ships to sail up mother Volga and into the Tsar's courtyard?
The acquisition of ships from Surat was actually suggested by the British, who were rather sick of the Iranians requisitioning their ships. They seem to have been happy with the arrangement, as they on a number of latter occasions purchased ships from Surat. It was a wiser choice than manufacturing the ships themselves, as Iran's good forests were around a thousand kilometers away from the Persian Gulf.
The future development of Mesopotamia really depends. The Mamluks of Iraq secured the Vilayets that made up Mesopotamia after Ahmad Pasha had died in 1747, becoming de-facto independent of the Ottoman State. In the 18th century, Mesopotamia was adversely affected mainly due to raids from Arabia. Realistically, a stronger force than the Mamluks is needed to guarantee the security of the region, so the most important step for whoever rules Iraq is the protection of the area from raids. You are correct in pointing out that Iraq does have a number of advantages though.
The Turco-Iranian War of 1743-1747: Part One
Nader's Invasion of the Ottoman Empire
The task of preparing for his second war with the Ottomans was an immense one. War had been likely for quite some time, with key issues such as borders and the religious status of Iran still in contention, though the size of the army that Nader was preparing for the invasion suggested that the coming war would not be simply about adjusting borders. Long had the Ottomans been the most effective rivals of Nader, frustrating his plans on a number of occasions and by way of their religious position, denying him the legitimacy that he craved. In order to truly secure his rule in Iran, and to enable him to have a free hand in building his Empire, the Ottomans had to be decisively defeated, and perhaps even humiliated. There could be no half-measures this time around, no substitute for total victory over the Ottomans.
The army was truly enormous, with as many as 375,000 fighting men at its height [1]. The force was divided into two, with Nader taking the bulk with him into Baghdad, and a smaller force advancing into the Caucasus and Anatolia under the joint command of his sons Reza and Nasrollah. Evidently, the poor relations with his eldest son which had marked their conduct toward each other following Nader’s return from India had been resolved somewhat. Nader was now 54 years old, and was beginning to consider the situation of his dynasty after his passing. Although there had been a time when his nephew Ali Qoli had been favoured, the recent year had seen the re-ascendance of his eldest son Reza, who had moderated his own behaviour and leveraged his influence with his younger brother Nasrollah, who was on good terms with both Reza and Nader. It is likely that the improved family situation had given Nader something of a new lease on life, and he hoped that victories won by his sons would cement their future claim to the throne.
Nader’s force crossed into Ottoman Iraq in the June of 1743, taking the city of Kirkuk after a day, largely thanks to the new siege mortars and guns. There he received the submission of a number of Kurdish chiefs in the area, from which he recruited cavalry to cut off the Ottoman fortresses left in Iraq, namely Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. Similarly in the North, the Iranians advanced on the city of Kars and laid siege to it, though it would be a number of months before the city was in Iranian hands. The Ottomans were shaken by the speed of the invasion, and began to assemble a relief army, while the Pasha of Baghdad, Ahmed Pasha, held fast in the city, knowing better than to confront Nader’s army in the open. For his part, Sultan Mahmud I announced a religious fatwa that permitted Ottoman subjects to kill and enslave Iranians, stating that they were still Shi’a and therefore heretics undeserving of the protections usually afforded to fellow Muslims. However, there were already some rumblings of unrest in Istanbul after the fall of Kirkuk.
Furious at the attitude of the Ottomans, Nader proceeded to lay siege to Mosul, with his impressive train of artillery bombarding the city non-stop for 8 days. However, the mining operations to bring down the walls were less successful, and the determined defenders of the city managed to improvise new defences and fend off an assault which left many Iranian dead. The Iranians attempted to negotiate a surrender but this was refused, and Nader maintained his siege of the city [2]. The determination of the defenders began to wane after nearly two months of siege, worn down by disease, incessant bombardment and the determination of the attackers. With no relief army on the way, the defenders of Mosul finally surrendered the city toward the end of September. Despite the difficulty of the siege, Nader did not permit a general looting of the city, though he had the Ottoman commander’s throat cut and the Turkish inhabitants of the city resettled. An Ottoman envoy who offered the hint of peace negotiations on the condition of an Iranian retreat from Ottoman territory was sent back to Istanbul empty-handed, and Nader marched for Baghdad.
At long last, Ahmed Pasha was confronted with the power of the Iranian army. Not entirely loyal to the Ottomans, he began entering negotiations while the Iranians besieged Baghdad, and with the hope of clemency (and the example of the Ottoman commander at Mosul fresh in his mind) he agreed to surrender the city, in exchange maintaining his place as the governor of Baghdad, answering now to the Iranian Shah rather than the Ottoman Sultan. November brought more bad news for the Ottoman Sultan, as a relief army sent to push back Nader’s sons from Kars faltered, and the city fell to the Iranian princes. On two major fronts, the Ottomans had suffered setbacks, but they had not lost yet. Although an uprising near Istanbul had to be crushed, the majority of notables and pashas in the outlying areas of the Empire remained loyal, and his European enemies remained embroiled in the War of the Austrian Succession. Mahmud, backed by the Ulema, resisted any attempts toward a peace, and remained hostile to the Iranians.
With Iraq largely pacified, Nader moved north with the bulk of his army in the spring of 1744 to join his sons, who were laying siege to the Ottoman fortress of Erzurum. The arrival of Nader, as well as the large number of siege guns he had with him hastened the fall of the fortress which fell on the 29th of May. Only the smaller fortress of Erzincan lay between Nader and the Anatolian heartland of the Empire. Envoys were sent once again to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud, who promised to consider the normalisation of the Ja'fari sect in return for a return to pre-war borders. By now, this was not enough for Nader, who wanted to keep his conquests. However, with a large army gathering near Constantinople, Mahmud was not content to give in to any more of Nader’s demands for the moment, and a continuation of the conflict now seemed inevitable.
[1] – The number is somewhat contentious, and represents the high estimate. The corresponding low estimate is around 200,000 men, still not an insignificant force by any stretch of the imagination.
[2] – A major point of divergence. In OTL, Nader agreed to a truce and to lift the siege, perhaps motivated by his increasing sickness. Here, he is far healthier and in keeping with previous actions such as the Siege of Kandahar, has the patience to endure.
* * * * * *
Erzurum, June 1744
Erzurum, June 1744
Nader had a colourful way of referring to his subordinates who had displeased him. “Senile Pimp” and “Cheap Male Prostitute” were just a few of his more choice ways of addressing people, though as it often seems in the world of diplomacy, it is the pleasant-sounding phrases that are saturated with anger and hatred. Thus when Nader addressed the Ottoman Sultan as “Dearest Brother” in a letter to him, the contempt was palpable.
“I won’t let this mentally retarded piece of oppose me at every turn”
Nasrollah shook his head. “I am not entirely sure he is the problem. These Ottoman Sultans, they are a more evolved type of the Safavids, luxury loving, obsessed with their harems and totally incapable of ruling. Blame his vizier”
Nader ignored him and told the scribe writing his letter “Be sure not to mention the fact I called him a piece of shit in the letter to him, eh?”
Reza corrected him. “Retarded piece of shit, father”
Tension seemed to fill the room as Nader glanced over to his eldest son. It was broken instantaneously when he burst out with laughter.
Nasrollah interjected “However true it may be of course, he is still the Sultan, and we need him”
Nader nodded. “That much is true. If we are ever to think of peace, we must have his word that our western flank is safe. If we are ever to stand against the Russians in the future, either of us, we should not quarrel. We are both Muslim, both Turks. This fighting is pointless”
Reza spoke out. “But sometimes, if there is a donkey who will not go across the bridge, it is better simply to get a new donkey.
“What do you mean?”
“Mahmud will not be the Sultan of the Ottomans for all time. His time will come one day, and were he to lose his throne earlier, perhaps our situation would be eased somewhat”
Nader had not seriously entertained this thought before. To unseat a fellow ruler, what kind of a precedent would it set? Would it matter? The Ottomans were forever killing their own in the pursuit of the throne, of even a temporary advantage. Surely the removal of the Sultan and his replacement with someone more pliant would not be such a bad thing if done in the interest of peace.
* * * * * *
A Revolution in Religious Affairs? The Establishment of the Ja'fari Madhab
A Revolution in Religious Affairs? The Establishment of the Ja'fari Madhab
Ever since the conversion of Iran to Shi’a Islam by the first Safavid Shah Ismail, religion both within Iran and in the context of Iran’s foreign relations had been driver of conflict. The initial waves of conquest were facilitated by the fanaticism of Shi’a Sufi orders, from whom the Qezelbash were formed. However, the Shi’ism of Iran’s rulers led to both problems with non-Shi’a peoples within Iran such as the Afghans, as well as with foreign rulers such as the Ottoman Empire. The Turkmen and Uzbek nomads of Central Asia often used Iran’s Shi’ism as justification for their slave raiding into the area, which contributed somewhat to the depopulation of Khorasan, especially after the death of Abbas the Great. Despite the problems that Iran’s Shi’a allegiance posed, it nevertheless remained a very useful tool for maintaining the legitimacy of the Safavid Dynasty, as well as ensuring good relations with the increasingly powerful Ulema.
However, with the fall of the Safavids, and the subsequent rise of Nader Shah in Iran, one of the key reasons for the maintenance of Safavid religious policies was now redundant. For many of the Shi’a faithful in Iran, Nader was a usurper without the legitimacy that had been accorded to the Safavids. Although he had been born a Shi’a Muslim, a number of sources suggest that he was not a true believer, and this made him more amenable to a change in religious policy. The first hints toward the shift that would take place came at the ceremony that would result in his formal rise to power at the Moghan Plain. He began to articulate the idea of a “Ja'fari Madhab” which would reform Twelver Shi’ism and place it in the context of Sunni Islam. However, with the exception of banning practices that had been offensive or completely alien to Sunnis, such as the ritual cursing of the Rashidun or “Rightly Guided” Caliphs there was little indication as to what Nader’s religious policy actually was. Ottoman Clerics skeptically looked upon it as nothing more than an attempt to sneak in heresy via the back door, and the Ottoman Ulema would be one of the forces most resistant to the recognition of the Ja'fari Madhab.
The manner in which the Ja'fari Madhab was first implemented was somewhat inconsistent. At home, it was presented as the “adjustment” of Shi’a practices and principles, which kept the core values and beliefs alive. However, to the Ottomans it was presented as a wholesale replacement of Shi’ism with a belief system far closer to Sunnism. While the Ottomans were initially pleased to hear of Iran’s abandonment of Shi’ism, their own restless domestic situation and the strong opposition of the Ulema precluded the possibility of recognizing another Madhab of Sunni Islam in addition to the existing four. When this was relayed to Nader, it became clear that the “Religious Question” would take more than simply negotiation to resolve.
Was the Ottoman rejection of the Ja'fari Madhab the primary reason for the Ottoman-Persian War of 1743 to 1747? Certainly, to the restless Nader, an Ottoman Empire that explicitly rejected his legitimacy on religious grounds was an intolerable threat that would have to be dealt with sooner or later. Although disputed by VOC records, Nader’s chroniclers state that his goal in warring with the Ottomans was to “restore harmony between nations and people, and to secure the people of Persia their place among the Sunni Islamic people of the world”. Ultimately it is merely speculation as to whether recognition of the Jafari’ Madhab was Nader’s primary goal in his war with the Ottomans, though it seems likely that it was just as large a concern as territorial ambitions. Unlike with his successors however, the Jafari’ Madhab was less a theological innovation, and one designed more to secure Nader’s legitimacy both with neighbouring Islamic states as well as with his own population.
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Author's Notes - Nader's invasion of the Ottoman is underway, and going somewhat better than OTL. Iran's forces are better disciplined than those of the Ottomans, more mobile and they are supremely well suited to the rough terrain of Anatolia. An Iranian victory seems almost certain, but what kind of victory would it be? And what will the effects be?
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Hopefully one that does better for Iran than the one Nader got in Down the Parallel Road and the Ottoman resurgence that saw.
In the name of Ali, Onwards to Constantinople!
In the name of Ali, Onwards to Constantinople!
Does Nader have any territorial ambitions beyond securing Mesopotamia and the Armenian highland?
I think nader will secure caucacus, iraq, and eastern anatolia for himself. Maybe he can gain a bit more but wisdom say he will be overextended. At very least what iran need after nader is someone who can manage all that new territories. It is easy to be a conqueror rather than administrator.
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